THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JONATHAN PADUA Y LLENADO, JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE, ACCUSED, JONATHAN PADUA Y LLENADO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

The issue in this case is the consequence of the positive
identification of the accused made by the lone prosecution eyewitness
(complainant herself) on which the trial court’s judgment of conviction mainly
rested.

This appeal prays for a reversal of the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region, Branch 28, Naga City in Criminal Case No.
RTC 90-3138, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings that the
prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused
Jonathan Padua y Llenado of the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal
detention of which he is presently charged, judgment is hereby rendered whereby
said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and
to pay the complaining witness TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS representing
moral damages. With costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.” (RTC Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 44)

The information filed against the accused-appellant with two
others who remain at large up to this time alleges:

“That on or about April 14, 1990, in the City of Naga,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap
the herein complainant DIANA CASTILLO Y BRIONES, a female, 15 years of age and
detained (sic) her from April 24, 1990 up to and until June 16, 1990, against
her will and consent.” (Rollo, p. 10)

Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant, with the assistance of
counsel, pleaded not guilty.

The people’s version of the antecedent facts is summarized by the
Solicitor-General in his brief, as follows:

“On April 24, 1990, at about six o’clock to seven o’clock in the
evening, complainant Diana Castillo, fifteen years of age, was at her residence
in Naga City. Her mother then asked her
to buy food at a nearby store (pp. 3-4, TSN, September 4, 1990).

“Obeying her mother’s request, complainant went out to buy some
food. On her way to the store, she saw
a car running towards her direction. Inside the car were three persons, two of whom were wearing a nun’s
dress. The car then stopped and the two
men in nun’s uniform alighted and stood in front of the Triangulo Elementary
School. When complainant passed by the
school, the two men pulled her into the car that was driven by appellant. They then inserted a handkerchief in her
mouth and she lost consciousness (pp. 5-6, ibid.).

“When complainant woke up, she found herself inside a cage with
other children. The boys were placed in
one cage while the girls were placed in another. The building where they were housed was made of concrete and they
were not allowed to get out. Three
guards were watching them and one of them was appellant. In the course of complainant’s detention,
she was injected with drugs at least three times a week. Everytime she was injected, she would pass
out (pp. 7-11, ibid.).

“After being detained for quite sometime, she decided to
escape. She made a hole on the wall
with the use of an ice pick that was left in her room. On June 14, 1990, she was able to escape by
going through the wall (sic) she created and decended (sic) by climbing down
the tree. She ran (sic) for
approximately 400 to 500 meters when she heard the barking of a dog. She got scared and climbed another
tree. She then came down and continued
running. When she felt exhausted, she
climbed a tree to rest for fear of snakes and ants that might bite her (pp.
18-23, TSN, ibid.).

“The following day, she came down the tree and continued her
escape. She then saw a house and
decided to seek assistance there. Inside the house was an old woman who allowed her to eat and she was
also provided with some clothing. Thereafter, the old woman accompanied her to the town of Sta. Elena,
Naga City. Upon reaching there, she
took a bus bound for Naga City leaving behind the old woman (pp. 24-29, TSN,
ibid.).

“When she reached Naga City, she went to Rotary Hall in Barangay
Triangulo where she wrote her mother. But before her mother could pick her up at the Hall, she left home
already with her nephew Jose. When she
reached the house, she narrated everything to her mother (pp. 28-31, TSN,
ibid.).

“The following morning, complainant was brought to the Bicol
Regional Training Hospital for treatment and thereafter she was brought to the
Police Headquarters to report the incident (pp. 31-32, ibid.).

“Several days thereafter, complainant was invited by the police
to identify a suspect who was arrested in front of the Regional Hospital. When she saw appellant in the police
headquarters, she became so afraid and positively identified appellant as one
of her kidnappers (pp. 34-35, TSN, ibid.).

