CECILE DE OCAMPO, WILFREDO SAN PEDRO, REYNALDO DOVICAR, BIEN MEDINA, CESAR ABRIOL, ARTEMIO CASTRO, LARRY ALCANTARA, MICHAEL NOCUM, JESUS DEO JR., PUBLEO DARAG, EDUARDO BINO, ED…

This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside
the resolution issued by the respondent National Labor Relations Commission on
July 8, 1991, in Certified Case No. 0548 entitled “In Re: Labor Dispute at Baliwag Mahogany
Corporation,” affirming with modification its previous decision dated
October 23, 1990, declaring the union officers and/or members who participated
in the illegal strike staged on February
6, 1990 to have lost their status of employment; and directing private
respondent Baliwag Mahogany Corporation to pay separation pay to certain employees
and to reinstate without backwages all union members not found to have
committed prohibited acts.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioners Cecile de Ocampo, Wilfredo San Pedro, Reynaldo
Dovicar, Bien Medina, Cesar Abriol, Artemio Castro, Larry Alcantara, Michael
Nocum, Jesus Deo, Jr., Publeo Darag, Eduardo Bino, Eduardo Veles, Ervin David,
Prostacio Perez, Noel Victor, Eleno Dacatimban, Antonio Bernardo, Carlito
Victoria, Timoteo Mijares, Alex Ramos, Reynaldo Cruz, Modesto Mamesia, Domingo
Silarde, Renato Puertas, Rene Villanueva, Marcelo dela Cruz and Hernando Legaspi
are employees of private respondent Baliwag Mahogany Corporation. They are either officers or members of the
Baliwag Mahogany Corporation Union- CFW, the existing collective bargaining
agent of the rank and file employees in the company. Private respondent Baliwag Mahogany Corporation is an enterprise
engaged in the production of wooden doors and furniture and has a total
workforce of about 900 employees.

In 1988, private respondent Baliwag Mahogany Corporation
(company) and Baliwag Mahogany Corporation
Union-CFW (union) entered into a collective bargaining agreement containing,
among other things, provisions on conversion into cash of unused vacation and
sick leaves; grievance machinery procedure; and the right of the company to
schedule work on Sundays and holidays.

In November, 1989, the union made several requests from the
company, one of which was the cash conversion of unused vacation and sick
leaves for 1987-1988 and 1988-1989.

Acting on the matter, the company ruled to allow payment of
unused vacation and sick leaves for the period of 1987-1988 but disallowed cash
conversion of the 1988-1989 unused leaves.

On January 3, 1990, the company issued suspension orders affecting
twenty (20) employees for failure to render overtime work on December 30,
1989. The suspension was for a period
of three (3) days effective January 3, 1990 to January 5, 1990.

On the same day, the union filed a notice of strike on the
grounds of unfair labor practice particularly the violation of the CBA
provisions on non-payment of unused leaves and illegal dismissal of seven (7)
employees in November, 1989.

On January 13, 1990, the company issued a notice of termination
to three (3) employees or union
members, namely, Cecile de Ocampo, Rene Villanueva and Marcelo dela Cruz, of
the machinery department, allegedly to effect cost reduction and redundancy.

The members of the union conducted a picket at the main gate of
the company on January 18, 1990.

On the same day, the company filed a petition to declare the
strike illegal with prayer for injunction against the union, Cecile de Ocampo,
Wilfredo San Pedro and Rene Aguilar.

An election of officers was conducted by the union on January 19, 1990. Consequently, Cecile de Ocampo was elected as
president.

During the conciliation meeting held at National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) on January 22, 1990 relative to the notice of strike
filed by the union on January 3, 1990, the issue pertaining to the legality of
the termination of three (3) union members was raised by the union. However, both parties agreed to discuss it
separately.

Subsequently, in a letter dated January 28, 1990, the union
requested for the presence of a NCMB representative during a strike vote held
by the union. The strike vote resulted
to 388 votes out of 415 total votes in favor of the strike.

