SANYO PHILIPPINES WORKERS UNION-PSSLU LOCAL CHAPTER NO. 109 AND/OR ANTONIO DIAZ, PSSLU NATIONAL PRESIDENT, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. POTENCIANO S. CANIZARES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS LABO…

This petition seeks to nullify: 1) the order of respondent Labor Arbiter Potenciano Cañizares dated
August 6, 1991 deferring the resolution of the motion to dismiss the complaint
of private respondents filed by petitioner Sanyo Philippines Workers
Union-PSSLU Local Chapter No. 109 (PSSLU, for brevity) on the ground that the
labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over said complaint and 2) the order of the
same respondent clarifying its previous order and ruling that it had
jurisdiction over the case.

The facts of the case are as follows:

PSSLU had an existing CBA with Sanyo Philippines Inc. (Sanyo, for
short) effective July 1, 1989 to June 30, 1994. The same CBA contained a union
security clause which provided:

“Section 2. All
members of the union covered by this agreement must retain their membership in
good standing in the union as condition of his/her continued employment with
the company. The union shall have the
right to demand from the company the dismissal of the members of the union by
reason of their voluntary resignation from membership or willful refusal to pay
the Union Dues or by reasons of their having formed, organized, joined,
affiliated, supported and/or aided directly or indirectly another labor
organization, and the union thus hereby guarantees and holds the company free
and harmless from any liability whatsoever that may arise consequent to the implementation of the provision of
this article.” (pp. 5-6, Rollo)

In a letter dated February 7, 1990, PSSLU, through its national
president, informed the management of Sanyo that the following employees were
notified that their membership with PSSLU were cancelled for anti-­union,
activities, economic sabotage, threats, coercion and intimidation, disloyalty
and for joining another union: Benito
Valencia, Bernardo Yap, Arnel Salvo, Renato Baybon, Eduardo Porlaje, Salvador
Solivel, Conrado Sarol, Angelito Manzano, Allan Misterio, Reynaldo Ricohermoso,
Mario Ensay and Froilan Plamenco. The
same letter informed Sanyo that the same employees refused to submit themselves
to the union’s grievance investigation committee (p. 53, Rollo). It appears that many of these employees were
not members of PSSLU but of another union, KAMAO.

On February 14, 1990, some officers of KAMAO, which included Yap,
Salvo, Baybon, Solibel, Valencia, Misterio and Ricohermoso executed a pledge of cooperation with PSSLU
promising cooperation with the latter union and among others, respecting,
accepting and honoring the CBA between Sanyo and specifically:

“1.     That we shall remain officers and members
of KAMAO until we finally decide to rejoin Sanyo Phil. Workers Union-PSSLU;

“2.     That henceforth, we support and cooperate
with the duly elected union officers of Sanyo Phil. Workers Union-PSSLU in any
and all its activities and programs to insure industrial peace and harmony;

“3.     That we collectively accept, honor, and
respect the Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into between Sanyo Phil.
Inc. and Sanyo Phil. Workers Union?PSSLU
dated February 7, 1990;

“4.     That we collectively promise not to engage
in any activities inside company premises contrary to law, the CBA and existing
policies;

“5.     That we are willing to pay our individual
agency fee in accordance with the provision of the Labor Code, as amended;

“6.     That we collectively promise not to violate
this pledge of cooperation.” (p. 55, Rollo)

On March 4, 1991, PSSLU through its national and local
presidents, wrote another letter to Sanyo recommending the dismissal of the
following non-union workers: Bernardo
Yap, Arnel Salvo, Nenato Baybon, Reynaldo Ricohermoso, Salvador Solibel, Benito
Valencia, and Allan Misterio, allegedly because: 1) they were engaged and were still engaging in anti-union
activities; 2) they willfully violated the pledge of cooperation with PSSLU
which they signed and executed on February 14, 1990; and 3) they threatened and
were still threatening with bodily harm and even death the officers of the
union (pp. 37-38, Rollo).

Also recommended for dismissal were the following union members
who allegedly joined, supported and sympathized with a minority union,
KAMAO: Gerardo Lasala, Legardo Tangkay,
Alexander Atanacio, and Leonardo Dionisio.

The last part of the said letter provided:

“The dismissal of the above-named union members is without
prejudice to receive (sic) their termination pay if management decide (sic) to
grant them benefits in accordance with law. The union hereby holds the company free and harmless from any liability
that may arise consequent to the implementation by the company of our recommendations
for the dismissal of the above-mentioned workers.

