PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROMEO PADICA Y LORICA, LESLIE GANS Y MELENDRES, FLORENTINO FABRIGAS, ROMEO PRADEZ, LEONARDO MARAJAS, LEOPOLDO MARAJAS AND LEON…

Accused-appellant Leon Marajas, Jr. y Ramos appeals from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, Branch CXVI, dated January 8, 1990, finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for ransom with murder upon an
amended information dated November 16, 1984 and reading as follows:

“That on or about the 8th day of February, 1978, in the
Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
together with John Doe @ Boy Taga, Peter Doe @ Eddie Boy Marajas, Richard Doe @
Tito and Edward Doe @ Elmer whose true names, identities and whereabouts are
still unknown and mutually helping and aiding one another, with the use of
three (3) firearms with the different caliber (sic) by means of craft, violence
against and intimidation of person, did then and there kidnap Francis Banaga,
detain and deprive him of his liberty for a period of three (3) days and
demanded (sic) five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) for his release and
while thus illegally detaining the latter, said accused, pursuant to said
conspiracy did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent
to kill and with treachery shoot Francis Banaga, thereby inflicting on him
gunshot wounds on the head and other parts of his body which caused his
instantaneous death as a consequences.”^[1]

The records show that Leon Marajas, Jr., Romeo Padica, Leslie
Gans, Florentino Fabrigas, Romeo Pradez, Leonardo Marajas and Leopoldo Marajas
were originally charged in the latter part of 1978 with kidnapping for ransom
with murder and illegal possession of firearms before Military Commission No.
27 in Criminal Case No. 27-163 thereof. However, on January 11, 1979, counsel for accused Leon Marajas, Jr. prayed for the
transfer of the case to the civil courts.^[2]

On August 17, 1981, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal
filed an information for kidnapping for ransom with murder, docketed as
Criminal Case No. Pq-81-1596-P, before Branch III of the then Court of First
Instance of Pasay City against
the aforementioned accused, but with the exception of herein appellant whose
name was inadvertently not included therein.^[3] A
separate charge for illegal possession
of firearms was lodged before Branch 146 of the Makati Regional Trial
Court but the case was later placed in the archives some time in 1985.^[4]

Accused Romeo Padica and herein appellant were both arraigned on
January 15, 1982 and, with the assistance of their respective counsel, both
pleaded not guilty.^[5]
It appears, however, that appellant entered his plea during the arraignment under the name of “Leonardo
Marajas.”^[6]
Trial thereafter ensued but, subsequently, the case was reraffled to Branch
CXVI, Pasay City, of the Regional Trial Court where it remained until the
conclusion of the trial in 1990.

Earlier thereto, however, upon discovery of the omission of
herein appellant’s name in the original information, the prosecution filed a
motion on November 16, 1984 for the admission of an amended information
including appellant’s name as one of the accused.^[7] On
May 30, 1985, the trial court issued an order admitting the amended
information.^[8] Thereafter, or on July 17, 1985,
appellant, duly assisted by counsel, entered a plea of guilty upon being
arraigned on the amended information.^[9] On
the other hand, in an order dated August 27, 1985,^[10]
accused Padica was discharged from the information to be utilized as a state
witness.

The People’s brief,
drawing principally from the factual findings of the court a quo
based on the evidence adduced in this case, with supplemental data and documentation of the
testimonial evidence as borne out by the transcripts, which we find to be
correct, presented the prosecution’s case in this wise:

“On or about 9:00 o’clock in the morning of February 8, 1978,
appellant and his brother,
Leopoldo Marajas, using a car driven by Leopoldo, visited Romeo Padica in his
house in Muntiniupa, Metro Manila. Leopoldo requested Padica, his compadre, to drive for Eddie Boy Marajas, a
brother of Leopoldo and appellant, and his classmates, giving Padica P100.00
for the purpose. Upon receiving the
amount, Padica, pursuant to the instructions of Leopoldo, drove the car, with
Leopoldo and appellant on board, and proceeded to Samson Tech in Pasay City,
arriving there at about 10:00
A.M. Leopoldo left the vehicle and,
upon coming back after a while, he told Padica
that they were going to Sukat, Parañaque. In Sukat, the three stopped at a restaurant when (sic) they
ordered something to eat (TSN, November 17, 1988, pp. 6-10).

