EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TERESITA VALLES, LORETO ALEDIA AND PEDRO ORDOÑEZ, RESPONDENTS.

On May 30, 1980, P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and designating certain parcels
of land in Rosario and General Trias, Cavite, as the “Cavite Export
Processing Zone” (CEPZ).  For
purposes of development, the area was divided into Phases I to IV.  A parcel in
Phase IV was bought by the Filoil Refinery Corporation, formerly Filoil
Industrial Estate, Inc.  The same parcel
was later sold by Filoil to the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).

Before EPZA could take possession of the area, several
individuals had entered the premises and planted agricultural products therein
without permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil.  To convince the intruders to depart
peacefully, EPZA, in 1981, paid a P10,000-financial-assistance to those who
accepted the same and signed quitclaims. 
Among them were Teresita Valles and Alfredo Aledia, father of respondent
Loreto Aledia.

Ten years later, on May 10, 1991, respondent Teresita Valles,
Loreto Aledia and Pedro Ordoñez filed in the respondent Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) a joint complaint (Pinagsamahang Salaysay) praying for
“justice and other reliefs and remedies” (“Katarungan at iba pang
tulong”).  The CHR conducted an
investigation of the complaint.

According to the CHR, the private respondents, who are farmers,
filed in the Commission on May 10, 1991 a verified complaint for violation of
their human rights.  They alleged that on
March 20, 1991, at 10:00 o’clock in the morning, Engineer Neron Damondamon,
EPZA Project Engineer, accompanied by his subordinates and members of the 215th
PNP Company, brought a bulldozer and a crane to level the area occupied by the
private respondents who tried to stop them by showing a copy of a letter from
the Office of the President of the Philippines ordering postponement of the bulldozing.  However, the letter was crumpled and thrown
to the ground by a member of Damondamon’s group who proclaimed that:  “The President in Cavite is Governor
Remulla!”

On April 3, 1991, mediamen who had been invited by the private
respondents to cover the
happenings in the area were beaten up and their cameras were snatched from them
by members of the Philippine National Police and some government officials and
their civilian followers.

On May 17, 1991, the CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding
EPZA, the 125th PNP Company and Governor Remulla and their subordinates to
desist from committing further acts of demolition, terrorism, and harassment
until further orders from the Commission and to appear before the Commission on
May 27, 1991 at 9:00 a.m. for a dialogue (Annex A).

On May 25, 1991, two weeks later, the same group accompanied by men of Governor Remulla, again
bulldozed the area.  They allegedly
handcuffed private respondent Teresita Valles, pointed their firearms at the
other respondents, and fired a shot in the air.

On May 28, 1991, CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista issued
another injunction Order reiterating her order of May 17, 1991 and expanded it
to include the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, the contractors, and
their subordinates.  The order reads as
follows:

“Considering the sworn statements of the farmers whose
farmlands are being bulldozed and the wanton destruction of their irrigation
canals which prevent cultivation of the farmlands as well as the claim of
ownership of the lands by some farmers-complainants, and their possession and
cultivation thereof spanning decades, including the failure of the officials
concerned to comply with the Constitutional provision on the eviction of rural
‘squatters’, the Commission reiterates its Order of May 17, 1991, and further
orders the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, their Contractors and
representatives to refrain and desist from bulldozing
the farmlands of the complainants-farmers
who have come to the Commission for relief, during the pendency of this
investigation and to refrain from further destruction of the irrigation canals
in the area until further orders of the Commission.

“This dialogue is reset to June 10, 1991 at 9:00 a.m. and the
Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways or his representative
is requested to appear.” (p. 20, Rollo; underlining ours.)

On July 1, 1991, EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift the Order
of Injunction for lack of authority to issue injunctive writs and temporary
restraining orders.

On August 16, 1991, the Commission denied the motion.

On September 11, 1991, the petitioner, through the Government
Corporate Counsel, filed in this Court a special civil action of certiorari
and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction, alleging that the CHR acted in excess of its
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the restraining
order and injunctive writ; that the private respondents have no clear, positive
right to be protected by an injunction; that the CHR abused its discretion in
entertaining the private respondent’s complaint because the issues raised
therein had been decided by this Court, hence, it is barred by prior judgment.

On September 19, 1991, this Court issued a temporary restraining
order, ordering the CHR to cease and desist from enforcing and/or implementing
the questioned injunction orders.

In its comment on the petition, the CHR asked for the immediate
lifting of this Court’s restraining order, and for an order restraining
petitioner EPZA from doing further acts of destruction and harassment.  The CHR contends that its principal function
under Section 18, Art. 13 of the 1987 Constitution, “is not limited to mere
investigation” because it is mandated, among others, to:

“a.  Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any
party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights;

“b.  Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations
thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;

“c.  Provide appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as
Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures
and legal aid services to the under
privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;

“d.  Monitor the Philippine Government’s
compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights.  (Underscoring ours.)” (p. 45, Rollo.)

On November 14, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion praying
that he be excused from filing a Comment for the CHR on the ground that the
Comment filed by the latter “fully traversed and squarely met all the
issues raised and discussed in the main Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition” (p. 83, Rollo.)

Does the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or
restraining order against supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to
cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of?

In “Hon. Isidro Cariño, et
al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al.,” G.R. No. 96681, December 2,
1991, we held that the CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial
body.

“The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence
and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving
civil and political rights.  But
fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function
of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.  The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking.  To be considered
such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law
to those factual conclusions to the end
that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of
review as may be provided by law.  This function, to repeat, the Commission does
not have.

“xxx                                                                           xxx                                                                        xxx.

“Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having
merely the power ‘to investigate,’ cannot and should not ‘try and resolve on
the merits’ (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No.
90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there
be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the
teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights,
or civil or political rights had been transgressed.  More particularly, the Commission
has no power to ‘resolve on the
merits’ the question of (a) whether or
not the mass concerted actions engaged
in by the teachers constitute a strike
and are prohibited or otherwise restricted
by law; (b)
whether or not the act of carrying
on and taking part in those actions,
and the failure of the teachers to
discontinue those actions and return to their classes despite the order
to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of
relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary
sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c)
what were the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what
sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.”
(pp. 5 & 8.)

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to “provide
for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose
human rights have been violated or need protection” may not be construed
to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ
of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have
expressly said so.  “Jurisdiction is
conferred only by the Constitution or by law (Oroso, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. Nos. 76828-32, 28 January 1991; Bacalso vs. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, 26
October 1967, 21 SCRA 519).  It is never
derived by implication, (Garcia, et al. vs. De Jesus, et al., G.R. No. 88158;
Tobon Uy vs. Commission on Election, et al., G.R. Nos. 97108-09.  March 4, 1992.)

Evidently, the “preventive measures and legal aid
services” mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and
judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR
may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights
violations.  Not being a court of
justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of
preliminary injunction may only be issued “by the judge of any court in
which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court
of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court.  It
may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance [now Regional
Trial Court] in any action pending in an inferior court within his
district.” (Sec. 2. Rule 58, Rules of Court).  A writ of preliminary injunction is an
ancillary remedy.  It is available only
in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights
and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition is GRANTED.  The orders of
injunction dated May 17 and 28, 1991 issued by the respondent Commission on
Human Rights, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the temporary restraining
order which this Court issued on September 19, 1991, is hereby made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Feliciano and
Bellosillo, JJ., on leave.

Padilla, J., see dissenting
opinion.