Consequently, the union
staged a strike on February 6, 1990.

On February 7, 1990, the company filed a petition to assume
jurisdiction with the Department of Labor and Employment.

On February 16, 1990, the company filed an amended petition,
praying among other things, that the strike staged by the union on February 6,
1990 be declared illegal, there being no genuine strikeable issue and the violation
of the no-strike clause of the existing CBA between the parties.

The Secretary of Labor in an order dated February 15, 1990,
certified the entire labor dispute to the respondent Commission for compulsory
arbitration and directed all striking workers including the dismissed employees
to return to work and the management to accept
them back.

The company filed an
urgent motion for assignment of
a sheriff to enforce the order of the Secretary.

In an order dated February 22, 1990, the Secretary of Labor
directed Sheriff Alfredo Antonio, Jr., to implement the order.

On February 23, 1990, the sheriff, with the assistance of the
PC/INP of San Rafael, removed the barricades and opened the main gate of the
company.

Criminal complaints for illegal assembly, grave threats, and
grave coercion were filed against Cecile de Ocampo, Timoteo Mijares, Modesto
Mamesia and Domingo Silarde by the local police authorities on February 24,
1990.

On February 25, 1990, the
company caused the publication
of the return to work order in two (2) newspapers, namely NGAYON and ABANTE.

In its letter dated
February 27, 1990, the union, through
its President Cecile de Ocampo, requested the Regional Director of DOLE, Region
III to intervene in the existing
dispute with management.

Meanwhile, the company
extended the February 26, 1990
deadline for the workers to return to work until March 15, 1990.

The respondent Commission rendered a decision on October 23,
1990, declaring the strikes staged on January 18, 1990 and February 6, 1990 illegal,
the dispositive portion of which provides as follows, to wit:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

“1. The strike staged on January 18, 1990 is
hereby declared illegal and all employees who participated therein are
reprimanded therefor and further warned that future similar acts shall be dealt
more severely;

“2. The strike staged on February 6, 1990 is
hereby declared illegal and the Union officers/members are deemed suspended
from March 15, 1990 the last deadline of
the company for them to report to the date of promulgation of this
Decision. In short, the Union
officers/members are ordered reinstated to their positions but without
backwages;

“3. Baliwag Mahogany Corporation is hereby
directed to immediately reinstate Cecile de Ocampo, Rene Villanueva and Marcelo
dela Cruz to their former positions without loss of seniority rights
to pay them full backwages for
the period from January 17, 1990 to March 15, 1990 only;

“4. The Baliwag Mahogany Corporation is hereby
directed to immediately reinstate Alex Ramos, Ronaldo Cruz, Fernando Hernandez,
Renato Puertas, Hernando Legaspi to their former positions and to pay them
backwages from date of dismissal to March 15, 1990 only;

“5. The Baliwag Mahogany Corporation is hereby
exonerated of the charge of unfair labor practice;

“6. The Baliwag Mahogany Corporation is directed
to pay its employees the cash equivalent of unused sick leaves for year 1989;

“7. The Baliwag Mahogany Corporation is directed
to remit to the Union the dues for the month of January 1990.

“SO
ORDERED.” (Rollo, pp. 68-69)

Such decision prompted the company to file a motion for
reconsideration substantially on the ground that public respondent seriously
erred in not dismissing the employees particularly the union officers, who
participated in the illegal strike.

In its supplemental motion for reconsideration, the company
contended that as a result of the strike, it failed to meet the purchase orders
for the quarter valued at fifteen million pesos.

Petitioners filed an opposition to the company’s motion for
reconsideration and subsequently, a supplemental comment/opposition to motion
for reconsideration.

On December 13, 1990, the respondent Commission directed the
Labor Arbiter to receive evidence on the issues raised in the motion for
reconsideration and additional evidence on the issues already passed upon, and
to submit a report thereon.

