THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MIGUEL L. DELA CRUZ Y LIBUCAN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Sometime in September, 1990, the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the San Juan Police Station received
reports that one Miguel dela Cruz was engaged in the sale of shabu in
Santa Lucia Street, San Juan, Metro Manila. It appears that some of the members of that Unit had already been
hearing about dela Cruz, a.k.a. “Luga,” although they had not
yet seen him personally. Corporal Jaime
Blanco and Patrolman Cesar B. Turingan were assigned to the case.

Blanco and Turingan decided to entrap dela Cruz through a
so-called “buy-bust” operation: Turingan would impersonate a shabu buyer; present himself to dela
Cruz and ask to purchase some of the prohibited drug; and once dela Cruz took
the bait, delivered the shabu to Turingan and received the money from
the latter, he would be placed under arrest, and the shabu and money
confiscated for use as evidence against him.

In the evening of September 12, 1990, Turingan dressed himself in
nondescript clothing — short pants and T-shirt — and provided himself with a
bicycle, and two (2) one-hundred peso bills, to be used as purchase money for
the shabu. On one face of each
of the bills, at the right lower portion, Turingan wrote his initials,
“CBT.” The serial numbers of the one-hundred peso bills were also
copied in the police blotter by Pfc. Ricardo Marzo, viz.: “PM 60674 and JU 45557.” Also
entered in the police blotter prior to the departure of Blanco and Turingan was
the plan to conduct a “buy-bust” operation; and upon the officers’
return after the operation, the time of their return was also entered,
“10:00 p.m., September 12, 1990.”

Turingan, Blanco, and four other police officers proceeded to the
house of Miguel dela Cruz, a small shanty built on a sidewalk, at Santa Lucia
Street. It was raining heavily, and
they had to wait for about an hour for the downpour to stop. When the rain abated, they saw Miguel come
out of his house. Turingan went to him,
on his bicycle, and asked to “score two (2) decks of shabu,” i.e.,
buy two hundred pesos’ worth of
shabu. Miguel accepted
the money tendered by Turingan– the same two (2) marked one-hundred peso bills the serial numbers
of which had been recorded in the police blotter, as above stated — and went
back inside his house, emerging moments later with two (2) plastic tea bags
containing white crystalline granules which he handed over to Turingan. Turingan thereupon identified himself as a
policeman and placed Miguel under arrest, as Turingan’s companions moved
in. Turingan retrieved the money from
Miguel’s person. He also placed his
initials on the plastic bags given to him by Miguel.

Miguel dela Cruz was brought to the police station. There he was questioned by Pfc. Ricardo
Marzo. The white substance in the
plastic bag sold to Turingan by Miguel was sent to the Crime Laboratory
Services of the Philippine National Police at Camp Crame, Quezon City. Upon examination and analysis by a forensic
chemist, the substance was found to be methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a
regulated drug. The evidence was
thereafter submitted to the Public Prosecutor who, after due preliminary
investigation, filed an information with the Regional Trial Court at Pasig,
charging Miguel dela Cruz with the crime of violating Section 15, Article III
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, in that “not being lawfully
authorized to possess any regulated drug, * * (he, Miguel,) did * * willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver 0.18 grams of white crystalline
substance contained in two (2) transparent plastic bags, which were found
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a regulated drug * * .”

The facts just set out were narrated to the Regional Trial Court
by the prosecution witnesses at the trial of Miguel dela Cruz after he had been
arraigned and had entered a plea of innocent to the indictment. These witnesses were Turingan, the arresting
officer and so-called “poseur-buyer,” Marzo, the investigating
patrolman; and Lt. Leslie Chambers, the forensic chemist.

The defense version of the facts is entirely different. The defense witnesses — Miguel himself, and
his mother, Purificacion Ribucan — contradicted the police officers’ story.

Miguel testified that he is a plumber, earning a minimum of P100.00
a day; he is a widower and with him live his mother and two (2) young children,
aged seven and eight years. What
happened, according to him, was that while he was in his house in the evening
of September 12, 1990, a car suddenly stopped in front of his shanty from which
three (3) men alighted. He recognized
two of the men as police officers, having seen them in the neighborhood several
times before while they were on patrol in a police car. They asked him what his name was and when he
told them, they accused him of being a seller of shabu. Despite his denial of the accusation,
he was held by the waist and his wallet was forcibly taken from him. The men entered Miguel’s house although they
had no search warrant. Miguel’s mother,
who was awakened by the men’s flashlights which were being beamed at every
corner of the shanty, remonstrated with the men, to no avail. The men found no shabu on
Miguel nor inside his house, yet he was handcuffed, and made to go to the
police station with the men on board the latter’s automobile. On the way, the men kept on pressing him to
admit to being a shabu vendor. At the police station, one of the men, Cpl. Blanco, extracted two (2)
one-hundred pesos bills from the P800.00 contained in Miguel’s wallet and gave
them to the police officer investigating him. His wallet and its contents were never returned to him. He was not assisted by any lawyer during the
investigation. The thrust of Miguel’s
testimony is that the shabu was “planted” by the policemen;
i.e., that he was “framed,” although there was no “bad
blood” between him and
them, and he could give no reason why the latter would arrest him as a
drug-pusher without cause.