“Subsequently, appellant was charged with Kidnapping with
Serious Illegal Detention.” (Appellee’s Brief, pp. 3-6; Rollo, p. 74)

On the other hand, a different version is presented by the
accused-appellant, to wit:

“On June 21, 1990, a 15-year old girl by the name of Diana
Castillo, accompanied by her mother, showed up at the police headquarters in
Naga City and reported that she was abducted by some unknown persons on April
24, 1990 while she was walking along Diversion Road in Triangulo, Naga City
(pp. 4-6 and 32, TSN, 4 Sept. 1990). She further said that she was forcibly kept in detention in an
undisclosed place somewhere in Camarines Norte until she was able to escape on June 16, 1990. She told the police that her abductors
looked like Chinese (Exh. 2; pp.
19-20, TSN, 6 Sept. 1990).

“The girl also said that while she was in detention, she was
injected several times with an unknown liquid. She said that there were other children being kept in that place where
she was detained (Exh. 2, pp. 19-20, TSN, id.).

“An investigation of the report of Diana Castillo was conducted
by the police, but nothing came out of it until about two months later, or on
August 9, 1990, when a man was arrested near the Camarines Sur Regional
Hospital in Naga City while allegedly in the act of taking forcibly an infant
girl from her mother (Exh. C; p. 32,
TSN, id.).

“Diana Castillo was then brought by the police investigators to
the police station where she was made to see the man who was arrested. The man, who turned out to be the accused
Jonathan Padua, had Chinese features; and he was not among those who
participated in her abduction and illegal detention (pp. 34-35, TSN, 4 Sept.
1990; pp. 34-35, TSN, 6 Sept. 1990).

The Accused

“Jonathan Padua y Llenado is a resident of Meycauayan, Bulacan, married with 2 children (p. 29,
TSN, 16 Oct. 1990; p. 4, TSN, 6 Nov. 1990). He earns his living as a tricycle driver, while his wife operates a
carenderia beside a tannery factory (p. 31, TSN, 16 Oct. 1990; p. 3, TSN, 6
Nov. 1990).

“Prospecting on profiting from supplying the leather factory
with raw animal skin, the couple decided to sell their tricycle, with the
proceeds of the sale to be used as their capital. The accused intended to get the animal hide from a cousin in
Antipolo, Buhi, Camarines Sur (p. 32, TSN, 16 Oct. 1990; pp. 13 and 25, TSN, 17
Oct. 1990; p. 4, TSN, 6 Nov. 1990).

“On August 7, 1990, Jonathan Padua sold his tricycle for
P39,000.00 (Exh. 4; p. 7, 16 Oct. 1990). He deposited P30,000.00 in a bank (Exh. 5; p. 35, TSN, id.); gave P3
000.00 to his wife (p. 41, TSN, 16 Oct. 1990; p. 11, TSN, 6 Nov. 1990); and
kept the remaining amount which he intended to use for his expenses in Bicol
(p. 16, TSN, 17 Oct. 1990).

“Before leaving Meycauayan, however, he invited a friend to a
drinking binge, which then ended up with both of them taking a drug known as
‘shabu’ (pp. 37-38, TSN, 16 Oct. 1990). In the morning of the following day, he went to the Philtranco terminal
in Pasay City and boarded a bus to Bicol (pp. 39-40, TSN, id.).

“While on the bus, the accused began experiencing symptoms of
paranoia — that people were after him and his money. He transferred to another bus then got off in Labo when he
noticed that four persons were following him (pp. 40-42, TSN, id.).

“A policeman accompanied him to Daet, Camarines Norte and he was
made to pay for the food taken by the policeman in a restaurant. He was allowed to board a mini-bus bound for
Naga City. With the drug having taken
hold of him, he again felt that he was being followed, this time by a man whom
he saw talking with the policeman in the restaurant. He got off the mini-bus when he saw a military detachment (pp.
43-47, TSN, id.).

“Instead of being given assistance, the soldiers at the
detachment took his money and left him with P500.00 only. He was made to board a bus back to Daet with
two soldiers accompanying him. The bus
stopped at a canteen and the two soldiers left him. He boarded a bus bound for Sorsogon (pp. 47-49, TSN, id.; pp.
2-3, TSN, 17 Oct. 1990).

