SALVADOR D. BRIBONERIA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, GERTRUDES B. MAG-ISA, MARRIED TO AND ASSISTED BY PEDRO MAG-ISA, RESPONDENTS.

On 17 October 1991, the petitioner filed with this Court a
petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, Eleventh Division,* in
CA-G.R. SP No. 20114 dated 13 August 1990 as well as its resolution dated 9
September 1991 denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsi­deration.

Acting upon the petition, the Court required the private
respondents to comment thereon. After
the private respondents had filed their comment, the Court resolved to consider
the comment as answer and to give due course to the petition and the case was
deemed submitted for decision.^[1]

The antecedents are as follows:

On 23 May 1988, petitioner Salvador D. Briboneria, as plaintiff,
filed a complaint^[2]
for Annulment of Document and Damages, with prayer for preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order against private respondent Gertrudes B.
Mag-isa, with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, docketed therein as Civil Case
No. 55961, alleging inter alia that:

“x x x

2. Plaintiff, together with his wife Nonita A. Briboneria, are the
registered owners (of) a parcel of land located at 59 Amsterdam Street
Provident Village, J. de la Pena, Marikina, Metro-Manila, covered under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-29859 (Copy attached herewith as Annex A)
more particularly described as follows:

“A parcel of land xxx situated in the Municipality of
Marikina, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon xxx containing an area of THREE
HUNDRED (300) SQUARE METERS, more or less, xxx”

Among the improvements
on this parcel of land is plaintiff’s residential house where his wife and
children used to stay until they migrated to the United States.

3. The abovementioned parcel of land was acquired and the residential house
was constructed through plaintiff’s hard-earned salaries and benefits from his
employment abroad.

4. Plaintiff, as the duly registered owner, has declared the
above-described parcel of land and residential house for tax purposes under
P.D. No. 464, copies of Declaration of Real Property attached herewith as Annexes
B and B-1.

5. Of late, plaintiff was surprised to learn that his wife Nonita A.
Briboneria sold to defendant Gertrudis B. Mag-isa by means of a Deed of
Absolute Sale, copy attached herewith as Annex C, the abovementioned house and
lot.

6. Plaintiff, as the duly registered owner, never authorized or empowered
Nonita A. Briboneria or anybody for or on his behalf, stead or represen­tation
to enter into any transaction regarding the sale, transfer or conveyance of the
abovedescribed house and lot.

7. Plaintiff had all along been expecting that the house and lot shall be
for his family, parti­cularly his children.

8. As a result of the unauthorized sale, plain­tiff was denied the use and
enjoyment of his properties since defendant Gertrudis B. Mag-isa had even leased
the premises to another who in turn had prohibited plaintiff from entering the
premises.

9. By reason of the unlawful deprivation from him of his properties,
plaintiff suffered serious anxiety, fright, mental anguish and wounded feel­ings
and further subjected him to social humilia­tion and embarassment, particularly
considering that the abovementioned properties came from his hard-earned
salaries and emoluments from his employment abroad, for which defendants
Mag-isa must be adjudged liable for moral damages in an amount not less than
ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) or as may be equitably determined by this
Honorable Court.

10. In order to serve as an example or
correction for the public good, defendants Mag-isa should likewise be adjudged
liable for exemplary damages in an amount not less than ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P100,000.00) or as may be equitably deter­mined by this Honorable Court.

11. Plaintiff, in protection of his
legitimate right and interests prejudiced by defendants – Mag-isa, was
constrained to engage the services of undersigned counsel for P50,000.00,
exclusive of appearance fees and expenses.

Plaintiff adopts the foregoing.

12. The next move of defendants – Mag-isa
is to consolidate ownership over the properties by means of the Deed of
Absolute Sale (Annex C herein) which is inceptually void.

13. Defendant Register of Deeds of Marikina
would have no other alternative but to give due course to the consolidation of
ownership over the proper­ties in the name of defendants – Mag-isa which
eventually causes grave and irreparable injury, untold injustice and undue
prejudice to plaintiff unless – a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction, or at least a Temporary Restraining Order is
immediately issued by this Honorable Court enjoining or res­training defendant
Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro-Manila or any person acting on his behalf
from consolidating ownership of the house and lot covered under TCT No. N-29895
of the Registry of Deeds for the province of Rizal in the name of defendants –
Mag-isa or their heirs or successor-in-interest.

