PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE SANDIGANBAYAN AND CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR., RESPONDENTS.
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People versus Sandiganbayan and Paredes
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the People of the Philippines against the Sandiganbayan and Ceferino Paredes, Junior. The People ask the Supreme Court to reverse the Sandiganbayan's resolution granting Paredes's motion to quash the information against him for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that the offense had already prescribed. The case matters because it fixes the rules on when prescription begins to run in offenses punished by special laws, and because it holds that a later law lengthening the prescriptive period cannot be applied to a crime already committed, since to do so would be to enact an ex post facto law.
Procedural History
Two letter-complaints were filed with the Tanodbayan in October and December 1986 by Teofilo Gelacio, a political leader of the wife of the congressman of Agusan del Sur, shortly after Paredes had replaced her as officer in charge of the province. The Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the City Fiscal of Butuan City, who conducted a preliminary investigation and recommended the filing of an information. The Tanodbayan approved the recommendation and filed the information in the Sandiganbayan in August 1989.
Paredes was arrested on a warrant issued by the Sandiganbayan. Claiming that the information and the warrant were void because he had been denied his right to a preliminary investigation, he refused to post bail. His wife filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Supreme Court, which denied it, holding that the proper remedy was for Paredes to post bail and to move to quash the information before arraignment.
Paredes then filed in the Sandiganbayan an urgent motion to quash the information and to recall the warrant of arrest, alleging prescription, the invalidity of the preliminary investigation for lack of notice to him, and violation of due process by the long delay. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion on the ground of prescription. The People came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari under Rule 45.
Facts
In January 1976, while Paredes was the provincial attorney of Agusan del Sur, he filed an application for a free patent over a parcel of land in the Rosario public land subdivision in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. The prosecution alleged that he misrepresented to Armando Luison, the land inspector of the Bureau of Lands, that the land was disposable, when he knew it had already been reserved for a school site. A report favorably recommending the issuance of a free patent was given, and a decree of title was released.
On May 28, 1976, the Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur issued Original Certificate of Title Number 8379 in the name of Paredes as a result of the grant of the patent over the school site reservation.
More than ten years later, in October and December 1986, Gelacio filed his letter-complaints with the Tanodbayan. The information was filed in the Sandiganbayan only in August 1989. Both Paredes and Luison denied that any inducement took place.
Issues
- Whether or not the offense charged had already prescribed when the information was filed.
- Whether or not the prescriptive period should be computed from the filing of the application in January 1976, or from the issuance and registration of the title in May 1976, rather than from the discovery of the offense.
- Whether or not the amendment of the prescriptive period from ten years to fifteen years under Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 may be applied retroactively to a crime committed in 1976.
Applicable Provisions
Section 2 of Act Number 3326, as quoted by the Sandiganbayan, governs the computation of the prescriptive period for violations of special laws:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
This provision fixes the operative date for the commencement of prescription as the date of the violation of the law, or its discovery if not then known.
Section 11 of Republic Act Number 3019, as it stood when the crime was committed, fixed the prescriptive period at ten years. Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, approved in March 1982, increased that period to fifteen years. The Court held that the amendment cannot reach back to the 1976 crime.
Section 22 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which the Court invokes, provides:
No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
This is the constitutional barrier that prevents the retroactive application of the longer prescriptive period to Paredes.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the offense had prescribed. The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that the date of the violation of the law becomes the operative date for the commencement of the period of prescription. Whether the crime was the filing of the application in January 1976 or the inducement of Luison to recommend its approval, it prescribed ten years later, in January 1986. Gelacio's complaint of October 1986 was filed late.
On the second issue, the Court rejected the prosecution's theory that prescription should not commence upon the filing of the application because no one could have known of it except Paredes and Luison. The Court agreed with the Sandiganbayan that it is not only the land inspector who passes upon the disposability of public land. Other public officials pass upon the application, including the surveyor, the regional director, the Director of Lands, and the Department Secretary. Even if the period ran from the registration and issuance of the title on May 28, 1976, registration being constructive notice to the whole world, the period would have fully run on May 28, 1986, five months before Gelacio filed his complaint and more than thirteen years before the information was filed in August 1989.
On the third issue, the Court held that Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 may not be given retroactive application, for it would be prejudicial to the accused. It would deprive him of the substantive benefit of the shorter ten-year period, which was an essential element of the crime at the time he committed it. Protection from prosecution under a statute of limitation is a substantive right. To apply the amendment to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law, for it would alter his situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime already extinguished. The new prescriptive period applies only to offenses committed after its approval.
Doctrine
Under Section 2 of Act Number 3326, prescription in violations of special laws begins to run from the day of the commission of the violation, and if not then known, from its discovery. The date of the violation is the operative date.
The statute of limitations is jurisdictional, and the time within which the offense is committed is a jurisdictional fact. The information must be actually filed within the time prescribed.
Protection from prosecution under a statute of limitation is a substantive right. A law lengthening the prescriptive period cannot be applied to a crime already committed, because it would be an ex post facto law prohibited by Section 22 of Article III of the Constitution.
Disposition
The petition was denied for lack of merit, and the resolution of the Sandiganbayan granting the motion to quash was affirmed. Paredes won, and may no longer be prosecuted.
Remember This
Prescription in special laws runs from the day of the violation, and a later law lengthening the prescriptive period cannot reach a crime already committed, for that would be an ex post facto law. Examiners use this case to test the computation of prescription under Act Number 3326 and the retroactivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195.