ROLITO GO Y TAMBUNTING, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS; THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 168, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NCJR PASIG, M.M.; AND PEOPLE OF THE…

According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their
Investigation Report,^[1]
on 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan,
Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. Petitioner entered Wilson St.,
where it is a one-way street and started travelling in the opposite or
“wrong” direction. At the
corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner’s and Maguan’s cars nearly
bumped each other. Petitioner alighted
from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the
scene. A security guard at a nearby
restaurant was able to take down petitioner’s car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the
scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live
ammunition for a 9mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land Transportation Office showed that the car was
registered to one Elsa Ang Go.

The following day, the police returned to the scene of the
shooting to find out where the suspect had come from; they were informed that
petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the shooting. The police obtained a facsimile or
impression of the credit card used by petitioner from the cashier of the bake
shop. The security guard of the bake
shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he positively identified him as the
same person who had shot Maguan. Having
established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the police launched
a manhunt for petitioner.

On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan
Police Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police;
he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that
time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman. That same day, the police promptly filed a complaint for
frustrated homicide^[2]
against petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis
Villa Ignacio (“Prosecutor”) informed petitioner, in the presence of
his lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary
investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver.

On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the
Prosecutor, and before an information could be filed in court, the victim,
Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s).

Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing
an information for frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder^[3]
before the Regional Trial Court. No
bail was recommended. At the bottom of
the information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had
been conducted because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for
petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release
and proper preliminary investiga­tion,^[4]
alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that no
preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was
filed. Petitioner also prayed that he
be released on recognizance or on bail. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, acting on the omnibus motion, wrote
on the last page of the motion itself that he interposed no objection to
petitioner being granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00.

On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte
motion for special raffle^[5]
in order to expedite action on the Prosecutor’s bail recommendation. The case was raffled to the sala of
respondent Judge, who, on the same date, approved the cash bond^[6]
posted by petitioner and ordered his release.^[7]
Petitioner was in fact released that same day.

On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial
Court a motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation^[8]
and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the court be suspended. He stated that petitioner had filed before
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal an omnibus motion for
immediate release and preliminary investigation, which motion had been granted
by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, who also agreed to recommend cash bail
of P100,000.00. The Prosecutor attached
to the motion for leave a copy of petitioner’s omnibus motion of 11 July 1991.

Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order^[9]
granting leave to conduct preliminary investigation and cancelling the
arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution shall have
concluded its preliminary investigation.

On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio
issued an Order,^[10]
embodying the following: (1) the 12
July 1991 Order which granted bail was recalled; petitioner was given 48 hours
from receipt of the Order to surrender himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order
which granted leave to the prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation was
recalled and cancelled; (3) petitioner’s omnibus motion for immediate release
and preliminary investigation dated 11 July 1991 was treated as a petition for
bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991.

On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court assailing the 17 July
1991 Order, contending that the information was null and void because no
preliminary investigation had been previously conducted, in violation of his
right to due process. Petitioner also
moved for suspension of all proceedings in the case pending resolution by the
Supreme Court of his petition; this motion was, however, denied by respondent
Judge.

On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police.

By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to the Court of
Appeals.

On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court
setting the arraignment of petitioner on 23 August 1991.

On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
motion to restrain his arraignment.

On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order
directing the Provincial Warden of Rizal to admit petitioner into his custody
at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same
date, petitioner was arraigned. In
view, however, of his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court entered for him
a plea of not guilty. The trial court
then set the criminal case for continuous hearings on 19, 24 and 26 September;
on 2, 3, 11 and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22 November 1991.^[11]

On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus^[12]
in the Court of Appeals. He alleged
that in view of public respondents’ failure to join issues in the petition for certiorari
earlier filed by him, after the lapse of more than a month, thus prolonging his
detention, he was entitled to be released on habeas corpus.

On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas
corpus.^[13]
The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
on the one hand, and the petition for habeas corpus, upon the
other, were subsequently consolidated in the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution
denying petitioner’s motion to restrain his arraignment on the ground that that
motion had become moot and academic.

On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and
the prosecution presented its first witness.

