G.R. No. 102004. December 16, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DANTE DABON, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-Appellant Dante Dabon was charged on December 16, 1988 in
Criminal Case No. 160 (88) of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, Branch
19, with the crime of rape, and, on a plea of not guilty,[1] was
tried therefor upon an information the accusatory portion of which alleges —
“That on or about the 28th day of August, 1988, in the
Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, said accused, armed with stainless knife, by means of
violence and intimidation, did and then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of complainant Teresa Dionaldo against her will, and in
her own house.”[2]
As is to be expected, especially in cases of this nature, the
contending parties invariably submit conflicting versions which are necessarily
addressed to judicial evaluation. From
a careful review of the records, we find that the decision of the trial court
correctly and adequately summarizes the evidence presented by the prosecution
and the defense in support of their respective positions, hence the relevant
portions of said decision are best reproduced hereunder.
“The version of complainant has been set forth as follows:
“On August 28, 1988 at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, she
was sleeping in their house together with her two children (three years old and
one year old respectively). Her husband
at that time being a photographer, went to Dawis, for a picture taking
engagement. While sleeping, she noticed
a weight on top of her body. So, she
was awakened. When she opened her eyes,
she saw a hunting knife at her bust. A
man on top of her, said: ‘Do not create
any noise or else, I will kill the three (3) of you.’ As she looked at his face, she recognized him to be Dante
Dabon. Witness further identified the
accused in the courtroom. While the accused
was pointing his knife to her, he also covered her face with a blanket. She struggled and tried to look at him face
to face. She was able to recognize the
accused because there was a small kerosene lamp hung on one of the posts of
their house, and at the upper portion of the place where they slept.
“When the accused rode on top of her, he was wearing a red
polo shirt. On his lower extremities,
he was already completely naked. Because of fear that she and her children will be killed, she submitted
herself and gave in to his desire. After the accused satisfied his lustful desire, he ran out of the
house. She was left, crying and
trembling with fear.
“The victim was nineteen (19) years old at the time of the
incident, a native (Ilocana tribe) of Tulawa, Allah Vale, South Cotabato.
“The victim’s husband, Meliton Dionaldo, corroborated the
testimony of his wife as to his whereabouts on the said time and place. When he arrived at about fifteen minutes
before 1:00 o’clock in the morning, he was met by his wife, crying, and
informed him about the incident. After the revelation from his wife, he went
down from the house and tried to search the surroundings. At the back portion, he was able to retrieve
a knife. When he showed it to his wife,
his wife affirmed that the same knife was used in threatening her. Witness further found out his own jacket was
used by the accused in wiping the private part of his wife after the
intercourse.
“On the following day, he made a report to the police that he
knows (sic) the accused four (4) months ago prior to the date of the
incident. On cross-examination, the
witness Mr. Dionaldo further declared that he brought the jacket and the
hunting knife to the police station but the hunting knife only was retained by
the police. On re-direct examination,
he (the witness) further testified that his house is surrounded by three (3)
mercury lamps aside from the lamp which illuminates their house coming from the
concrete fence of Mr. Selma.
“Dr. Armie O. Monarca, a resident physician of the Davao del
Sur National Hospital testified that on August 29, 1988, she had examined the
complainant and found out (sic) to be negative; that she did not find anything
from the vagina; that it is very hard to determine whether there was sexual intercourse
or not since the examination was made one day after the alleged rape.
“On the other hand, the defense version comprises the
testimonies of Ruel de Leon, Felix Maceda, Lagrimas Abalayan and the accused
himself.
“Ruel de Leon testified that he is connected with the de Leon
Gun Store, the owner of which is his father; that their business has 12 to 15
branches located in Cotabato, Zamboanga, Dipolog, Pagadian, Kidapawan, Butuan,
Cagayan de Oro, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Iligan, Digos and General Santos City.
