RAMON M. ABIERA, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND PLANTERS BANK, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner Ramon Abiera was
the Manager of the Roxas City branch of private respondent Republic Planters
Bank (RPB) at the time of his dismissal on April 28, 1987, on the ground of
loss of confidence.

The said branch had
earlier been the subject of an audit by the internal auditors of RPB’s head office. Sometime thereafter, in August 1986, Abiera applied for vacation leave
for about two weeks “to take a much needed rest.”

Upon his return, the petitioner received a memorandum from the
Executive Vice President of the respondent bank requiring him to submit his
response to the internal audit report. The report suggested his possible participation in the violations
therein noted.

He was not allowed
in the meantime to resume his position. Instead, RPB extended his leave of absence from September 12, 1986 to
October 12, 1986, then to November 12, 1986, and finally to December 12, 1986.

After submitting his response   to
the audit examination report, Abiera received a memorandum containing the following Specification of Charges
which he was required to explain:

1.     
Over-financing in the amount of P2,573,000.00.

2.     
Approval of loan advances to a certain Manuel Alparanque in violation of RPB’s policy
prohibiting the grant of new loans to clients
with past due accounts.

3.     
Continuous loan approval/releases to the spouses
Rebecca/Edmund Ibañez despite full knowledge of the defect of their title to
the mortgaged properties.

4.     
Entering into a contract manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the Bank in the repair of the ceiling/mezzanine floor of its
Roxas branch.

5.     
Insuring in excess of the market value of mortgaged
collaterals and properties not offered as collaterals without advising the
planter-borrowers concerned.

6.     
Advancing the payment of the insurance premiums without prior
clearance and approval from management and in gross violation of RPB’s existing
policy on the matter.

7.     
Violation of the Bank’s domestic travel policy.

These acts were claimed to have been committed by the petitioner in violation of the
following sections of RPB’s Code of Discipline:

Section 2. – Entering in
behalf of the Bank into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the officer or employee profited or
will profit thereby.

Section 12. – Serious violation of any established loan
policy, office procedure/practice of the Bank with or without loss or damage to
the Bank.

The Specification of Charges also advised him as follows:

In view hereof, you are hereby requested to appear before the
Investigating Committee on December 18, 1986 at 3:00 p.m. at the Executive Lounge, Legazpi Towers 300, Roxas Blvd.,
Manila, to explain why you will not be held liable for violations of the
specified provisions of the Code of Discipline. You may bring your lawyer who can assist you during the hearing. (Underscoring supplied)

The hearing was re-scheduled to January 9, 1987, at his request, and he appeared thereat
without counsel. RPB claims that the
Investigating Committee asked him if he desired the assistance of counsel and
that he manifested he was waiving the same.

For his part, Abiera has consistently alleged that after service
of the Specification of Charges upon him, he received a memorandum from Regional Manager Eriberto Garcia informing him
of only a preliminary hearing of his case on December 18, 1986.

Abiera says that since he had been called to only a preliminary
hearing and believing that it
would be informal, he saw no need to bring a lawyer. Thus, when the hearing was held on January 9, 1987 (as re-set),
he was not represented by counsel.

On January 12, 1987, the petitioner was notified of his
preventive suspension for thirty days without pay. He formally protested, averring that the “preliminary
hearing” was procedurally defective for the following reasons:

1.   
Thinking that the hearing was merely a fact-finding exercise
preliminary to an administrative hearing, he did not bring along legal
counsel. Such hearing proceeded without
providing him with any legal assistance.

2.   
The composition of the Committee and the role of its members in
the hearing were not made known to him.

3.   
The heating was held without benefit of a formal reply from
him, and the auditors who prepared the report on which the charges were based
did not swear to the truth of their report.

4.   
The hearing was inquisitorial in nature and he was not given a
chance to constructively present his side.

5.   
He was not allowed to hear and confront the witnesses against
him and to present his own evidence.

6.   
The evidence on which the auditors based their findings and
conclusions was not explained.

The petitioner says he
demanded from RPB access to the
branch records, copies of the transcript of the hearings, the opportunity to
confront the witnesses against him, the services of a legal counsel, and such
other rights appertaining to him in an administrative case, but his demand was
ignored.

On February 4, 1987, additional charges were filed against the
petitioner, this time concerning irregularities in the disposition of domestic
sugar quedans for calendar year 1985-1986. RPB sent him a directive to file an answer. The petitioner refuted these new charges in writing. Thereafter, the Investigating Committee
submitted its findings to the management and recommended his dismissal. Accordingly, RPB sent him a Notification of
Termination on April 7, 1987.

Still protesting his innocence, the petitioner demanded
withdrawal of the notification but RPB refused. Abiera then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the
private respondent. After considering
the evidence submitted by both parties, Labor Arbiter Ma. Sol Monteclaro-Manalo found for him and ordered his
reinstatement with back wages.^[1] On
appeal to the NLRC, however, the decision was reversed^[2] and
the motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied.^[3] The
petitioner then came to this Court for relief.