On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a
consolidated decision^[14]
dismissing the two (2) petitions, on the following grounds:

a. Petitioner’s warrantless arrest was valid
because the offense for which he was arrested and charged had been
“freshly committed.” His identity had been established through
investigation. At the time he showed up
at the police station, there had been an existing manhunt for him. During the confrontation at the San Juan
Police Station, one witness positively identified petitioner as the culprit.

b. Petitioner’s act of posting bail constituted
waiver of any irregularity attending his arrest. He waived his right to preliminary investigation by not invoking
it properly and seasonably under the Rules.

c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it issued the 17 July 1991 Order because the trial court had the inherent
power to amend and control its processes so as to make them conformable to law
and justice.

d. Since there was a valid information for
murder against petitioner and a valid commitment order (issued by the trial
judge after petitioner surrendered to the authorities whereby petitioner was
given to the custody of the Provincial Warden), the petition for habeas corpus
could not be granted.

On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more
witnesses at the trial. Counsel for
petitioner also filed a “Withdrawal of Appearance”^[15]
with the trial court, with petitioner’s conformity.

On 4 October 1991, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari
was filed. On 14 October 1991, the
Court issued a Resolution directing respondent Judge to hold in abeyance the
hearing of the criminal case below until further orders from this Court.

In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be
addressed: first, whether or not a lawful
warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of
petitioner Go; and second, whether petitioner had effectively waived his right
to preliminary investigation. We
consider these issues seriatim.

In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that
under the facts of the case, petitioner had been validly arrested without
warrant. Since petitioner’s identity as
the gunman who had shot Eldon Maguan on 2 July 1991 had been sufficiently
established by police work, petitioner was validly arrested six (6) days later
at the San Juan Police Station. The
Solicitor General invokes Nazareno v. Station Commander, etc., et al,^[16]
one of the seven (7) cases consolidated with In the Matter of the Petition
for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil, etc. v. Ramos, et al.,^[17]
where a majority of the Court upheld a warrantless arrest as valid although
effected fourteen (14) days after the killing in connection with which Nazareno
had been arrested. Accordingly, in the view
of the Solicitor General, the provisions of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court were applicable and because petitioner had declined to waive the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the Prosecutor was legally
justified in filing the information for murder even without preliminary
investigation.

On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully
arrested without warrant because he went to the police station six (6) days
after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not
been “just committed” at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who
arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly
none had the “personal knowledge” required for the lawfulness of a
warrantless arrest. Since there had
been no lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary investigation,
could not apply in respect of petitioner.

The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil
v. Ramos is, in the circumstances of this case, misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos, by an eight-to-six
vote, the Court sustained the legality of the warrantless arrests of petitioners
made from one (1) to fourteen (14) days after the actual commission of the
offenses, upon the ground that such offenses constituted “continuing
crimes.” Those offenses were subversion, membership in an outlawed
organization like the New Peoples Army, etc. In the instant case, the offense for which petitioner was arrested was
murder, an offense which was obviously commenced and completed at one definite
location in time and space. No one had
pretended that the fatal shooting of Maguan was a “continuing crime.”

Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantless
“arrest” or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within
the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
which provides as follows:

“Sec. 5. Arrest
without warrant; when lawful. — A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person;

(a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense
has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person
to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7.”

Petitioner’s “arrest” took
place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The “arresting” officers obviously were not present,
within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot
Maguan. Neither could the
“arrest” effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably
regarded as effected “when [the shooting had] in fact just been
committed” within the meaning of Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the “arresting” officers had any
“personal knowledge” of facts indicating that petitioner was the
gunman who had shot Maguan. The
information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made
by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the
gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman’s car’s plate number
which turned out to be registered in petitioner’s wife’s name. That information did not, however,
constitute “personal knowledge.”^[18]

It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful
warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule
113. It is clear too that Section 7 of
Rule 112, which provides:

“Sec. 7. When
accused lawfully arrested without warrant. When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be
filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the
offended party or arresting office or person.

However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the
person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer
in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a
lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his
choice. Notwithstanding such waiver,
he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.