“On the bus, a man took his wallet and his travelling bag. He got off when the bus reached a place
somewhere in Naga City. Desperate he
walked purposeless until he saw a small store where he bought a blade with the
remaining change in his pocket. He
slashed his wrist with the blade. Two
uniformed policemen found him sprawled on the ground in front of an Iglesia ni
Kristo Church (pp. 3-5, TSN, 17 Oct. 1990; p. 15, TSN, 23 Oct. 1990).

“The two policemen brought him to the Camarines Sur Regional
Hospital. The policemen noticed that he
was high on drugs since he was saying that it was raining when the day was
bright and fair. The policemen left him
at the hospital after they were assured by the doctor of the condition of the
patient. (pp. 15-16, TSN, 23 Oct.
1990).

“After being treated of his wound, the accused began to walk out
of the hospital compound; and he then noticed that there were around fifteen
persons near two passenger jeepneys staring at him. He saw two women and he approached them requesting that he be
allowed to walk with them. One of the
two women was carrying a child and the accused asked her if he can hold the
child for her. The woman consented; but
when the accused got hold of the child, the woman screamed (pp. 6-7, TSN, 17
Oct. 1990).

“The men near the passenger jeepneys surrounded the accused. One of them asked him to hand over the child
to him and the accused complied. A
police car then arrived and he was brought to the police station where, about
two hours later, a girl accompanied by a policeman arrived. The girl was Diana Castillo (pp. 7-8, TSN,
17 Oct. 1990; p. 35, TSN, 6 Sept. 1990).

“Without the accused being placed in a line-up, Diana Castillo
then pointed at him as one of those who abducted her two months before (p. 8,
TSN, 17 Oct. 1990; p. 35, TSN, 6 Sept. 1990; p. 36, TSN, 4 Sept. 1990).

“The effects of shabu to a user, among other varied reactions,
are irrational behavior, visual and auditory hallucinations, depression and
suicidal tendencies, and paranoia. The
effects are recurring and are manifest for no less than 48 hours from intake of
the drug (pp. 6-8 & 12,
TSN, 23 Nov. 1990); pp. 41-42, TSN, 16 Oct. 1990; Exhs. 9 and 10).”
(Appellant’s Brief, pp. 3-8; Rollo, p. 61)

After trial on the merits and the judgment of conviction on April
19, 1991, the accused-appellant filed a motion for new trial on May 3, 1991
which was denied by the trial court on June 27, 1991.

On appeal, the accused-appellant raises the following assigned
errors:

“The trial court erred:

1. In failing to apply the most careful
scrutiny of the prosecution’s testimony, instead giving undue consideration to
every circumstance of guilt and thus losing sight of those that favor
innocence:

a. It misrepresented the actual deportment of the complainant on the
witness stand;

b. It misstated a material fact and made illogical inferences unsupported
by the evidence on record;

2. In misjudging the defense of the accused as
consisting of alibi and good character when in fact, the defenses raised were
alibi and mistaken identity;

3. In rigidly applying the principle that positive
identification is all-prevailing without, however, analyzing the varying
circumstances of its certainty;

4. In denying the accused’s motion for new
trial and thus failing to consider that character evidence is essential when
credibility is placed in issue.” (Appellant’s Brief, pp. 1-2; Rollo, p. 61)

The vital issue presented by the above assigned errors questions
the trial court’s appreciation of the evidence in favor of the prosecution
which anchored its case against the accused-appellant on the “positive
identification” made by the complainant herself as the lone eyewitness imputing
the crime charged to the accused-appellant.

The well-entrenched rule that the trial court’s findings of fact
are accorded great weight on appeal is not without exceptions. Hence, among the recognized exceptions are:

“(1) When the conclusion is a finding based
entirely on speculation;

(2) When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3) Where there is grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; and

(5) When the court, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of
both the appellant and the appellee.” (See People v. Ernesto Yabut y Torres,
G.R. No. 82263, June 26, 1992 citing People v. Taruc, 157 SCRA 178 [1988])

The case at bar falls under the fourth exception aforementioned.

