PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. LORETO SALANGGA AND LAURETO LOPEZ, ACCUSED.  LORETO SALANGGA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Accused-appellant Loreto Salangga, alias “Dodong,” and
Laureto Lopez, alias “Retoy,” were haled to court as conspirators in
the rape and killing of a fifteen-year old barrio lass named Imelda Talaboc,
allegedly committed in Magsaysay, Davao del Norte on or about July 18, 1987.^[1]

Assisted by counsel de
oficio, both accused pleaded not guilty during their
arraignment. After trial, judgment was
rendered by said trial court on February 21, 1991 finding appellant Salangga
guilty of attempted rape with homicide, imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua but with full credit for his preventive imprisonment, and ordering
him to pay P30,000.00 as indemnity to the heirs of the victim. Accused Laureto Lopez was acquitted for
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.^[2]

It appears that in the late afternoon of July 18, 1987, in Sitio
Ogsing, Barangay Tacul, Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, Imelda Talaboc was
sent by her mother to fetch water from the spring, or “bugac,”
the only source of water in the vicinity. Imelda left with two one-gallon containers.

At around 5:30 to 6:30 of the same afternoon, when the dusk of
twilight was enveloping the area, one Ricky Monterde, a friend and brother in
faith of the Talaboc family, who resided only two hundred meters away from the
latter’s residence, likewise went to fetch water. On his way, he saw appellant Salangga walking about three meters
ahead of Imelda. He noticed that
appellant kept glancing back towards Imelda who was carrying water
containers. Trailing the girl was
accused Lopez who was walking behind her at a distance of about twenty fathoms.^[3]

On the same occasion, Lenie Alingay, a twelve-year old elementary
student residing at Sitio Ogsing, was on her way home from her
grandfather’s house. She recounted that
she met Imelda at the downhill crossing leading towards the barrio. Lenie explained that she was about four
meters away from Imelda, while the latter was following appellant and walking
about two meters behind him. As Imelda
came abreast with Lenie, the former asked the latter if she was going to school
on Monday. Then, as Lenie proceeded on
her way home, she saw that Lopez who was sitting on a rice paddy suddenly stood
up and followed Imelda. At about the
same time, Lenie also saw Ricky Monterde fetching water from the spring.

When Bernardo Talaboc, father of Imelda, came home from work, he
was informed by his wife that Imelda, whom she sent to the “bugac” earlier, was
missing. Talaboc set out to look for
Imelda. On his way to the spring, he
came upon two water containers left standing at a spot about four hundred
meters away from their house.^[4]

His search for Imelda led Talaboc to the house of Ricky who told
him that he had earlier seen Imelda on her way home with appellant walking
ahead of her. Ricky then accompanied Talaboc
and his son to the house of the barangay captain, Severino Laput, to whom they
reported Imelda’s disappearance. Thereafter, together with the members of his household and some
neighbors, they continued looking for Imelda. At around 8:00 o’clock that same night, they found the corpse of Imelda
lying in the bushes about twenty meters away from where the water containers
were earlier found.

Imelda was found with her clothes on but her panty was
missing. Her face was disfigured by
physical blows, she had been stabbed by a knife, and her eyes were gouged
out. The searching party brought home
the body of the victim.

Talaboc went to see Lenie Alingay and her family to inquire
whether they witnessed any unusual happening that fatal afternoon, since the “bugac” is only about
twenty meters away from their house. Lenie told him about her brief encounter with Imelda, as earlier
narrated.

Appellant and Lopez were arrested
that same night at around 8:00 o’clock, after the corpse of Imelda had
been found, upon the orders of Barangay Captain Laput based on the
information given by Ricky and Lenie implicating the two of them. They both became the main suspects
responsible for the grievous fate of Imelda, as they were the persons last seen
with her before the tragedy. The
soldiers of the 46th Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army took them into
custody.

