🎧 Case Brief Lecture

EDUARDO P. PILAPIL, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 101978. April 07, 1993 April 7, 1993

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Pilapil versus Sandiganbayan

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by Eduardo Pilapil, then the Congressman of the Third District of Camarines Sur, against the Sandiganbayan, its Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena, and the People of the Philippines. Pilapil asks the Supreme Court to annul the Sandiganbayan resolutions that denied his motion to quash the information charging him with a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act Number 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. He anchors his motion on two grounds: that the Sandiganbayan never acquired jurisdiction over his person because the information was filed without probable cause, and that the preliminary investigation was conducted for malversation, not for the graft charge actually filed. The case matters because it fixes the boundaries of a motion to quash — what a preliminary investigation really is, when its absence can be raised, and how probable cause is measured at the threshold of trial.

Procedural History

After the Office of the Ombudsman directed the filing of an information for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law, the information was filed before the Sandiganbayan. A warrant of arrest was issued, and Pilapil was allowed to post bail, after which the warrant was recalled. Pilapil then filed a motion to quash on the ground that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over his person because the information was filed without probable cause. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion, holding that the factual and legal questions raised were evidentiary in nature and matters of defense that could best be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. It likewise denied his motion for reconsideration and set his arraignment. Pilapil came to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari and mandamus, and by reason of its filing the Sandiganbayan held the arraignment in abeyance.

Facts

On October 16, 1987, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office donated a Mitsubishi L-300 ambulance to the Municipality of Tigaon, Camarines Sur. Pilapil, the Congressman of the Third District of Camarines Sur, received the ambulance in behalf of the municipality, but he did not deliver it to the municipality.

Unaware of the donation, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tigaon passed resolutions requesting an ambulance from the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. The municipal mayor, Eleanor Lelis, sought the help of Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena, who is from Tigaon. Justice Garchitorena contacted the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, learned of the earlier donation made through Pilapil, and informed the mayor that the request could not be favorably acted upon. When the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office verified the whereabouts of the vehicle with Pilapil, he indicated his willingness to return it, and in a letter he asked that it instead be donated to the Municipality of Tinambac. On December 26, 1988, he personally returned the ambulance, already painted over to cover the logo of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the other markings. With the return of the vehicle, Tigaon finally received a brand new Besta Kia ambulance unit.

Justice Garchitorena wrote the then Chief Justice about the matter and also sent the Deputy Ombudsman a letter-complaint against Pilapil. In the preliminary investigation that followed, Pilapil was required to submit his counter-affidavit, and he did, explaining that the vehicle had no medical attachments and that he had sought assistance from the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation for its conversion, and that he acceded to his staff's suggestion to include the name of that office on the sides of the ambulance. The Ombudsman Investigator found no probable cause for malversation, but the Ombudsman, in a resolution, sustained that finding and nonetheless found a prima facie case for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law, directing that the information be filed for that offense. The information was then filed before the Sandiganbayan.

Issues

  • Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash and the motion for reconsideration.
  • Whether or not the absence of a preliminary investigation on the specific charge of violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law is a ground to quash the information.
  • Whether or not the preliminary investigation conducted under the title of malversation was sufficient to justify the filing of the graft charge.
  • Whether or not Pilapil waived his right to a preliminary investigation.
  • Whether or not the information was filed without probable cause.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, on the grounds for a motion to quash, provides:

The absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash a complaint or information under Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.

This is the rudimentary rule the Court invokes at the outset, and it disposes of Pilapil's principal theory that the lack of a preliminary investigation on the graft charge deprived the court of jurisdiction.

The last paragraph of Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary Investigation having been first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence to his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule.

This provision defeats Pilapil's claim that he could not have asked for a new preliminary investigation because he learned of the charge only after the information was filed.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court holds that the Sandiganbayan did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction, nor with grave abuse of discretion, in denying the motion to quash and the motion for reconsideration. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case, nor does it impair the validity of the information or render it defective. The proper procedure is not to quash but to hold the proceedings in abeyance and remand the case to the Ombudsman or the Special Prosecutor for a preliminary investigation. The Court explains that the lack of jurisdiction contemplated by the rule refers to the lack of any law conferring upon the court the power to inquire into the facts, to apply the law, and to declare the punishment for an offense in a regular course of judicial proceeding. When the court has jurisdiction, any irregularity in the exercise of that power is not a ground for a motion to quash. Lack of jurisdiction is not waivable, but the absence of a preliminary investigation is waivable, and in fact is frequently waived.

On the second issue, the Court finds that a preliminary investigation was in fact conducted. Pilapil was properly apprised of the act complained of and given ample opportunity to rebut it; he submitted his own affidavit and those of his witnesses. The Court notes that a preliminary investigation is nothing more than the submission of the parties' respective affidavits, counter-affidavits, and evidence to buttress their separate allegations.

On the third issue, the Court holds that the preliminary designation of the offense in the directive to file a counter-affidavit is not conclusive; it is only a conclusion of law of the Deputy Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman is not bound by that qualification. The Ombudsman is guided by the evidence presented and may formulate and designate the offense on that basis. Even the designation of the offense by the prosecutor in the information itself has been held inconclusive, because the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.

On the fourth issue, the Court holds that even assuming no preliminary investigation was conducted for the information filed, Pilapil waived his right thereto for failure to ask the Sandiganbayan or the Ombudsman for a new preliminary investigation. The right to a preliminary investigation is not a fundamental right and may be waived expressly or by silence; it may be forfeited by inaction and can no longer be invoked for the first time at the appellate level. Pilapil bewailed the absence of a new preliminary investigation only before the Supreme Court, and the Court calls this an afterthought and a last ditch effort that came a bit late.

On the fifth issue, the Court holds that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime are evidentiary in nature and matters of defense, the truth of which can best be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It does not mean actual and positive cause, nor does it import absolute certainty; it is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction; it is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. In passing on a motion to set aside an information on the ground that the accused has been charged without probable cause, the court should not be guided by the rule that the accused must be shown guilty beyond reasonable doubt, but rather whether there is sufficient evidence which inclines the mind to believe, without necessarily leaving room for doubt, that the accused is guilty. The Court likewise dismisses as clearly unfounded the insinuation that Presiding Justice Garchitorena used the influence of his office, holding that bringing to the attention of appropriate officials possible transgressions of the law is as much an obligation of the highest official of the land as it is the responsibility of any private citizen.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, the absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash the information; it does not affect the court's jurisdiction, nor does it invalidate the information. The remedy is to hold the proceedings in abeyance and remand the case for a preliminary investigation. Second, lack of jurisdiction is not waivable, but the absence of a preliminary investigation is waivable, expressly or by silence, and may be forfeited by inaction; it cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Third, the designation of the offense in the information is not conclusive; the real nature of the charge is determined by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. Fourth, probable cause for the filing of an information is a reasonable belief, not absolute certainty, and the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is a matter of defense to be threshed out at trial.

Disposition

The petition for certiorari and mandamus was dismissed for lack of merit, and the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan denying the motion to quash and the motion for reconsideration were sustained.

Remember This

The one line worth memorizing: the absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash, for it does not affect jurisdiction and is waivable by silence. Examiners like to use this case on motions to quash, on the waivability of the right to preliminary investigation, and on the standard of probable cause at the threshold of trial.