14. Plaintiff is ready and willing to post
a bond in such amount as this Honorable Court may equit­able determine subject
to such conditions and terms as may be appropriately imposed thereon.”

In due time, private respondent Gertrudes B. Mag-isa, as
defendant, filed her answer^[3]
alleging as follows:

“1. Defendants admit
their circumstances as alleged in paragraph 1, the age of plaintiff but denies
the rest of the allegations therein for lack of knowledge and/or information
sufficient to form a judgment as to the truths thereof.

2. Defendants admit the
allegations in paragraph 2 that pursuant to Transfer Certificate of Title No.
N-29859 (Annex ‘A’), plaintiff together with his wife appears to be the
registered owners of the subject parcel of land but that is more apparent and
(sic) real considering that defendants have admittedly bought the land and the
improvements thereon and defendants were purchasers in good faith and for
value.

3. Defendants deny the
allegations in paragraph 3 for lack of knowledge and information to form a judgment as to the truths, and granting arguendo that the acquisition of
the land and the construction of the house came from the salaries and benefits
of the plaintiff, said salaries and benefits are considered conjugal.

4. Defendants deny the
allegations in paragraph 4 for lack of knowledge and information sufficient to
form a judgment as to the truth thereof although it may be of judicial notice
that the Office of the Provincial/Municipal Assessor motu proprio accomplishes
(sic) Annexes ‘B’ and ‘B-1’ and all tax declarations for that matter based on
existing records in said office.

5. Defendants admit the
allegations in paragraph 5 in so far as the transaction of absolute sale
between them and defendant’s (plaintiff’s) wife who acted not only in her
behalf but also as attorney-in-fact of her husband, plaintiff in the instant
case, which transaction was actually
known by and with the consent of or should at least have been known to and with
the consent of plaintiff as evidenced by a letter of plaintiff to his wife, a xerox copy of which is attached
hereto as Annex ‘1’ and made an integral part hereof.

6. Defendants deny the
allegation in paragraph 6, the truth and fact being that plaintiff’s wife was
duly authorized by a Special Power of Attorney to transact on and sell the
subject house and lot, a xerox copy of which marked Annex ‘2’ is hereto
attached and made an integral part hereof.

7. Defendants deny the
allegations in paragraph 7 for lack of knowledge and information sufficiento
(sic) form a judgment as to the
truths thereof.

8. Defendants deny the
allegations in paragraph 8 to the effect that he was denied the use and enjoyment of his properties for the reason
that as the owners of the property, defendants have the absolute rights of use
and enjoyment over said properties with the prerogative to lease the same to
any party of their choice, the lessee with the right to exclude others from the
use and enjoyment of the premises.

9. Defendants deny the
allegations in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 not only for lack of knowledge and
information to form a judgment as to the truths thereof but also because said
allegations have no factual and legal basis.

10. Defendants admit the
allegations in paragraph 12 in so far as the prospective registration of Annex
‘C’ is concerned but deny the rest of the allegations for reasons stated
earlier to the effect that Annex ‘C’ is a
valid and binding sale, with defendants as the purchasers in good faith
and for value.

11. Defendants admit the
allegations in paragraph 13 in so far as the ministerial functions of defendant
Register of Deeds but deny the rest of the allegations the same being without
any factual and legal basis for reasons essayed earlier.

12. Defendants deny the
allegations in Paragraph 14 for lack of knowledge and information sufficient to
form a judgment as to the truths thereof aside from the fact that plaintiff’s
alleged readiness and willingness to post a
bond will simply be exercises in futility.”

On 13 September 1988, after issues in the case had been joined,
petitioner served on the private respondent Mag-isa a request for admission^[4]
reading as follows:

“ATTY. ALFREDO A. ALTO

Counsel for Defendant Mag-isa

Balaga-Luna Building

Malolos,
Bulacan

Greetings:

Plaintiff, through counsel, respectfully
requests your admission within ten (10) days from service hereof pursuant to
Rule 26, Rules of Court of the following:

The Material facts

1. That plaintiff, together with his wife Nonita A. Briboneria, are the
registered owners of a parcel of land together with the improvements thereon
covered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-29895 (Annex A-Complaint)
located at 59 Amsterdam Street, Provident Village, Marikina, Metro-Manila.