“Thereafter, with Padica still driving the car, they proceeded
to the Superville Subdivision, also in Sukat, where they arrived at about 11:30
A.M. of the same date. Eddie Boy
Marajas and Francis Banaga, both fourteen (14) years of age, more or less, were
in said subdivision. Leopoldo alighted
from the car and talked to them. Subsequently, Leopoldo together with Francis and Eddie Boy, boarded the car. All of them proceeded to Calamba, Laguna,
with Padica still driving the vehicle. Seated beside Padica was Leopoldo Marajas,
while appellant and Eddie Boy occupied the back seat, with Francis Banaga
between them (Ibid, pp. 10-13).

“Upon reaching Calamba at about 12:00 noon of the same date,
Leopoldo Marajas told Padica to drive the car into the sugarcane plantation at
the side of the road. Once inside the
plantation, Padica stopped the car when told to do so by Leopoldo, who then
alighted from the vehicle and told Francis Banaga to alight. However, Francis refused to get down from
the car. Notwithstanding his
resistance, he was forced out of the car by Leopoldo Marajas, Eddie Boy and
appellant, who pulled him out of
the vehicle. Thereafter, the three
brought Francis Banaga to a place inside the sugarcane plantation, more or less
ten (10) meters away from the car, while Padica remained in the vehicle. Leopoldo Marajas then delivered several stabbing
blows at Banaga after which appellant shot Banaga with a handgun. Banaga fell on the ground. Leopoldo, Eddie Boy and appellant returned
to the car. Leopoldo took the wheel
from Padica and drove the car to Muntinlupa, where Padica alighted and was left
behind with Leopoldo warning Padica, ‘Pare, steady ka lang, isang bala ka
lang.’ (Ibid., pp. 10-19).

“On or about 5:00 P.M. of the same day, while in his house at
Gatchalian Subdivision in Parañaque, Tomas Banaga, father of Francis, became
alarmed when his son failed to come home. A few minutes after 6:00 P.M. of (the) same date, someone called up by
phone, telling Tomas not to look for his son as he was in good condition, and
demanding P500,000.00 for his (Francis’) release. Tomas reported the incident to the Philippine Constabulary authorities
in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Sgt.
Rodolfo Bucao, Sgt. Villanueva and Sgt. Cierlito were dispatched to the Banaga
residence (TSN, January 15, 1982, pp. 4-6).

“On February 9, 1978, Tomas received a second phone call in
the course of which the caller reduced the amount demanded to P200,000.00. On February 10, 1978, there was another
phone call with (the) caller lowering the amount to P23,000.00 and giving
instructions that the money be wrapped in a newspaper, placed in a paper bag,
and delivered by a girl wearing a T-shirt to Luneta, in front of the National
Library, under a tree with red flowers, at 8:30 P.M. of February 10, 1978
(Ibid., pp. 6-10).

“Norma Camello, sister-in-law of Tomas Banaga, volunteered to
deliver the money as the maid of (the) Banaga family who was supposed to do it
was scared. Between 7:00 and 7:30 P.M.
of February 10, 1978, Camello was brought by Sgt. Bucao and CIC Ocampo in front
of Bayview Hotel at Roxas Blvd., Manila. At about 8:00 P.M. of the same date, she went to the National Library at
Luneta and positioned herself under a tree with red flowers, pursuant to the
instructions of the caller. A few
minutes later, a taxicab arrived. Appellant alighted from the vehicle, approached Camello and got the
money from her which was in a paper bag, saying: ‘Hihintayin na lang ninyo ang
bata mamaya sa bahay’ (TSN, Sept. 19, 1985, pp. 6-12). When appellant returned to the waiting
taxicab and was about to board it, Sgt. Simplicio Dulay, one of those sent to
Luneta to entrap the person who would receive the ransom money, apprehended and
arrested appellant (TSN, March 11, 1986, pp. 2-5).

“(At) or about 2:00 P.M. of February 11, 1978, pursuant to the
information given by appellant during the investigation, a Philippine
Constabulary team led by Lt. Napoleon Cachuela, accompanied by appellant, went
to Calamba, Laguna to search for the body of Francis Banaga. Appellant led the team to the place where
the cadaver was dumped, which was inside a sugarcane plantation about 75 meters
away from the road. The team recovered the body of Francis
Banaga and brought it to the Municipal Health Officer of Calamba for autopsy
(TSN, October 2, 1986, pp. 10-17).

