VIOLETA ALDOVINO, ALI ALIBASA, FELIX BALINO, DIONISIO BALLESTEROS, JOSE N. BALEIN, JR., FREDDIE CAUTON, JANE CORROS, ROBERTO CRUZ, TRINIDAD DACUMOS, ANGELITA DIMAPILIS, ANDREA E…

ASSERTING that their plight is similar to petitioners’ in Mandani v. Gonzales,^[1] and in the consolidated cases of Abrogar v. Garrucho, Jr., and Arnaldo v. Garrucho, Jr.,^[2] herein petitioners and intervenors seek reinstatement and payment of
back wages.

Section 29 of Executive Order No. 120, which took effect upon its
approval on 30 January 1987, reorganizing the then Ministry of Tourism,
provides that incumbents whose positions are not included in the new position
structure and staffing pattern or who are not reappointed are deemed separated
from the service. Pursuant thereto, the
then Ministry of Tourism (MOT, now Department of Tourism, DOT) issued various
office orders and memoranda declaring all positions thereat vacant,^[3]
and effecting the separation of many of its employees,^[4] which
led to the Mandani, Abrogar and
Arnaldo cases, as well as the instant petition.

In Mandani, we
declared null and void all office orders and memoranda issued pursuant to E.O.
120 and directed “public respondents or their successors x x x to immediately restore the
petitioners to their positions without loss of seniority rights and with back
salaries computed under the new staffing pattern from the dates of their
invalid terminations at rates not lower than their former salaries.”^[5]

In Abrogar and
Arnaldo, we ordered the
reinstatement of petitioners “to their former positions without loss of
seniority rights and with back salaries computed under the new staffing pattern
from the dates of their invalid dismissals at rates not lower than their former
salaries, provided, however, that no supervening event shall have occurred
which would otherwise disqualify them for such reinstatement, and provided,
further, that whatever benefits they may have received from the Government by
reason of their termination shall be reimbursed through reasonable salary
deductions.”^[6]

Herein petitioners and intervenors claiming that they should not
be deprived of the relief granted to their former co-employees plead for
reinstatement “without loss of seniority rights and with back salaries
computed under the new staffing pattern from dates of their invalid termination
at rates not lower than their former salaries.”^[7]

Decisive in this recourse is the determination of whether the
separation of herein petitioners and intervenors from service was pursuant to
office orders and memoranda declared void in Mandani.

Except for petitioners Samuel Hipol, Jane Corros and Myrna
Salvador, and intervenors Concepcion Timario, Efren Fontanilla, Ascension
Padilla and Evelyn Enriquez, public respondents do not dispute that petitioners
and intervenors were unseated from the then Ministry of Tourism, pursuant to
office orders and memoranda issued under E.O. No. 120. Public respondents nevertheless pray for the
denial of the petition not only because petitioners and intervenors failed to
exhaust administrative remedies and that their claims are barred by laches, but
also in view of the disruption of the present organizational set-up if
reinstatement is directed.

The Solicitor General argues that while petitioners and
intervenors (except petitioners Samuel Hipol, Jane Corros and Efren Fontanilla)
were dismissed contemporaneously with their colleagues in Mandani (filed 3 June 1987 and
decided 4 June 1990), Abrogar (filed
31 October 1990 and decided 6 August 1991) and Arnaldo (filed 7 January 1991 and decided 6 August 1991),
they filed this petition and the interventions only in October 1991, and
February, March, May and July 1992, or more than four (4) years later, hence,
laches has set in. In reply,
petitioners and intervenors explain –

x x x since the time these DOT employees were illegally dismissed
in May, 1987, most of them returned to the far away provinces of their origin
because they became jobless. It was
only by the slow and unreliable communication of word of mouth that they came
to know much later on that they are (sic) entitled to be reinstated to the DOT
x x x x^[8]

The doctrine of laches is “principally a question of inequity
of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on some
change in x x x the relation of parties.”^[9] In
the case at bar, equity, if ever invoked, must lean in favor of petitioners and
intervenors who were unjustly injured by public respondents’ unlawful
acts. The prejudice from the
high-handed violation of the rights of petitioners and intervenors resulting in
their loss of employment is far more serious than the inconvenience to public
respondents in rectifying their own mistakes.

