JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO AND JOSE ALFONSO, ALL SURNAMED OPOSA, MINORS, AND REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS ANTONIO AND RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, MINOR, REPRESENTED B…

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of
Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners
dramatically associate with the twin concepts of “inter-generational
responsibility” and “inter-generational justice.” Specifically,
it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action
to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment” of Philippine
rainforests and “arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country’s vital
life-support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth.”

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-777 which
was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all
minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the
Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non­-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in
concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural
resources. The original defendant was
the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable
Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the
petitioners.^[1]
The complaint^[2]
was instituted as a taxpayers’ class suit^[3]
and alleges that the plaintiffs “are all citizens of the Republic of the
Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of
the natural resource treasure that is the country’s virgin tropical
rainforests.” The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally
concerned about the preservation of said resource but are “so numerous
that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court.” The minors
further asseverate that they “represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn.”^[4]
Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

“x x x ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to -?

(1) Cancel all existing
timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.”

and granting the plaintiffs “x x x
such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.”^[5]

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the
Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million
(30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in
which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these
rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is
irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures
which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific
evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology,
the country’s land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of
fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for
agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the
distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation
have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages
resulting from the drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the
“aquifer,” as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization
of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water,
incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the
Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss
of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded
estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately
the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and
extinction of the country’s unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the
disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the
disappearance of the Filipino’s indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of
rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic
life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g)
recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country,
(h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of
windbreakers, (i) the flooding of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from
the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and
shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated
for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the
generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth’s capacity to
process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic
climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as
the “greenhouse effect.”

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental
consequences of continued deforestation are so capable of unquestionable
demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This notwithstanding, they
expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary,
photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

“CAUSE
OF ACTION

7.     Plaintiffs replead by reference the
foregoing allegations.

8.     Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines
had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53%
of the country’s land mass.

9.     Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that
there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four
per cent (4.0%) of the country’s land area.

10.   More recent surveys reveal that a mere
850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the
entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares
of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.

11.   Public records reveal that defendant’s
predecessors have granted timber license agreements (‘TLA’s,’) to various
corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial
logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA
holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex ‘A’.

12.   At the present rate of deforestation, i.e.
about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per
hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines
will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not
earlier.

13.   The adverse effects, disastrous consequences,
serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation
to the plaintiff minors’ generation and to generations yet unborn are evident
and incontrovertible. As a matter of
fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already
being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

14.   The continued allowance by defendant of TLA
holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage
and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their
successors — who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and
unique natural resource treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes
a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds
in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

15.   Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the
State in its capacity as the parens patriae.

16.   Plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative
remedies with the defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to
cancel all logging permits in the country.

A copy of the
plaintiffs’ letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex ‘B’.

17.   Defendant, however, fails and refuses to
cancel the existing TLA’s, to the continuing serious damage and extreme
prejudice of plaintiffs.

18.   The continued failure and refusal by
defendant to cancel the TLA’s is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs,
especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified
(sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous
cultures which the Philippines has been abundantly blessed with.

19.   Defendant’s refusal to cancel the
aforementioned TLA’s is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in
the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is
the policy of the State —

‘(a)   to create, develop, maintain and improve
conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable
harmony with each other;

‘(b)   to fulfill the social, economic and other
requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos and;

‘(c)   to ensure the attainment of an environmental
quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being’. (P.D. 1151, 6
June 1977)

20.   Furthermore, defendant’s continued refusal to
cancel the aforementioned TLA’s is contradictory to the Constitutional policy
of the State to —

a.      effect ‘a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income and wealth’ and ‘make full and efficient use of natural
resources (sic).’ (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);

b.      ‘protect the nation’s marine wealth.’
(Section 2, ibid);

c.      ‘conserve and promote the nation’s
cultural heritage and resources (sic).’ (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);

d.      ‘protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.’ (Section 16,
Article II, id.).

21.   Finally, defendant’s act is contrary to the
highest law of humankind — the natural law — and violative of plaintiffs’
right to self-preservation and perpetuation.