“According to the necropsy report of Dr. Eusebio Panganiban of
the Calamba Municipal Health Office, Francis Banaga sustained two (2) entry
gunshot wounds, one on the head and the other on the chest, with two (2) exit
gunshot wounds and several lacerated
wounds. The death of Francis was caused
by ‘intra-thoracic brain hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds.’ (TSN, July 25, 1986, pp. 17- 69).

“After three (3) years in hiding out of fear for his life,
Romeo Padica finally revealed to Lt. Cruz (sic) of Regional Security Unit Intelligence Division, Lucena
City that he (Padica) witnessed the killing of Francis Banaga. Padica had met Lt. Cruz (sic) near the
Lucena City Market and after making the disclosure, surrendered to the
authorities (TSN, December 12, 1988, p.
6).”^[11]

Appellant predictably presented a different narration of the
events that led to his arrest. He
insists that he was the victim of an elaborate frame-up by the Military
authorities assigned to investigate the case. Appellant claims that on February 8, 1978, the day that the victim
disappeared, he was in Batangas province, where he was a resident. In the early morning of February 10, 1978,
he decided to go to Manila, with Sto. Tomas, Batangas as his point of
departure, in order to thresh out some financial matters in connection with his
business of buy and sell.^[12]

He arrived in Manila at around 9:00 A.M. and proceeded to the
office of Mrs. Aquilina Marquez-Marajas, his sister-­in-law, at Mabini Street
in Malate to talk to his brother, Leonardo. Not finding Leonardo there, he then went to the house of his sister, Nelly
Marajas, a neighbor of the Banaga family, at Gatchalian Subdivision in
Parañaque. He was about to board a
tricycle at the main gate of the subdivision at around 930 A.M. when he was
suddenly accosted by two Metrocom officers in civilian clothes who forcibly
took him to a car. Appellant was later
brought at about 12:00 noon to the Siesta Court Hotel, also in Malate, where he
was repeatedly beaten and subjected to torture by his abductors who tried in
vain to extract information about the disappearance of Francis Banaga.^[13]

In the evening of the same day, he was taken out of the hotel and
was taken by the men to an unspecified safehouse where, once again, his ordeal
at their hands was resumed. Unable to
bear the maltreatment any further, appellant then tried to fool them by
admitting that the missing Francis Banaga could be found in Paete, Laguna. He then led a group of his captors to the
said place but they found no trace of the missing boy. Incensed at the deception, the men took him
back to the safehouse.^[14]

Later, appellant was again taken out of the safehouse and,
together with another captive whom he identified only as
“Florentino,” he was brought to an isolated sugarcane
plantation. There Florentino led the
military team to the cadaver of Francis Banaga.^[15]
Appellant and Florentino were later brought back to the safehouse. The former claims that he was kept there for
about two months, during which time he helped in the maintenance and care of
the safehouse and its surroundings. He
also met at the safehouse Leslie Gans, one of the accused, but he had no
occasion to discuss their predicament with him. After appellant’s confinement, he was turned over to the prison
authorities of Bicutan Rehabilitation Center where he remained until the start
of the trial.^[16]

After more than eight years of trial, which for one reason or
another was punctuated by numerous and needless postponements, the trial court
rendered its assailed decision pronouncing the guilt of appellant for the crime
of kidnapping for ransom with murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay Tomas Banaga, father of Francis
Banaga, the sum of P30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the child, without
pronouncement as to costs.^[17]

Appellant is now before us insisting on the reversal of the
judgment of conviction by theorizing that the court below erred: (a) in ruling
that the guilt of appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt; (b) in giving full credence to the testimony of
state witness Romeo Padica; (c) in laying emphasis on the weakness of the
defense interposed by appellant; and (d) in disregarding the inconsistencies
raised by the defense as minor and insubstantial.^[18]

After a careful and exhaustive review of the records, the
testimonial and documentary evidence, and the arguments of the prosecution and
the defense, we are satisfactorily persuaded that the prosecution has duly
discharged its onus probandi insofar as the culpability of appellant is concerned, but we do not
adopt as correct the nature or categorization of the offense for which he must
do penance.

1.  At the outset, from the
evidence on record, we are not convinced that the crime of kidnapping for ransom was committed as charged in
both the original and amended informations. Rather the crime committed was murder, attended by the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and/or abuse of superior strength, and not the
complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder as found by the trial court
without objection by either the prosecution or defense. The essential element in the crime of
kidnapping that the victim must have been restrained or deprived of his
liberty,^[19]
or that he was transported away against his will with the primary or original
intent to effect that restraint, is absent in this case. The malefactors evidently had only murder in
their hearts when they invited the trusting Francis Banaga to go with them to
Laguna, and not to confine or detain him for any length of time or for any
other purpose.