2. That plaintiff, as the duly registered owner has declared for the year
1988 the parcel of land and residential house for tax purposes under P.D. 464.

3. That plaintiff’s family used to live at the said residential house.

4. That
defendant Mag-isa actually lives near the location address of plaintiff’s
properties.

5. That defendant Mag-isa knows that plaintiff works abroad but he
(plaintiff) regularly comes home and stays with his family at their residential
house abovementioned.

6. That the abovementioned house and lot were acquired through plaintiff’s
hard-earned salaries and benefits from his employment abroad.

7. That plaintiff has reserved the house and lot as a place to stay to (sic) with his family upon his retirement
from his employment.

8. That plaintiff had never authorized his wife or anybody for that matter
to sell or to dispose of the property covered under TCT No. N-29895.

9. That plaintiff never executed the alleged Special Power of Attorney
dated November 14, 1984 appended as Annex 2 – Answer.

10. That the alleged Special Power of
Attorney mentions ‘Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-29995 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal.’

11. That plaintiff never personally
appeared before Notary Public Jose Constantino upon whom the acknowledgment of
said Special Power of Attorney was made.

12. That plaintiff never sold or disposed
of, and never consented to the sale or disposition of the properties covered
under TCT No. N-29995.

13. That plaintiff never received the
consideration of the alleged sale, and he never benefited therefrom in any
manner.

14. That defendant Mag-isa never confirmed
with plaintiff notwithstanding their being neighbors, the authenticity of the
alleged Special Power of Attorney and the validity of the alleged Deed of
Absolute Sale particularly considering that the subject matter thereof involves
plaintiff’s properties.

15. That plaintiff was denied the use and
enjoyment of his properties since defendant Mag-isa had even leased the
premises to another who in turn had prohibited plaintiff from entering the
premises.

The Material Documents

1. Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-29895 of the Register of Deeds of
Rizal, copy attached to the Complaint as Annex A.

2. The Declarations of Real Property filed by Salvador D. Briboneria
pursuant to P.D. 464 for the year 1988, copies attached to the Complaint as
Annexes B and B-1.”

On 10 November 1988, the private respondents filed with the court
a quo their Answer to Request for Admission,^[5]
alleging that most if not all the matters subject of petitioner’s request for
admission had been admitted, denied and/or clarified in their verified answer
dated 20 June 1988, and that the other matters not admitted, denied and/or
clarified were either irrelevant or improper.

On 18 November 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for Sum­mary
Judgment,^[6]
claiming that the Answer to Request for Admission was filed by private
respondents beyond the ten (10) day period fixed in the request and that the
answer was not under oath; that, consequently the private respondents are
deemed to have admitted the material facts and documents subject of the request
for admission, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. The private respondents filed an opposition^[7]
to the motion for summary judgment, while the petitioner filed a reply^[8]
to said opposition.

On 28 December 1988, the trial court issued an order^[9]
denying the petitioner’s motion for summary judgment. Petitioner moved for reconsideration^[10]
which the court granted in its order dated 20 July 1989, setting aside the
order of 28 December 1988.^[11] The
private respondents, in turn, filed a Motion for Clarification and
Reconsideration, to which the petitioner filed an opposition.^[12]
On 1 February 1989, the trial court issued another order^[13]
this time setting aside its order of 20 July 1989 and set the pre-trial
conference on 22 February 1989.

The petitioner thereupon filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to annul and
set aside the order dated 1 Febuary 1989 of the court a quo, alleging that the said order was
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. On 13 August 1990, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision,^[14]
dismissing the petition. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied,^[15]
he is now before us in the present petition.

Petitioner assails the respondent appellate court in holding that
the matters of fact and the documents requested to be admitted are mere
reiterations and/or reproductions of those alleged in the complaint. He claims that the material facts and
documents described in the request for admission are relevant evidentiary
matters supportive of his cause of action. He further argues that the private respondents have impliedly admitted
the material facts and documents subject of the request for admission on
account of their failure to answer the request for admission within the period
fixed therein, and for said answer not being under oath.

