FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA SURPOSA, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the
issuance of a restraining order and preliminary mandatory injunction to annul
and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 11, 1991^[1]
affirming the decision dated March 20, 1990 of the Insurance Commission^[2]
in ordering petitioner Finman General Assurance Corporation to pay private
respondent Julia Surposa the proceeds of the personal accident insurance policy
with interest.

It appears on record that
on October 22, 1986, deceased Carlie Surposa was insured with petitioner
Finman General Assurance Corporation under Finman General Teachers Protection
Plan Master Policy No. 2005 and Individual Policy No. 08924 with his parents,
spouses Julia and Carlos Surposa and brothers Christopher, Charles, Chester and
Clifton, all surnamed Surposa, as beneficiaries.^[3]

While said insurance policy was in full force and effect, the
insured Carlie Surposa, died on October 18,
1988 as a result of a stab wound inflicted by one of the three (3) unidentified
men without provocation and warning on the part of the former as he and
his cousin, Winston Surposa, were waiting for a ride on their way home along
Rizal-Locsin Streets, Bacolod City after attending the celebration of the
“Maskarra Annual Festival.”

Thereafter, private respondent and the other beneficiaries of
said insurance policy filed a written notice of claim with the petitioner
insurance company which denied said claim contending that murder and assault are not within the scope of the
coverage of the insurance policy.

On February 24, 1989,
private respondent filed a complaint with the Insurance Commission which subsequently
rendered a decision, the pertinent portion of which reads:

“In the light of the foregoing, we find respondent liable to
pay complainant the sum of P15,000.00 representing the proceeds of the policy
with interest. As no evidence was
submitted to prove the claim for mortuary aid in the sum of P1,000.00, the same cannot be entertained.

“WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered ordering respondent
to pay complainant the sum of P15,000.00 with legal interest from the date of
the filing of the complaint until fully satisfied. With costs.”^[4]

On July 11, 1991, the appellate court affirmed said decision.

Hence, petitioner filed this petition alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the appellate court in applying the principle of “expresso unius exclusion alterius” in a personal
accident insurance policy since death resulting from murder and/or assault are
impliedly excluded in said insurance policy considering that the cause of death
of the insured was not accidental but rather a deliberate and intentional act
of the assailant in killing the former as indicated by the location of the lone
stab wound on the insured. Therefore, said
death was committed with deliberate intent which, by the very nature of a
personal accident insurance policy, cannot be indemnified.

We do not agree.

“The terms ‘accident’ and ‘accidental’, as used in insurance
contracts have not acquired any technical meaning, and are construed by the
courts in their ordinary and common acceptation. Thus, the terms have been taken to mean that which happen by
chance or fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is unexpected,
unusual, and unforeseen. An accident is
an event that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation — an event
that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause
and, therefore, not expected.”

“x x x. The generally accepted rule is that, death or injury
does not result from accident or accidental means within the terms of an
accident-policy if it is the natural result of the insured’s voluntary act,
unaccompanied by anything unforeseen except the death or injury. There is no accident when a deliberate act
is performed unless some additional, unexpected, independent, and unforeseen
happening occurs which produces or brings about the result of injury or
death. In other words, where the death
or injury is not the natural or probable result of the insured’s voluntary act,
or if something unforeseen occurs in the doing of the act which produces the
injury, the resulting death is within the protection of the policies insuring
against death or injury from accident.”^[5]

As correctly pointed out by the respondent appellate court in its
decision:

“In the case at bar, it cannot, be pretended that Carlie
Surposa died in the course of an assault or murder as a result of his voluntary
act considering the very nature of these
crimes. In the first place, the insured
and his companion were on their way home from attending a festival. They were confronted by unidentified
persons. The record is barren of any
circumstance showing how the stab wound was inflicted. Nor can it be pretended that the malefactor
aimed at the insured precisely because the killer wanted to take his life. In any event, while the act may not exempt
the unknown perpetrator from criminal liability, the fact remains that the
happening was a pure accident on the part of the victim. The insured died from an event that took
place without his foresight or expectation, an event that proceeded from an
unusual effect of a known cause and therefore, not expected. Neither can it be said that there was a
capricious desire on the part of the accused to expose his life to danger
considering that, he was just going home after attending a festival.”^[6]

Furthermore, the personal accident insurance policy, involved
herein specifically enumerated only ten (10) circumstances wherein no liability
attaches to petitioner insurance company for any injury, disability or loss
suffered by the insured as a result of any of the stipulated causes. The principle of “expresso unius
exclusio alterius” — the mention of one thing implies the exclusion
of another thing — is therefore applicable in the instant case since murder
and assault, not having been expressly included in the enumeration of the
circumstances that would negate liability in said insurance policy cannot be
considered by implication to discharge the petitioner insurance company from
liability for any injury, disability Or loss suffered by the insured. Thus, the failure of the petitioner
insurance company to include death resulting from murder or assault among the
prohibited risks leads inevitably to the conclusion that it did not intend to
limit or exempt itself from liability for such death.

Article 1377 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines provides that:

“The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a
contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.”

Moreover,

“it is well settled that contracts of insurance are to be
construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the
insurer. Thus ambiguity in the words of
an insurance contract should be interpreted in favor of its beneficiary.”^[7]

WHEREFORE, finding no irreversible error in the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals, the petition for certiorari
with restraining order and preliminary injunction is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman),
Padilla, Regalado, and Melo, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 12-17. Ponente: Justice Luis L. Victor with the concurrence
of Justice Santiago M. Kapunan and Justice Segundino G. Chua.

^[2]
Original Record, pp. 50-54. Penned by Insurance Commissioner Adelita A. Vergel
de Dios.

^[3]
Id., at pp. 2-5.

^[4]
Id., at p. 50.

^[5]
De la Cruz vs. Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., 17 SCRA 559
[1966].

^[6]
Rollo, pp. 15-16.

^[7]
National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 533 [1986].