We have consistently held that where the taking of the victim was
incidental to the basic purpose to kill, the crime is only murder,^[20]
and this is true even if, before the killing but for purposes thereof, the
victim was taken from one place to another.^[21] Thus,
where the evident purpose of taking the victims was to kill them, and from the
acts of the accused it cannot be inferred that the latter’s purpose was
actually to detain or deprive the victims of their liberty, the subsequent
killing of the victims constitute the crime of murder,^[22]
hence the crime of kidnapping does not exist and cannot be considered as a
component felony to produce a complex crime of kidnapping with murder. In fact, as we held in the aforecited case
of Masilang, et al., although the accused had planned to kidnap
the victim for ransom but they first killed him and it was only later that they
demanded and obtained the money, such demand for ransom did not convert the crime into kidnapping since no
detention or deprivation of liberty was involved, hence the crime committed was
only murder.^[23]

That from the beginning of their criminal venture appellant and
his brothers intended to kill the victim can readily be deduced from the manner
by which they swiftly and cold-bloodedly snuffed out his life once they reached
the isolated sugarcane plantation in Calamba, Laguna. Furthermore, there was no evidence whatsoever to show or from
which it can be inferred that from
the outset the killers of the victim intended to exchange his freedom for
ransom money. On the contrary, the
demand for ransom appears to have arisen and was consequently made as an
afterthought, as it was relayed to the victim’s family very much later that
afternoon after a sufficient interval for consultation and deliberation among
the felons who had killed the
victim around five hours earlier.

It will be observed
that under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the circumstance that the
kidnapping is perpetrated for the purpose of ransom raises the imposable
penalty to death.^[24] It
is essential, however, that the element of deprivation or restraint of liberty
of the victim be present. The fact
alone that ransom money is demanded would not per se qualify the act of preventing
the liberty of movement of the victim into the crime of kidnapping, unless the
victim is actually restrained or deprived of his liberty for some appreciable
period of time or that such restraint was the basic intent of the accused. Absent such determinant intent and duration
of restraint, the mere curtailment of freedom of movement would at most
constitute coercion.

In addition, Francis Banaga, then already fourteen years of age
and a fourth year high school student, was neither forced nor coerced
unlawfully into going along with his killers. He voluntarily boarded the car and went with the Marajas brothers to
Laguna. The victim had every reason to
trust them as they were his neighbors in Gatchalian Subdivision. In fact, one of the brothers, accused
Leonardo Marajas alias “Eddie Boy,” was his schoolmate and a playmate.^[25]

There was treachery since, under the aforestated circumstances,
the victim was lured by his killers into going with them to Laguna without the
slightest inkling of their nefarious design, coupled with the sudden and
unexpected assault by the malefactors on the hapless victim in the isolated
sugarcane plantation in Calamba, which thereby divested him of an opportunity
either to effectively resist or to escape.^[26]
Abuse of superior strength was likewise present, for the accused deliberately
resorted to their collective strength for the purpose of overpowering whatever
feeble defense the poor Francis Banaga could offer.^[27]
They thus insured the commission of the crime with practically no risk at all
to themselves.

Under the factual features present in the commission of the
crime, however, we are inclined to grant that the circumstance of superior
strength should not be appreciated distinctly but should be considered as being
absorbed in and by treachery,^[28] and
the same is true with regard to the allegation of craft. Hence, abuse of superior strength may not be
taken into account separately in this case, either as a qualifying or as an aggravating circumstance. On the other hand, although the trial court
and both parties herein have again passed sub silentio thereon,
it is evident that the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place was
present since appellant and his co-accused obviously and deliberately chose the
desolation and isolation of the sugarcane plantation to perpetrate the crime
far from the gaze of potential eyewitnesses.^[29] This circumstance is underscored by
the fact that they committed the crime at about 12:00 noon, a time of day when
any passersby or assistance could hardly be expected in the vicinity of the locus
criminis.^[30]
This aggravating circumstance of despoblado should, therefore, be considered against appellant even if it was not
alleged in the informations since it was duly proved.^[31]

Appellant’s defense that he was in another place at the time of Francis
Banaga’s disappearance and killing must necessarily fail. Indeed, trite as our innumerable
reiterations have already made this statement of rejection, we must perforce again reprobate
appellant’s alibi as an inherently weak defense decidedly easy of
concoction. Apart from that, it is
considered as clearly negative in nature. Hence, when arrayed against the positive declarations of the witnesses
for the prosecution, the same would all the more be given little consideration.^[32]