“It is however suggested that the Grievance Machinery be
convened pursuant to Section 3, Article XV of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) before their actual dismisal from the company.” (p. 38, Rollo)

Pursuant to the above letter of the union, the company sent a
memorandum to the same workers advising them that:

“As per the attached letter from the local union President
SPWU and the federation President, PSSLU, requesting management to put the
herein mentioned employees on preventive suspension, effective immediately,
preliminary to their subsequent dismissal, please be informed that the
following employees are under preventive suspension effective March 13, 1991 to
wit:

1.      Bernardo
Yap

2.      Renato
Baybon

3.      Salvador
Solibel

4.      Allan
Misterio

5.      Edgardo
Tangkay

6.      Leonardo
Dionisio

7.      Arnel
Salvo

8.      Reynaldo
Richohermoso

9.      Benito
Valencia

10.  Gerardo Lasala

11.  Alexander Atanacio

“The above listed employees shall not be allowed within company
premises without the permission of management.

“As per request of the union’s letter to management, should
the listed employees fail to appeal the decision of the union for dismissal,
then effective March 23, 1991, said listed employees shall be considered
dismissed from the company.” (p. 39, Rollo)

The company received no information on whether or not said
employees appealed to PSSLU. Hence, it
considered them dismissed as of March 23, 1991 (p. 40, Rollo).

On May 20, 1991, the dismissed employees filed a complaint (pp.
32-35, Rollo) with the NLRC for illegal dismissal. Named respondents were PSSLU and Sanyo.

On June 20, 1991, PSSLU filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that the Labor
Arbiter was without jurisdiction over the case, relying on Article 217 (c) of
P.D. 442, as amended by Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6715 which provides that
cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of the collective
bargaining agreements shall be disposed of by the labor arbiter by referring the
same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration.

The complainants opposed the motion to dismiss complaint on these
grounds: 1) the series of conferences
before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board had been terminated; 2)
the NLRC Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case which was a termination
dispute pursuant to Article 217 (2) of the Labor Code; and 3) there was nothing
in the CBA which needs interpretation or implementation (pp. 44-46, Rollo).

On August 7, 1991, the respondent Labor Arbiter issued the first
questioned order. It held that:

“x x x.

“While there are seemingly contradictory provisions in the
aforecited article of the Labor Code, the better interpretation will be to give
effect to both, and termination dispute being clearly spelled as falling under
the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, the same shall be respected. The jurisdiction of the grievance machinery
and voluntary arbitration shall cover other controversies.

“However, the resolution of the instant issue shall be
suspended until both parties have fully presented their respective positions and the said issue shall be
included in the final determination of the above-captioned case.

“WHEREFORE, the instant Motions to Dismiss are hereby held
pending.

“Consequently, the parties are hereby directed to submit their
position papers and supporting documents pursuant to Section 2, Rule VII of the
Rules of the Commission on or before the hearing on the merit of this case
scheduled on August 29, 1991 at 11:00 a.m.” (p. 23, Rollo)

On August 27, 1991, PSSLU filed another motion to resolve motion
to dismiss complaint with a prayer that the Labor Arbiter resolve the issue of
jurisdiction.

On September 4, 1991, the respondent Labor Arbiter issued the
second questioned order which held that it was assuming jurisdiction over the
complaint of private respondents, in effect, holding that it had jurisdiction
over the case.

On September 19, 1991, PSSLU filed this petition alleging that
public respondent Labor Arbiter cannot assume jurisdiction over the complaint
of public respondents because it had no jurisdiction over the dispute subject
of said complaint. It is their
submission that under Article 217(c) of the Labor Code, in relation to Article
261 thereof, as well as Policy Instruction No. 6 of the Secretary of Labor,
respondent Arbiter has no jurisdiction and authority to take cognizance of the
complaint brought by private respondents which involves the implementation of
the union security clause of the CBA. The function of the Labor Arbiter under the same law and rule is to
refer this case to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration.

In its comment, private respondents argue that Article 217(a) 2
and 4 of the Labor Code is explicit, to wit:

“ART. 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission.

“a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor
Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide x x
x the following cases involving all workers, x x x:

“x x x

“2) Termination disputes,

“x x x

“4) Claims for actual, moral, exeplary and other forms of
damages arising from the employer-employee relations.”

