THE UNITED STATES, COMPLAINANT AND APPELLEE, VS. CATALINO VERGARA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
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United States versus Vergara
The Case
This is the case of United States versus Vergara, an early decision of the Philippine Supreme Court construing the amnesty proclaimed by the President of the United States in the aftermath of the Philippine insurrection. The Government prosecuted Catalino Vergara, a former president of the town of Mangatarem in Pangasinan under the Filipino revolutionary government, for the killing of two suspected American spies. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, and he asked the Court to declare him entitled to the amnesty. The case matters because it fixes the meaning of the phrase "internal political feuds or dissensions among the Filipinos themselves" in the amnesty proclamation, and because it announces the rule that an act of grace is construed liberally in favor of the accused.
Procedural History
Vergara was tried and convicted of the crime of murder in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, and that court sentenced him to death. From that judgment he appealed to the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court he did not principally dispute the evidence of guilt; he asked instead that he be declared entitled to the benefit of the amnesty offered by the President's proclamation of July 4, and the Solicitor-General, representing the Government, agreed that the petition should be granted. The Supreme Court therefore passed upon the petition for amnesty, assuming for that purpose that his guilt had been sufficiently proved.
Facts
In March 1900, Catalino Vergara was understood to be the president of the pueblo of Mangatarem, in the Province of Pangasinan, under the Filipino revolutionary government. Sometime in that month he either himself killed, or caused to be killed, two unknown persons who were suspected of being spies of the Americans. The circumstances of the killing are not disclosed by the evidence.
There was no direct evidence that the two were native Filipinos, but the Court thought it could fairly be inferred that they were. The Court likewise regarded it as a legitimate conclusion from the facts that the two were put to death solely because they favored the Americans or had rendered services to the American Army.
There was no evidence tending to show that Vergara, in putting these persons to death, acted under the orders of any superior authority. That last point is decisive of the category into which the crime falls.
Issues
- Whether or not the killing of the two suspected American spies by Vergara is covered by the amnesty granted in the President's proclamation of July 4.
- Whether or not the phrase "internal political feuds or dissensions among the Filipinos themselves" in the proclamation embraces crimes committed by Filipinos against fellow Filipinos on account of their sympathy for, or services to, the American Government.
Applicable Provisions
The President's proclamation of July 4 grants amnesty in the following terms:
for the offenses of treason and sedition, and for all offenses political in their character committed in the course of such insurrections pursuant to orders issued by the civil or military insurrectionary authorities, or which grew out of internal political feuds or dissensions between Filipinos and Spaniards or the Spanish authorities, or which resulted from internal political feuds or dissensions among the Filipinos themselves during either of said insurrections.
This is the provision the Court construes, and the whole case turns on whether Vergara's crime falls within its third category.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the amnesty covers three classes of offenses: first, purely political crimes, compendiously described in the proclamation as treason and sedition; second, common crimes political in their character, that is, committed in furtherance of the interest of the insurrection, if committed pursuant to orders from superior authority; and third, crimes shown to have had their origin in the two classes of internal political feuds or dissensions named, without reference to whether they are in their nature political or common crimes, and without reference to whether they were committed under orders of a superior authority or not. Vergara's case clearly fell outside the first and second categories, because there was no evidence that he acted under orders of any superior authority. The question was whether it fell within the third.
On the second issue, the Court admitted that the phrase "internal political feuds or dissensions among the Filipinos themselves" is somewhat vague and indeterminate, and hence not free from obscurity. It held that some meaning must be attached to it, and that the meaning must not be narrow and restricted, repugnant to the nature of the proclamation, which as an act of grace should, where the language admits of doubt, be construed in accordance with the rule favorabilia sunt amplianda, that is, favorable things are to be enlarged. The Court found that the most wide-reaching and significant of the internal political dissensions by which Filipinos were divided among themselves during the insurrection was that which separated those who resisted from those who supported the Government of the United States, and that many of the latter class were murdered by their fellow-countrymen on account of their political sympathies. It saw no sufficient ground to hold that the author of the proclamation intended to exclude these and similar crimes from the amnesty while including crimes arising from minor feuds between opposing factions of insurgents. The Court noted that it had already held, in the earlier cases of United States versus Isidro Guzman and United States versus Catalino Ortiz, that crimes of this political character fell within the proclamation, and it was not inclined to recede from those views, which it thought in accord with a sound interpretation of the proclamation.
Doctrine
An amnesty proclamation is an act of grace, and where its language admits of doubt it is construed liberally in favor of the accused, under the maxim favorabilia sunt amplianda. The amnesty for treason and sedition and for all offenses political in their character covers three classes: purely political crimes; common crimes political in their character committed pursuant to orders of superior authority; and crimes which resulted from internal political feuds or dissensions, whether between Filipinos and Spaniards or among Filipinos themselves, without regard to whether they are political or common in nature and without regard to superior orders. The political division between Filipinos who resisted and Filipinos who supported the American Government is itself an internal political dissension among Filipinos, so that a killing of a suspected American spy by a Filipino, motivated by the victim's sympathy for the Americans, falls within the amnesty even absent orders from a superior authority.
Disposition
The Supreme Court declared Vergara entitled to the benefit of the amnesty, and ordered that he be discharged upon filing the required oath, with costs de oficio.
Remember This
Remember the three categories of the amnesty and the rule that an act of grace is construed liberally in favor of the accused. Examiners use this case to test the meaning of "internal political feuds or dissensions among the Filipinos themselves" and the principle that penal amnesties, being acts of grace, are interpreted in favor of the accused.