RICARDO ENCARNACION, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

This petition seeks to
review and set aside the decision* of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on 28 January 1991 in C.A. G.R. No. 17012 and its
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration dated 5 August 1991, both
reversing the decision** of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Br. VI, dated 15 January 1988.

Petitioner Ricardo Encarnacion became a telephone service
subscriber of private respondent Pilipino Telephone Corporation (PILTEL for
short) after payment of the required fees. His telephone was installed on 3 June 1982. Under the terms and conditions governing the account, petitioner
was to pay monthly rentals (local service charges) and other bills for long
distance calls that may be made by him or by others thru his phone (toll
charges).

At midnight of 10 July 1982, petitioner’s phone service was
disconnected by PILTEL in order to switch operations to the digital electronic
system. Instead, however, of a
temporary disconnection, petitioner claims his telephone went out of order and
was not operational from 10 July to 30 September 1982. Despite his numerous complaints, the
telephone service was not restored, PILTEL however billed petitioner for July,
August and September 1982. He refused
to pay the local service charges for said months but admits paying toll charges
(long distance calls) during the same period. The telephone service was restored on 1 October 1982. From 1 October 1982 up to May 1983,
petitioner paid all service charges; however, PILTEL carried over to his
monthly bills (after the alleged restoration of service) the unpaid local service
charges for the months of July, August and September 1982 amounting to
P164.43. Petitioner refused to pay the
carried over amount, insisting that it is unjust to pay when no service was
rendered for said period.

Due to non-payment of the carried over amount, respondent
temporarily disconnected petitioner’s telephone on 19 May 1983. On 14 July 1983, the disconnection was made
permanent.

Claiming unjustified disconnection, and in order to compel
restoration of telephone service, petitioner filed a complaint for Specific
Performance and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against PILTEL (docketed as Civil Case No. 140-R, RTC, Br. VI,
Baguio CIty). Respondent’s answer in
the RTC averred that the telephone service was operational during the months of
July, August and September 1982 except from July 19 to 22, September 22 to
October 2 and October 29 to November 4, 1982, as shown by the trouble card of Tel.
No. 442-4822 but for which interruptions in service, periodic rebates were
granted. Petitioner’s refusal to pay
despite due notices and given grace periods led to the permanent disconnection,
according to private respondent PILTEL.

Upholding petitioner’s contention, the RTC held:

“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds that
the preponderance of evidence is in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant and accordingly judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant, as follows:

1.               
Ordering the defendant to restore the telephone service of the
plaintiff under its contract and to maintain the same in adequate and good
service for as long as
plaintiff pays promptly his bills for the same;

2.               
Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages;

3.               
Ordering the defendant to pay the amount of P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages;

4.               
Ordering the defendant to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of
P5,000.00; and the costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED.”^[1]

PILTEL appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the RTC and
held:

“Of crucial significance are the notices (Exhs. BB-CC, pp.
148-150) of disconnection sent by appellant and received by appellee before his
telephone was finally disconnected by the former reminding him of his unpaid
bills for the months of July to September 1982 and giving him a grace period to
settle his account. Thus, negating
gross negligence and bad faith on the part of appellant in disconnecting his
telephone service in view of his adamant refusal to pay his overdue bills.

x x x

It is worth noting that during the hearing of the preliminary
injunction appellant had already restored appellee’s telephone service and in
fact condoned the balance of his telephone account thus rendering moot and
academic the action for specific performance.

Anent the award of moral and exemplary damages, We find the same
devoid of legal justification in view of the foregoing disquisition.”^[2]

Petitioner is now before us claiming that the Court of Appeals’
decision suffers from the following flaws:

“I. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a serious
misapprehension of fact when it considered the trouble record (the very
piece of evidence on which respondent court anchored its decision) as having
been prepared and presented by petitioner-appellee which, if properly evaluated,
would justify a different conclusion.”

“II. Respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in
reversing the trial court and rendering a decision not borne out by the record
and not based on substantial evidence.”

“III. Respondent Court of Appeals
erred in deciding a question of substance in a way not in accord with law or
with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.”^[3]

Petitioner asserts that there is a question of law involved in this appeal. We do not think so. The appeal involves an appreciation of
facts, i.e., whether the questioned decision is supported by the evidence and
the records of the case. In other
words, did the Court of Appeals commit a
reversible error in considering the trouble record of the subject
telephone? Or is this within the
province of the appellate court to consider? Absent grave abuse of discretion, this Court will not reverse the
appellate court’s findings of fact.