If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, the accused may within five (5)
days from the time he learns of the filing of he information, ask for a
preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his
favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule.” (Underscoring supplied)

is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at
all. When he walked into the San Juan
Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at
the disposal of the police authorities. He did not state that he was “surrendering” himself in all
probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon
Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with
the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary
investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging
petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceeded under the
erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required
petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as
a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive error for petitioner
was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been
accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a
warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing
at the preliminary investigation.

Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had
waived his right to preliminary investigation, we note that petitioner had from
the very beginning demanded that a preliminary investigation be conducted. As earlier pointed out, on the same day that
the information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court, petitioner
filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and
preliminary investigation. The
Solicitor General contends that that omnibus motion should have been filed with
the trial court and not with the Prosecutor, and that petitioner should
accordingly be held to have waived his right to preliminary investigation. We do not believe that waiver of
petitioner’s statutory right to preliminary investigation may be predicated on
such a slim basis. The preliminary
investigation was to be conducted by the Prosecutor, not by the Regional Trial
Court. It is true that at the time of
filing of petitioner’s omnibus motion, the information for murder had already
been filed with the Regional Trial Court: it is not clear from the record whether petitioner was aware of this
fact at the time his omnibus motion was actually filed with the
Prosecutor. In Crespo v. Mogul,^[19]
this Court held:

“The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the
purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists
warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the
information in the proper court. In
turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the
criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the
case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and
recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate
action. While it is true that the
fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or
not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already
been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper
in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the
Court. The only qualification is that
the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused,
or the right of the People to due process of law.

x x x              x x x                 x x x

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint
or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case [such] as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court. Although
the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal
cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on
the trial court. The Court is the best
and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. x x x”^[20]
(Citations omitted; underscoring supplied)

Nonetheless, since petitioner in his
omnibus motion was asking for preliminary investigation and not for a
re-investigation (Crespo v. Mogul involved a re-investigation),
and since the Prosecutor himself did file with the trial court on the 5th day
after filing the information for murder, a motion for leave to conduct
preliminary investigation (attaching to his motion a copy of petitioner’s
omnibus motion), we conclude that petitioner’s omnibus motion was in effect
filed with the trial court. What was
crystal clear was that petitioner did ask for a preliminary investigation on
the very day that the information was filed without such preliminary investigation,
and that the trial court was five (5) days later apprised of the desire of the
petitioner for such preliminary investigation. Finally, the trial court did in fact grant the Prosecutor’s
prayer for leave to conduct preliminary investigation. Thus, even on the (mistaken) supposition
apparently made by the Prosecutor that Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised
Court was applicable, the 5-day reglementary period in Section 7, Rule 112 must
be held to have been substantially complied with.

We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to
a preliminary investigation. While that
right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament since it has in
fact been established by statute, it is a component part of due process in
criminal justice.20 The right to have a preliminary
investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense
and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not
a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial is
inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak
of expense; the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one
save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To deny petitioner’s claim to a preliminary
investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due
process.

The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his
right to a preliminary investigation in the instant case considering that he
was already arraigned on 23 August 1991. The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when
the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a
plea at arraignment.^[21]
In the instant case, petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right to
preliminary investigation before his arraignment. At the time of his arraignment, petitioner
was already before the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
precisely asking for a preliminary investigation before being forced to stand
trial.

Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that
by posting bail, petitioner had waived his right to preliminary
investigation. In People v. Selfaison,^[22]
we did hold that appellants there had waived their right to preliminary
investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and
proceeded to trial “without previously claiming that they did not have
the benefit of a preliminary investigation.”^[23]
In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail
and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary
investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by
petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary
investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to
conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that
petitioner’s claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.

We would clarify, however, that contrary to petitioner’s
contention the failure to accord preliminary investigation, while constituting
a denial of the appropriate and full measure of the statutory process of
criminal justice, did not impair the validity of the information for murder nor
affect the jurisdiction of the trial court.^[24]

It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed
that petitioner was entitled to bail. This was equivalent to an acknowledgment on the part of the Prosecutor
that the evidence of guilt then in his hands was not strong. Accordingly, we consider that the 17 July
1991 order of respondent Judge recalling his own order granting bail and
requiring petitioner to surrender himself within forty-eight (48) hours from
notice, was plainly arbitrary considering that no evidence at all — and
certainly no new or additional evidence — had been submitted to
respondent Judge that could have justified the recall of his order issued just
five (5) days before. It follows that
petitioner was entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right.

