RAMON T. LOPEZ, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court of the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 07388, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 43, Manila in Criminal Case No. 84-25155.

I

The Information filed against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 43, Manila reads as follows:

“The undersigned accuses RAMON LOPEZ y TUGNAO of violation of
Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, committed as follows:

“That on or about March 13, 1984, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with three others
whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by approaching one EMMANUEL DIZON y NARIO,
driver of a Mitsubishi Colt Lancer four-door sedan bearing Plate No. PDY-765,
while inside the UST Compound, this City, pointing bladed weapons at him and
stabbing him with the same, driving said vehicle to Dasmarinas, Cavite where
they left said EMMANUEL DIZON Y NARIO, forcibly take, steal and carry away the
following motor vehicle, against the latter’s will, to wit: one (1) brown Mitsubishi Colt Lancer, 4-door
sedan, 1983 Model bearing Plate No. PDY-765, valued at P87,000.00, belonging to
said Emmanuel Dizon y Nario, to the damage and prejudice of said owner in the
aforesaid sum of P87,000.00, Philippine currency” (Records p. 1).

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. On June 20, 1989, the Regional Trial Court
rendered a decision, rejecting the retraction made by the complaining witness,
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months as minimum to twenty (20) years as maximum, and to pay the
costs.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
trial court.

Hence this petition.

II

The facts as found by the trial court and accepted by the Court
of Appeals are as follows:

On March 13, 1984, at around 2:00 P.M., complainant, Emmanuel N.
Dizon, parked his car at the campus of the University of Santo Tomas, Espana,
Manila, to wait for his cousin. While
he was seated at the driver’s seat, four men approached the car. One of them was petitioner, who poked a
knife at Dizon. Another companion of
petitioner got into the right front seat while the two others occupied the back
seat of the car. Dizon was pulled out
of the driver’s seat and forced to sit at the back. Petitioner then took over the wheel. After announcing that they were staging a carnap, they asked for
the car key. As Dizon was slow in
giving the key, he was stabbed at the right portion of his abdomen. After getting the key, petitioner drove the
car away. The other malefactors stabbed
Dizon several times, hitting him on the right brow, elbow, shoulder, right hip
and knees. Thereafter they punched him
with their fists. At a certain point,
petitioner stopped the car to allow his companions to buy a piece of rope,
which they used to hog-tie Dizon. They
also covered Dizon’s face with a shirt. Dizon was then brought to Cavite where he was thrown out of the
car. He lost consciousness. When he regained consciousness, he found all
his tormentors gone. He was able to
free himself and seek help. Some
barangay tanods brought him to the University Medical Center in Dasmarinas,
Cavite.

Meanwhile, the family of Dizon received a call from the hospital,
informing them that he was confined therein and that his vehicle was carnapped.

Dizon’s father and three brothers proceeded in their jeep to the
hospital. While driving along Roxas
Boulevard, Manila, they saw the “carnapped” car going in the same
direction. They deliberately bumped the
car to force it to stop. They then
jumped out of the jeep and opened the door of the stalled car. They found petitioner in the driver’s seat,
with a companion seated beside him. A
brother of Dizon called a policeman, who arrested petitioner and his companion. The father and brothers of Dizon then
proceeded to the hospital where Dizon was being treated. Dizon was then asked if petitioner and his
companion were the ones who took the car and mauled him. He identified only petitioner as one of the
malefactors.

On his part, petitioner denied having carnapped the vehicle. According to him, he was merely asked by
Darel Jacinto to drive the vehicle to the corner of Augusto Francisco and Nakar
Streets and to deliver it to a certain George. He consented to drive the vehicle but he proceeded first to a restaurant
at Roxas Boulevard to take his merienda. Unfortunately, he was not able to do so because the vehicle he was
driving was bumped by a jeepney.

III

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not giving
credence to the recantation of Dizon, who executed an affidavit of desistance
stating that he was not sure whether petitioner was one of the malefactors.

We have previously held that mere retraction by a prosecution
witness does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony if credible (People
v. Dulay, 217 SCRA 103 [1993]). The
Court looks with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in
court. The rationale for
the rule is obvious: Affidavits of
retraction can easily be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation
or for a monetary consideration. Recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable. There is always the probability that it will later be repudiated
(People v. Clamor, 198 SCRA 642 [1991]).

Where a witness
testifies for the prosecution and retracts his testimony and subsequently
testifies for the defense, the test of determining which testimony to believe
is one of comparison coupled with the application of the general rules of
evidence (Reano v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 525 [1988]).

A testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside
lightly and before this can be done, both the previous testimony and the
subsequent one should be carefully juxtaposed and the circumstances under which
each was scrutinized. In other words,
all the expedients devised by man to determine the credibility of a witness
should be utilized to ascertain which of the contradictory testimonies
represents the truth (People v. Clamor, supra).