In a petition for review under Rule 45, Rules of Court, invoking
the usual reason, i.e., that the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
substance not in accord with law or with applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court, a mere statement of the
ceremonial phrase is not sufficient to confer merit on the petition. The petition must specify the law or
prevailing jurisprudence on the matter and the particular ruling of the
appellate court violative of such law or previous doctrine laid down by the
Supreme Court. In the case at bar, petitioner
quoted the applicable law on admissibility of business entries.^[4]
A thorough reading of the law and the Court of Appeals ruling vis a vis the
questioned trouble record fails to reveal the appellate court decision’s
departure from law or settled doctrine of the Supreme Court. Sec. 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
states:

“Entries in the course of business. – Entries made at, or near the time of the transaction to which
they refer, by a person deceased, outside of the Philippines or unable to
testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be
received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his
professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty.”

The entry “may be received as prima
facie evidence” – if the person who made the entry cannot
testify. The rule establishes a
disputable presumption regarding admissibility of a document.

“While technically, evidence not submitted before the lower
Court may not be considered by the appellate court on appeal, the rule admits
of exceptions where as in this
case the testimonies have been duly transcribed in regular proceedings which
have not been impugned by the parties who themselves were also the protagonist
therein. In such cases, what matters is
the prevention of needles delays and the orderly and expeditious dispatch of
judicial business.”^[5]

Discrediting or giving credence to a
piece of evidence pertains to its materiality or relevance (the tendency in
reason to establish the probability or improbability of a fact in issue). The trouble record in question formed part
of the records. The RTC decision^[6]
evaluated its materiality and did not give it credence. The Court of Appeals believed
otherwise. Outside the circumstances of
this case, i.e. if it were found that there is no other evidence to support its
decision, the Court of Appeals’ reliance on the trouble record would be
questionable. However, unless there is
a clearly grave or whimsical abuse on its part, findings of fact of the
appellate court will not be disturbed.^[7] The
Supreme Court will only exercise its power of review in known exceptions such
as gross misappreciation of evidence or a total void of evidence.

In the case at bar, we find no reversible error in the Court of
Appeals’ decision after considering certain statements of the trial court
itself which, ironically, ruled in favor of petitioner. Assuming arguendo that the trouble
record is incompetent evidence, petitioner’s arguments on the total absence of
phone service for July, August, and September 1982 is belied by the RTC’s
recitation of facts, thus: “The
plaintiff, however, paid “the toll charges” covering long distance
calls during said period of July 1982, August 1982 and September 1982 (Exhibit
G).”^[8]

Why, it may be asked, was petitioner able to use his telephone
for long distance calls but not for local calls for the same given period? He does not explain. It appears correct to say that the telephone
line was not really dead for the whole three (3) months of July, August and September
1982, but only for intermittent periods. We do not condone the constant disruption of private respondent’s
telephone service, but petitioner must be accurate in his claim if he expects
to be awarded damages.

We find no reason for the award of moral and exemplary damages as
the disconnection was done after due notices to petitioner. Petitioner was further given a rebate for the period of interrupted
service. His account balance was
condoned by means of a credit memo and the telephone line was restored on 14
December 1983. These are no badges of
wanton, reckless, oppressiive or malevolent actuation on the part of private
respondent.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the peltition for review is DENIED; the questioned
Court of Appeals’ decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Regalado, and Nocon, JJ., concur.

* Justice Manuel C. Herrera,
writing for the Court, Justices Alfredo L. Benipayo and Fortunato A. Vailoces
concurring.

** Judge Ruben C. Ayson, presiding

^[1]
Rollo at pp. 44 to 53

^[2]
Ibid, pp. 38-43

^[3]
Ibid, pp. 22, 26 and 29

^[4]
Revised Rules of Court – Rule 130, Section 37

^[5]
Regalario vs. Northwest Finance Corporation No. L-26243, 30 September
1982, 117 SCRA 45. See also Beo vs. Court of Appeals – G.R. No. 95709,
200 SCRA 575, 13 August 1991

^[6]
Rollo, p. 50

^[7]
Gimeno vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-22747, 29 December 1977, 80 SCRA 623

^[8]
RTC decision, p. 2, par. 2, lines 21-23, Rollo at p. 45