The private respondents also claimed that insofar as Salvo,
Baybon, Ricohermoso, Solibel, Valencia, Misterio and Lasala were concerned,
they joined another union, KAMAO during the freedom period which commenced on
May 1, 1989 up to June 30, 1989 or before the effectivity of the July 1, 1989
CBA. Hence, they are not covered by the
provisions of the CBA between Sanyo and PSSLU. Private respondents Tanghay, Atanacio and Dionisio admit that in
September 1989, they resigned from KAMAO and rejoined PSSLU (pp. 66(a)- 68, Rollo).

For its part, public respondent, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, is of the view that a
distinction should be made between a case involving “interpretation
or implementation of collective bargaining agreement or
“interpretation” or “enforcement” of company personnel
policies, on the one hand and a case involving termination, on the other
hand. It argued that the case at bar
does not involve an “interpretation or implementation” of a
collective bargaining agreement or “interpretation or enforcement” of
company policies but involves a “termination.” Where the dispute is
just in the interpretation, implementation or enforcement stage, it may be
referred to the grievance machinery set up in the CBA or by voluntary
arbitration. Where there was already
actual termination, i.e., violation of rights, it is already cognizable by the
Labor Arbiter.

Article 217 of the Labor Code defines the jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter.

“Article 217. Jurisdiction
of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. a) Except as otherwise provided under this
Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by
the parties for decision without extension even in the absence of stenographic
notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or
non-agricultural:

1.     
Unfair labor practice cases;

2.     
Termination disputes;

3.     
If accompanied with a claim for re­instatement, those cases that workers may file
involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment;

4.     
Claims for actual,
moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee
relations;

5.     
Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code,
including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts;

6.     
Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security,
Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from
employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or
household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.

(b) The Commission
shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor
Arbiters.

(c)  Cases arising from the interpretation or
implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed
of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and
voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements.”

It is clear from the above article that termination cases fall
under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. It should be noted however that said article at the outset excepted from
the said provision cases otherwise provided for in other provisions of the same
Code, thus the phrase “Except as otherwise provided under this Code x x
x.” Under paragraph (c) of the same article, it is expressly provided that
“cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective
bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation and enforcement
of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by
referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may
be provided in said agreements.

It was provided in the CBA executed between PSSLU and Sanyo that
a member’s voluntary resignation from membership, willful refusal to pay union
dues and his/her forming, organizing, joining, supporting, affiliating or
aiding directly or indirectly another labor union shall be a cause for it to
demand his/her dismissal from the company. The demand for the dismissal and the actual dismissal by the company on
any of these grounds is an enforcement of the union security clause in the
CBA. This act is authorized by law
provided that enforcement should not be characterized by arbitrariness (Manila
Mandarin Employee Union v. NLRC, G.R. No. 76989, 29 Sept. 1987, 154 SCRA 368)
and always with due process (Tropical Hut Employees Union v. Tropical Food
Market, Inc., L-43495-99, Jan. 20, 1990).

The reference to a Grievance
Machinery and Voluntary Arbitrators for the adjustment or resolution of
grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of their CBA and
those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies is mandatory. The law grants
to voluntary arbitrators original and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from
the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies (Art. 261,
Labor Code).

In its order of September 4, 1991, respondent Labor Arbiter
explained its decision to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, thus:

“The movants failed to show (1) the provisions of the CBA to
be implemented, and (2) the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrator
already formed and properly named. What
self-respecting judge would ‘refer a case from his responsibility to a
shadow? To whom really and specifically
shall the case be indorsed or referred? In brief, they could have shown the (1) existence of the grievance
machinery and (2) its being effective.

“Furthermore, the aforecited law merely directs the ‘referral’
cases. It does not expressly confer
jurisdiction on the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration panel, created
or to be created. Article 260 of the
Labor Code describes the formation of the grievance and voluntary
arbitration. All this of course shall
be on voluntary basis. Is there another
meaning of voluntary arbitration? (The
herein complainant have strongly opposed the motion to dismiss. Would they go willingly to the grievance
machinery and voluntary arbitration which are installed by their opponents if
directed to do so?)” (p. 26, Rollo)

The failure of the parties to the CBA to establish the grievance
machinery and its unavailability is not an excuse for the Labor Arbiter to
assume jurisdiction over disputes arising from the implementation and
enforcement of a provision in the CBA. In the existing CBA between PSSLU and Sanyo, the procedure and mechanics
of its establishment had been clearly laid out as follows:

“ARTICLE XV – GRIEVANCE MACHINERY

“Section 1. Whenever
any controversy should arise between the company and the union as to the
interpretation or application of the provision of this agreement, or whenever
any difference shall exist between said parties relative to the terms and
conditions of employment, an earnest effort shall be made to settle such
controversy in substantially the following manner:

First Step. (Thru Grievance)
The dispute shall initially be resolved by conference between the management to
be represented by the Management’s authorized representatives on the one hand,
and the Union to be represented by a committee composed of the local union
president and one of the local union officer appointed by the local union
president, on the other hand within three days from date of concurrence of
grievance action. In the absence of the
local union president, he (shall) appoint another local union officer to take
over in his behalf. Where a controversy
personally affects an employee, he shall not be allowed to be a member of the
committee represented by the union.