“On August 28, 1988, he testified that he was in Butuan City
together with his wife, Felix Maceda, Perfecto Maat and the accused, Dante
Dabon for a business transaction. His
wife also conducted an audit in their branch office. On the following day, August 29th, they left for General Santos
City; at about 8:00 to 9:00 o’clock in the
evening, when they arrived at Digos, and dropped by the office to get some
papers in their branch office, they noticed that a group of persons loaded in a
jeep together with the father of the accused, arrived and picked up Dante
Dabon. They were informed that Dante
was facing a case. After getting the
papers in the office, they proceeded to the municipal building. He asked the police about the case of Dante
but the policemen merely informed him that the accused is facing a case of
rape. Right after then, their group
proceeded to General Santos City, leaving Dante Dabon in the hands of the
policemen. The testimony of Ruel de
Leon was corroborated by Felix Maceda, who was one of the group mentioned
above. The accused’s version, as far as
his whereabouts during the said incident (is concerned) was also the same as
what the witnesses declared. He denied
the alleged offense because he was in Butuan City together with the group when
the crime was committed; that the reason why he is being sued in this case was
probably to make money out of the family and for some personal grudges. To prove his defense, he presented Mrs.
Lagrimas Abalayan Zamora, who testified that sometime in the last week of
September, 1988, between 5:00 o’clock to 6:00 o’clock, she visited her
half-brother Demetrio Dabon in his house. She noticed the arrival of Mr. Dionaldo; that Mr. Dionaldo was asking
for P10,000.00 to ‘quits’ the case of her nephew. [3]
After trial, the court below rendered judgment on June 26, 1991
finding appellant guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt, sentencing him to
suffer “imprisonment for life or reclusion perpetua” with accessory
penalties of the law, and entitling him to a deduction in the service of his
sentence by reason of his preventive imprisonment. The stainless knife used in the commission of the rape was
forfeited in favor of the State and the civil liability was deemed reserved.[4]
Appellant now seeks the reversal of the aforequoted judgment,
faulting the trial court (1) for convicting him of the crime of rape for the
reason that the prosecution’s evidence failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) for not
giving credence to his defense of alibi.[5]
Rape is a crime which is not normally committed in the presence
of witnesses, hence courts have perforce to rely on the credibility of the
complainant’s testimony as weighed against the credibility of the accused.[6]
In fact, conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on the credibility of
the complainant’s testimony.[7]
Prosaic as it may appear by constant repetition, we reiterate the settled rule
that the trial court’s finding is generally viewed as correct and entitled to
the highest respect because it is more competent to so conclude, having seen
closely the way the witnesses testified, their deportment, and the peculiar
manner in which they gave their testimonies and other evidence in court.[8]
The court a quo found
complainant’s testimony to be natural, straightforward and convincing, and with
details consistent with human nature and the ordinary normal course of things.[9]
We have held that a candid and straightforward narration by the victim of how
she had been raped bears the earmarks of credibility.[10]
Appellant, however, discredits complainant for having allegedly made
inconsistent statements in her affidavit taken on August 29, 1988 at the Digos
Police Headquarters vis-a-vis her open court declaration, to wit:
x x x
“q Please
tell us what was that unusual incident that transpired?
a While sleeping I noticed a weight that was
on top of my body, and so I was awakened. When I opened my eyes I (saw) a hunting knife at my bust, sir.” [11]
x x x
“q Now,
when you were awakened, what happened to your short(s) and other apparel?
a My short(s) and my blouse were removed by
the accused in order to satisfy his desire. It was he who rolled down and removed it from myself (sic).”[12]
The pertinent portion of her aforesaid affidavit, on the other
hand, reads:
“6. Q- Please narrate to this investigator as
briefly as you can the circumstances surrounding this particular incident.
A- That at about 8:00
o’clock that evening, I sleep (sic) early with my two children. My husband was then at Barangay Dawis, this
town taking pictures at the Coronation Program, as my husband is a professional
photographer. That after an hour, I was
awakened because of weight on top of me and I found out that Dante Dabon, our
neighbor, was on top of me and noticed that his penis had penetrated my
vagina.”[13]
The defense considers this seeming variance “a great whale
of inconsistency on a very material point.” It goes further by saying that complainant was telling a lie.[14] We disagree.