22.   There is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage
of the country’s vital life-support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth.”^[6]

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr.,
filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action
against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question
which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of
Government. In their 12 July 1990
Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows
a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3)
the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant’s abuse
of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
aforementioned motion to dismiss.^[7]
In the said order, not only was the defendant’s claim — that the complaint
states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question
— sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the
reliefs prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and
set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent
their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.^[8]

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and
the petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably
states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their
right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
(Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the
DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the
concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man’s
inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in
natural law. Petitioners likewise rely
on the respondent’s correlative obligation, per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to
safeguard the people’s right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent
Secretary’s alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License
Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available
involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution’s
non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in
this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by
the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State
when public interest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners
failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague
and nebulous allegations concerning an “environmental right” which
supposedly entitles the petitioners to the “protection by the state in its
capacity as parens patriae.” Such allegations,
according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the
question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political
question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative
branches of Government. They therefore
assert that the petitioners’ recourse is not to file an action in court, but to
lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents
submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of
law. Once issued, a TLA remains
effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25)
years. During its effectivity, the same
can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after
due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other
forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners’ proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled
without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due
process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural
matters. Petitioners instituted Civil
Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The
original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this
matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule
that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general
interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so
numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of
them before the court. We likewise
declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to
ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of
a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are
present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter
being but an incident to the former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they
can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and
harmony of nature.” Nature means the created world in its entirety.^[9]
Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations.^[10]
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the
minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that
right for the generations to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been
addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a
meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments
adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule
against the respondent Judge’s challenged order for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order
read as follows:

x x x

“After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the
Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of
all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness,
a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific
legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the
Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on
unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs
fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it,
being impressed with political color and involving a matter of public policy,
may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the
sacred principle of ‘Separation of Powers’ of the three (3) co-equal branches
of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter
how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing renewing
or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to ‘impairment of contracts’ abhored
(sic) by the fundamental law.”^[11]

We do not agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the
plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right
involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete
with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies
these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right —
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental
law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides:

“SEC. 16. The State
shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.”

This right unites with the right to
health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:

“SEC. 15. The State
shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.”

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be
found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the
Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the
civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether
for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation —
aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need
not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the
well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect
and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be
lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come —
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of
the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following
exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner
Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:

“MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section
mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution — air,
water and noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam
President. The right to healthful (sic)
environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing
the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance.”^[12]

The said right implies, among many other
things, the judicious management and conservation of the country’s
forests. Without such forests, the
ecological or environmental balance would be irreversibly disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the
Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the
country’s natural resources,^[13]
then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192,^[14]
Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources “shall be the primary government agency responsible for
the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country’s
environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands,
mineral resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and
lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all
natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable
sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and
future generations of Filipinos.” Section 3 thereof makes the following
statement of policy:

“SEC. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the
State to ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and
conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of
the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the
population to the development and use of the country’s natural resources, not
only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to
recognize and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost
implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation of our
natural resources.”

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated in Title XIV,
Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987,^[15]
specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:

“SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the
benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as
the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of
the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining
a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and
utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different
segments of the present as well as future generations.

(2) The State shall
likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social
and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development
and conservation of our natural resources.”

The above provision stresses “the necessity of maintaining a
sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment.” Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically
speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the
fact of the agency’s being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:

“SEC. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be
primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to
law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State’s
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization, and conservation of the country’s natural resources.”

Both E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set
the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the
“environmental right” of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were
issued. The former “declared a
continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve
conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable
harmony with each other, (b) to fulfil the social, economic and other
requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure
the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of
dignity and well-being.”^[16]
As its goal, it speaks of the “responsibilities of each generation as
trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations.”^[17]
The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent)
to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR’s duty — under its
mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the
Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the
correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a
cause of action. Petitioners maintain
that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of
discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence,
the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or
granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

“x x x an act or omission of one party in violation of the
legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right
of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission
of the defendant in violation of said legal right.”^[18]

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss
based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action,^[19]
the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of
the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth or falsity
of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed
hypothetically admitted. The only issue
to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint?^[20]
In Militante vs. Edrosolano,^[21]
this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should “exercise the
utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the
ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to
manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically
admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the
legal order. The law itself stands in
disrepute.”

After a careful examination of the petitioners’ complaint, We
find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as
the specific averments under the subs-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate
enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be
granted, wholly of partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of
the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the
grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 cannot be said to
raise a political question. Policy
formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of
Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis
policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the
political question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the
exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive
and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution states that:

“Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.”

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political
Law,^[22]
Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of his Court, says:

“The first part of the authority represents the traditional
concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred by law. The second part of
the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of
justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion
of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and
particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. The catch, of course, is
the meaning of ‘grave abuse of discretion,’ which is a very elastic phrase that
can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.”