By her own testimony, Miguel’s mother sought to corroborate his
declarations.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding
Miguel dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged,
“illegal sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated
drug,” imposing on him “the penalty of life imprisonment and ** a
fine of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00).” It also directed the Branch
Clerk of Court “to turn over the subject regulated drug to the Dangerous
Drugs Board ** (for disposal) in accordance with its rules and
regulations.” The Court accorded superior credit to the prosecution’s
proofs, rejecting the defense theory of a “frame-up” which it
described as “a very handy one and
so easy to concoct and fabricate.”

Through his counsel de officio — a member of the Public
Attorney’s Office (PAO) — Miguel dela Cruz appealed from this verdict. In this Court and in his behalf, the PAO
submits that the Trial Court erred in holding that “the apprehending officers
were presumed to have performed their duties regularly,” “in giving
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and completely
disregard(ing those) of the defense witnesses,” “in not finding that
the search conducted by the apprehending officers in the shanty of the accused
is illegal as it violated his constitutional rights,” and, in fine,
“in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as charged.”

The PAO posits the absurdity of dela Cruz having readily agreed
to sell shabu to a complete stranger and in an open, public place.

There is nothing absurd in such a scenario. The selling of prohibited drugs to complete
strangers, openly and in public places, has become a common occurrence, a sad
fact of which this Court has taken notice and attributed to “the growing
casualness of drug pushers in the pursuit of their illicit trade, as if it were
a perfectly legitimate operation involving no particular caution or qualm of
conscience.”^[1]
This is particularly true in isolated transactions or sales in small quantities
as in the case at bar; drug pushers have been observed to sell their prohibited
wares to anyone who has the money to pay for the drug, be they strangers or
not, in private as well as in public places.^[2]
Familiarity between the buyer and the seller seems neither required nor
expected, the terms of the sale and the distribution of the prohibited drug
being evidently of the essence and the exclusive consideration of the
transaction.^[3]
It is not therefore unusual or improbable for a drug pusher to sell to a total
stranger.^[4]
As this Court has pointed out in People v. Paco, a 1989 case:^[5]

“Drug-pushing when done on a small level as in this case
belongs to that class of crimes that may be committed at anytime and at any
place. After the offer to buy is
accepted and the exchange is made, the illegal transaction is completed in a
few minutes. The fact that the parties
are in a public place and in the presence of other people may not always
discourage them from pursuing their illegal trade as these factors may even
serve to camouflage the same. Hence,
the Court has sustained the conviction of drug pushers caught selling illegal
drugs in a billiard hall (People v. Rubio, G.R. No. 66875, June 19, 1986, 142
SCRA 329; People v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 72141, January 12, 1987, 147 SCRA 252),
in front of a store (People v. Khan, supra), along a street at 1:45
p.m. (People v. Toledo, G.R. No. 67609,
November 22, 1985, 140 SCRA 259), and in front of a house (People v.
Policarpio, G.R. No. 69844, February 23, 1988).”

The appellant’s counsel would also make capital of the
discrepancy between the actual serial numbers of the two (2) marked one-hundred
peso bills, on the one hand, and the numbers written in the police
blotter: the serial number of one of
the bills, PM760674 having been noted as “PM60674,” and the other
bill, the serial number of which is JU45557, having been copied as
“JU455-7.” He theorizes that such a discrepancy, coupled with the
testimony of Pat. Marzo that he conducted the investigation of Miguel dela Cruz
and “blottered it in the police blotter” (sic), shows that the
recording of the serial numbers could have taken place only upon the return of
the entrapment team to the police station with their quarry.

Nothing in the record warrants such an inference. On the contrary, both documentary and
testimonial evidence of the prosecution relating to the matter sustain the
conclusion that the recording of the serial numbers of the bills was made prior
to the “buy-bust” operation. Between the actual and the recorded numbers there is substantial
identity — PM760674, recorded as PM60674; JU45557, recorded as JU455-7. The discrepancies between them are plainly
nothing but clerical errors, ascribable to carelessness or lack of
concentration. As much may be inferred
from the testimony of Pfc. Ricardo Marzo,^[6] to
wit:

“FISCAL: Could you tell the Honorable Court, what is the difference
between the number in Exhibit H-1^[7] and
the number in Exhibit E?^[8]

A:              Maybe
it was actually omitted, the number 7 was omitted.”