The petitioner assails the findings of the NLRC and maintains
that RPB failed to comply with the requirements of due process in effecting his
dismissal.

We do not agree.

The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the
essential elements of due process. There is a long line of decisions to the effect that neither of these
elements can be omitted without running afoul of the constitutional guaranty.^[4]

We hold that the first element was not violated because the
petitioner was duly notified of
the Specification of Charges and invited to appear at the hearing scheduled for
their investigation. He was even
advised to bring a lawyer with him if he so desired.

The requirement for hearing was also observed. The petitioner cannot say he was deprived of
this right because the record shows he was duly afforded ample opportunity to
defend himself and introduce evidence on his behalf.

Sec. 5 of Rule XIV, of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the Labor Code, provides:

Sec. 5. Answer and
Hearing. The worker may answer the
allegations stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable
period from receipt of such notice. The
employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.

“Ample opportunity” connotes every kind of assistance
that management must accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately
for his defense, including legal representation.

Abiera says he believed that the hearing to which he was invited
was only preliminary and so would not require the presence of his lawyer. Even so, he was not precluded from asking
for the suspension of that hearing after he realized that he was already being
“grilled,” as he put it, in a formal investigation.

It is also not true that the petitioner had not been given a
chance to defend himself. The
established fact is that he did this verbally and through written replies to
the internal audit report and the additional charge against him. The Court especially notes his
point-by-point refutation dated September 18, 1986.^[5] His
explanation was quite detailed and belies his claim that he was not given
access to the private respondent’s records.

A formal trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential to due process. It
is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting
evidence on which a fair decision can be based. According to Llora
Motors Inc. vs. Drilon,^[6] this
type of hearing is not even mandatory in cases of complaints lodged before the
Labor Arbiter. And in Sajonas vs. NLRC,^[7]
we observed as follows:

Finally, on the matter of due process which petitioners claim was
denied them by private respondent during the investigation which led to their
dismissal, we agree with respondents that although the aforesaid
investigations were not conducted in the manner of a regular trial in court,
the elements of due process, namely, the right to be informed of the charges,
to be present and to be heard, were accorded petitioners. In said investigations, petitioners freely
and voluntarily answered the questions and even made further statements in
their defense during the concluding stages thereof.

Commenting on the
same topic, we said earlier in Zaldivar vs.
Sandiganbayan:^[8]

Due process as a constitutional precept does not, always and in all
situations, require trial-type proceedings. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity
to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s
defense. “To be heard” does
not only mean verbal arguments in
court. One may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to
be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no
denial of procedural due process.

The parties could have held a
trial-type hearing, but they decided instead to submit the case for decision on the basis of the position
papers, documentary evidence and other pleadings already submitted before the
Labor Arbiter. This arrangement was
mutually agreed upon by them during the hearing held on July 27, 1989, and is
authorized under Article 221 of the Labor Code.^[9]

It is true that the right of confrontation is embraced in due
process and that the petitioner did demand the appearance of the internal
auditors so he could cross-examine them. It is also true that this demand was rejected by the Investigating
Committee. Nevertheless, the petitioner
saw fit not to insist on this right and in fact subsequently waived it when he
agreed at the said hearing on the above-discussed procedure.^[10]

Regarding the ground for his dismissal, we find that the NLRC
correctly sustained the Investigating Committee in concluding that the petitioner, as branch manager, violated
RPB’s Code of Discipline through the numerous transactions he entered into or
approved that caused detriment to the bank and its clients. The charges were either expressly admitted
by him or established by preponderant evidence. His conduct caused the private respondent to lose confidence in
his judgment and even his integrity and provided the just cause for his
dismissal as branch manager. Article
282(c) of the Labor Code plainly states:

Art. 282. Termination by
employer. – An employer may terminate
an employment for any of the following causes:

x x x

(c) Fraud or
willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative;

It is clear that the public respondent has committed no grave abuse of
discretion that would warrant the reversal of its decision sustaining the
petitioner’s dismissal. There was justified loss of confidence in
him by the respondent bank. In view of
the nature of its business, the bank had every reason to demand that the conduct of the petitioner,
who was holding a sensitive and responsible position, be entirely above-board
and fully deserving of its trust.

Accordingly the petition is DISMISSED, with costs
against the petitioner. It is so
ordered.

Padilla,
Griño-Aquino, and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Medialdea, J., on leave.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 106.

^[2]
Ibid., p. 116

^[3]
Id., p. 118.

^[4]
Century Textile Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 528 (1988); (1988); Gold
City-Integrated Port Services, Inc.
v. NLRC, 189 SCRA 811 (1990), Kwilway Engineering Works v. NLRC,
195 SCRA 526 (1991).

^[5]
Annex “4,” Records, Vol. 2, pp. 45-50.

^[6]
179 SCRA 175 (1989).

^[7]
183 SCRA 182 (1990).

^[8]
166 SCRA 313; 337-338 (1988).

^[9]
San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, 173 SCRA 314 (1989).

^[10]
TSN, July 27, 1989, Records, Vol. 2, pp. 344-347.