The trial court, in appreciating the evidence on record,
committed reversible error in dismissing the defense of alibi and ruling that
the positive identification of the accused-appellant
by the complainant as the lone eyewitness presented by the prosecution
established his guilt to a moral certainty.

In the case of People v. Acosta (187 SCRA 39 [1990]), we
stated that:

“The identification of the offender is crucial in every criminal
prosecution where the defense pleads alibi. Unless the identity of the culprit is established beyond reasonable
doubt, the charge against the accused must be dismissed on the ground that the
constitutional presumption of innocence has not been overcome.” (At. p. 42)

The attendant circumstances regarding the manner by which the
complainant in this case pinpointed the accused-appellant as the culprit at the
police station strongly indicate that the identification was improperly
suggested by the police.

It is an undisputed fact that the accused-appellant in the case
at bar was not identified in a police line-up. Considering that a positive identification in which only the accused is
presented to the witness is, more often than not, as tainted as an uncounselled
confession (See People v. Hassan, 157 SCRA 261 [1988]), courts, in such
instances, must be the bulwark against a blatant miscarriage of justice.

On direct examination, the accused-appellant recounted how he was
identified by the complainant at the police station after he was arrested for
the attempted kidnapping of a one-month old baby as alleged in an information
dated August 10, 1990 (Exhibit “C”). Thus, he testified as follows:

xxx                       xxx                              xxx

“Q.  And at the police station what happened?

A.    While at the police station I was investigated, they asked for my
name, from where I was, and ………. and I told my name and the place where I came
from.

Q.   Now what else happened at the Police Station?

A.    While I was at the Police station for around two (2) hours or
more already ‘a girl arrived with a man with his arm on the shoulder of the
girl and this man was in civilian clothes but I noticed he had a gun on his waist,
sir.

Q.   And what happened next?

A.    They were conversing on one side of the police station while I
was also seated beside the table, sir.

Q.   And what did the girl do after talking with the man with a gun?

A.    After they finished conversing the girl approached me and
suddenly pointed at me.

Q.   After the girl pointed at you, what happened next?

A.    I was placed inside the jail sir.” (TSN; October 17, 1990, pp. 7-8)

Moreover, the complainant herself, on cross-examination, stated
that:

“Q. Now, do you remember the Police Officer
fetching you in your house telling you that the person who kidnapped you was
caught?

“There is no law requiring a
police line-up as essential to a proper identification. (People v. Espiritu, 191 SCRA 503
[1990]). Thus, even if there was no
police line-up, there could still be proper identification as long as such
identification was not suggested to the witnesses by the police.” (At p. 362)

The complainant was summoned to the police station on account of
the accused-appellant’s arrest for attempted kidnapping. The police officer who fetched the
complainant banked on the possibility that the person arrested was the suspect
they were looking for in the case of kidnapping with serious illegal detention
filed at the instance of the complainant two months before.

On the other hand, the
complainant, upon seeing that the said suspect was chinky-eyed and on the basis
of her recollection that one of her alleged kidnappers had chinese features,
readily pointed at the accused-appellant at the police station for purposes of
positive identification after she was apprised by the police of the
circumstances of the accused-appellant’s arrest.

The probability that the
positive identification was not influenced by the police would not have existed
had the complainant’s bases thereof been free from uncertainty and incredulity
as disclosed by her testimony in court.

As pointed out by the accused-appellant in his brief:

xxx                                                    xxx                                                      xxx

“3. On a very significant fact, as it would lay
the basis for her identification of the accused, Diana Castillo first declared
that the accused got off from the car and opened the door while her 2
companions pushed her into the car (pp. 56, TSN, 4 September 1990). However, after admitting that she was pushed
into the car beside the driver’s seat, and perhaps realizing the absurdity of
the accused getting off from the car and opening the door on the opposite side,
she then said that the accused did not get off from the car anymore but merely
stretched his hand to open the door. (pp. 59-60, TSN, 4 September 1990);

xxx                                                    xxx                                                      xxx

“8. Another glaring contradiction on the vital
subject of identification is when she declared that she was ‘positive’ she saw
the accused only seven times during her entire period of detention (p.
34, TSN, 4 September 1990). But later
she said that she was injected with an unknown liquid twenty-six times,
(pp. 14-15, 6 September 1990), and in all those 26 occasions the accused was
always with the two other guards doing the injections (pp. 32-33, TSN, id.).

