NILDA GABRIEL, EVA GABRIEL, EDGAR GABRIEL, GEORGE GABRIEL, ROSEMARIE GABRIEL, MARIBEL GABRIEL, CYNTHIA GABRIEL, RENATO GABRIEL, GERARDO GABRIEL, JOJI ZORAYDA GABRIEL, DANIEL GAB…

In its decision in CA-G.R. SP. No. 19797 promulgated on August
23, 1991,^[1]
respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari filed
by herein petitioners assailing the orders of the lower court in Special
Proceeding No. 88-44589 thereof which effectively sustained the appointment of
private respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel as administrator of the estate of the
late Domingo Gabriel.

Petitioners’ present appeal by certiorari would have this
Court set aside that decision of respondent court, hence the need to examine
the chronology of antecedent facts, as found by respondent court and detailed
hereunder, pertinent to and which culminated in their recourse now before us.

On May 12, 1988, or nine (9) months after Domingo Gabriel died on
August 6, 1987, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XI, a petition for letters of administration alleging, among
others, that he is the son of the decedent, a college graduate, engaged in
business, and is fully capable of administering the estate of the late Domingo
Gabriel. Private respondent mentioned
eight (8) of herein petitioners as the other next of kin and heirs of the
decedent.^[2]

On May 17, 1988, the court below issued an order^[3]
setting the hearing of the petition on June 29, 1988, on which date all persons
interested may show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The court further directed the publication
of the order in “Mabuhay,” a newspaper of general circulation, once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks. No opposition having been filed despite such publication of the notice
of hearing, private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. Thereafter, the probate court issued an order, dated July 8, 1988,
appointing private respondent as administrator of the intestate estate of the
late Domingo Gabriel on a bond of P30,000.00.^[4]

Subsequently, a notice to creditors for the filing of claims
against the estate of the decedent was published in the “Metropolitan
News.” As a consequence, Aida Valencia, mother of private respondent, filed
a “Motion to File Claim of (sic) the Intestate Estate of Domingo P.
Gabriel” alleging that the decision in a civil case between her and the
deceased remained unsatisfied and that she thereby had an interest in said
estate.^[5]

On December 12, 1988, private respondent filed for approval by
the probate court an “Inventory and Appraisal” placing the value of
the properties left by the decedent at P18,960,000.00, which incident was set
for hearing on January 16, 1989.^[6]

On February 2, 1989, petitioners Nilda, Eva, Boy, George,
Rosemarie, and Maribel, all surnamed Gabriel, filed their “Opposition and
Motion” praying for the recall of the letters of administration issued to
private respondent and the issuance of such letters instead to petitioner Nilda
Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter of the deceased, or any of the other
oppositors who are the herein petitioners.^[7] After some exchanges and on order of the
court, petitioners filed an “Opposition to the Petition and Motion,”
dated May 20, 1989, alleging that (1) they were not duly informed by personal
notice of the petition for administration; (2) petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the
legitimate daughter,­ should be preferred over private respondent; (3) private
respondent has a conflicting and/or adverse interest against the estate because
he might prefer the claims of his mother; and (4) most of the properties of the
decedent have already been relinquished by way of transfer of ownership to
petitioners and should not be included in the value of the estate sought to be
administered by private respondent.^[8]

On September 21, 1989, the probate court issued an order denying
the opposition of petitioners on the ground that they had not shown any
circumstance sufficient to overturn the order of July 8, 1988, in that (1) no
evidence was submitted by oppositor Nilda Gabriel to prove that she is a
legitimate daughter of the deceased; and (2) there is no proof to show that the
person who was appointed administrator is unworthy, incapacitated or unsuitable
to perform the trust as to make his appointment inadvisable under these
circumstances.^[9]
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was likewise denied in an
order dated December 22, 1989.^[10]

From said orders, herein petitioners filed a special civil action
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, on the following grounds:

1.     
The orders of September 21, 1989 and December 22, 1989 are
null and void, being contrary to the facts, law and jurisprudence on the
matter;

2.     
Respondent judge in rendering the aforesaid orders gravely
acted with abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction,
hence said orders are null and void ab initio; and

3.     
Private respondent is morally incompetent and unsuitable to
perform the duties of an administrator as he would give prior preference to the
claims of his mother against the estate itself.^[11]