For it to prosper, it must be shown that not only was the accused
at some other place at the time of the commission of the
offense, but that it was also physically impossible
for him to have been there when it happened.^[33]
Indeed, as correctly pointed out by the trial court in its decision, appellant
was not even sure as to his whereabouts on February 8, 1978. He simply offered as an explanation therefor
that he was “more or less” in Batangas, which allegation was
completely uncorroborated.^[34]

In light of the
foregoing, appellant’s further denial that he was entrapped on the night of
February 10, 1978 by the authorities after receiving ransom money from Norma
Camello must likewise be rejected. Both
Norma Camello and Sgt. Simplicio Dulay, one of the police operatives,
positively and without hesitation identified appellant as the person who was
collared at Luneta Park.^[35]
Moreover, the police report clearly and definitely bears out the fact that
appellant was arrested by the investigating police officers on that night
pursuant to the dragnet plan that was prepared for the purpose,^[36]
the veracity of which record further enjoys the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duties which appellant failed to rebut.

2.  Appellant asserts that
the trial court should not have given credence to the testimony of Romeo Padica as it is incredible
and inconsistent with the other evidence on record. He affects surprise as to why the Marajas brothers would go to
the extent of hiring Padica to drive for them when, in fact, Padica himself knew
that Leopoldo Marajas was a skilled driver. Moreover, he expresses disbelief that Romeo Padica never conversed with
the group while they were on the road and that, although the latter claims to
be a close friend of Leopoldo, he never even knew what was Leopoldo’s
profession and what was the surname of their common “compadre.” He
likewise characterizes as incredible the circumstance that he and his cohorts
supposedly carried out the crime in broad daylight and that thereafter they
simply dismissed Padica with a casual threat of “Pare, steady ka lang isang bala ka lang.”

There is no merit in all the foregoing submissions and
pretensions of appellant. It is true
that the testimony of a particeps criminis is to
be invariably viewed with much caution, coming as it does from a polluted,
source.^[37]
However, in the case at bar and after a careful evaluation, we find no
plausible reason to depart from the favorable appreciation by the trial court
of Padica’s testimony which the said court characterized as reasonable and
probable, given in a clear, straightforward and convincing manner thereby
leaving no doubt in the mind of said court that he was telling the truth.^[38]

Jurisprudentially embedded is the rule that the stamp of approval
given by the trial court on the testimony of a particular witness as a
consequence of its factual findings is normally accorded finality by appellate
courts, the court below having had the opportunity to observe closely the
manner by which such witness testified.^[39] Furthermore, not a single shred of
evidence was introduced by the defense to show any ill motive on the part of
Padica to impute such a serious
crime on appellant and his
brothers, thus entitling to considerable credit his testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding Francis Banaga’s
death. These conclusions we confirm,
not by mere reliance on dicta, but from our own review and calibration of the
evidence.

There is certainly nothing strange in the matter of the Marajas
brothers requesting Padica to drive for them. As testified to by the latter, he was then a close friend of one of the
brothers, Leopoldo, who was the one who requested him to drive, and the latter
presumably had full confidence in him as he was at the time a professional
driver of taxicabs. Romeo Padica,
likewise, can not be discredited just because of his silence on the road and
for not knowing Leopoldo’s profession and the surname of a common
“compadre.” It is of
common knowledge that there are persons who are taciturn and not as inquisitive
as others, or who disdain prying into the affairs even of their close friends.

Be that as it may, this witness did testify to and narrate in his sworn statement
some personal matters regarding the Marajas siblings, such as the fact that
Leopoldo was staying at a house
adjacent to that of the Banagas in Tionguiao Street at Gatchalian Subdivision together with his wife,
children and Eddie Boy Marajas; that said house was owned by a sister of the
brothers; and that Francis Banaga, whose picture he positively identified in
court, was a playmate and schoolmate of Eddie Boy Marajas, thus lending
credence to his claim of close and fraternal ties with Leopoldo Marajas.^[40]

The fact that appellant and his co-accused carried out the murder
of Francis Banaga in broad daylight is hardly surprising. As pointedly noted by the Solicitor General,
“it is not difficult to
believe that appellant and his co-accused committed the crime in broad daylight
because there were no other persons at the scene of the incident,” as the same
was inside a desolate sugarcane plantation in the outskirts of Calamba, Laguna
and the crime was perpetrated at noon of that day, as we have earlier
explained.