On July 8, 1991, the respondent Commission rendered a resolution
affirming with modification the decision dated October 23, 1990, the dispositive
portion of which provides as follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of October 23,
1990 is hereby MODIFIED, to wit:

“1. The strike staged on February 6, 1990 is
hereby declared illegal and the Union officers/members who participated in said
strike committed prohibited acts are deemed to have lost their status of
employment, to wit:

1. Cecile de Ocampo

2. Wilfredo San Pedro

3. Reynaldo Aguilar

4. Bren Medina (Bien Medina)

5. Cesar Abriol

6.
Artemio Castro

7. Larry Alcantara

8. Melie Nocum (Michael Nocum)

9. Jesus Deo, Jr.

10. Publeo Darag

11. Eduardo Bino

12. Eduardo Vices (Eduardo Veles)

13. Abroin David (Ervin David)

14. Protacio Perez (Prostacio Perez)

15. Celso Sarmiento

16. Neol Vicbon (Noel Victor)

17. Alano Dacatimban (Eleno Dacatimban)

18. Antonio Bernardo

19. Carlito Victoria

20. Timoteo Mijares

21. Alex Ramos

22. Reynaldo Cruz

23. Modesto Manesia

24. Domingo Silarde

25. Renato Puertas

26. Hernando Legaspi

“2. The Baliwag Mahogany Corporation is directed
to pay Cecile de Ocampo, Rene Villanueva and Marcelo Cruz separation pay
computed at one month per year of service in addition to one month pay as
indemnification pay for lack of notice (Art. 283, Labor Code).

“3. The Baliwag Mahogany Corporation is directed
to pay Alex Ramos, Reynaldo Cruz, Renato Puertas, Hernando Legaspi separation
pay computed at one (1) month per year of service in addition to backwages
limited to six (6) months.

“4. The Baliwag Mahogany Corporation is directed
to reinstate but without backwages all Union members not found herein to have
committed prohibited acts nor found to have accepted settlement from it nor
have voluntarily left the Company for reasons of their own.

“5. All other findings in the questioned
Decision are affirmed.

“SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, pp. 45-47)

Hence, this present petition raising three (3) issues, to wit:

“1. Whether or not there is legal basis for
declaring the loss of employment status by petitioners on account of the strike
in respondent Company.

“2. Whether or not the dismissals of petitioners
Cecile de Ocampo, Rene Villanueva, and Marcelo dela Cruz from their positions
by the company on the ground of redundancy was done in good faith.

“3. Whether or not respondent NLRC acted
correctly in allowing respondent company to submit additional evidence in
support of its Motion for Reconsideration and in giving credence to the said
evidence despite the fact that the same were not newly-discovered evidence as
defined under the Rules of Court.” (Rollo, p. 11)

After a careful review of the records of this case, the Court
finds the petition devoid of merit.

Petitioners insist that there
is no specific finding by the respondent Commission regarding the particular
participation of the individual petitioners in the supposed acts of violence or
commission of prohibited acts during the strike such as denial of free ingress
to the premises of the company and egress therefrom as well as illegal acts of
coercion during the February, 1990 strike.

The Solicitor General disagrees and claims that it is undisputed
that the union resorted to illegal acts during the strike arguing that private
respondent’s personnel manager specifically identified the union officers and members
who committed the prohibited
acts and actively participated therein.

Moreover, the Solicitor General maintains that the illegality of
the strike likewise stems from the failure of the petitioners to honor the
certification order and heed the return-to-work order issued by the Secretary
of Labor.

Answering this contention, the petitioners argued that their
failure to immediately return to work was not impelled by any malicious or
malevolent motive but rather, by their apprehension regarding their physical
safety due to the presence of military men in the factory who might cause them harm.

The law on the matter is Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, to
wit:

“Article 264 (a) Prohibited activities. – (a)
x x x.

“No strike or lockout
shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the
Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or
voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same
grounds for the strike or lockout.

“Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a
consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full
backwages. Any union officer who
knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to
have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient
ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired
by the employer during such lawful strike.”

The clear mandate of the aforequoted article was stressed in the
case of Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc. (G.R. Nos.
88710-13, December 19, 1990, 192 SCRA 396, 411) where it was held that a strike that is undertaken despite the
issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification order
becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal, pursuant to the second
paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code as amended and the Union officers and
members, as a result, are deemed
to have lost their employment status for having knowingly participated in an
illegal act.

Unrebutted evidence shows that the individual petitioners defied
the return-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor issued on February 15,
1990. As a matter of fact, it was only
on February 23, 1990 when the barricades were removed and the main gate of the
company was opened. Hence, the
termination of the services of the individual petitioners is justified on this
ground alone.

Anent the contention that the respondent Commission gravely
abused its discretion when it allowed the presentation of additional evidence
to prove the loss suffered by the company despite the fact that they were mere
afterthoughts and just concocted by the company, time and again, We emphasize
that “technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. Labor officials should use every and
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively,
without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of
due process” (Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 80600, March 21, 1990, 183 SCRA 451, 457).

Turning to the legality of the termination of three (3) of the
individual petitioners, petitioners contend that the company acted in bad faith
when it terminated the services of the three mechanics because the positions
held by them were not at all abolished but merely given to Gemac Machineries.

On the contrary, the company stresses that when it contracted the
services of Gemac Machineries for the maintenance and repair of its industrial
machinery, it only adopted a cost-saving and cost-consciousness program in
order to improve production efficiency.

We sustain respondent Commission’s finding that petitioners’
dismissal was justified by redundancy due to superfluity and hence legal.

We believe that redundancy, for purposes of our Labor Code,
exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably
demanded by the actual requirement of the enterprise. Succinctly put, a position is redundant where it is superfluous,
and superfluity of a position or positions may be the outcome of a number of
factors, such as overhiring of workers, decreased volume of business, or
dropping of a particular product line or service activity previously
manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise. The employer has no legal obligation to keep in its payroll more
employees than are necessary for the operation of its business (Wiltshire File
Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 82249, February 7,
1991, 193 SCRA 665, 672).

The reduction of the number of workers in a company made
necessary by the introduction of the services of Gemac Machineries in the
maintenance and repair of its industrial machinery is justified. There can be no question as to the right of
the company to contract the services of Gemac Machineries to replace the
services rendered by the terminated mechanics with a view to effecting more
economic and efficient methods of production.

In  the same case, We ruled
that “(t)he characterization of (petitioners’) services as no longer
necessary or sustainable, and therefore properly terminable, was an exercise of
business judgment on the part of (private respondent) company. The wisdom or soundness of such
characterization or decision was not subject to discretionary review on the
part of the Labor Arbiter nor of the NLRC so long, of course, as violation of
law or merely arbitrary and malicious action is not shown” (ibid,
p. 673).

In contracting the services of Gemac Machineries, as part of the
company’s cost-saving program, the services rendered by the mechanics became redundant
and superfluous, and therefore properly terminable. The company merely exercised its business judgment or management
prerogative. And in the absence of any
proof that the management abused its discretion or acted in a malicious or
arbitrary manner, the court will not interfere with the exercise of such
prerogative.

Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings of
administrative bodies are entitled to great weight and these findings are
accorded not only respect but even finality when supported by substantial
evidence (Family Planning Organization of the Philippines, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 75907, March 23, 1992, p. 7 citing Asian
Construction and Development Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 85866, July 24, 1990, 187 SCRA 784, 787). Hence, the truth or the falsehood of alleged
facts is not for this Court now to re-examine.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, it is clear that
the assailed resolution of the respondent Commission is not tainted with
arbitrariness nor grave abuse of discretion.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit
and the resolution of the respondent Commission dated July 8, 1991 is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Griño-Aquino, and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.