The most honest witnesses may make mistakes sometimes, but such
innocent lapses do not necessarily impair their credibility. The testimony of a witness must be
considered and calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated portions thereof
or isolated passages therein.[15] It
is a matter of judicial experience that an affidavit, being taken ex parte, is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate,
sometimes from partial suggestions, sometimes for want of suggestions and
inquiries, without the aid of which
the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances
necessary for the correction of the first suggestions of his memory and for his
accurate recollection of all that belongs to the subject.[16]
Affidavits taken ex parte are generally considered to
be inferior to the testimony given in open court.[17]
Therefore, discrepancies between statements of the affiant in his affidavit and
those made by him on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him.[18]
Furthermore, a rape victim is not and cannot be expected to keep
an accurate account of the traumatic experience she went through.[19]
What herein complainant stated in her affidavit and in open court constitute
but one chain of events. Thus,
chronologically, what happened was that while she was sleeping, she noticed a
weight on top of her body and so she was awakened. When she opened her eyes, she saw a hunting knife at her
bust. The man on top of her, the
appellant herein, said: “Do not
create any noise or else I will kill the three (3) of you.” He then
covered her face with a blanket, but she struggled and tried to look at him
face to face. She was able to look at
his face. Afterwards, her shorts and
blouse were rolled down and removed by appellant in order to satisfy his
desire. His penis then penetrated her
vagina. The rape was thus consummated.
Applicable to this case is the jurisprudential dictum that a
young and decent Filipina who testifies that she was raped says all that is
necessary to show its commission.[20]
Considering the inbred modesty and antipathy of a Filipina to airing in public
things that affect her honor, it is hard to conceive that the complainant would
assume and admit the ignominy she had undergone,[21] and
endure the ordeal of testifying to all its shameful details, if she had not in
fact been raped.[22]
Besides, the natural instinct, of a young, decent Filipina is to protect her
honor.[23]
It bears notice that the complainant herein is a simple housewife, nineteen
years old and an unlettered member of an ethnic tribal community.
It is also indisputable that appellant was positively identified
by complainant.[24] Her testimony as to who abused her is
credible where, as in this case, she had absolutely no motive to incriminate
and testify against appellant.[25] The
defense submits that the rape story appears to be “a conjugal concoction
to probably extract money from the family of the accused.”[26]
With respect to this pretension, we give credit to the logical observation of
the lower court that such a theory is unbelievable since the accused is only
earning P500.00 a month as a house boy. Furthermore, the trial court emphasizes the fact that it found no reason
at all on the part of the complainant to impute to appellant the commission of
so serious an offense which carries with it the maximum penalty, and to testify
falsely against him if it were not true.[27] And
as we have likewise observed, as a rule, a victim of rape will not come out in
the open if her motive were not to obtain justice.[28]
The defense advances the argument that the rape did not take
place because, if it did, the complainant could have shouted for assistance
from her neighbors.[29] It
demonstrably appears, however, that the complainant did not do so since she
thought nobody would come to her rescue considering that there was an ongoing discotheque
party at the nearby Cor Jesu College, and she further presumed that her
teacher-neighbor was already sleeping. What she did was to sit down at the floor of the house, trembling and
crying.[30]
Complainant’s aforestated reaction and actuations at that
instance do not in any way impair her credibility. Even among adults, different people react differently to a given
situation or type, of situation and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with
a strange and startling or frightful experience. It is not uncommon for young girls to conceal for some time the
assaults on their virtue because of the rapist’s threat on their lives,[31] aside from the fact that Filipinas are
naturally bashful. Here, since
complainant was expecting her husband to arrive shortly, as he did at around
1:00 A.M., naturally it was for him that she waited and to whom she immediately
reported the disgraceful assault on her chastity.
Appellant also takes it against complainant’s husband for reporting
the alleged rape only on the following day and for supposedly having slept
soundly even after he was informed of the alleged rape.[32]
This is a deliberate misstatement. Properly understood, what complainant meant was that her husband slept
briefly while waiting for the morning to come so he could report the matter to
the authorities.[33]
As to why he had to wait for the following day to report the
incident is explained by the respective testimonies of complainant and her
husband. Complainant explained that
after she had narrated to her husband how appellant committed the felony
against her, her husband had to conduct an inspection of the premises of their
house and, after some time, he was able to recover his jacket and the knife
used by appellant,[34] both
of which he presented to the police the following morning. Meliton Dionaldo explained that he was able
to go to the police early the following day as it was already 1:00 A.M. when he
arrived at home and, after he was able to get the details of the occurrence
from his wife, he still had to conduct the aforesaid search resulting in his
recovery of the items earlier stated.[35]
The incident was promptly reported to the police at 8:00 o’clock
the next day.[36]
A lapse of seven (7) hours could not be considered an undue “delay.”