The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that in the instant case,
trial on the merits has already commenced, the Prosecutor having already
presented four (4) witnesses, impact upon, firstly, petitioner’s right to a
preliminary investigation and secondly, petitioner’s right to be released on
bail? Does he continue to be entitled
to have a preliminary investigation conducted in respect of the charge against
him? Does petitioner remain entitled to
be released on bail?

Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we
consider that petitioner remains entitled to a prelimi­nary investigation
although trial on the merits has already began. Trial on the merits should be suspended or held in abeyance and a
preliminary investigation forthwith accorded to petitioner.^[25]
It is true that the Prosecutor might, in view of the evidence that he may at
this time have on hand, conclude that probable cause exists; upon the other
hand, the Prosecutor conceivably could reach the conclusion that the evidence
on hand does not warrant a finding of probable cause. In any event, the constitutional point is that petitioner was not
accorded what he was entitled to by way of procedural due process.^[26]
Petitioner was forced to undergo arraignment and literally pushed to trial
without preliminary investigation, with extraordinary haste, to the applause
from the audience that filled the courtroom. If he submitted to arraignment and trial, petitioner did so
“kicking and screaming,” in a manner of speaking. During the proceedings held before the trial
court on 23 August 1991, the date set for arraignment of petitioner, and just
before arraignment, counsel made very clear petitioner’s vigorous protest and
objection to the arraignment precisely because of the denial of preliminary
investigation.^[27]
So energetic and determined were petitioner’s counsel’s protest and objection
that an obviously angered court and prosecutor dared him to withdraw or
walkout, promising to replace him with counsel de oficio. During the trial, just before the prosecution
called its first witness, petitioner through counsel once again reiterated his
objection to going to trial without preliminary investigation; petitioner’s
counsel made of record his “continuing objection.”^[28]
Petitioner had promptly gone to the appellate court on certiorari and
prohibition to challenge the lawfulness of the procedure he was being forced to
undergo and the lawfulness of his detention.^[29]
If he did not walkout on the trial, and if he cross-examined the prosecution’s
witnesses, it was because he was extremely loath to be represented by counsel de
oficio selected by the trial judge, and to run the risk of being held to
have waived also his right to use what is frequently the only test of truth in
the judicial process.

In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so
hold that petitioner remains entitled to be released on bail as a matter of
right. Should the evidence already of
record concerning petitioner’s guilt be, in the reasonable belief of the
Prosecutor, strong, the Prosecutor may move in the trial court for cancellation
of petitioner’s bail. It would then be
up to the trial court, after a careful and objective assessment of the evidence
on record; to grant or deny the motion for cancellation of bail.

To reach any other conclusion here, that is, to hold that
petitioner’s rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail were effectively
obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into the record would be to
legitimize the deprivation of due process and to permit the Government to
benefit from its own wrong or culpable omission and effectively to dilute
important rights of accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing point. It may be that to require the State to
accord petitioner his rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail at this
point, could turn out ultimately to be largely a ceremonial
exercise. But the Court is not
compelled to speculate. And, in any
case, it would not be idle ceremony; rather it would be a celebration by
the State of the rights and liberties of its own people and a re-affirmation of
its obligation and determination to respect those rights and liberties.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT the Petition for
Review on Certiorari. The Order
of the trial court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and
the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 September 1991 hereby REVERSED.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to
conduct forthwith a preliminary investigation of the charge of murder against
petitioner Go, and to complete such preliminary investigation within a period
of fifteen (15) days from commencement thereof. The trial on the merits of the criminal case in the Regional
Trial Court shall be SUSPENDED to await the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.

Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon
posting of a cash bail bond of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). This release shall be without prejudice to
any lawful order that the trial court may issue, should the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the
preliminary investigation.

No pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Medialdea, Romero, and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Regalado, and Davide, Jr., JJ., join J. Griño-Aquino in her
dissenting opinion.