The petition can not be upheld; the petitioner’s contentions are
devoid of merit.

To begin with, a cursory reading of the petitioner’s complaint
and his request for admission clearly shows, as found by respondent appellate
court, that “the material matters and documents set forth in the request
for admission are the same as those set forth in the complaint which private
respondents either admitted or denied in their answer.”^[16]
The respondent court therefore correctly held that this case falls under the
rule laid down in Po vs. Court of Appeals.^[17]
wherein this Court held:

“A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact
already admitted by his pleading and concerning which there is no issue (Sherr
vs. East, 71 A2d, 752, Terry 260, cited in 27 C.J.S. 91), nor should he be
required to make a second denial of those already denied in his answer to the
complaint. A request for admission is
not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting
party’s pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or
documents described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to
establish said party’s cause of action or defense. x x x.”

Moreover, under Section 1, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court,^[18] the request for admission
must be served directly upon the party;
otherwise, the party to whom the request is directed cannot be deemed to have
admitted the genuineness of any relevant document described in and exhibited
with the request or relevant matters of fact set forth therein, on account of
failure to answer the request for admission.^[19]

In one case, namely, CA-G.R. No. 20561-R, entitled “Jose
Ledesma, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellee, versus Guillermo Locsin,
Defendant-Appellant”,^[20] the
Court of Appeals in favorably resolving the defendant-appellant’s motion for
reconsideration of its earlier decision (wherein it affirmed the summary
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in favor of
plaintiff Jose Ledesma, Jr. upon failure of defendant Guillermo Locsin to answer
a request for admission served upon his counsel by
the plaintiff) held in its Resolution dated 1 June 1963, as follows:

“The issue raised by the first two assigned errors is whether or
not a request for admission must be served directly on a party, and not his
counsel, in order that said request can be considered as validly served. In our decision which is sought to be
reconsidered, we held that a request for admission may be validly served upon
party’s counsel. After a further review
of the facts of the case and the circumstances surrounding the same, we are now
fully convinced that it should not be so.

“The general rule as provided for under Section 2 of Rule 27
(now Section 2, Rule 13) of the Rules of Court is that all notices must be
served upon counsel and not upon the party. This is so because the attorney of a party is the agent of the party and
is the one responsible for the conduct of the case in all its procedural
aspects; hence, notice to counsel is notice to party. The purpose of the rule is obviously to maintain a uniform
procedure calculated to place in competent hands the orderly prosecution of a
party’s case (Chainani v. Judge Tancinco, G.R. No. L-4782, Feb. 29, 1952;
Cabili v. Badelles, G.R. No. L-17786, Sept. 29, 1962). However, the general rule cannot apply where
the law expressly provides that notice must be served upon a definite
person. In such cases, service must be
made directly upon the person mentioned in the law and upon no other in order
that the notice be valid.

‘Whenever notice is necessary, it must appear that it was served on
the proper person, and there must be strict compliance with a statute requiring
service on a particular person, so that service on another person is not
sufficient.’

‘In general, service of notice of a modal or formal step in a
proceeding on the attorney of record is suffi­cient, if not otherwise
specifically provided by statute or rule of court.’ (66 C.J.S. 658)

“Thus, we see that section 7 of Rule 40, with regard to notice
of pendency of an appeal from an inferior court to a Court of First Instance,
provides that ‘it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court to notify the
parties of that fact by registered mail’, and the Supreme Court construing said
section held, in Ortiz v. Mania, G.R. No. L-5147, June 2, 1953, that the notice
of the pendency of the appeal must be served upon the parties for said section
being express and specific cannot be interpreted to mean that the notice can be
given to the lawyer alone.

“Similarly, section 1 of Rule 20 (now Section 1, Rule 25)
provides that ‘any party may serve upon any adverse party written
interrogatories’, and Chief Justice Moran commenting on this rule states that
‘the written interroga­tories referred to in the instant provision should be
delivered directly to the adverse party’. We see no valid reason why a different rule should govern request for
admission inasmuch as written
interrogatories and request for admissions are both modes of discovery.