Moreover, petitioners and intervenors cannot be deemed to have
slept on their rights considering, as we should, the following unrebutted
allegations in the main petition:

7. Petitioners protested their illegal
termination from the DOT. Many of them
questioned their termination with the Department of Labor and Employment where
they filed a Complaint against the DOT and its top officials for illegal
dismissal x x x x Some of them questioned their illegal termination before the
Civil Service Commission.

8. Many of petitioners joined a picket and
demonstration held by illegally terminated employees of the DOT before its
office at the DOT building at the Luneta Park.

9. Petitioners were forced to receive their
separation or retirement benefits from the DOT, but all under protest. The others continued to fight their cases
with the Department of Labor and Employment even if they got their separation
and/or retirement benefits.

x x x x

11. After the finality of this Decision
(Mandani) x x x x many other terminated employees of the DOT wrote to then DOT
Secretary Peter D. Garrucho, Jr., as the successor-in-interest of former Sec.
Jose U. Gonzalez, and DBM Secretary Guillermo Carague, asking that following
the Decision in this Mandani vs. Gonzalez case and being similarly
situated as the twenty-eight (28) petitioners therein, that they be reinstated
to their former or equivalent positions in the DOT and/or to be paid their back
wages. Then x x x DOT Secretary
Garrucho and DBM Sec. Carague never responded to these letters and did not
reinstate and/or pay any of their back wages.

x x x x

16. Following the Decision of this Honorable
Court in the Mandani vs. Gonzalez case and its Resolution in the
consolidated cases of Abrogar vs. Garrucho and Arnaldo vs. Garrucho,
petitioners made representations with the DOT to be reinstated and/or paid
their back wages x x x x^[10]

Neither could petitioners and intervenors be faulted for not
joining in the previous petitions because, as we held in Cristobal v.
Melchor (No. L-43203, 29 July 1977;
78 SCRA 175, 183, 187) –

More importantly, Cristobal could be expected- without necessarily
spending time and money by going to court – to relie upon the outcome of the
case filed by his co-employees to protect his interests considering the
similarity of his situation to that of the plaintiffs therein and the identical
relief being sought. On this point, We
find a statement of Justice Louis Brandeis of the United States Supreme Court
in Southern Pacific vs. Bogert, relevant and persuasive, and We quote:

The essence of laches is not merely lapse of time. It is essential that there be also
acquiescence in the alleged wrong or lack of diligence in seeking a
remedy. Here plaintiffs, or others representing
them, protested * * * and ever since they have * * * persisted in the diligent
pursuit of a remedy * * * * Where the cause of action is of such a nature
that a suit to enforce it would be brought on behalf, not only of the
plaintiff, but of all persons similarly situated, it is not essential that each
such person should intervened (sic) in the suit brought in order that he be
deemed thereafter free from the laches which bars those who sleep on their
rights (citations omitted).

x x x x

This Court, applying the principle of equity, need not be bound
by the rigid application of the law, but rather its action should conform to
the conditions or exigencies to a given problem or situation in order to grant
a relief that will serve the ends of justice.

To paraphrase then Chief Justice John Edwin Marshall of the
United States Supreme Court, let us to (do) complete justice and not do justice
by halves (‘The court of equity in all cases delights to do complete justice
and not by halves.’ Marshall, C.J.­Knight vs. Knight, 3 P. Wms. 331, 334;
Corbet v. Johnson, I Brock, 77, 81 – both cited in Hefner, et al. vs.
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 123 U.S., 309, 313).”

We emphasize that prescription was never raised here as an
issue; at most, it is deemed waived. In
Fernandez v. Grolier International, Inc.,^[11]
we stated:

In the case of Director of Lands v. Dano (96 SCRA 161, 165),
this Court held that ‘inasmuch as petitioner had never pleaded the statute of
limitations, he is deemed to have waived the same.’

In the cited case of Director of Lands v. Dano, the Director of
Lands, who was similarly situated as public respondents herein who
represent the Government, was deemed to have waived the defense of prescription
“inasmuch as petitioner had never pleaded the statute of
limitations.”

The matter of prescription, we reiterate, may not be considered
at this late stage, not only because it was never raised and therefore now
foreclosed, but more importantly, because it must yield to the higher interest
of justice. Incidentally, it is only in
the dissent that the question of prescription is introduced. Not even the Government raised it.