Cruz, J., see separate
concurrence.

---

^[1]
Annex “A” of Petition; Rollo,
pp. 29-32.

^[2]
Rollo, p. 28.

^[3]
Annex “B” of Petition, Rollo,
pp. 33-34.

^[4]
Annex “C” of Petition, Rollo, pp. 35-43.

^[5]
Annex “D” of Petition, Rollo, pp. 44-45.

^[6]
Annexes “E” and “E-1” of Petition, Rollo, pp. 46-48.

^[7]
Annex “F” of Petition, Rollo, p. 49.

^[8]
Annex “G” of Petition, Rollo,
pp. 50-51.

^[9]
Annex “G-1” of Petition, Rollo,
p. 52.

^[10]
Annex “H” of Petition, Rollo,
pp. 54-55.

^[11]
Annex “J” of Petition, Rollo, pp. 57-58.

^[12]
Annex “K” of Petition, Rollo,
pp. 59-66.

^[13]
Annex “K-1” of Petition, Rollo,
pp. 67-68.

^[14]
Annex “N” of Petition, Rollo,
pp. 109-120.

^[15]
Annex “A” of Comment, Rollo,
p. 154.

^[16]
G.R. No. 86332.

^[17]
G.R. No. 81567, promulgated 3 October
1991.

^[18]
People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986).

^[19]
151 SCRA 462 (1987).

^[20]
151 SCRA at 469-471.

20 Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354
(1989); San Diego v. Hernandez, 24 SCRA 110 (1968); People v.
Monton, 23 SCRA 1024 (1968); People v. Oandasan, 25 SCRA 277 (1968);
Lozada v. Hernandez, 92 Phil. 1051 (1953); U.S. v. Banzuela, 31
Phil. 564 (1915).

^[21]
People v. Monteverde, 142 SCRA 668 (1986); People v. Gomez, 117
SCRA 72 (1982); People v. Marquez, 27 SCRA 808 (1969); People v.
de la Cerna, 21 SCRA 569 (1967).

^[22]
110 Phil. 839 (1961).

^[23]
110 Phil. at 848.

^[24]
People v. Gomez, supra: People v. Yutila, 102 SCRA 264
(1981); People v. Casiano, 111 Phil. 73 (1961).

^[25]
In Rodis, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, 2nd Division (166 SCRA 618
[1988]), the Court said:

“x x x And while the absence
of preliminary investigations does not affect the court’s jurisdiction over the
case (n)or do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it
defective, but, if there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants,
before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence,
the court, instead of dismissing the information, should conduct such
investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the
inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted. In this case, the Tanodbayan has the duty to
conduct the said investigation.

Thus, although the Sandiganbayan
was correct in ruling that the absence of a preliminary investigation is not a
ground for quashing an information, it should have held the proceedings in
the criminal cases in abeyance pending resolution by the Tanodbayan of
petitioner’s petition for reinvestigation, as alternatively prayed for by
him in his motion to quash. (166 SCRA
at 623-624)

In Paredes v.
Sandiganbayan (193 SCRA 464 [1991]), the Court stated:

“x x x The remedy of the
accused in such a case is to call the attention of the court to the lack
of a preliminary investigation and demand, as a matter of right, that
one be conducted. The court,
instead of dismissing the information, should merely suspend the trial and
order the fiscal to conduct a preliminary investigation. Thus did we rule in Ilagan v. Enrile,
139 SCRA 349.” (193 SCRA at 469)

^[26]
Section 14 (1), Article III, 1987
Constitution: “No person should be
held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.”

^[27]
ATTY. ARMOVIT:

x x x. We are sad to make the
statement that it would seem that the government now in this proceeding would
like to become the law breaker. Why do
we say this, Your Honor. The
Information for a serious crime of murder was filed against the accused without
the benefit of the preliminary investigation. As a matter of fact, Your Honor, the want of preliminary
investigation has been admitted by no less than the Investigating Fiscal
himself. x x x

x x x                 x
x x                 x x x

ATTY. ARMOVIT:

Why do we say the government becomes a law breaker. We have a case of US vs.
Marfori. It says and I quote (counsel
reading said portion in open court). x
x x Likewise in San Diego v. Hernandez, the Supreme Court says and l
quote, (counsel reading said portion in open court). All of these doctrines had been recently quoted in the case of Doromal
v. Sandiganbayan. In
addition to this, we have filed a motion before this
Court. The Motion to Suspend
Proceedings and Transfer Venue which is set for hearing on 28 August
1991. The arguments we cited in
this motion to suspend proceedings and to transfer venue are not invention of
this counsel.