Having demonstrated to Padica the brutal and merciless manner in
which they disposed of Francis Banaga, appellant and his brothers were
undoubtedly secure in the thought that Padica would have been sufficiently
terrorized thereby and would thereafter keep his silence, and so, just for good measure, they uttered the
threat on the latter’s life simply as a reminder of what they had in store for him should he waver and ignore that
injunctive warning.

It is further contended by appellant that the trial court should
not have granted the motion to discharge Romeo Padica from the information, as
one of the conditions for its grant has not been met, namely, that the
prosecution has not shown that Padica did not appear to be the most
guilty. Incidentally, appellant slurs
over the fact that this order of the trial court was sustained by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16302 which denied appellant’s petition for certiorari
and prohibition assailing said order, the judgment therein having become final
and executory on January 20, 1989.^[41]

Appellant has also clearly lost sight of the rule that the discharge of an accused to be a state
witness, lies within the sound discretion of the court before whom it is sought
and in the exercise of that discretion, it is not required that the court be
absolutely certain that all the requirements for the proper discharge of a
co-accused be present.^[42] In
the case under consideration, the prosecution presented enough evidence to
support its motion for the discharge of Padica. The trial court’s reliance thereon and its consequent finding on
the basis thereof that Padica did not appear to be the most guilty must be
respected as it was in better position to evaluate such evidence.

Appellant likewise points to portions in the testimony of Padica
which are allegedly not substantiated by the evidence on record. Thus, appellant argues that while Padica claimed that the victim was
stabbed by Leopoldo Marajas and then
shot at four times by appellant, yet the necropsy report of the medico-legal
officer, Dr. Eusebio P. Panganiban, showed no stab wounds but only lacerated
wounds and two gunshot wounds. Further,
Padica’s testimony that the victim was dragged inside the plantation and
instantly stabbed and shot to death is supposedly belied by the findings in the
necropsy report that Francis Banaga’s body had several hematomas and
contusions.^[43]

We nonetheless agree with and give due credit to the following
explanation of the court below regarding these seeming conflicting aspects:

“The defense counsel also capitalized on the supposed
inconsistency between the allegation of Padica that Leon Marajas, Jr. shot
Banaga four (4) times and the autopsy report stating that the victim sustained
two (2) entry gunshot wounds. Padica
testified that Leon Marajas, Jr. shot Francis Banaga four (4) times without
stating that the victim was hit also four (4)
times. The fact that he suffered
two (2) entry gunshot wounds clearly indicates that Francis was shot,
supporting the version of Padica that the child was fired upon by Leon Marajas,
Jr.

“Also pointed out as a basis for not believing the testimony
of Padica is the supposed conflict between his assertion that Leopoldo Marajas
stabbed Banaga with a knife and the finding of Dr. Panganiban that the victim,
aside from the gunshot wounds, sustained only lacerated wounds and
contusions. The defense implied that
Banaga was not stabbed by Leopoldo Marajas as there is no finding that he
sustained stab wounds. A logical
analysis of this point shows that there is no inconsistency. Padica stated that he saw the accused
Leopoldo Marajas stab the victim but he did not say that Banaga was hit by the
stabbing blows delivered by the said accused. It could also be that one of the blows hit the boy but without piercing
his body, causing only lacerations thereon.”^[44]

As for the several hematomas and contusions that were discovered
on the body of Francis Banaga, it is entirely possible that the same were
inflicted when the victim put up a furious struggle for his life against his
assailants. According to Padica, the Marajas brothers forcefully pulled out
Banaga from the car when they stopped by the roadside. They continued to inflict physical harm on
the boy while prodding him to proceed inside the sugarcane plantation until
they reached a clearing where, after Leopoldo Marajas delivered stabbing blows
on the victim which may not have inflicted knife wounds but contusions from the
assailant’s clenched fists, Leon Marajas, Jr. then fired away with the fatal
shots. All the while and just before he
was shot to death, Padica narrated that the victim desperately exerted all
efforts to ward off the assault on his person.^[45]

Appellant also raises as an issue the questionable manner in
which Padica surrendered, after nearly three years of hiding, to Lt. Cesar
Perez of the Lucena PC Regional Security Unit whom he met only for the first
time at the Lucena City marketplace.