In any event, Marzo’s testimony^[9]
leaves no doubt as to when the recording of the serial numbers was done:

“Q:  With
regards (sic) to you, what was your participation in this case?

A:    I
investigated the case.

Q:   And
aside from investigating the case, what else was your participation in this
case? before the operation started?

A:    I
blotter (sic) the marked money before the
operation.

Q:     And you say you blotter (sic) the marked
money before the operation, to what are you referring ** when you say you
blotter (sic) the money?

A:    The
marked money used in the buy-bust operation.

Q:   What
is this blotter all about?

A:    It
was our SOP which we should have blottered (sic) the money we used in the
operation.

* *
* * *

Q    With regards (sic) to the entry in the
police blotter which is now marked as Exhibit H-1, when did you made (sic) the
entries thereto (sic)?

A:    The
operation, Sir? The blotter?

Q:   The
serial number?

A:    Right before the operation, Sir.

Q:   Could
you tell the Honorable Court when the operation started or when the actual
buy-bust operation started, if you know?

ATTY. ALDEA: Your Honor please, I will
object to that. The witness is not
competent to testify because he has been saying, Your Honor, that he was the
investigator or that he was the one who investigated.

COURT:   But
he also made the entry of the 2 P100.00 bill (sic) before the buy-bust
operation. Wieness may answer.

A:    We
leave (sic) our office at about 8:30 o’clock in the evening or past 8:00
o’clock in the evening of September 12, 1990 for the buy-bust operation to be
conducted at Barangay Sta. Lucia.

Q:   When
did you blotter the serial number of the money, when or on what date or on
(sic) what time?

A:    At
about 8:30 o’clock in the evening.

Q:   On
what date?

A:    September
12, 1990, just about they leave for operation. (sic).”

Pfc. Marzo’s statement that he “blottered it
in the police blotter, Sir” — which appellant contends is a tell-tale
sign of a frame-up — refers to the investigation being conducted by him and
not to the serial numbers. This is
obvious from the question to which that answer was given:^[10]

“Q:   And when they return back, they return back
before 10:00 o’clock in the evening, what did you do when they return back at
10:00 o’clock in the evening of September 12, 1990? (sic)

A:     When Cpl. Jaime Blanco investigated on the
person of Miguel de la Cruz, I am conducting the investigation and blotted it
in the police blotter, Sir (sic).”

The questioning had clearly shifted to what Pfc. Marzo had done
at 10:00 o’clock in the evening after the “buy-bust” operation
team had returned. Marzo’s answer was
that he conducted the investigation and “blotted it in the police
blotter.” The pronoun, “it,” in his answer could not but refer
to “investigation,” the noun immediately preceeding. To say that “it” refers to the
recording of the serial numbers would be contrary to the elementary rules of
grammer and common sense.

All things considered, this Court is satisfied that the Regional
Trial Court was correct in its analysis and assessment of the evidence and in
convicting the appellant on the basis thereof.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court a quo dated
April 16, 1991, in Criminal Case No. 1373-D, being in all respects in accord
with the evidence and the law, is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Regalado, and
Nocon, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Peo. v. Carpio, G.R. No. 88942, March 25, 1992; see also, Peo. v.
Bagawe, G.R. Nos. 885215-16, April 7, 1992 and Peo. v. Castillo, G.R.
No. 93408, April 10, 1992

^[2]
Peo. v. Santiago, G.R. No. 94472, March 3, 1992; Peo. v. Fabian,
G.R. No. 83392, Dec. 10, 1991; Peo. v. de la Cruz, 191 SCRA 160

^[3]
Peo. v. Babac, 204 SCRA 968 (1991), citing Peo. v. Rumeral, G.R.
No. 86320, Aug. 5, 1991 and Peo. v. Sanchez, 173 SCRA 305

^[4]
Peo. v. Castillo, G.R. No. 93408, April 10, 1992

^[5]
G.R. No. 76893, Feb. 27, 1989, 170 SCRA 681, cited in several subsequent
decisions, including: Peo. v.
Tandoy, 192 SCRA 28; Peo. v. Hilario, 196 SCRA 716; Peo. v.
Carpio, supra; Peo. v.
Mauyao, G.R No. 84525, April 6, 1992; Peo. v. Bagawe, supra

^[6]
TSN, Feb. 18, 1991, p. 26

^[7]
The entry in the blotter: “PM60674”

^[8]
The actual number of the bill: “PM760674”

^[9]
TSN, Feb. 18, 1991, pp. 23, 28. italics
supplied

^[10]
Id., p. 29.