TERTULIANO ABEJARON, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, (TWELFTH DIVISION) AND PEPSI COLA BOTTLING CO., INC., RESPONDENTS.

In 1978, petitioner Tertuliano Abejaron was employed by private
respondent Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., Inc. as a salesman.

In May 1980, Pepsi suspended him without pay for an alleged
unremitted collection of P67,945.70. A complaint for estafa was also filed against
him with the Provincial Fiscal of General
Santos but this was subsequently dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence.

Abejaron was reinstated on November 11, 1980, but in November
1982, he was served a warning on
a second charge that he had incurred questionable route shortages and had
repeatedly failed and refused to remit his daily collections. He was “grounded” pending
investigation of this matter.

In 1983, Pepsi filed another complaint for estafa against
Abejaron with the City Fiscal of
General Santos City. This time the
corresponding information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of General
Santos City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 3067.^[1]

On August 29, 1986, the trial court acquitted Abejaron of the
crime charged.^[2]
Nevertheless, Abejaron was eventually separated by Pepsi on March 21, 1983.

Abejaron never filed any complaint with the Labor Department when
he was suspended in 1980 and when he was dismissed in 1983. Instead, he sued Pepsi for damages on
November 24, 1986, for what he called the malicious filing of the estafa charge
against him. This complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 3475 in the Regional Trial Court of General Santos
City.

On April 25, 1989,
Judge Manuel Luis S. Gumban rendered a decision holding Pepsi liable for all the awards prayed for in the complaint, to
wit, P50,000 as actual damages, P65,317.87 as actual or compensatory damages,
P35,000 as attorney’s fees, P200,000 as moral damages, and litigation expenses.^[3]

In its appeal to the respondent court, Pepsi raised for the first
time the sole issue of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the
case. It maintained that as the
complaint was essentially a monetary claim arising from an employer-employee
relationship, jurisdiction was vested thereover in the Labor Arbiter.

The respondent court rejected this contention thus:

A cursory reading of the complaint filed by the appellee
indubitably shows no trace of any fact tending to establish that the same was
based on the illegal termination from office of herein appellee. Conversely, a scrutiny of the complaint
reveals that the same was apparently filed to recover damages on the basis of
the alleged malicious prosecution and its consequence on the part of the
appellee.

The Court has carefully examined the allegations in the complaint
and holds that the above pronouncement is correct. The respondent court did not err in ruling that the case came
under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not of the Labor
Arbiter.

In Honiron Philippines,
Inc., et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,^[4] this
Court declared:

Mendiola’s action is founded essentially on “the highly
malicious and grossly wanton acts and omission” of defendants. Specifically, the administrative services
manager’s act of filing a complaint for frustrated qualified theft against him
out of personal resentment, the personnel manager’s false, malicious and
slanderous imputation of the crime of theft against him leading to the
termination by Honiron of his services without clearance and while the case was
still being investigated by the police, and Honiron’s insistence on prosecuting
him for the alleged crime. The
complaint was not anchored on the termination of Mendiola’s services per
se, but rather on the manner and consequent effects of such termination.

Mendiola’s complaint being based on alleged violations of Civil Code provisions instead of the
Labor Code, his action is basically a
civil dispute cognizable by the
regular courts.

A more exhaustive discussion of this same issue is found in the
case of Pepsi Cola Distributors of the Philippines, Inc. v. Gal-lang,^[5]
where, after referring to the cases of Medina vs. Castro-Bartolome,^[6]
Singapore Airlines, Ltd., vs. Paño,^[7]
Molave Motor Sales, Inc. vs. Laron,^[8]
Quisaba vs. Sta. Ines Melale Veneer and Plywood, Inc.^[9] and
San Miguel Corporation vs. NLRC,^[10] we
held as follows:

The case now before the Court involves a complaint for damages for
malicious prosecution which was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Leyte by
the employees of the defendant company. It does not appear that there is a “reasonable causal
connection” between the complaint and the relations of the parties as
employer and employees. The complaint
did not arise from such relations
and in fact could have arisen independently of an employment relationship between the parties. No such relationship or any unfair labor
practice is asserted. What the
employees are alleging is that the petitioners acted with bad faith when they
filed the criminal complaint which the Municipal Trial Court said was intended
“to harass the poor employees” and the dismissal of which was
affirmed by the Provincial Prosecutor “for lack of evidence to establish
even a slightest probability that all the respondents herein have committed the
crime imputed against them.” This is a matter which the labor arbiter has no competence to resolve as the applicable
law is not the Labor Code but the Revised Penal Code.

Significantly, Pepsi questioned the lack of jurisdiction of the
trial court for the first time only on appeal to the respondent court. While it is true that the question of
jurisdiction may be raised at any time, there does not seem to be any reason
why the private respondent did not invoke the issue earlier.

What it should have done when the complaint was filed in the Regional
Trial Court was move for its dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject-matter. If the motion
was denied, it could have come to this Court directly in a special civil action
for certiorari alleging the same ground. Pepsi did neither of these. Instead, it willingly proceeded to trial,
saying naught a word about the issue of jurisdiction. Later, when the trial court rendered judgment against it, it went
to the Court of Appeals in an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 rather than directly
to this Court under Rule 65.