Second step. (Thru
Arbitrator mutually chosen) Should such dispute remain unsettled after twenty
(20) days from the first conference or after such period as the parties may
agree upon in specified cases, it shall be referred to an arbitrator chosen by
the consent of the company and the union. In the event of failure to agree on the choice of voluntary arbitrator,
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, Department of Labor and
Employment shall be requested to choose an Arbitrator in accordance with
voluntary arbitration procedures.

“Section. 2. The
voluntary Arbitrator shall have thirty (30) days to decide the issue presented
to him and his decision shall be final, binding and executory upon the
parties. He shall have no authority to
add or subtract from and alter any provision of this agreement. The expenses of voluntary arbitration
including the fee of the arbitrator shall be shared equally by the company and
the union. In the event the arbitrator
chosen either by the mutual agreement of the company and the union by (the) way
of voluntary arbitration or by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) failed to assume his position, died, become disabled or any other manner
failed to function and or reach a decision, the company and the union shall by
mutual agreement choose another arbitrator; in the event of failure to agree on
the choice of a new voluntary arbitrator, the matter shall again be referred
back to the NCMB who shall be requested again to choose a new arbitrator as
above provided. Any grievance not
elevated or processed as above provided within the stipulated period shall be
deemed settled and terminated.

“Section 3. It is hereby agreed that decisions of the
union relative to their members, for implementation by the COMPANY, should be
resolved for review thru the Grievance Machinery; and management be invited to participate
in the Grievance procedure to be undertaken by the union relative to (the) case
of the union against members.” (pp. 134-135, Rollo)

All that needs to be done to set the machinery into motion is to
call for the convening thereof. If the
parties to the CBA had not designated their representatives yet, they should be
ordered to do so.

The procedure introduced in RA 6715 of referring certain
grievances originally and exclusively to the grievance machinery and when not
settled at this level, to a panel of voluntary arbitrators outlined in CBA’s
does not only include grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the CBA but applies as well to those arising from the
implementation of company personnel policies. No other body shall take cognizance of these cases. The last paragraph of Article 261 enjoins
other bodies from assuming jurisdiction thereof:

“The commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional
Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes,
grievances or matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators and shall immediately
dispose and refer the same to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration
provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.”

In the instant case, however, We hold that the Labor Arbiter and
not the Grievance Machinery provided for in the CBA has the jurisdiction to
hear and decide the complaints of the private respondents. While it appears that the dismissal of the
private respondents was made upon the recommendation of PSSLU pursuant to the
union security clause provided in the CBA, We are of the opinion that these
facts do not come within the phrase “grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of (their) Collective Bargaining Agreement and
those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies,” the jurisdiction of which pertains to the Grievance Machinery
or thereafter, to a voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary
arbitrators. Article 260 of the Labor
Code on grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrator states that “(t)he parties
to a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall include therein provisions that will
ensure the mutual observance of its terms and conditions. They shall establish a machinery for the
adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from
the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies”. It is further provided in said article that
the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective representatives
to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is not settled in that level,
it shall automatically be referred to voluntary arbitrators (or panel of
voluntary arbitrators designated in advance by the parties. It need not be mentioned that the parties to
a CBA are the union and the company. Hence, only disputes involving the union and the company shall be
referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.

In the instant case, both the union and the company are united or
have come to an agreement regarding the dismissal of private respondents. No grievance between them exists which could
be brought to grievance machinery. The
problem or dispute in the present case is between the union and the company on
the one hand and some union and non-union members who were dismissed, on the
other hand. The dispute has to be
settled before an impartial body. The
grievance machinery with members designated by the union and the company cannot
be expected to be impartial against the dismissed employees. Due process demands that the dismissed
workers grievances be ventilated before an impartial body. Since there has already been an actual
termination, the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED. Public respondent Labor Arbiter is directed
to resolve the complaints of private respondents immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Griño-Aquino, and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.