In 1977, we in fact relaxed the rule on prescription in Cristobal
v. Melchor^[12]
to give way to a determination of the case on the merits where, like in
this case, “[i]t was an act of the government through its responsible
officials x x x which
contributed to the alleged delay in the filing of x x x complaint for reinstatement.” But, we need not go
back that far. On 15 August 1991, the
Court En Banc granted the
related petition in intervention of Alberto A. Peralta, et al.,^[13]
in the consolidated cases of Abrogar v. Garrucho, and Arnaldo v. Garrucho, even if filed on 1
August 1991 or two months after the four-year prescriptive period, which lapsed
on the 14th and 28th of May
1991. As we ruled in Cristobal v.
Melchor,^[14]
“it is indeed the better rule that courts, under the principle of equity,
will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the
doctrine of laches when to do so manifest
wrong and injustice would
result.”

The principle that prescription does not run against the State,
which contemplates a situation where a private party cannot defeat the claim of
the State by raising the defense of prescription, is inapplicable because in
this case the private parties are the ones filing a suit against the
State. Consequently, we reiterate our
pronouncement in Fernandez v.
Grolier International, Inc.,^[15] that “[i]t is true that there
are exceptions to the rule that an action will not be declared to have
prescribed if prescription is not expressly invoked (Garcia vs. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250). However, where considerations of substantial justice come in (as
in this case when the very employment, and therefore the lifeblood, of each
petitioner/intervenor is involved), it is better to resolve the issues on the
basic merits of the case instead of applying the rule on prescription which the
private respondent waived when it was not pleaded.” Anyhow, it was public
respondents who created the problem of petitioners and intervenors by illegally abolishing their positions and terminating
their services in outrageous disregard of the basic protection accorded civil
servants, hence our repeated pronouncement that it was unconstitutional.

An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in
legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been passed. It is therefore stricken from the statute
books and considered never to have existed at all. Not only the parties but all persons are bound by the declaration
of unconstitutionality which means that no one may thereafter invoke it nor may
the courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a total nullity.^[16]
Plainly, it was as if petitioners and intervenors were never served their
termination orders and, consequently, were never separated from the
service. The fact that they were not
able to assume office and exercise their duties is attributable to the
continuing refusal of public respondents to take them in unless they first
obtained court orders, perhaps, for government budgetary and accounting
purposes. Under the circumstances, the more prudent thing that public
respondents could have done upon receipt of the decision in Mandani, if they were earnest in
making amends and restoring petitioners and intervenors to their positions, was
to inform the latter of the nullification of their termination orders and to
return to work and resume their functions. After all, many of them were supposed to be waiting for instructions
from the DOT because in their termination orders it promised to directly
contact them by telephone, telegram or written notice as soon as funds for
their separation would be available.^[17]

Furthermore, the representations to DOT made by petitioners and
intervenors for their reinstatement partook of the nature of an administrative
proceeding, and public respondents also failed to raise the issue of
prescription therein. As already
adverted to, that issue was never raised before us. In reciting the alleged instances of delay in bringing up this
suit, the Solicitor General simply referred to laches, not prescription. Since this case is an original action, and
if we treat the petition and interventions as ordinary complaints, the failure
of public respondents to raise the issue of prescription in their comments
cannot be interpreted any less than a waiver of that defense. For, defenses and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except the
failure to state a cause of action
which may be alleged in a later pleading, if one is permitted.^[18]

Above all, what public respondents brought up was the doctrine of
laches, not prescription; and laches is different from prescription. The defense of laches applies independently
of prescription. While prescription is
concerned with the fact of delay, laches is concerned with the effect of
delay. Prescription is a matter of
time; laches is a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced,
this inequity being founded on some change in the condition of the property or
the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at
law. Prescription is based on fixed
time, laches is not.^[19] In
any case, it can be said that the prescriptive period was tolled with the
filing of the termination cases before the Department of Labor and Employment
and the Civil Service Commission, the pendency of which is acknowledged in the
Comment and Memorandum of public respondents.

Incidentally, even the picketing of the premises and the placards
demanding their immediate reinstatement could not be any less than written
demands sufficient to interrupt the period of prescription. As we noted earlier, “[a]fter the
finality of this Decision (Mandani) x x x x many other terminated employees of
the DOT wrote to then DOT Secretary Peter D. Garrucho, Jr. x x x x and DBM
Secretary Guillermo Carague asking that following the Decision in this Mandani
vs. Gonzales case and being similarly situated as the twenty-eight (28)
petitioners therein x x x they be reinstated to their former or equivalent
positions in the DOT and/or to be paid their back wages.” But “[t]hen
x x x DOT Secretary Garrucho and DBM Sec. Carague never responded to these
letters,”^[20]
so that it may be said that the period that was interrupted never started to
run again against petitioners and intervenors.

