THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROGELIO BALIDIATA Y ASONG, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

The accused-appellant seeks the reversal of the judgment in Criminal
Case No. 310-V-91 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section
4, Article II, Republic Act No. 6425, other­wise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Law of 1972, as amend­ed, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

In an information dated May 31, 1991, the appel­lant was charged
with having wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sold and delivered to the
prosecution witnesses thirteen (13) handrolled marijuana cigarettes, a
prohibited drug, worth P50.00.

The facts established by the evidence of the prosecution are summarized
in the Solicitor General’s brief as follows:

“Sometime in May 29, 1991, the Chief of the CID-NPD, Caloocan
City, acting on the repeated complaints of drug pushing-selling by concerned
citizens of Marulas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila sent a special team of five
policemen to Marulas to investigate said complaints. The team proceeded to Tampoy St., Marulas, Valenzuela, with the
plan to entrap the drug pushers through a buy-bust operation wherein a member
of the team (Pepito Gutierrez) would pose as a buyer of the prohibited
drug. (pp. 2-5, tsn, July 3, 1991).

“Arriving at Tampoy St., Marulas, Bulacan the police team was
met by an informant (p. 5, supra) who pointed to appellant who was then
standing at Tampoy St., (p. 6, tsn, July 8, 1991). Appellant asked Gutierrez how many ‘marijuanas’ he would buy and
to which Gutierrez answered how many could he buy for P50.00. Appellant left and after a few minutes
returned and handed to Gutierrez thirteen (13) sticks of marijuana which were
placed inside a cigarette pack. Gutierrez gave P50.00 to appellant and immediately the other members of
the police team approached and apprehended the appellant and later brought
[him] to the police station for investigation (pp. 5-6, tsn, July 3, 1991).

“The seized marijuana sticks were referred to the NBI Forensic
Chemistry Section which when examined, were positive for marijuana, per the
certification issued by Ruby Calalo, NBI Forensic Chemist (Exh. ‘C’).”
(pp. 49-50, Rollo.)

After trial, the lower court made the following findings:

“The testimonies of Sgt. Pepito Gutierrez and Sgt. Alfredo
Dela Cruz in Court are corroborated by their joint affidavit (Exhs. E, E-1,
E-2, and E-3). Even as they testified
that when they went to the buy bust operation area, they had no specific person
in mind, on whom the buy bust would be applied, it is stated in the said joint
statement that after a series of surveillance with the aid of informants
conducted in Valenzuela, they proceeded to Tampoy II, Valenzuela for the
possible arrest of marijuana pushers which they found in their surveillance and
information gathering abundant in that area; that an informant introduced
Officer Pepito Gutierrez to the accused, who told the accused that Gutierrez
wanted to buy marijuana. The sale
materialized and for a buying price of P50.00, the 13 sticks were sold by the
accused. This is believed by the Court.

“The testimony for the defense that a certain Fernando Tan y Reyes was with him when brought to the
CID for verification, but was subse­quently released bolstered the fact, that
the accused did sell the 13 sticks and therefore not released unlike Fernando
Tan against whom no sufficient evidence was found.

“The Court heard the testimonies for the defense that even
when the accused was brought to the Fiscal he did not protest and did not
explain his innocence but just cried, and the fact that he did not complain
against the policemen for falsely charging him, are signs that he did commit
the crime charged against him.

“The police officers who conducted the buy bust who
apprehended the accused, were not shown by the defense to have been impelled by
any ulterior motive for doing so. Under
present jurisprudence, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty on their part must be recognized. This was repeatedly enunciated in the case
of People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee vs. June Sanchez y Carmona,
defendant-appellant, 173 SCRA 305 where the Supreme Court ruled:

“‘Remedial law: Evidence; Presumption of Regular Performance of Duty; Witnesses; The
testimony of the two police officers carries with it the presumption of regular
performance of official functions – As is so
common in criminal cases of
this kind there is here a direct conflict between the positive
testimony of the arresting officers,
Sgts. Palmero and Serrano, and the testimony of the accused. The trial court which had the opportunity to
observe the detailed demeanor of the prosecution witnesses and of the accused
on the witness stand, and to listen to their respective testimonies, gave more
credence to the statements of the arresting officers, Sgts. Palmero and
Serrano. The trial court pointed out
that these government agents had no known motive or reason falsely to impute a
serious and unfounded charge against the accused. x x x.’