ATTY. FLAMINIANO:

He is talking to the motion which is
set for August 28, Your Honor.

ATTY. ARMOVIT:

I want to be heard, Your Honor.

ATTY. FLAMINIANO:

The Motion is set for August 28 and he
is now arguing on that motion.

COURT:

I am going to stop you. You concentrate on the motion before the
Court.

FISCAL VILLA IGNACIO:

The pending incident is for the
arraignment of the accused, Your Honor.

COURT:

What we are doing are not pertinent
to the issue. This would be
unprocedural.

ATTY. ARMOVIT:

What we are trying to say, Your
Honor, why do you rush with the arraignment of the accused when there are
several unresolved incidents. The
special civil action before the Court of Appeals where we questioned the very
validity …..

COURT:

Until now the Court of Appeals has
not given due course regarding that.

ATTY. ARMOVIT:

The government rushes with the
proceedings here. In the Court of
Appeals they filed a motion for extension of ten days from August 19 or until
August 29 to comment on that special civil action. There are dozens of cases which languishes 2, 3, 4 to 5
years. Why so special and selective
in the treatment of this case. I ask
that question.

COURT:

Before you proceed, can you cite an
incident before this Court where the preliminary investigation has been
delayed.

FISCAL VILLA IGNACIO:

The information was filed last July
11, 1991. Today is August 23. Where is the rush in arraigning the accused.

COURT:

Heard enough. Proceed with the arraignment of the accused.

ATTY. ARMOVIT:

In my 30 years of practice, this is
the first time I am stopped by the Court in the middle of my arguments.

FISCAL VILLA IGNACIO:

You are wasting the time of the
court.

COURT:

Order in the court. Order in the court.

ATTY. ARMOVIT:

I want to make of record that there
has been clapping after the manifestation of the Hon. Fiscal, Your Honor.

COURT:

Let us proceed with the arraignment.

ATTY. ARMOVIT:

May I conclude citing, Your Honor,
the Supreme Court decision.

COURT:

I have made my ruling. The
accused is entitled to speedy trial. That is the reason why this arraignment was set for today.

ATTY. ARMOVIT:

May I move for a reconsideration, Your Honor.

COURT:

The motion for reconsideration is denied. Proceed with the arraignment of the accused.

ATTY. ARMOVIT:

Your Honor, may we move that we be given a period of five days to
file a motion to quash information.

FISCAL VILLA IGNACIO:

This is plain dilatory tactics, Your Honor.

COURT:

In view of the refusal of the accused to enter a plea on account of the
advice of his lawyer, let therefore a plea of not guilty be entered into the record of this case.

ATTY. ARMOVIT:

I would like to move for a ruling on our motion to be given five days to
file a motion to quash. We did not hear
the ruling on that point, Your Honor.

COURT:

As prayed for, counsel for accused is hereby given a period of five
days from today within which to file his Motion to Quash, x x x.

It is understood that the Motion to Quash will not in anyway affect the
arraignment of the accused.

ATTY. ARMOVIT:

Considering the favorable ruling of
the Court that we were given five days to file a motion to quash, may we
move that the Court order the entering a plea of not guilty of the accused be
expunged from the record, otherwise, we will deem to have waived our right to
file a motion to quash.

x x x                 x
x x                 x x x

ATTY. ARMOVIT:

With due respect considering that
there are very serious criminal law question involved in this proceedings, we
respectfully submit that it is premature. Besides, I have unresolved motion to inhibit the Presiding Judge.

COURT:

I will cut you there x x x assuming
you were given five days to file a motion to quash, it doesn’t mean the
arraignment is considered moot and academic. The arraignment stands including the plea of not guilty to the
offense as charged. I am asking you
whether you are availing the pre-trial without prejudice to filing a motion to
quash.