The requirement of prior resort to administrative remedies is not
an absolute rule and this did not bar direct access to this Court in the
analogous cases of Dario v.
Mison,^[21]
and Mandani v. Gonzales,^[22]
thus –

The Court disregards the questions raised as to procedure, failure
to exhaust administrative remedies, the standing of certain parties to sue
(this was raised by the Civil Service Commission in G.R. No. 86241, and failure
to exhaust administrative remedies was raised in G.R. Nos. 81954 and 81917 by
the Solicitor General), and other technical objections, for two reasons,
“(b]ecause of the demands of public interest, including the need for
stability in the public service” (Sarmiento III v. Mison, G.R. No. 79974,
December 17, 1987, 153 SCRA 549, 551-552) and because of the serious
implications of these cases on the administration of the Philippine civil
service and the rights of public servants.

On the argument that existing organizational set­up would be
disrupted if reinstatement be directed, we need only reiterate our 18 October
1990 Resolution in Mandani that –

An erring head of a Department, Bureau, or Office cannot avoid
reinstatement, payment of back pay, and other acts of compliance with the
orders of this Court by interposing changes effected subsequent to his unlawful
acts and claiming that such changes make it difficult to obey this Court’s
orders.

The basic principle to be applied whenever the Court declares an
administrative official to have acted in an unlawful manner is for that
official to undo the harmful effects of his illegal act and to accord to the
aggrieved parties restoration or restitution in good faith to make up for the
deprivations which may have been suffered because of his act.^[23]

Petitioners and intervenors, who are similarly situated as their
counterparts in Mandani, Abrogar and Arnaldo, deserve no less
than equal treatment.

The Solicitor General takes exception to petitioner Samuel Hipol
who was separated from the service under an order of 19 May 1986 issued
pursuant to Sec. 2, Art. III, of Proclamation No. 3, and not under E. O. No.
120.^[24]
In reply, petitioner Hipol admits that he was “in the process of working
for his reinstatement/reappointment at the DOT when x x x all positions thereat were declared vacant x x x x”^[25] Since his separation from service was
not under void orders issued pursuant to E.O. No. 120 and, worse, he was not
even an incumbent when E.O. No. 120 was issued, Hipol could not be considered
as in the same situation as the petitioners in Mandani, Abrogar and Arnaldo.

A parallel case is that of intervenor Concepcion Timario who,
according to the Solicitor General, resigned effective 28 May 1987 and was not
separated under any of the invalid orders.^[26]
Intervenor Timario however contends that she is entitled to relief because her
courtesy resignation was accepted on 9 June 1987 or during the period positions
were declared vacant pursuant to MOT Office Order No. 9-87.^[27]
It is significant to note that Timario’s letter of resignation cited
“professional reasons” as cause
for her abdication^[28]
which, obviously, pertains to the nature of her work. Moreover, conspicuously absent is the customary order requiring
the filing of courtesy resignations. Timario may not be permitted to characterize, by way of self-serving
assertions, that her resignation was merely a courtesy resignation pursuant to
any of the voided office orders or memoranda.

The claim of the Solicitor General that petitioners Jane Corros
and Efren Fontanilla were not employees of the Ministry of Tourism because
their names did not appear in the regular plantilla of the Ministry of Tourism,^[29]
is specious since the listing of names in the plantilla is not a conclusive
evidence of employment. Nonetheless, in
view of the incessant allegation of the Solicitor General that Corros and
Fontanilla were not employees of the Ministry, and considering the photocopies
of Fontanilla’s appointment papers and termination order submitted by him,^[30]
as well as the bare assertion of petitioner Corros that she was for 11 years
PRO I in the Licensing Division of the Ministry and that her name could not be
found in the plantilla because she is now Jane Ombawa in view of her marriage,^[31]
the fact of employment should be threshed out first in a proper forum as this
Court is not a trier of facts.