“The 13 sticks of marijuana alleged by the above-mentioned
law-enforcers were found positive for marijuana as evidenced by the Dangerous
Drugs Report No. DDM-91-392 (Exhs. C, C-1, C-2) testified on by Forensic
Chemist Rubie Baniela Calalo. The
number of marijuana sticks in accused’s possession, 13 in all which is of
considerable quantity is evidence that he is a seller pusher. This was ruled in the case of People of the
Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Roberto Toledo y Tejario alias ‘Obet,’
accused-appellant, 140 SCRA 259, No. L-67609, November 22, 1985:

“‘Criminal Law; Evidence; Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act;
Possession of considerable quantity of marijuana leaves and seeds coupled with
the fact that the accused is not a user of prohibited drugs, indi­cates an
intention of the accused to sell, distribute and deliver marijuana.’

“Section 4 of RA 6425 as amended provides:

“‘Sale, Administra­tion, Delivery, Distribu­tion and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs – Penalty of life imprisonment to death and
a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver,
give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited
drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. If the victim of the offense is a minor,
or should a prohib­ited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the
death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be
imposed.’ (As amended by PD No. 1675, February 17, 1980)

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the
accused Rogelio Balidiata guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Violation of Section 4 Article II RA 6425, and hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of life imprison­ment, and a fine of twenty thousand pesos without
subsidiary imprison­ment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

“The accused shall be credited with the full term of his
preventive imprisonment.” (pp. 15-17, Rollo.)

In his appeal to this Court, the accused makes the following
assignments of error:

1. The Court a quo
gravely erred in letting accused-appellant be arraigned without assistance of
counsel;

2. The Court a quo seriously erred in giving more credence to the witnesses for
the prosecution rather than to the witness for the defense.

3. The Court a quo fatally erred in encouraging instead of
discouraging artificial entrapment in the apprehension of violators of the
Anti-Dangerous Drugs Act;

4. The Court a quo
manifestly erred in not construing the provi­sions of the Anti-Dangerous Drugs
Act in case of doubt in favor of the accused-appellant; and

5. The Court a quo
evidently erred in condemning instead of acquitting the accused-appellant.

There is no merit in the appellant’s allegation that the
proceedings in the trial court were tainted by violation of his legal and
constitutional rights because he was arraigned without the assistance of
counsel. An examination of the records
reveals the contrary. The trial court’s
order of June 7, 1991, states the follow­ing:

“The accused assisted by Atty. Donato Mabbayad, counsel de
officio, appointed by the Court, upon ar­raignment, pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged.” (p. 7, Orig. Records.)

The statement in
the decision that the accused was arraigned
without the assistance of counsel
appears to be a clerical error that
should be corrected on the basis of the
record. Significantly, the
appellant failed to raise that issue in the trial court, hence, he is barred from raising it for the first
time on appeal (People vs. Leoparte, 187 SCRA 190; Ruiz vs. Caneba, 191 SCRA 865).

Appellant’s other
contention that the Court a quo seriously erred in giving
more credence to the prosecu­tion witnesses rather than the defense, has
no merit. Criminal cases turn upon the credibility of witnesses. A careful review of the records of this
case and the arguments raised in
the appellant’s brief, discloses no reason why we should not accord the usual
respect given to the factual findings of the trial court. Settled
is the rule that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, we have always accorded
the highest respect to the findings of the trial court for it is
in a better position than us to decide that question, for it heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial. Unless the trial court has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might
affect the outcome of the case, we do not disturb its factual conclusions
(People vs. Egas, 137 SCRA 188).

The entrapment laid
out by the police which led to the
arrest of the appellant in flagrante delicto is no bar to the prosecution of the offender. “Entrapment is a lawful police tactic
for trapping and capturing law breakers in the execution of their criminal plan
x x x” (People vs. Natipravat, 145 SCRA 483). The drug pusher is not induced to break the law for he is in fact
al­ready engaged in the business of selling prohibited drugs. As distinguished from an
“inducement” which is illegal and would result in making the
policemen princi­pals by induction, in an entrapment they merely execute a plan
to catch the drug dealer in the act of plying his nefarious trade.

Credence should be given to the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses, especially the police officers who are presumed to have performed
their duties in a regular manner in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary. The Court may not close its
eyes to the seriousness of the drug menace in our country which, according to
some newspaper reports, is now the third largest trading post for prohibited
drugs in Asia.

Moreover, in this case, there is nary a hint that the policemen
who took part in the entrapment of the accused were impelled by any ulterior or
corrupt motive to falsely indict him for such a grave felony. Their
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit (People vs. Sanchez, 173 SCRA
305).

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision of the
trial court convicting the accused-appellant, Rogelio Balidiata y Asong, of
having violated Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, the
judgment under appeal is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Bellosillo, and
Quiason, JJ., concur.