ATTY. ARMOVIT:

Consistently, there is no valid
proceedings before this Court. I would
rather not participate in this case. But if it is the Court’s order then we’ll have to submit, but from this
representation we will not voluntarily
submit.

x x x                 x
x x                 x x x

ATTY. ARMOVIT:

This representation manifested that I
would rather not participate in this case. But if it is the Court’s order we would submit to the Order of this
Court because we are officers of the law not that we are already
representing the accused. May we
respectfully move to strike out from the record the inofficious order of the
Hon. Prosecutor to appoint a counsel de oficio. The accused is entitled to counsel de parte.

FISCAL VILLA IGNACIO:

But counsel de parte refuses to
participate, in which the incumbent court can appoint a PAO lawyer in case of
the absence of counsel de parte.

COURT:

The objection of the Public
Prosecutor is well taken. That is the
procedure of the Court, that if the accused has no counsel de parte we always
appoint a counsel de oficio for the accused.

ATTY. ARMOVIT:

We respectfully submit that accused
in criminal case is entitled to his counsel of his own choice. May we at least allow the accused to express
his opinion or decision on matters as to who should give him legal
representation.

COURT:

You just said earlier you don’t
want to participate in the proceedings.

ATTY. ARMOVIT:

That is not what I said. I said that we’ll not voluntarily
participate but if it is the Court’s order, certainly the accused has the
right of his own counsel of choice.

COURT:

The Court will now reiterate
ordering the trial of this case.

x x x     x x x     x x x” (TSN,
23 August 1991, pp. 2-9; underscoring supplied)

During the hearing held on 4
September 1991, before the Court of Appeals, in the Petition for Habeas Corpus,
counsel for petitioner recounted in detail what took place before the trial
court and stressed the objection entered by the petitioner before the trial
court and that petitioner participated in the proceedings below not voluntarily
but under the coercive power of the trial judge. Counsel concluded:

“x x x Again I said, Your
Honors, we are not participating in this proceedings, but we will submit
to what the Judge rules because that is all we can do. While we object we have to submit. That is why, Your Honors, dates were set out
of compulsion not because we voluntarily participated but we reserved our
right, Your Honors, to pursue our special civil action and so that is why these
dates came about.” (TSN, 4 September 1991, Records in C.A.-G.R. Nos.
SP-25800 and 25530, pp. 37-39; underscoring supplied).

^[28]
The relevant portion of transcript of stenographic notes reads as follows:

“COURT:

And considering that the Court has
not been restrained by the Court of Appeals despite the petition, let the trial
of this case proceed.

ATTY. ARMOVIT:

Your Honor please may we just
record a continuing objection on the grounds that are cited in our petition for
habeas corpus and certiorari to conduct the further proceedings this Court
and by the way Your Honor, we do not consider unfortunate the deliberation and
serious thoughts our higher courts are giving in respect to a consideration of
the constitutional right of the accused invoked before that body rather it is
the most judicial act of uplifting the highest court of our land.

COURT:

Alright proceed.

PP VILLA IGNACIO:

We call on our first witness to the
witness stand, Mr. Nicanor Bayhona. (TSN, 19 September 1991, p. 6; underscoring supplied).

^[29]
In People v. Lambino (103 Phil. 504 [1958]), Lambino, before
commencement of trial, demanded his right to preliminary investigation. His motion for preliminary investigation was
denied by the trial court which, in due course of time, convicted Lambino. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the
trial court did not err in denying Lambino’s motion for preliminary
investigation because said motion was filed after he had entered a plea of not
guilty and because he took no steps to bring the matter to a higher court to
stop the trial of the case. The Supreme
Court said:

“x x x Again, before the
commencement of the trial, appellant reiterated his petition for a preliminary
investigation, which was overruled, nevertheless appellant took no steps to
bring the matter to higher courts and stop the trial of the case; instead he
allowed the prosecution to present the first witness who was able to testify
and show the commission of the crime charged in the inform­ation. By his conduct, we held that he waived his
right to a preliminary investigation and is estopped from claiming it.”
(103 Phil. at 508; underscoring supplied)

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