“9. On the subject of identification again, she
first admitted that the three guards who were doing the injections did not look
like Chinese (p. 19, TSN, 6 September 1990). Pressed further on this point, and after pondering on the question for
some time and after looking at the fiscal for some clues (please see pp. 23-24,
TSN, id.)., she backtracked and said that one of the guards looked like a
Chinese (p. 23, TSN, id.). She
described the other guards as ‘Malays’ although she said that they had fair
complexion and ‘tall noses’ and their faces ‘reddish’ in color (pp. 29-32, TSN,
id.). Obviously, she was rectifying her
previous statement that the 3 guards making the injections did not look like
Chinese, which would exculpate the accused who had distinct Chinese features.

“10. Thus, she
contradicted her police statement (Exh. 2) on the physical appearance of the
guards who were injecting her whom she described as having Chinese features
(answer to question no. 8, Exh. 2).” (Appellant’s Brief, pp. 11-14; Rollo, p. 61)

The aforequoted inconsistencies are inexplicable and cast doubt
on whether the complainant had the full opportunity to recognize her alleged
kidnapper or that the kidnapper was the appellant. The Court is not persuaded that the positive identification in
this case meets the test of moral certainty. As we held in the case of People v. Nicolas (204 SCRA 191
[1991]):

“x x x Mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for
the proof required by law to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt inasmuch as the conviction for a criminal offense must be
based on clear and positive evidence. (Gaerlan v. Court of Appeals and People, 179 SCRA 20 [1989];
Macadangdang v. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA 308 [1989). (At p. 202)

The prosecution evidence on the details of the crime as
introduced by the lone eyewitness is replete with irreconcilable
self-contradictions and inconsistencies sufficient to shatter the said victim’s
credibility. As contained in the
accused-appellant’s brief, the discrepancies in the victim’s oral testimony are
as follows:

“1. She testified that she was placed inside a
cage together with some children (p. 7, TSN, 4 September 1990). Finding this perhaps as too
over-imaginatively bizarre, she revised her story by changing the primitive
cage into a high-tech room with glass walls and partitions complete with video
sets (pp. 3-4, TSN, 6 September 1990);

“2. She declared that she made a hole out of
the same hole where she used to peep and that this was the hole she used in
escaping (pp. 18-19, TSN, 4 September 1990). On cross?examination, she made a different story by saying that
she made another hole since the old peep hole could be seen from the ship (pp.
17-18, TSN, 6 September 1990);

xxx    xxx
   xxx

“4. She also said that in the area where she was
abducted, there were people around as there were a row of houses lined along
the highway (p. 43, TSN, 4 September 1990) as, in fact, just beside the school
were a wielding (sic) shop (Exh. 1-b) and a vulcanizing shop (Exh.
4-c). Yet later she said that, aside
from her abductors, she did not see any persons around as the residents in the
area were all ‘inside their houses’ when the incident occurred between
6:00 to 7:00 in the evening (p. 58, TSN, id.), which was also rather odd as
people, especially in the urban areas, do not retire at that early hour;

“5. She categorically said that she entered
first the Triangulo Elementary School compound in going to the store of Tiang
Rosa (pp. 41-42, TSN, 4 September 1990). Later admitting that the store of Tiang Rosa was not at the back of the
school, she then said that she did not enter anymore the school compound (pp.
44-45, TSN, id.);

“6. She first declared that, while on her way
home, she was on the left side of the highway going to Mabulo bridge (p. 44,
TSN, 4 September 1990), but then later said that she was on the right side (pp.
45-46, TSN, id.);

“7. She said that on the third day of her
detention, she was transferred to another room when two more children, who were
also apparently kidnapped, arrived (p. 11, TSN, 4 September 1990); but she
again changed her mind by later saying that only one girl arrived (p. 11, TSN,
6 September 1990). (Appellant’s Brief,
pp. 10-12; Rollo, p. 61)

Inasmuch as the victim’s credibility is tainted by virtue of her
own vacillating and confusing declarations, corroborative evidence should have
been adduced by the prosecution. The
prosecution presented the victim herself and the two physicians who prepared
the medical certificate dated August 10, 1990 (Exhibit “B”) on the physical
examination conducted on the victim on June 21, 1990.