But, as Padica candidly revealed, and we find his explanation
satisfactory and credible, he had desired all along to surrender as he had
grown tired of constantly fearing for his life and of his difficult plight as a
fugitive froth justice. He was
obviously always on the lookout for persons in authority whom he could trust
during his stay of two to three months in Lucena City where he had in the
meantime found work as a porter in the public market. In the course of his stay there, he had heard about the
“kind-hearted” Lt. Perez, a ranking officer of the local
constabulary.^[46]
His subsequent meeting and surrender to Lt. Perez at the marketplace was no
strange coincidence as it is obviously a place where all kinds of people go to and cross paths.

That it may have taken Padica over two years to finally give
himself up to the authorities is understandable. He had witnessed a heinous
crime perpetrated on a defenseless fourteen-year old boy by his killers, and
the latter had threatened him with bodily harm should he reveal what they had
done. In view thereof, it was but
natural that Padica would hide, away from the possible clutches of the Marajas
brothers, and keep unto himself the dark secret lest he suffer the same grim
fate that befell Francis Banaga.

3. Appellant finally
contends that the failure of the prosecution to charge him as an accused in the
original information is a fatal defect. Again, we find no merit in this fatuous assertion.

The rule is that the complaint or information should sufficiently
allege the name of the accused, failing which the complaint or information
would be rendered invalid. The test of
sufficiency is laid down in Section 7, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which states:

“Sec. 7. Name of
the accused. – A complaint or
information must state the name and surname of the accused or any appellation
or nickname by which he has been or is known, or if his name cannot be
discovered he must be described under a fictitious name with a statement that
his true name is unknown.

If in the course of the proceeding the true name of the accused is
disclosed by him, or appears in some other manner to the court, the true name
of the accused shall be inserted in the complaint or information and
record.”

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that appellant was
arraigned under the original information and
that he entered thereto a plea of not guilty under the name of
“Leonardo Marajas.” At that juncture, appellant should have raised
the error as to his identity by filing a motion
to quash on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over his person, in line with the doctrine explained in People vs. Narvaes^[47]
laid down as early as 1934.

But, as aforestated, appellant did not do so but instead
voluntarily appeared at the arraignment and pleaded not guilty thereat, albeit
under a different name. Consequently,
the trial court acquired jurisdiction over his person and it could have
rendered a valid judgment of conviction based on the original information even
without need of an amendatory information to correct appellant’s name. What we stated in Narvaes is worth
repeating:

“x x x (w)hen the appellant was arraigned under the name of
Pedro Narvaes, which is the name appearing in the information, he merely
entered his plea of ‘not guilty’ under the said name. It was on that occasion that he should have for the first time
raised the question of his identity, by filing a demurrer based on the court’s
lack of jurisdiction over his person, inasmuch as he was then considered as
Pedro Narvaes, not Primo Narvaes. Not
having filed the said demurrer, it must
necessarily be understood that he renounced it and therefore he is now
estopped from raising, or insisting to raise, the same question, not only in
this appeal but even at the trial. x x
x.”

The subsequent amendment to insert in the information Leon
Marajas, Jr.‘s real name involved merely a matter of form as it did not, in any
way, deprive appellant of a fair opportunity to present his defense.^[48]
Moreover, the amendment neither affected nor altered the nature of the offense
charged since the basic theory of the prosecution was not changed nor did it
introduce new and material facts.^[49] Such
an amendment is explicitly allowed under the second paragraph of Section 7, in
relation to Section 14, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of which provides that
“(t)he information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form,
without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter
and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion
of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
accused.” At any rate, whatever irregularity may have attended the
inclusion of appellant’s name as an accused in the amended information has been
waived by his subsequent appearance and entry of plea at his arraignment under
said amendatory information.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is
hereby SET ASIDE and another one is rendered CONVICTING accused-appellant Leon
Marajas, Jr. y Ramos of the crime of murder and IMPOSING upon him the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the late
Francis Banaga the sum of P50,000.00 as
death indemnity, in line with current jurisprudential policy, and
likewise to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Nocon, and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

* Accused Romeo Padica y Lorica
(who was later discharged to be a state witness) and Romeo Pradez are one and
the same person (Original Record, 546). The other accused have remained at large, hence the lone appellant in this case is Leon Marajas, Jr. y
Ramos.

^[1]
Original Record, 148-149.

^[2]
Ibid., 332.

^[3]
Ibid., 1-2.

^[4]
TSN, July 21, 1988, 13-14.