Assuming arguendo that there was some time gap, it is to be borne in
mind that delay in reporting the incident is not an indication of a fabricated
charge,[37] nor does it cast doubt on the
credibility of the complainant.[38] In People
vs. Santiago,[39] we
held that the lapse of the period of 35 days before the victim finally reported
the sexual abuse committed against her by accused cannot be considered
unreasonably long to render the victim’s testimony doubtful.
Appellant also contends that the best evidence to show that he
really wiped his semen with the jacket of the victim’s husband was the jacket
itself but, as it turned out, complainant’s husband did not leave it with the
police as evidence.[40] This
was satisfactorily explained by witness Meliton Dionaldo as follows:
“q You
claimed to have a jacket and you believed that it was used by the accused in
wiping himself. Where is the jacket
now?
a I brought that jacket to the police station
and afterwards the police returned it to me and I brought it home. Only this hunting knife was retained by the
police.”[41]
It must be noted that complainant’s husband is a photographer who
did not even finish high school.[42] He
is not a lawyer who is expected to know what evidence is material and what is
not. Not being aware of the legal
technicalities, he cannot be expected to know what evidence to preserve and to
present. Being guided merely by the
instructions of the police investigator, the failure to present the jacket is
not attributable to him. Besides, the
testimonial evidence on this particular point is more than adequate to
establish that corroborative fact.
Appellant further postulates that it is very improbable that someone would rape the complaining witness
in her house where there were bright lights nearby and holes in the house, such
that the occupants therein can be seen.[43] The
defense has perhaps forgotten that appellant made death threats on the
complainant and her children, which cowed the latter into giving in to his
bestial desire without creating a commotion.[44]
Besides, it is a matter of judicial
acceptance that rape can be committed even in places where people congregate,
in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, and even inside a house
where there are other occupants.[45] Lust
is no respecter of time or place.[46]
Veering to another angle, the defense submits that there was no
rape because there was no evidence of sexual intercourse thirty hours before
the medical examination of the complaining witness, drawing for that purpose
upon this part of the testimony of the examining physician, Dr. Armie O.
Monarca:
“q You
were the one who placed this word ‘negative’?
a Yes,
sir.
q When
we speak of negative, that means there is none?
a There
is none.
q You
said you have examined the patient’s genitalia, is it not?
a Yes,
sir.
q And
by the looks of things after the examination it could be that she never had sexual intercourse some 30 hours before the
examination?
a Yes,
sir.”[47]
Again, the defense commits another polemic distortion. The physician did not say that there was no
sexual intercourse. What she said was
“it could be” that complainant did not have sexual intercourse. Obviously, the import of her statement is
that it was possible that there had been no sexual intercourse, but neither did
she rule out the possibility that there may have been sexual congress thirty
hours before the examination. To get a
clearer perspective, it is best to have a closer look at the testimony of the
physician:
“q Now,
what was (sic) your findings Mrs. Witness
in connection with that examination?
a As
negative and the sperm cell analysis was also negative.
q Why?
a Since
the patient, the complainant, is already married and she has borne children.
q You
mean there was a sperm cell but because the woman is married you placed there
negative?
a It
is difficult to compare. I mean, I put
there, i.e. – negative findings since that is expected of a married woman?
q You
mean to tell us there was a sperm cell?
a Yes,
sir.