It would be risky to reject the testimony taken before the court
of justice simply because the witness who has given it later may change his
mind for one reason or another. Such
rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the
mercy of unscrupulous witnesses (De Guzman v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184
SCRA 128 [1990]).

To ensure that justice is not denied, the Court has carefully
gone over the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimony of the
complainant. We have reached the same
conclusion as that of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

On direct testimony, Dizon testified as follows:

“Q   By
the way, did you recognize who were these persons?

A    No, sir. I did not recognize them.

Q   If
you will see them, you will recognize them?

A    Yes, sir.

Q   And how many of these
four (4) would you recognize?

A    I can only recognize one
at this moment, sir.

Q   Is he here in court?

A    Yes, sir.

Q   If
you know him will you point to him.

A    That one, sir. (Witness pointing to a man in a striped polo
shirt who, when asked of his name, gave the same as Ramon Lopez). (TSN, p. 9-10, February 25, 1985, Direct
Examination of E. Dizon).

Q   The
question is did you see the accused again?

Fiscal       Where?

A    Yes Sir, he was also in
the hospital.

Atty. Dionido

Q   Why was the accused
there?

Witness

A    I was asked to identify
him, sir.

Q   Who
made you identify the accused in this case?

A    I think a police
investigator, sir.

xxx                                    xxx                               xxx

Q   And then during that time
that alleged investigator asked you what did they asked you about this case.

A    They asked if they were
the ones who carnapped the car, sir.

Q   You mentioned
“sila” who were they?

A    Ramon Lopez and I do not
know the others, sir.

Q   And then, after asking
you if who among them perpetrated the crime, what did you answer to the
investigator?

A    I only pointed to Ramon
because I recognized him, sir” (TSN, Feb. 25, 1985, pp. 23-25).

On cross examination, Dizon testified as follows:

Q   Now
after you were pulled into the rear seat, you said that one of the accused
entered the car on the front door, left. Who opened the door?

A    The accused, sir
(Witness pointing to accused Ramon Lopez).

Q   You could recall very
distinctly the features of these four (4) people that entered the car
notwithstanding the elements of surprise and fear which came unto you at the
very time?

A    Yes, sir” (TSN,
February 25, 1985, p. 45).

The recanted testimony of Dizon reads as follows:

“Q   Mr.
Witness, in the information filed in court, you charged Ramon Lopez y Tugnao
who as alleged in the information, was the person who used force and violence
upon you on March 13, 1984, with the end of (sic) view of getting this
Mitsubishi Colt Lancer?

A    He
looks like the one who took my car, sir.

Q   You just stated Mr.
Witness that quoting you, he looks like the person who took my car on March 13,
1984, are you positive or certain that this person here, the accused, was the
very same person who took your car on March 13, 1984?

A    I
am not sure when I pointed to him if he was the one who took my car, sir (TSN,
p. 7, March 15, 1989).

Q   How come that you are
changing and clarifying your stand only now?

A    Because
of the lapse of time that the case is dragging, it is only now that I realized
that he was not the culprit, sir (TSN, p. 11, March 15, 1989).

Q   Now, this case happened
or took place on March 13, 1984, yet (sic) and now is 1989 or more or less a period
of four (4) years, you executed this
affidavit of desistance after four years. Why is it that it took you four years to change your mind and testify in
favor of the accused?

A    Because of the time that
lapsed, he is no longer in my mind and my conscience bothers me, sir.

Q   Did you not have the time
to see the fiscal’s office to tell that you are now bothered in testifying
against the accused?

A    Because I was angry at
that time, sir.

Q   The question is do you
have no time going to the fiscal’s office and tell us that you are bothered by
your conscience?

A    None, sir.

Q   But you have the time to
see the accused and the counsel for the accused?

Atty. Fernandez:

Objection, your
honor. I only met the witness here in
court.

Fiscal:      Regardless
of where you met the counsel? witness

A    None, sir.

Q   But you have the time to
see them?

A    Yes, sir” (TSN,
March 15, 1989, p. 11).

Between the testimony of Dizon as prosecution witness on one hand
and that of his affidavit of recantation and testimony for the defense on the
other hand, the former must be given credence and the latter rejected. His testimony as a prosecution witness was
coherent, clear, precise and unwavering even in the face of the
cross-examination conducted by the defense counsel. In so doing, he positively identified petitioner as the culprit
and lucidly described how petitioner took his car.

IV

The “carnapping” in this case was committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons. The penalty prescribed under Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539 is
“imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not
more than thirty years.” Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, if an offense is punished by a special law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the said
law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same. In fixing the maximum penalty,
the trial court must have taken into consideration the fact that the stolen car
was recovered the same day.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.