As stated at the outset, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment
dismissing that petition for certiorari on the ground that the
appointment of an administrator is left entirely to the sound discretion of the
trial court which may not be interfered with unless abused; that the fact that
there was no personal notice served on petitioners is not a denial of due
process as such service is not a jurisdictional requisite and petitioners were
heard on their opposition; and that the alleged violation of the order of
preference, if any, is an error of fact or law which is a mistake of judgment,
correctible by appeal and not by the special civil action of certiorari.^[12]

In the petition for review on certiorari at bar,
petitioners primarily aver that under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court,
it is the surviving spouse who is first in the order of preference for the
appointment of an administrator. Petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel is the widow and legal surviving
spouse of the deceased Domingo Gabriel and should, therefore, be preferred over
private respondent who is one of the illegitimate children of the decedent by
claimant Aida Valencia. Secondly, they
claim that assuming that the widow is incompetent, the next of kin must be
appointed. As between a legitimate and
an illegiti­mate child, the former is preferred, hence petitioner Nilda
Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, must be preferred over private respondent
who is an illegitimate son. Thirdly, it
is contended that the non-observance or violation per se of the order of
preference already constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.

On the other hand, private respondent contends that the court did
not commit a grave abuse of discretion in not following the order of preference
because the same is not absolute and the choice of who to appoint rests in the
sound discretion of the court. He calls
attention to the fact that petitioners Nilda Gabriel and Felicitas Jose-Gabriel
never applied for appointment despite the lapse of more than nine (9) months
from the death of Domingo Gabriel, hence it was not possible for the probate
court to have considered them for appointment. Besides, it is not denied that several properties of the deceased have
already been relinquished to herein petitioners, hence they would have no
interest in applying for letters of administration. Lastly, private respondent submits that it has not been shown
that he is incompetent nor is he disqualified from being appointed or serving
as administrator.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides:

“SEC. 6. When and
to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in
the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or
fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:

(a)  
To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be; or next
of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as
such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;

(b)  
If such husband or wife, as the case may be, or the next of
kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin neglects for thirty (30) days after the death
of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c)
If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve,
it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.” (Emphases
ours.)

Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the
order of preference in the issuance of letters of administration, categorically
seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires
that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator. It would be a grave abuse of discretion for
the probate court to imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignore that
directive without any valid and sufficient reason therefor.

In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a
deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in
said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. This is the same consideration which Section
6 of Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the
appointment of administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap
the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or,
on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest, and most influential motive to
administer the estate correctly.^[13]

This is likewise the same consideration which the law takes into
account in establishing the preference of the widow to administer the estate of
her husband upon the latter’s death, because she is supposed to have an interest
therein as a partner in the conjugal partnership.^[14] Under the law, the widow would have the
right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent,
aside from her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as much, if not more interest in
administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin.^[15] On this ground alone, petitioner Felicitas
Jose-Gabriel, the widow of the deceased Domingo Gabriel, has every right and is
very much entitled to the administration of the estate of her husband since one
who has greater interest in the estate is preferred to another who has less.^[16]

Private respondent, however, argues that Felicitas Jose-Gabriel
may no longer be appointed administratrix by reason of her failure to apply for
letters of administration within thirty (30) days from the death of her
husband, as required under the rules.

It is true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that the
preference given to the surviving spouse or next of kin may be disregarded by
the court where said persons neglect to apply for letters of administration for
thirty (30) days after the decedent’s death. However, it is our considered opinion that such failure is not
sufficient to exclude the widow from the administration of the estate of her
husband. There must be a very strong
case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the administration.^[17]

In the case at bar, there is no compelling reason sufficient to
disqualify Felicitas Jose-Gabriel from appoint­ment as administratrix of the
decedent’s estate. Moreover, just as
the order of preference is not absolute and may be disregarded for valid cause^[18]
despite the mandatory tenor in the opening sentence of Rule 78 for its
observance, so may the 30-day period be likewise waived under the permissive
tone in paragraph (b) of said rule which merely provides that said letters, as
an alternative, “may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors.”

On the other hand, we feel that we should not nullify the
appointment of private respondent as administrator. The determination of a person’s suitability for the office of
judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the
court exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not to be
interfered with on appeal, unless the said court is clearly in error.^[19] Administrators have such a right and
corresponding interest in the execution of their trust as would entitle them to
protection from removal without just cause. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 82 provides the legal and specific causes
authorizing the probate court to remove an administrator.