The trial court summarized the testimonies of the said medical
officers as follows:

“Dr. Ma. Victoria Alvaro who was qualified as an expert on
obstetrics and gynecology cases declared that on June 21, 1990 she examined the
complainant for gynecologic clearance. She identified a medical certificate she issued on August 10, 1990
(Exhs. B and B-1). In findings No. 4
and 5 stated in her medical certificate, she explained that said finding of
incomplete healed hymenal lacerations mean that the hymen was lacerated. The whole width of the hymen, however, was
not lacerated, so it is an incomplete heal or supervision. If the whole width was lacerated, it is
called complete hymenal laceration and it is found at the 9:00 o’clock and 3:00
o’clock position and the same could have been caused by many factors such as
sexual intercourse, jumping running, etc.

“In his testimony also, Dr. Rogerio Reyes who was, asked
questions to qualify him as an expert witness, declared that on June 21, 1990
he examined the complainant and his findings were those listed in the medical
certificate (Exhs. B and B-2; Exhs. 3, 3-­A, 3-B). In explaining his findings, he declared that usually hematoma is
an accumulation of blood under the skin usually as a result of fracture of
blood vessel which is secondary to trauma. In his finding number 1, he found hematoma, 1 x 1 cm. at the right side of
the back of the complainant, around two (2) inches from the shoulder and the
same probably as a trauma, or when hit by a bad object such as wood or a fist
blow.

“The injury listed in number 2’ of the medical certificate is a
healed punctured wound at the lateral aspect of the upper portion of the right
arm about 3 to 4 inches above the elbow and the same was probably caused by a
pointed sharp instrument. Injury number
3 listed in the medical certificate was located in the inner side of the left
arm about 1 1/2 inches from the elbow and could have been probably caused by
needle marks, though the Doctor could not determine anymore the proximate time
the same was inflicted as the wound was already healed. It was probable, however, that the injuries
listed in the medical certificate could have probably (sic) been inflicted one
(1) month before the complainant was examined. On cross?examination, Dr. Reyes declared, among others, that it
takes only five (5) to seven (7) days for a needle injection because it
completely disappears. An injection
will completely heal in five (5) days to one (1) week.” (RTC Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 31)

A careful perusal of the above testimonies readily discloses that
they are inconclusive and, therefore, serve no probative value as regards the
implication that the accused-appellant is the culprit in this case. Hence, the Court is not persuaded that the
prosecution presented the required quantum of proof in criminal cases. Our ruling in the case of People v. Viray
(202 SCRA 320 [1991]) bears reiteration:

“Under the Constitution, the accused has in his favor the
presumption of innocence. Unless his
guilt is demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an
acquittal. The requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt, ‘a certainty that
convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon
it.’ In the present case, the requirement of moral certainty has not
been met.” (At p. 332)

The trial court, in ruling that the inconsistencies and
contradictions cited by the accused-appellant referred only to minor details,
paralleled the instant case with the inconsistencies and contradictions in the
case of People v. Barcelona (191 SCRA 100 [1990]). We disagree with the correlation made by the
trial court simply because in the Barcelona case which involved the
crime of rape the complainant therein positively identified the accused as the
person who raped her and the
trial court made a finding that she had no doubts nor second thoughts about her identification of the accused-appellant. The inconsistencies mentioned therein did
not change the fact that the complainant was raped by the accused­-appellant as
they merely touched on relatively minor details as where the latter bit him
while she tried to repel his advances; how long the sexual act took place;
whether she reported the incident to her uncle; or whether she felt any
ejaculation.

