REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND DELFINA S. DOLOR, RESPONDENTS.

On 10 August 1988, private respondent Delfina S. Dolor filed an
application before the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, for the confirmation and registration of
her title to a 908-square meter residential lot located at the interior of
Dencio Cabanela Street, Poblacion, Daet, Camarines Norte, described on Plan
Ccn-05-000025 and covered by Tax Declaration No. 005-0823.

On 25 November 1988, when the case was called for initial
hearing, the Fiscal entered his appearance on behalf of petitioner Republic of
the Philippines. Respondent Delfina S.
Dolor moved that an order of general default be issued against the whole world
except petitioner which had filed an opposition. On the same date, the trial court issued an order, stating:

When this case was called for initial hearing today, only the
Fiscal in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines interposed an opposition to
the application.

Applicant, thru counsel, prayed for the issuance of an order of
general default against the whole world with the exception of the Republic of
the Philippines represented by the Fiscal.

It appearing from the record that the jurisdictional requirements
have been complied with and there being no private oppositor to the
application, the reception of evidence is hereby delegated to the Branch Clerk
of Court who is required to render a report within twenty (20) days from the
date of hearing which is hereby set on Dec. 20, 1988 at 9:00 o’clock in the
morning.^[1]

At the hearing on 20 December 1988, respondent Dolor’s counsel marked
as Exhibits “A” to “D,” respectively, the Notice of Initial
Hearing, the Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the
Official Gazette, the Affidavit of Publication of the Editor of the
“Weekly Informer,” and the Certification or Return of Posting by the
Deputy Sheriff.

Satisfied that respondent Dolor had a registerable title over
subject property the trial court in its decision of 17 August 1989 confirmed
her title thereto and ordered its registration as her exclusive property.^[2]

Petitioner assailed the trial court’s decision before the Court
of Appeals on a purely jurisdictional ground. Petitioner argued that it was incumbent upon respondent Dolor to show
proof that on or before the date of initial hearing on 25 November 1988, there
had been compliance with the requirements specified by Sec. 23 of P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as The Property Registration Decree, to wit:

Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. – The
court shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue an order
setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier
than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.

The public shall be given notice of the initial hearing of the
application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and
(3) posting.

1. By publication. – Upon receipt of the order of the court
setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration
shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official
Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines; Provided,
however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to
confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an
interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known,
and ‘to all whom it may concern’. Said
notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain
date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be
granted x x x x

The records show that while the trial
court stated that the jurisdictional requirements were complied with on 25
November 1988, they were yet to be presented on 20 December 1988 before its
Branch Clerk, the designated Commissioner.

In its decision dated 16 July 1991, the appellate court affirmed
the decision of the trial court.^[3] It
found petitioner’s submission not only too formalistic but also contrary to the
facts and the law and in derogation of substantial justice, rationalizing thus
–

We find that the requirements of Sec. 23 of Presidential Decree No.
1529 have been complied with in the instant case. The record shows that the Notice of Initial Hearing set on
November 25, 1988, issued by the Administrator, National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration (Exh. “A”) had been published in the
September 10, 1988 issue of the ‘Weekly Informer’ (Exh. “C”) and in
Volume 84, No. 42 of the Official Gazette issue of October 17, 1988 (Exh.
“B”), and posted in the prescribed conspicuous places in the subject
parcel of land and the municipal building of Daet, Camarines Norte by the
Sheriff (Exh. “D”). The
documents attesting to the compliance with Sec. 23 of PD 1529 were attached to
the record even before the date of the initial hearing of the instant Land
Registration Case No. N-678 x x x x

The appellant claims that while the presiding judge of the trial
court stated that ‘the jurisdictional requirements have been complied with’ on
November 25, 1988, the jurisdictional requirements have yet to be presented on
December 20, 1988 before the Branch Clerk of Court, the designated
Commissioner. Hence, appellant argues,
the Order of November 25, 1988 had no basis in fact and in law; there was no
notice to interested persons adjoining owners, and the whole world; and
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case has not yet been conferred with the
court on November 25, 1988.

We cannot agree. The
jurisdiction is not conferred by the marking of the relevant documents as
exhibits, but by the fact that all the requirements of Sec. 23, PD 1529 had
been complied with as shown by those documents proving compliance therewith,
identified later as Exhibits “A” to “D,” which were all
attached to the records of the case even before November 25, 1988. The trial court is not precluded from taking
cognizance of its own record. Although
in actual practice, it is incumbent upon the applicant’s counsel to mark those
documents as exhibits at the initial hearing to prove the jurisdictional facts,
the omission of such markings by applicant’s counsel who might have been as yet
unfamiliar with such practice would not deprive the trial court of its
jurisdiction to hear and proceed with the trial of the case, for the simple
reason that the jurisdictional requirements have been complied with as shown by
the documents that were already attached to the record of the case and of which
the trial court can take judicial notice. The failure of the Fiscal as well as the Presiding Judge to have called
the attention of the counsel for the applicant to proceed with the marking of
the documents to prove the jurisdictional facts would not have deprived the
trial court of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Neither would the marking of those documents
later after the initial hearing deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction.^[4]

In this petition,
while petitioner concedes that the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case is not conferred by the
marking of the relevant documents as exhibits but, rather, by the fact that all
the jurisdictional requirements of law had been carried out, yet, it takes
exception to the factual finding that there was compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements. As borne out by the records, at the
scheduled date of initial hearing on 25 November 1988 and even during the actual hearing on 20 December 1988, the
publication requirement in the Official Gazette was yet to be complied
with. Although the Notice of Initial
Hearing was included for publication in the 17 October 1988 issue of the
Official Gazette, specifically Vol. 84, No. 42, thereof, the same was however
released for publication only on 31 January 1989, as shown by the Certificate
of Publication issued by the Director of the National Printing Office.^[5]
In other words, the actual publication of the notice came out sixty-seven (67)
days after the scheduled initial hearing and/or forty-two (42) days after
private respondent had rested her case. Petitioner concludes that the late publication did not vest jurisdiction
in the trial court.