The Solicitor General contends that since petitioner Myrna
Salvador was a casual employee,^[32]
intervenor Ascension Padilla was a temporary appointee whose appointment
expired 20 February 1987,^[33] and
intervenor Evelyn Enriquez was also a temporary appointee,^[34]
their appointments are terminable at the pleasure of the appointing
authority. Considering however that the
office orders and memoranda which directed the separation of petitioners and
intervenors were annulled, hence in legal contemplation did not exist, the
effect is, as if the terminations did not occur. However, since the determination in this case is limited only to
the extent of the nullity of said orders and memoranda, the reinstatement of
Salvador, Padilla and Enriquez cannot be ordered in the instant proceeding.

The Solicitor General also seeks dismissal of the petition and
intervention against intervenors Rizalina T. Espiritu, Abdulia T. Landingin,
Medardo Ilao, Rosita Somera, Armando Cruz, Catalino Dabu, Francisco Villaraiz,
Norma Jumilla, Kennedy Basa, Rolando G. Cagasca and Alfonso Angeles because
they were already reinstated. However,
because of the unrefuted allegation that these employees were not yet paid
their respective back wages, then to that extent, their petitions must be
granted.

In computing back wages, we cannot blindly accept the allegation
of petitioners and intervenors that since their separation from the service in
1987, or about seven (7) years ago, they have been jobless hence entitled to
full back wages. Conformably with existing
jurisprudence, the award of back wages should not exceed a period of five (5)
years.^[35]

In the final analysis, the dissent admits that petitioners and
intervenors truly deserve the reliefs they pray for except that their cause of
action has allegedly prescribed. Shall
we now frustrate their rightful claims on a ground that was never raised, nor
even hinted at, by public respondents in the entire proceeding? That would be
antithetic to our concept of social justice; at the very least, it is
subversive of the rudiments of fairplay.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Petitioners Violeta Aldovino, Ali Alibasa,
Felix Balino, Dionisio Ballesteros, Jose N. Balein, Jr., Freddie Cauton, Roberto
Cruz, Trinidad Dacumos, Angelita Dimapilis, Andrea Estonilo, Mary Paz
Frigillana, Manuel Henson, Merlene Ibalio, Magdalena Jamilla, Alexander
Justiniani, Romulo Mirador, Julio Miravite, Dante Nagtalon, Clarita Namuco,
Alicia Orbita, Angelita Pucan, Myrna P. Salvador, Librada Tantay, and Araceli
De Veyra, and intervenors Josephine G. Andaya, Rosalinda T. Atienza, Jose M.
Baldovino, Jr., Asuncion C. Briones, Maribelle A. Garcia, Florita O. Ocampo,
Rolando Sison, Lourdes B. Tamayo, Rolando Valdez, Erlinda Piza, Eleonor Sagnit,
Fidel Sevidal, Eloisa Alonzo, Angelito Dela Cruz, Lynie Arcenas, Maria Emma
Jasmin, Macacuna Pangandaman, Rosalia Mauna, Romeo Padilla, Ascension Padilla,
Crispulo Padilla, Virgilio Dejero, Armando Mendoza, Anicita S. Baluyut, Antonino
D. Edralin, Evelyn A. Enriquez, Ma. Victoria L. Jacobo, Daniel M. Manamtam,
Jessie C. Manrique, Encarnacion T. Radaza, Mario P. Ruivivar, Amor T. Medina
and Felix L. Poliquit, are ordered REINSTATED immediately to their former
positions without loss of seniority rights and with back salaries computed
under the new staffing pattern from the dates of their invalid dismissals at
rates not lower that their former salaries but not to exceed a period of five
(5) years, provided, however, that no supervening event shall have occurred
which would otherwise disqualify them from such reinstatement, and provided,
further, that whatever benefits they may have received from the Government by
reason of their termination shall be reimbursed through reasonable salary deductions.

Public respondents are likewise ordered to pay intervenors
Rizalina P. Espiritu, Abdulia T. Landingin, Medardo Ilao, Rosita Somera, Armando Cruz, Catalino Dabu,
Francisco Villaraiz, Norma Jumilla, Kennedy Basa, Rolando G. Cagasca and
Alfonso Angeles their back salaries similarly under the above-quoted
conditions.

As regards petitioners Samuel Hipol, Jane Corros and Efren
Fontanilla, their petition is DISMISSED, as well as the petition in
intervention of Concepcion Timario.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bidin, Romero, Nocon, Melo, Quiason, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ.,
concur.

Narvasa, C.J., dissent on the
same grounds I did in Mison (176 SCRA 84, 132) & Mandani (186
SCRA 108,156)

Cruz, J., join J. Davide in his
dissent.