Prosecutor Quiñones
You said a while ago you
placed negative because the complainant was married. Do you want to tell us there were sperm cells?
a What
I mean by negative findings of a married person who has delivered children
compared to a single or unmarried patient.
q How
could you compare a married woman with that of a single (woman)?
a It
needs illustration. I mean the
genitalia of a married woman is different from that of a single (woman) who
ha(d) not experienced sexual intercourse, the la(b)ia is enclosed and the
position of the hymen is intact. There
is no laceration while (in the case of) a married woman who ha(d) experienced
sexual contact the hymen is already
lacerated, with old healing laceration and the la(b)ia is not in a position.
q Would
you say doctor the person examined experienced sexual intercourse immediately before you conducted the examination?
a I examined the patient the
following morning so, I cannot. It is
difficult to determine whether it was recent or whether there was sexual intercourse or not.“
x x x
Court. Questions from the court.
q From
your testimony that your finding is negative, does the court gather from you
that you did not find anything from the vagina?
a Yes,
your Honor.
q You
also stated since you examined the
patient one day after the alleged rape,
you concluded that it is very hard to determine whether there was sexual intercourse or not?
a Yes,
your Honor.“
x x x
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION
“Pros. Quiñones
q Do
you want to tell us Mrs. witness that you cannot determine whether the patient experienced
sexual intercourse about 20 or 30 hours
before the medical examination?
a No,
it is very difficult to determine.“[48] (Emphasis and words in parentheses
supplied.)
Needless to say, the absence of spermatozoa in the vagina or
thereabouts does not negate the commission of rape,[49]
since it is penetration, however slight, and not ejaculation, that constitutes
rape.[50]
Besides, complainant herself testified that appellant, in an act of onanism,
ejaculated on her legs, thus:
“q In
your affidavit, you stated that when this accused was about to ejaculate, he
pulled out his penis out of your vagina and ejaculated (o)n your legs and he
was trembling?
a Yes, you Honor, he was
trembling. Perhaps, he was in a
hurry. He was afraid that somebody
might arrive and catch him, your Honor.
q When he stood up, did
you also stand up?
a I stood up and
afterwards sat on the floor, and tried to wipe the sperms scattered on my legs, you Honor.”[51]
Appellant relies heavily on his defense of alibi[52]
despite the long settled doctrinal rule that alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification by the prosecution witnesses of the author of the
crime.[53] Justifiably, courts have always
looked upon the defense of alibi with suspicion[54] and
always receive it with caution,[55] not only because it is inherently
weak and unreliable but also because of its easy fabrication.[56]
Appellant’s claim of alibi, being supported only by the testimony
of his long-time employer and close friends, and not by credible, impartial or
disinterested persons, does not deserve the consideration he vainly hopes for,
more so in the light of his positive identification as the culprit.[57]
From a painstaking scrutiny of the records and a thorough consideration of the
evidence, we have no reason to doubt the veracity and the accuracy of the
identification made by
complainant.
It is very highly improbable, if not impossible, that appellant
was indeed in Butuan City at the time of the rape. Meliton Dionaldo, husband of complainant, established without
contradiction that when he left his house at the Estrada Compound in Digos at
around 7:30 A.M. of August 28, 1988, he met appellant in his yard. Appellant asked him where he was going and
he replied that he was going to take pictures in Dawis.[58]
He had known appellant for around four months[59] and
appellant confirmed that he was also a resident of a house located in a part of
the Estrada compound.[60] We
further quote with approval the submission of the Solicitor General on this
point:
“Nevertheless, if appellant was indeed in Butuan at the time
of the reported rape, why did his alleged companions in Butuan not protest his
innocence since they were all present when appellant was arrested? They did not
even accompany him to the police station. Worse, his own lawyer waived his right to submit his counter-affidavit
in the preliminary investigation of the complaint. It is thus clear that his alibi is an eleventh-hour contrivance
to get him off the hook.”[61]
In its judgment, the trial court decreed that “(i)t
appearing that the filing and docket fees are not paid, there is no declaration
of any civil liability which is deemed reserved.” However, the pertinent rule on this matter
is merely to the effect that when the offended party seeks to enforce civil
liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages
and, in the present instance, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted
with the criminal action at bar.[62]
Under Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code, the offended woman is entitled to
be indemnified and such indemnity, pursuant to the present policy of the Court,
shall be in an amount of at least P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo
is hereby AFFIRMED, but with, the modifications that the incorrect phrase
“imprisonment for life” is deleted therefrom and the sum of
P30,000.00 is hereby awarded, and should be paid by accused-appellant, to the
complainant by way of indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Feliciano, Nocon, and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1]
Original Record, 18.