The petitioner now contends that as the appeal was based on the
sole issue of jurisdiction, Pepsi sought the wrong remedy in going to the Court
of Appeals. Hence, upon receipt of its
petition for review, the Court of Appeals should have certified it to this
Court on the ground that it involved a pure question of law which it had no
authority to resolve.

True enough. But the
trouble is that the petitioner did not interpose any serious opposition when
the Court of Appeals entertained the appeal and thereafter resolved it. The petitioner spiritedly debated the issue
of jurisdiction with the private respondent before the respondent court as if
there was nothing amiss. He did not ask
the respondent court to certify the case to us. The petitioner was almost casual when he mentioned the procedural
flaw and did not choose to pursue it with vigor, as he should have. By his omission to fault an obvious error
and his active participation in the proceedings in the respondent court, he is
now estopped from raising this objection at this late hour.

At any rate, the result would have been the same if the case had
been referred to us by the Court of Appeals. Following the cases above cited, we would also have held that the
petitioner’s claim for damages was within the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court and not the Labor Arbiter.

The respondent court did not stop with its ruling on the issue of
jurisdiction. Although not assigned as an error, the award to Abejaron was discussed and modified by it after
finding that there was no convincing and preponderant evidence to prove malice
on the part of Pepsi when it charged Abejaron with estafa.

The respondent court thus held:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from dated April 25, 1989, is
hereby REVERSED, and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered absolving herein
appellant Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., Inc. from paying damages to the
appellee. No costs.

The petitioner claims that the respondent could not rule upon the
propriety of the award of damages because it had not been assigned as an error
by the appellant. He cites Rule 51,
Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court, reading as follows:

Sec. 7. Questions
that may be decided. ?
No error which does not affect
the jurisdiction over the subject matter will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors and
properly argued in the brief, save as the court, at its option, may notice
plain errors not specified, and also clerical
errors.

There is more than meets the eye here. The above provision should not be read in the restrictive manner
the petitioner suggests.

Interpreting this rule in Vda. de Javellana v. Court of Appeals,^[11]
this Court held:

The general rule is that only errors which have been stated in the
assignment of errors and properly argued in the brief will be considered, except errors affecting
jurisdiction over the subject-matter and plain, as well as clerical, errors.

But while the petitioner Javellana did not assign as error the failure
of the trial court to adjudge recovery and to award damages, we feel that there
is sufficient justification to set aside the judgment in this respect. For the error is patent. Under Sec. 7, Rule 51 of the Revised Rules
of Court, the Court of Appeals is given an option to consider and pass upon a proven error notwithstanding
the fact that it was not specifically assigned and argued in the brief.

Besides, an unassigned error closely related to the error properly
assigned, or upon which the determination of the question raised by the error
properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate court
notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error. (Hernandez vs. Andal, 78 Phil. 196).

At any rate, the Court is clothed with ample authority to review
matters, even if they are not assigned as errors in their appeal, if it finds
that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the
case (Ortigas vs. Lufthansa German Airlines, 64 SCRA 610).

A similar pronouncement was made in Baquiran vs. Court of
Appeals,^[12]
to wit:

Issues, though not specifically raised in the pleadings in the
appellate court, may, in the interest of justice, be properly considered by
said court in deciding a case, if they are questions raised in the trial court
and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the
parties failed to raise or the lower court ignore(d).

This was an affirmation of the earlier case of Hernandez vs.
Andal,^[13]
where we held:

While an assignment of error which is required by law or rule of
court has been held essential to appellate review, and only those assigned will
be considered, there are a number of cases which appear to accord to the
appellate court a broad discretionary power to waive this lack of proper
assignment of errors and consider errors not assigned.

Accordingly, we hold that the respondent court was justified in
ruling on the award of damages even if the issue was not assigned as an error
when the decision of the trial court was appealed. Consideration of this question was necessary to the just and
complete resolution of the case before it. There was enough in the record elevated to the respondent court to
enable it to reach its own conclusion on
this particular matter.

This Court has also examined the evidence of the parties and
agrees that the filing of the charge for estafa by Pepsi against Abejaron was
not made maliciously so as to entitle the petitioner to the relief he
seeks. Pepsi cannot be faulted for
suing on what it believed to be an actionable wrong even if the suit was
eventually dismissed. Its good faith not having been successfully
assailed, it cannot for this reason be held liable in the damages alleged by
the petitioner. The simple fact is that
even if he did sustain them, he still could not be allowed to recover thereon
for lack of a legal basis. In short,
this is a case of damnum absque injuria.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED and the
petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 77.

^[2] Ibid.,
pp. 64, 81.

^[3] Id.,
pp. 83-86.

^[4] G. R.
No. 66929, August 13, 1990.

^[5] 201
SCRA 695.

^[6] 116
SCRA 597.

^[7] 122
SCRA 671.

^[8] 129
SCRA 719.

^[9] 58
SCRA 771.

^[10]
161 SCRA 719.

^[11]
123 SCRA 799.

^[12]
2 SCRA 873.

^[13]
78 Phil. 96.