In petitioner’s brief filed before respondent Court of Appeals,
we note that the issue of late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in
the Official Gazette was raised squarely. But for no apparent reason, the issue was ignored in the questioned
decision. Indeed, respondent court
could have easily resolved the issue in favor of petitioner supported as it was
not only by competent evidence but also by ample jurisprudence.

The primary legal principle against which the legality of all the
proceedings conducted by the trial court should be tested is jurisdiction. In order to ascertain whether a court has
jurisdiction, the provision of the law in point should be inquired into.^[6]
Section 23 of P.D. 1529 explicitly provides that before the court can act on
the application for land registration, the public shall be given notice of the
initial hearing thereof by means of publication, mailing, and posting. In Director
of Lands v. Court of Appeals,^[7] citing Caltex v. CIR,^[8], this Court ruled that in all cases
where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and when
the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory it must be strictly complied
with, or the proceedings will be utterly void. So that where there is a defect of publication of petition, such
defect deprives the court of jurisdiction.^[9] And
when the court lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, the same lacks
authority over the whole case and all its aspects.^[10]

In Register of
Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon,^[11] an issue similar to the one presented in the
present petition was posed, that is, whether the actual
publication of the notice of the petition in the Official Gazette forty-seven
(47) days after the hearing, instead of at least thirty (30) days prior
to the date of hearing,^[12] was
sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the court to hear and determine the
petition. We answered in the negative
since the purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition for
reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such
a petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good
cause may do so within thirty (30) days before the date set by the court for
hearing the petition. It is the publication
of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case.

Regarding applications for land registration, the purpose of
publication of the notice of initial hearing is the same: to require all persons concerned who may
have any rights or interests in the property applied for to appear in court at
a certain date and time to show cause why the application should not be
granted. In particular, the notice in
this case commanded all persons concerned:

x x x to appear before this Court at its session to be held at
Branch XXXVIII, Municipality of Daet, Province of Camarines Norte, Philippines,
on the 25th day of November, 1988, at 8:30 o’clock in the forenoon, then and
there to present such claims as you may have to said land or any portion
thereof, and to submit evidence in support of such claims, and unless you
appear at said Court at the time and place aforesaid, your default will be
recorded and the title to the land will be adjudicated and determined in
accordance with law and
the evidence before the Court, and thereafter you will forever be barred from
contesting said application (or petition) or any decree entered thereon^[13]
(underscoring supplied).

Section 23 of P.D. 1529 does not provide a period within which
the notice should be published in the Official Gazette but for reasons already
obvious, the publication should precede the date of initial hearing. While there is no dispute that the notice was
included in Vol. 84, No. 42, 17 October 1988 issue of the Official Gazette,
this particular issue was released for publication only on 31 January 1989
when the initial hearing was already a fait
accompli. The point of
reference in establishing lack of jurisdiction of the trial court was 31
January 1989 because it was only on that date when the notice was made known to
the people in general.^[14]
Verily, the late publication of the notice defeated the purpose for its
existence thereby reducing it to a mere pro forma notice.

By reason of the defective notice of initial hearing, all the
proceedings conducted by the trial court which culminated in its decision
granting the prayer of respondent Dolor are declared VOID and it was error for
respondent Court of Appeals to have sustained the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned
decision of respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, is VACATED and SET ASIDE, and
the application of private respondent for the confirmation and registration of
her title over the property described therein is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Quiason, and
Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., (Chairman), on leave.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 35.

^[2]
LRC Case No. 678, NLTDRA Rec. No. N-60771, Annex “D,” Petition; Rollo,
pp. 37-39.

^[3]
Decision penned by Justice Celso L. Magsino with Justices Serafin E. Camilon
and Artemon D. Luna concurring; Rollo, pp. 31­-34.

^[4]
Id., pp. 32-33.

^[5]
Annex “C,” Petition; Rollo, p. 36.

^[6]
Auyong v. Court of Tax Appeals, No. L-25181, 11 January 1967, 19 SCRA 10.

^[7]
No. L-45168, 27 January 1981, 102 SCRA
370.

^[8]
No. L-28472, 30 April 1968, 23 SCRA 492.

^[9]
Po v. Republic, No. L-27443, 19 July 1971, 40 SCRA 37.

^[10]
Development Bank of the Phils.
Employees Union v. Perez, Nos.
L-22584 and L-23083, 30 May 1972, 45 SCRA 179.

^[11]
G.R. No. 88623, 5 February 1990, 181
SCRA 788.

^[12]
As mandated in Sec. 9, R.A. 26,
An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens
Certificate of Title Lost or Destroyed.

^[13]
Annex “B-1,” Memorandum for Private Respondent; Rollo, p. 124.

^[14]
People v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. 62243, 12 October 1984, 132 SCRA 523.