[2]
Ibid., 1.
[3]
Ibid., 97-99.
[4]
Ibid., 101.
[5]
Accused-Appellant’s Brief, 1; Rollo, 28.
[6]
People vs. Tereso, 194 SCRA 154 (1991).
[7]
People vs. Soliao, 194 SCRA 250 (1991).
[8]
People vs. Carson, 204 SCRA 266 (1991).
[9]
Rollo, 9.
[10]
People vs. Miscala, 202 SCRA 26 (1991).
[11]
TSN, February 21, 1989, 14.
[12]
Ibid., id., 19.
[13]
Exhibit “2”, Folder of Exhibits.
[14]
Accused-Appellant’s Brief, 9; Rollo, 36.
[15]
People vs. Natan, 193 SCRA 355 (1991).
[16]
People vs. Laredo, etc., et al., 185 SCRA 383 (1990).
[17]
People vs. Loveria, 187 SCRA 47 (1990).
[18]
People vs. Dumpe, et al., 183 SCRA 547 (1990).
[19]
People vs. Feliciano, 195 SCRA 19 (1991).
[20]
People vs. Tongson, 194 SCRA 257 (1991).
[21]
People vs. Eclarinal, et al., 182 SCRA 106 (1990).
[22]
People vs. Estolano, 193 SCRA 383 (1991).
[23]
People vs. Pasco, et al., 181 SCRA 233 (1990).
[24]
TSN, February 21, 1989, 14.
[25]
People vs. Natan, 193 SCRA 355 (1991).
[26]
Accused-Appellant’s Brief, 9; Rollo, 36.
[27]
Original Record, 99.
[28]
People vs. Rio, 201 SCRA 702 (1991).
[29]
Accused-Appellant’s Brief, 9; Rollo, 36.
[30]
TSN, February 21, 1989, 19, 29.
[31]
People vs. Raptus, 198 SCRA 425 (1991).
[32]
Accused-Appellant’s Brief, 10; Rollo, 37.
[33]
TSN, February 21, 1989, 22-23.
[34]
Ibid., id., 20-21.
[35]
TSN, February 20, 1989, 9-10.
[36]
Exhibit “2”, Folder of Exhibits.
[37]
People vs. Banayo, 195 SCRA 543 (1991).
[38]
People vs. Yambao, 193 SCRA 571 (1991).
[39]
197 SCRA 556 (1991).
[40]
Accused-Appellant’s Brief, 12-13; Rollo, 39-40.
[41]
TSN, February 21, 1989, 8.
[42]
Ibid., id., 22-23.
[43]
Accused-Appellant’s Brief, 13; Rollo, 40.
[44]
TSN, February 21, 1989, 14, 15.
[45]
People vs. De los Reyes, 203 SCRA 707 (1991).
[46]
People vs. Mangalino, 182 SCRA 707 (1991).
[47]
TSN, February 20, 1989, 6.
[48]
TSN, February 20, 1989, 4-7.
[49]
People vs. Yambao, supra.
[50]
People vs. Banayo, supra; People vs. Tongson, supra.
[51]
TSN, February 21, 1989, 28-29.
[52]
Accused-Appellant’s Brief, 19; Rollo,
45.
[53]
People vs. Obando, et al., 182 SCRA 95 (1990); People vs. Bocatcat Sr., et al., 188 SCRA 175
(1990).
[54]
People vs. Bondoc, 85 Phil. 545 (1950).
[55]
People vs. Cinco, et al., 67
Phil. 196 (1939).
[56]
People vs. Rafallo, et al., 86 Phil. 22 (1950).
[57]
People vs. Lucas, 181 SCRA 316 (1990);
People vs. Ampoan, et al., 187
SCRA 173 (1990); People vs. Beringuel, et al., 192 SCRA 561 (1990).
[58]
TSN, February 21, 1989, 8-9.
[59]
Ibid., February 20, 1989, 11.
[60]
Ibid., November 26, 1990, 16.
[61]
Appellee’s Brief, 15; Rollo, 82.
[62]
Sec. 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court, as amended by Resolution of the Supreme
Court dated July 7, 1988.