While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample
discretion in the removal of an administrator, it must, however, have some fact
legally before it in order to justify such removal. There must be evidence of an act or omission on the part of the
administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of
the court which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of
the administrator.^[20] In the instant case, a mere importunity by
some of the heirs of the deceased, there being no factual and substantial bases
therefor, is not adequate ratiocination for the removal of private respondent. Suffice it to state that the removal of an
administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or
beneficiaries of the estate. In
addition, the court may also exercise its discretion in appointing an
administrator where those who are entitled to letters fail to apply therefor
within a given time.^[21]

On the equiponderance of the foregoing legal positions, we see no
reason why, for the benefit of the estate and those interested therein, more
than one administrator may not be appointed since that is both legally
permissible and sanctioned in practice.^[22] Section 6(a) of Rule 78 specifically states
that letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and
the next of kin.^[23] In fact, Section 2 of Rule 82 contemplates a
contingency which may arise when there is only one administrator but which may
easily be remediable where there is co-administration, to wit: “When an executor or adminis­trator
dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or administrator may
administer the trust alone, x x x.” Also, co-administration, herein will
constitute a recognition of both the extent of the interest of the widow in the
estate and the creditable services rendered to and which may further be
expected from private respondent for the same estate.

Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment
of co-administrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment
and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented;^[24]
(2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estate of the deceased;^[25]
(3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing
one to settle;^[26]
(4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in
harmony for the best interests of the estate;^[27] and
(5) when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have
another competent person associated with him in the office.^[28]

Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we deem it just,
equitable and advisable that there be a co-administration of the estate of the
deceased by petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel and private respondent Roberto
Dindo Gabriel. As earlier stated, the
purpose of having co-administrators is to have the benefit of their judgment
and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented, especially
considering that in this proceeding they will respectively represent the
legitimate and illegitimate groups of heirs to the estate. Thereby, it may reasonably be expected that
all interested persons will be satisfied, with the representatives working in
harmony under the direction and supervision of the probate court.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is
MODIFIED by AFFIRMING the validity of the appointment of respondent Roberto
Dindo Gabriel as judicial administrator and ORDERING the appointment of
petitioner Felicitas Jose?Gabriel as co-administratrix in Special
Proceeding No. 88?4458 of Branch XI, Regional Trial Court of Manila.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, and Nocon, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Eduardo R. Bengzon, with Associate Justices Fidel
P. Purisima and Salome A. Montoya, concurring; Annex A, Petition; Rollo,
16.

^[2]
Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 19797, 12-13.

^[3]
Ibid., id., 14-15.

^[4]
Ibid., id., 16-17.

^[5]
Ibid., id., 18-19.

^[6]
Ibid., id., 20-23.

^[7]
Ibid., id., 25-26.

^[8]
Ibid., id., 32-33.

^[9]
Ibid., id., 35-36.

^[10]
Ibid., id., 56.

^[11]
Ibid., id., 6.

^[12]
Rollo, 16-21.

^[13]
Gonzales vs. Aguinaldo, et al., 190 SCRA 112 (1990).

^[14]
De Guzman vs. Limcolioc, 67 Phil. 404 (1939).

^[15]
Fule, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 74 SCRA 189 (1976).

^[16]
Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank, etc. vs. Escolin, et al.,
jointly decided with Testate Estate of the Late Linnie Jane Hodges, et al. vs.
Carles, et al., 56 SCRA 266 (1974).

^[17]
1 ALR 1247.

^[18]
Capistrano, et al. vs. Nadurata, et al., 46 Phil. 726 (1922); Arevalo,
etc. vs. Bustamante, et al. 69 Phil. 656 (1940).

^[19]
Mendiola vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 190 SCRA 421 (1990).

^[20]
Gonzales vs. Aguinaldo, et al., supra.

^[21]
Alabama vs. Hill, 76 S.E. 1001; Re Weaver, 119 N.W. 69.

^[22]
Matute vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 26 SCRA 768 (1969).

^[23]
The “next of kin” has been defined as those persons who entitled
under the statute of distribution to the decedent’s property (Cooper vs.
Cooper, 43 Ind. A 620, 88 NE 341).

^[24]
Gonzales vs. Aguinaldo, et al., supra

^[25]
Matias vs. Gonzales, et el., 101 Phil. 852 (1957); Corona vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., 116 SCRA 316 (1982); Vda. de Dayrit vs.
Ramolete, et al., 117 SCRA 608 (1982).

^[26]
Copeland vs. Shapley, 100 NE. 1080, cited in 34 C.J.S., Executors &
Administrators, 1316.

^[27]
In re Drew’s Estate, 236 N.W. 701.

^[28]
In re Fichter’s Estate, 279 N.Y.S. 597.