Feliciano, J., dissent on same
ground that I dissended in the Mison and Mandani cases with
Herrera, J. I also join in the dissent of Davide, J.

Regalado, J., Pro hac vice.

Davide, Jr., J. dissenting
opinion.

Puno, J., no part.

^[1]
G.R. No. 78525, 4 June 1990, and related cases; 186 SCRA 108.

^[2]
Resolution, G.R. No. 95773 & G.R. No. 96533, 6 August 1991.

^[3]
Office Order No. 9-87, 19 March 1987; Annex “A,” Petition; Rollo,
p. 20.

^[4]
Annexes “B” and “C,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 21-22.

^[5]
See Note 1, at p. 155.

^[6]
See Note 2, at p. 5.

^[7]
Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 18.

^[8]
Rollo, p. 148; see also pp. 60-61, 155, 160, and 167.

^[9]
Maneclang v. Baun, No. L-27876, 22 April 1992; 208 SCRA 179, 193.

^[10]
Petition, pp. 7-11, Rollo, pp. 8-12; see also Memorandum of Petitioners
and Intervenors, pp. 6-10; Rollo, pp. 226-230.

^[11]
G.R. No. 55312, 29 December 1987; 156 SCRA 830, 833.

^[12]
No. L-43203, 29 July 1977; 78 SCRA 175, 183.

^[13]
G.R. No. 95733, 15 August 1991: Rollo, p. 212.

^[14]
See Note 12, at 185, citing Fogg vs. St. Louis, H & K. R. Co. (C.C.)
17 Fed. 871, American Digest 1658 to 1896, Century Edition, Vol. 19, p. 462.

^[15]
See Note 11.

^[16]
Norton v. Shellby, 118 U.S. 425,
cited in Isagani Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1987 ed., pp. 233-234.

^[17]
Annex “C,” Petition; Rollo, p. 22.

^[18]
Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court.

^[19]
Nielson & Co., Inc. v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., No. L-21601,
17 December 1966, 18 SCRA 1040, citing 30 C.J.S.
522; Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 2, 5th ed., 177; See also Note
9.

^[20]
Par. 11, Petition, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 9-10.

^[21]
G.R. No. 81954, 8 August 1989, and related cases; 176 SCRA 84, 108-109.

^[22]
See Note 1, at pp. 138-139.

^[23]
See Note 1; Rollo, p. 534-C.

^[24]
Comment, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 177-178; Memorandum, p, 9; Rollo, p.
201.

^[25]
Reply to Comment, p. 2; Rollo, p. 59.

^[26]
Comment (Re: Petition for Intervention),
pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 103-104; Memorandum, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp.
203-204.

^[27]
Reply to Comment, p. 3; Rollo, p. 166.

^[28]
Annex “9”, Comment (Re: Petition for Intervention); Rollo, p. 118.

^[29]
Citing certification of the
Chief, Personnel Division, Department of Tourism, Comment, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 179-180; Memorandum, p. 8; Rollo, p. 200.

^[30]
Annexes “A” and “B”, Reply to Comment; Rollo, pp. 65-66.

^[31]
Reply to Comment, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 58-59; and Memorandum, p. 1; Rollo, p. 221.

^[32]
Comment, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 178-179; Memorandum, pp. 7-8; Rollo,
pp. 199-200.

^[33]
Comment Re: Petition for Intervention,
pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 102-103; Memorandum, p. 11; Rollo, p. 203.

^[34]
Comment Re: Petition for Intervention,
pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 130-131; Memorandum, pp. 12-13; Rollo, pp.
204-205.

^[35]
Regis, Jr., v. Osmeña, Jr., G.R. No. 26785, 23 May 1991; 197 SCRA 308,
321, citing Cristobal v. Melchor, L-43202, 29 July 1977, 78 SCRA 175,
187; Balquidra v. CFI, L-40490, 28 October 1977, 80 SCRA 123; Laganapan
v. Asedillo, L-28353, 30 September 1987, 154 SCRA 377, 387; Ginson v.
Municipality of Murcia, L­46585, 8 February 1988, 158 SCRA 1, 8; Antiporda
v. Ticao, L­30796, 15 April 1988, 160 SCRA 40, 42; San Luis v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 80160, 26 June 1989, 174 SCRA 258, 273.

200

6 pt
6 pt
0
3