In the instant case, the trial court failed to notice that the discrepancies
in the complainant’s testimony border on significant details particularly on
the identity of tile kidnappers involved and the manner of execution of the
alleged crime. Hence, although
generally, we accord utmost respect for the factual findings of the trial
court, this is an occasion where we are constrained to set aside such findings
inasmuch as the evidence on record shows that the trial court did not take into
account significant circumstances in arriving at its findings.

In the light of the weakness of the prosecution evidence in the
present case, the accused-appellant’s defense of alibi assumes importance. Although the defense of alibi is inherently
weak, this does not allow the prosecution to
renege on its duty to prove the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt
so as to obtain a judgment of conviction. (See People v. De Leon, 193 SCRA 511 [1991])

The accused-appellant’s claim that he was at his place of
residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan from April to August 1990 plying his route as
a tricycle driver and left for Bicol on August 7, 1990 to canvass leather in order to engage in the leather
business is corroborated by the testimonies of his wife, Lorna Lim-Padua (TSN,
November 6, 1990, pp. 2-5); Fr. Juanito L. Oliva, a Catholic Priest who saw the accused-appellant on April
29, 1990 at the baptism of his
last child and who declared having seen the accused-appellant at least three
times a week during the months of
May until sometime in July 1990 (TSN, November 15, 1990, pp. 8-10); and Tomas Rosales,
a municipal councilor of Meycauayan, Bulacan who attested to the fact that
before the baptism aforementioned he used to see the accused-appellant three to
four times a week either on his trimobile or in their store, that from May to
June 1990, he had seen the
accused-appellant two or three times a day driving his trimobile and that in
August 1990, he did not see the accused-appellant anymore the way he used
to. (TSN, November 15, 1990, pp. 15-17)

In rejecting the defense of alibi, the trial court ruled that the
element of physical impossibility for such a defense to prosper was not
established.

We rule otherwise. While
it is true that there is no concrete and definite proof that the accused-appellant was in Meycauayan, Bulacan on the
very day of the crime in question, i.e., on April 14, 1990 so that it was
possible for him to have been at the scene of the crime in Naga City on that
date, yet, the possibility becomes remote, if not wanting, when we consider it
in juxtaposition with the victim’s claim that during the two-month period of
her alleged illegal detention, the accused-appellant who, being one of those
who kidnapped him, was also one of the three persons who injected her three
times a week with a drug that made her fall asleep for seven hours. How can the accused-appellant be seen in
Meycauayan three or four times a week as a tricycle driver and still manage to
be part of the three-men team that administered the injections on the victim
three times a week during her illegal detention? As between the accused-appellant’s corroborated allegation and
that of the victim’s self-declarations, we lend more credence to the
former’s. Besides, it was error on the
part of the trial court to hold that one can cover the distance between
Meycauayan, Bulacan and Camarines Norte (where the victim was purportedly
detained) in just a couple of hours. On
the contrary, the trip alone from Meycauayan, Bulacan to Pasay City (where the
buses bound for the Bicol Region are) via public transportation takes no less than
two hours. The bus ride from the
station to Camarines Norte using the National Highway along Quezon Province
takes seven to eight hours on a night trip where the traffic is light. Hence, the accused-appellant could not have
assumed two different lives during the months of April until June as postulated
by the trial court’s ruling.

Kidnapping and serious illegal detention are serious crimes that
cause the police force some major headaches at present. The courts recognize the earnest efforts to
apprehend the perpetrators but are not wont to convict in cases where the only
clear evidence offered is the victim’s act of pointing an uncertain finger at
the suspect whose constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty must be safeguarded at all times. In the absence of evidence to overturn the presumption of innocence
obtaining in this case, a judgment of acquittal is inevitable.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated April 11, 1991 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
accused-appellant is ACQUITTED. His
immediate release from detention is hereby ORDERED, unless he is being held for
another lawful cause. With costs de
oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero, and
Melo, JJ., concur.