PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROGELIO BAYOTAS Y CORDOVA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City,
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted
thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas
died on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio
respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato
carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992
dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with
regard to Bayotas’ civil liability arising from his commission of the offense
charged.

In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the
death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result
of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego^[1]
insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing
his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.

Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the
view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while
judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and
civil penalties. In support of his
position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People
v. Castillo and Ocfemia^[2] which
held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal
liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die
before final judgment is rendered.

We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of
his conviction extinguish his civil liability?

In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo,
this issue was settled in the affirmative. This same issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect
both his criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of
the alleged crime?

It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:

“Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling
statute. It reads, in part:

‘ART. 89. How criminal
liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:

1. By the death of
the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;’

With reference to Castillo’s criminal liability, there is no
question. The law is plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.

The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of
the term ‘final judgment.’ Is it final judgment as contradistinguished from an
interlocutory order? Or, is it a
judgment which is final and executory?

We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo
Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:

‘La responsabilidad penal se extingue.

1. Por la muerte del
reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias,
solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.’

x x x                                                  x x x                                                    x
x x

The code of 1870 x x x it will be observed employs the term
‘sentencia firme.’ What is ‘sentencia firme’ under the old statute?

XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready
answer: It says:

‘SENTENCIA FIRME. La
sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por no haberse utilizado
por las partes litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y
plazos legales concedidos al efecto.’

‘Sentencia firme’ really should be understood as one which is
definite. Because, it is only when
judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed –
‘en condena determinada;’ or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt of the
accused becomes – ‘una verdad legal.’ Prior thereto, should the accused die,
according to Viada, ‘no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni
responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase.’ And, as Judge Kapunan well
explained, when a defendant dies before judgment becomes executory, ‘there
cannot be any determination by final judgment whether or not the felony upon
which the civil action might arise exists,’ for the simple reason that ‘there
is no party defendant.’ (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view. Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd
ed., pp. 859-860)

The legal import of the term ‘final judgment’ is similarly
reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the term ‘final judgment’
in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which
states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final ‘after the lapse of the
period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or
totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing
his right to appeal.’

By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected
funnel down to one positive conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means
judgment beyond recall. Really, as long
as a judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that
defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him.

Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without
reason. For where, as in this case, the
right to institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be
rendered must, of necessity, cover ‘both the criminal and the civil aspects of
the case.’ People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958
ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly,
Judge Kapunan observed that as ‘the civil action is based solely on the felony
committed and of which the offender might be found guilty, the death of the
offender extinguishes the civil liability.’ I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code,
Annotated, supra.

Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo’s criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced
by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the
civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous situation whereby we
will be called upon to clamp civil liability in a case where the source thereof
– criminal liability – does not exist. And, as was well stated in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al.,
CA-G.R. No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, ‘no party can be found and held
criminally liable in a civil suit,’ which solely would remain if we are to
divorce it from the criminal proceeding.”

This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case^[3]
was adopted by the Supreme Court in the cases of People of the
Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al.,^[4]
People of the Philippines v. Jaime
Jose, et al.^[5] and People
of the Philippines v. Satorre^[6]
by dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the accused pending appeal of
said cases.

As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison
case:

“The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been
established, and considering that there is as yet no final judgment in view of
the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said
accused-appellant Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal
Code; Reyes’ Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and
Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.”

On the other hand, this
Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v.
Marcelino Polinar^[7] and Lamberto
Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals^[8]
ruled differently. In the former, the
issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who died
before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring
any claim therefor against his estate. It was the contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the
death of the accused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and
civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph
1 of the Revised Penal Code. However,
this court ruled therein:

“We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been
extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of
1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the revised
Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court
below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on
account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action.

‘ART. 33. In cases of
defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.’

Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala’s civil
action for damages was to be considered instituted together with the criminal
action still, since both proceedings were terminated without final
adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet
be enforced separately.”

In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:

“x x x                                                             x
x x                                                                 x
x x

It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability
follows the extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89, only when
the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil
liability does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the
extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the former,
provided, of course, that death supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant
case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from the
crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale. (Italics ours)

x x x                                                              x
x x                                                                 x
x x.”

In the above case, the court was
convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was charged with estafa
could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
since said accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the property
subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: “Consequently, while the death of the accused herein extinguished
his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of
human relations remains.”

Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil
liability of the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal
liability due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.

To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to
survive, the court relied on the following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court^[9]
requires the dismissal of all money claims against the defendant whose death
occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then
it can be inferred that actions for recovery of money may continue to be heard
on appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI had
rendered its judgment. In such case,
explained this tribunal, “the name of the offended party shall be included
in the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or
the heirs of the deceased-accused should be substituted as
defendants-appellants.”