“Section 1 of Rule 23 (now
Section 1, Rule 26) of the Rules of Court which expressly states that ‘a
party may serve upon any other party a written request’ should receive no other
cons­truction than that the request for admission must be served directy on the
party and not on his counsel. Section 2
of Rule 27 (now Section 2, Rule 13) of the Rules of Court does not control the
mode of service of request for admission. It should be observed that the orders, motions and other papers
mentioned in said section have
this property in common: they have to
be filed with the court. A request for
admission, on the other hand, need not be filed with the court; it was intended
to operate extra-judicially and courts are not burdened with the duty to determine
the propriety or impropriety of the request for admission (I Moran’s Comments
on the Rules of Court, 1957 ed., 372-73; I Francisco’s Rules of Court, Part 2,
p. 282).

‘x x x Permission of the court is not required to make such a
request or demand, or to file it, or serve it on the adverse party; but service
must be made in the manner specified by the statute or rule.’ (27 C.J.C. 277)

And the answer to the request for admission
is likewise not a matter of record and would require another step in procedure
to bring it on record (Seranton Lackawanna Trust Co, vs. McDermont, 1 Pa. Dist.
& Co. 2nd 539, 55 Lack. Jur. 265, cited in 27 C.J.S. 277, fn 19). Section 2 of Rule 27 governs only those papers that have to be filed in
court and does not govern papers which, by the rules of procedure, do not have
to be filed in court.

“In view of the foregoing, it is our consi­dered opinion that
the request for admission made by plaintiff was not validly served and that,
therefore, defendant cannot be deemed to have admitted the truth of the matters
upon which admissions were requested and, consequently, the summary judgment
rendered by the court a quo has no legal basis to support
it. This conclusion renders it
unnecessary to discuss the other assigned errors.”

The plaintiff-appellee Jose Ledesma, Jr. filed with this Court a
petition for review on certiorari of the aforesaid resolution, docketed
as G.R. No. L-21715. On 2 October 1963,
this Court denied the petition, thus –

“After a consideration of the allegations of the petition
filed in case L-21715 (Jose Ledesma, Jr. vs. Guillermo Locsin), for review of
the deci­sion of the Court of Appeals referred to therein, THE COURT RESOLVED
to dismiss the petition for lack of merit.”

In the present case, it will be noted that the request for
admission was not served upon
the private respondent Mag-isa but upon her counsel, Atty. Alfredo A.
Alto. Private respondent Mag-isa,
therefore, cannot be deemed to have admitted the facts and documents subject of
the request for admission for having failed to file her answer thereto within
the period fixed in the request.

WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby,
DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 13 August 1990 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman) and
Grino-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., no part.

* Composed of Justices Josue N.
Bellosillo, as Chairman, Alfredo Marigomen and Filemon H. Mendoza, as
members, with Justice Alfredo Marigomen as ponente

^[1]
Resolution dated 11 November 1991. Rollo, p. 105

^[2]
Rollo, p. 25

^[3]
Ibid., p. 31

^[4]
Ibid., p. 37

^[5]
Ibid., p. 41

^[6]
Ibid., p. 46

^[7]
Ibid., p. 55

^[8]
Ibid., p. 54

^[9]
Ibid., p. 61

^[10]
Ibid., p. 63

^[11]
Ibid., p. 73

^[12]
Ibid., p. 76

^[13]
Ibid., p. 83

^[14]
Ibid., p. 81

^[15]
Ibid., p. 88

^[16]
Rollo, p. 85

^[17]
G.R. No. L-34341, 22 August 1988, 164 SCRA 668, 670

^[18]
Section 1, Rule 26 provides as follows: “At any time after the issues have been joined, a party may serve
upon any other party a written request for admission by the latter of any relevant
documents described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any
relevant matters set forth in the request. Copies of the documents shall be
delivered with the request unless copies have already been furnished.”

^[19]
Section 2 of Rules 26 provides s follows: “Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be
deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, which shall
not be less than ten (10) days after service thereof, or within such further
time as the court may allow on motion and notice, the party to whom the request
is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement
either deny­ing specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or
setting forth in detail the reason why he cannot truthfully either admit or
deny those matters.

“Objections
on the ground of irrelevancy or impropriety on the matter requested shall be
promptly submitted to the court for resolution.”

20 Unreported