^[5]
Original Record, 15-16.

^[6]
Ibid., 16.

^[7]
Ibid., 146.

^[8]
Ibid., 181.

^[9]
Ibid., 204.

^[10]
Ibid., 493.

^[11]
Brief for the Appellee, 4-10; Rollo, 116.

^[12]
TSN, January 25, 1989, 9-11.

^[13]
Ibid., id., 10-17.

^[14]
Ibid., February 15, 1989, 5-13.

^[15]
Appellant’s Brief, 23; Rollo, 77.

^[16]
TSN, February 15, 1989, 13-15; March 8, 1989, 5-17.

^[17]
Penned by Judge Alfredo J. Gustilo; Original Record, 737.

^[18]
Appellant’s Brief; Rollo, 53.

^[19]
People vs. Ablaza, 30 SCRA 173 (1969); People vs. Lora, et al.,
113 SCRA 366 (1982); People vs. Masilang, et al., 142 SCRA 673 (1986).

^[20]
People vs. Guerrero, et al., 103 Phil. 1136 (1958).

^[21]
People vs. Ty Sui Wong, et al., 83 SCRA 125 (1978).

^[22]
People vs. Camo, et al., 91 Phil. 240 (1952); People vs. Ong, et
al., 62 SCRA 174 (1975): People vs. Jimenez, et al., 105 SCRA 721
(1981).

^[23]
Supra, Fn. 19.

^[24]
As amended by Republic Acts Nos. 18 (1946) and 1984 (1954).

^[25]
TSN, November 17, 1988, 12; January 25, 1989, 7-8.

^[26]
People vs. Badilla, 185 SCRA 554 (1990); People vs. Mabuhay, 185
SCRA 675 (1990); People vs. Gabatin, 203 SCRA 225 (1991).

^[27]
People vs. Villanueva, et al., 128 SCRA 488 (1984); People vs.
Moka, et al., 196 SCRA 378 (1991).

^[28]
People vs. Damiar, et al., 127
SCRA 499 (1984); People vs. Tajon, 128 SCRA 656 (1984); People vs.
Buensuceso, al., 132 SCRA 143
(1985).

^[29]
People vs. Egot, 130 SCRA 134 (1984); People vs. Budol, 143 SCRA
241 (1986).

^[30]
See People vs. Rubia, 52 Phil. 172 (1928); People vs. AguinaIdo,
55 Phil. 610 (1931).

^[31]
People vs. Collado, 60 Phil. 610 (1934); People
vs. Domondon, 60 Phil. 729 (1934); People vs. Jovellano, et al.,
56 SCRA 156 (1974); People vs. De Guzman, et al., 164 SCRA 215
(1988).

^[32]
People vs. Bugho, 202 SCRA 164 (1991); People vs. Urquia, Jr., et al., 203 SCRA 735
(1991); People vs. Lee, et al., 204 SCRA 900 (1991).

^[33]
People vs. Santito, Jr., et al., 201 SCRA 87 (1990); People vs.
Arroyo, et al., 201 SCRA 616 (1990).

^[34]
Original Record, 734.

^[35]
TSN, September 19, 1985, 20; May 22, 1986, 17-18.

^[36]
Original Record, 535; Exhibit E.

^[37]
People vs. Tabayoyong, et al., 104 SCRA 724 (1981).

^[38]
Original Record, 735.

^[39]
People vs. Umali, et al., 193 SCRA 493 (1991);
People vs. Ruedas, 194 SCRA 553 (1991); People vs. Ponce, et al., 197 SCRA 746 (1991).

^[40]
TSN, November 17, 1988, 18-19; November 24, 1988, 7-8; Exhibit Q, Original
Record, 547-549.

^[41]
Original Record, 601-607.

^[42]
People vs. Ibañez, 92 Phil. 933 (1957); People vs. Bautista, et
al., 106 Phil. 39 (1959); People vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., 124 SCRA 338 (1983).

^[43]
Exhibit G; Original Record, 538.

^[44]
Original Record, 736.

^[45]
TSN, November 17, 1988, 14-15; November 24, 1988, 13-15.

^[46]
Ibid., December 12, 1988, 6.

^[47]
59 Phil. 738 (1934).

^[48]
U.S. vs. De la Cruz, et. al., 3 Phil. 331 (1904).

^[49]
Arevalo, et al., vs. Nepomuceno, etc., et al., 63 Phil. 627 (1936); People vs. Labatete, 107
Phil. 697 (1960).