It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo
to Torrijos, the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability
depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other
than delict. Stated differently, the
claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the criminal
action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.

However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego,
et al.^[10]
departed from this long-established principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted
by the lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego’s death supervened during the
pendency of the appeal of his conviction.

This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss
Sendaydiego’s appeal but only to the extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive
although it was clear that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the
criminal action already extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for the court to continue
exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the
correctness of Sendaydiego’s conviction despite dismissal of the criminal
action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution
of July 8, 1977 stating thus:

“The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil
liability survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment
was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him
of three complex crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered him
to indemnify the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be
P57,048.23).

The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly
instituted with the criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its
reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for the civil liability is
separate and distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma,
105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).

When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies
before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to
be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the
action survives him. It may be
continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975;
67 SCRA 394).

The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the
funds improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs.
Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).

In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the
appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is
concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction
over his possible civil liability for the money claims of the Province of
Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no
criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making applicable, in
determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code x x x and, for
that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days
of the names and addresses of the decedent’s heirs or whether or not his estate
is under administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted
for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is
concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).”

Succeeding cases^[11]
raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of
the settled rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil
liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the
entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.

But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision in Sendaydiego
impels us to revert to the old ruling.

To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action impliedly
instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter’s
extinction due to death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction,
pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:

“When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil
liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are
instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence
shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.”

Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support
to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising
appellate jurisdiction over the accused’s civil liability ex delicto when his
death supervenes during appeal. What
Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be
brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense independently
of any criminal action. In the event
that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil
case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be
that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of
evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the
survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect
merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due
to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in the
criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the
accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter:

“Art. 89. How criminal
liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:

1. By the death of
the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;

x x x                                                              x
x x                                                                
x x x.”

However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the
expressed intent of Article 89. It
allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto
treating the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed
under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a
separate civil action. This had the
effect of converting such claims from one which is dependent on the outcome of
the criminal action to an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of
which does not even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings.^[12]
One would be hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a
transformation. It is to be borne in
mind that in recovering civil liability
ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action,
rooted as it is in the court’s pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty to the
intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that
“every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.”
In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused
pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil
liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things.

In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from
crime, the final determination of the criminal liability is a condition
precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal
action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal
thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts
which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal
liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which
is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the
institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a
criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego
resolution of July 8, 1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental
distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action
referred to under Article 30. Surely,
it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the
conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated
under Article 30.

Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not
apply Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:

“Sendaydiego’s appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of
showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for
which his estate would be liable.”^[13]

In other words, the Court, in resolving
the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a determination on whether
Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego’s conviction and pronounced the same
as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final
determination of Sendaydiego’s civil liability, there was a reopening of the
criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego’s
civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of
his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no
longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein
for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded
as it is on the criminal.

Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to
serve as another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, the Court made the inference that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego
consist of money claims, the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if
defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable
therefor. Hence, the Court’s
conclusion:

“‘When the action is for the recovery of money’ ‘and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall
be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided’ in Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the
action survives him. It may be
continued on appeal.”

Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, this
course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:

“x x x                                                                         x
x x                                                                
x x x.

I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both Torrijos
and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that where the
civil liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had already
passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of First Instance (now the
Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to exercise appellate
jurisdiction thereover despite the extinguishment of the component criminal
liability of the deceased. This
pronouncement, which has been followed in the Court’s judgments subsequent and
consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and
abandoned as being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.

Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary
civil actions. There is neither
authority nor justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil
actions instituted together with and as part of criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the
summary conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil action upon
the death of the offender. x x x.”

Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal
proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized
as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3
enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.

Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be
viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims
against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for
Sendaydiego’s civil liability. “What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to
Section 5 of Rule 86,^[14] are
contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may include even the restitution of
personal or real property.”^[15] Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive
enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and
claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that money claims arising from delict do not form
part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex
delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim
therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal
action engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his
conviction.

Accordingly, we rule: if
the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto
desires to recover damages from the same act or omission
complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111^[16]
(1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony
previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the
separate civil action is premised determines against whom the same shall be
enforced.

If the same act or omission complained of also arises from
quasi-delict or may, by provision of law, result in an injury to person or
property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed against
the executor or administrator^[17] of
the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:

“SECTION 1. Actions
which may and which may not be
brought against executor or administrator. – No action upon a claim for the recovery of
money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest
therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to
recover damages for an injury to person
or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against him.”

This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala^[18]
where we held that, in recovering damages for injury to persons thru an
independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must
be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased
accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule
explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the
last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from
contract, express or implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely personal
obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort.

Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises
from contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the estate of
the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, “the death of the accused
prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.”

2. Corollarily, the claim
for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.^[19] Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates
these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a
result of the same act or omission:

a)      Law^[20]

b)      Contracts

c)      Quasi-contracts

d)      x
x x                 x x x                 x x x

e)      Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil
liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may
be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture
of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on
the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155^[21]
of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription.^[22]

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the
death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil
liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed
without qualification.

WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio
Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., on leave.

---

^[1]
Nos. L-33252, L-33253 and L-33254, 81 SCRA 120.

^[2]
No. 22211-R, November 4, 1959, 56 O.G. No. 23, p. 4045.

^[3]
supra.

^[4]
L-30612, April 27, 1972, 44 SCRA 523.

^[5]
No. L-28397, June 17, 1976, 71 SCRA 273.

^[6]
No. L-26282, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 439.

^[7]
No. L-24098, November 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 970.

^[8]
No. L-40336, October 24, 1975, 67 SCRA 394.

^[9]
“Section 21. Where claim
does not survive. – When the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon,
and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it
shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these
rules.”

^[10]
Supra.

^[11]
People v. Badeo, G.R. No. 72990, November 21, 1991, 204 SCRA 122;
Petralba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81337, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA
644; Dumlao v. Court of Appeals, No. L-51625, October 5, 1988, 166 SCRA
269; Rufo Mauricio Construction v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No.
L-75357, November 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 712; People v. Salcedo, No.
L-48642, June 22, 1987, 151 SCRA 220; People v. Pancho, No. L-32507,
November 4, 1986, 145 SCRA 323; People v. Navoa, No. L-67966, September
28, 1984, 132 SCRA 410; People v. Asibar, No. L-37255, October 23, 1982,
117 SCRA 856; People v. Tirol, No. L-30538, January 31, 1981, 102 SCRA
558; and People v. Llamoso, No. L-24866, July 13, 1979, 91 SCRA 364.

^[12]
Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion observed that:

“x x x this provision
contemplates prosecution of the civil liability arising from a criminal offense
without the need of any criminal proceeding to prove the commission of the
crime as such, that is without having to prove the criminal liability of the
defendant so long as his act causing damage or prejudice to the
offended party is proven by preponderance of evidence.”

^[13]
Supra, p. 134.

^[14]
SEC. 5. Claims which must
be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred;
exceptions. – All claims for money
against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the
same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and
expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against
the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise
they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in
any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the
claimants. Where an executor or
administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by
the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he
has against the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court
as herein provided, and mutual
claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final judgment
is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be
considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim had been
presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be
approved at their present value.

^[15]
As explained by J. Regalado in the deliberation of this case.

^[16]
SECTION 1. Institute of criminal
and civil actions. – When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to
institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.

Such civil action includes recovery
of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Article 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or
omission of the accused.

A waiver of any of the civil
actions extinguishes the others. The
institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil
actions separately waives the others.

The reservation of the right to
institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution
starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

In no case may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.

When the offended party seeks to
enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate
or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in
these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award
for actual damages.

In cases wherein the amount of
damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing
thereof in court for trial.

^[17]
Justice Regalado cited the Court’s ruling in Belamala that
since the damages sought, as a result of the felony committed amounts to injury
to person or property, real or personal, the civil liability to be recovered
must be claimed against the executor/administrator and not against the estate.

^[18]
Ibid.

^[19]
Justice Vitug who holds a similar view stated: “The civil liability may still be pursued in a separate civil
action but it must be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict,
except when by statutory provision an independent civil action is authorized
such as, to exemplify, in the instance enumerated in Article 33 of the Civil
Code.” Justice Regalado stressed that:

“Conversely, such civil
liability is not extinguished and survives the deceased offender where it also
arises simultaneously from or exists as a consequence or by reason of a
contract, as in Torrijos; or from law, as stated in Torrijos and
in the concurring opinion in Sendaydiego, such as in reference to the
Civil Code; or from a quasi-contract; or is authorized by law to be pursued in
an independent civil action, as in Belamala. Indeed, without these exceptions, it would be unfair and
inequitable to deprive the victim of his property or recovery of damages
therefor, as would have been the fate of the second vendee in Torrijos
or the provincial government in Sendaydiego.”

^[20]
See Articles 19, 20, 21, 31, 32, 33, 34, 2176 of the Civil Code; see related
provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, particularly Sec. 1,
Rule 111.

^[21]
ART. 1155. The prescription of actions
is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a written
extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written
acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.

^[22]
As explained by J. Vitug in the deliberation of this case.