In Daza vs. Singson,^[23]
Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

“In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection
becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented
before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from
resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers,
in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: x x x.”

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the
complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the
Constitution. The court a quo
declared that:

“The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no
matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing
or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to ‘impairment of contracts’ abhored
(sic) by the fundamental law.”^[24]

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if
not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons,
even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with
utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits
and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever
bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their
terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public
interest and welfare. He was aware that
as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be
read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

“x x x Provided, That when the national interest so
requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract,
concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein x x
x.”

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be
revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due
process clause of the Constitution. In Tan
vs. Director of Forestry,^[25]
this Court held:

“x x x A timber license is an instrument by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. A timber
license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is
only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated
by public interest or public welfare as in this case.

‘A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise
would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state,
or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation’ (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this
Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights,
neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G.
7576). x x x”

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co.,
Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary:^[26]

“x x x      Timber
licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which
the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the
end that public welfare is promoted. And
it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the
State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests
so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See
Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry,
G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].”

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment
clause, which reads:

“SEC. 10. No law
impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.”^[27]

cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same
are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive
issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber
licenses. Hence, the non?impairment
clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized
as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such a law could have
only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the
purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp.,^[28]
this Court stated:

“The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is
not meant to be absolute. The same is
understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the
promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty
of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and
general welfare.”

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New
York,^[29]
quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,^[30]
to wit:

“’Under our form of government the use of property and the
making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public
concern. The general rule is that both
shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for
government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the
detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them
harm. Equally fundamental with the
private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common
interest.’”

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police
power of the state.^[31]

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how
the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the
respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract
would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to
it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant
Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18
July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their
complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned
timber license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo, and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., see separate
opinion concurring in the result.

Narvasa, C.J., Puno, and
Vitug, JJ., no part.

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^[1]
Rollo, 164; 186.

^[2]
Id., 62-65, exclusive of annexes.

^[3]
Under Section 12, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court.

^[4]
Rollo, 67.

^[5]
Id., 74.

^[6]
Rollo, 70-73.

^[7]
Annex “B” of Petition; Id.,
43-44.

^[8]
Paragraph 7, Petition, 6; Rollo, 20.

^[9] Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary, unabridged, 1986, 1508.

^[10]
Title XIV (Environment and Natural Resources), Book IV of the Administrative
Code of 1987, E.O. No. 292.

^[11]
Annex “B” of Petition; Rollo, 43-44.

^[12]
Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 4, 913.

^[13]
For instance, the Preamble and Article XII on the National Economy and
Patrimony.

^[14]
The Reorganization Act of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.

^[15]
E.O. No. 292.

^[16]
Section 1.

^[17]
Section 2.

^[18]
Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666 [1947]; Community
Investment and Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88 Phil. 215 [1951]; Remitere vs.
vda. de Yulo, 16 SCRA 251 [1966]; Caseñas vs. Rosales, 19 SCRA 462
[1967]; Virata vs. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 680 [1991]; Madrona vs.
Rosal, 204 SCRA 1 [1991].

^[19]
Section 1(g), Rule 16, Revised Rules of Court.

^[20]
Adamos vs. J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. 25 SCRA 529 [1968]; Virata vs.
Sandiganbayan, supra.; Madrona vs. Rosal, supra.

^[21]
39 SCRA 473, 479 [1971].

^[22]
1991 ed., 226-227.

^[23]
180 SCRA 496, 501-502 [1989]. See also,
Coseteng vs. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377 [1990]; Gonzales vs. Macaraig,
191 SCRA 452 [1990]; Llamas vs. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 [1991]; Bengzon vs.
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767 [1991].

^[24]
Rollo, 44.

^[25]
125 SCRA 302, 325 [1983].

^[26]
190 SCRA 673, 684 [1990].

^[27]
Article III, 1987 Constitution.

^[28]
110 Phil. 198, 203 [1960]; footnotes omitted.

^[29]
291 U.S. 502, 523, 78 L. ed. 940, 947-949.

^[30]
22 SCRA 135, 146-147 [1968].

^[31]
Ongsiako vs. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 [1950]; Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp., supra.; Phil. American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor
General, supra.; Alalayan vs. NPC, 24 SCRA 172 [1968]; Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers’
Union, 59 SCRA 54 [1974]; Kabiling vs. National Housing Authorithy, 156
SCRA 623 [1987].

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6 pt
6 pt
0
3