At the army detachment, said suspects were bodily searched. According to the prosecution, the soldiers
recovered from appellant a piece of lady’s underwear, later identified by
Talaboc to be that of his daughter, Imelda. Afterwards, both suspects were ordered to undress. The prosecution claims that appellant’s body
bore what looked like bite marks and scratches, but none was found on the body
of Lopez.

The following morning, the suspects were brought to the office of
Station Commander Manuel Macabutas in the municipal hall where both were
investigated by P/Sgt. Mario Gataber of the Magsaysay Police Station. Appellant scrawled his quivery signature on
an unsworn statement,^[5]
handwritten by some other person, wherein he admitted the crime charged, except
that he was not able to consummate his bestial desire because Imelda fought
very hard against him.^[6]

The defense had a different version to tell. It was claimed that on July 18, 1987, at
about 9:00 P.M. while appellant was repairing a wall in his kitchen, some
members of the 46th Infantry Brigade and Lopez came to his house. He was informed that Barangay Captain Laput was requesting for their presence at his
house. Both accused complied with the
request and went to the residence of Laput. The latter asked them if they were responsible for the death of Imelda
and they vehemently denied any participation in the crime.

The accused were then brought to the 46th Infantry Brigade
Headquarters where they were allegedly subjected to severe physical beatings by
the soldiers. Unable to bear the
maltreatment any further, they were compelled to admit the earlier accusations
against them.

The next day, a strong and painful kick in the stomach was
inflicted on appellant by one of his custodians for refusing to carry a lady’s
underwear and a pair of blue slippers in his pocket, which items were later
identified by Talaboc as belonging to his daughter. Consequently, he carried the same with him when they were brought
to the Magsaysay Municipal Hall where they were investigated by Sgt.
Gataber. Afterwards, appellant was
asked to sign a document, explained to
him as having something to do with his food, to which importuning the unlettered
appellant acceded. Unfortunately, the
document turned out to be his supposed statement admitting his guilt for
attempting to rape Imelda and subsequently killing her.^[7]

Appellant Loreto Salangga has now come before us, through counsel
de oficio, contending that the trial court erred in
convicting him of the crime charged on the basis of insufficient circumstantial
evidence.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that a peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when (a) in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) an offense has in fact just been
committed and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and (c) the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped. In cases
falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) thereof, the person to be arrested without
a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail,
and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7, Rule 112.

From these provisions, it
is not hard to conclude that appellant was arrested in violation of his
fundamental right against unjustified warrantless arrest. On the night he was arrested, he was in his
house peacefully attending to some domestic chores therein. It cannot be suggested that he was in
any way committing a crime or attempting to commit one. Also, the soldiers had no personal knowledge
of the crime he was being charged with, nor was he a fugitive from the law.

The right of the accused to be secure against any unreasonable
searches on and seizure of his own body and any deprivation of his liberty is a
most basic and fundamental one. The
statute or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of
arrest is strictly construed. Its
application cannot be extended beyond the cases specifically provided by law.^[8]

Bernardo Talaboc testified that both accused were frisked and
asked to undress before him, some soldiers of the 46th Infantry Brigade, and Barangay Captain Laput inside the Army detachment. If he is to be believed, that body search
incredibly yielded a lady’s panty from the pocket of appellant and which
underwear he identified as that of his daughter. It would surely have been the height of stupidity for appellant to
be keeping on his person an incriminating piece of evidence which common sense
dictates should have been destroyed or disposed of. For that matter, according to Barangay Captain
Laput before whom appellant was brought shortly after his apprehension and who
was also present therein, nothing was taken from said appellant.^[9]

In any event, the underwear allegedly taken from the accused is
inadmissible in evidence, being a so-called “fruit of a poisonous
tree.” Likewise, there is definitely an
improbability in the claim of Talaboc that he was able to recognize the
underwear of his daughter. It is an
atypical and abnormal situation under Filipino customs for a father to be
familiar with the underwear of his daughter. This is highly improbable, and it is plain common sense that
improbabilities must be carefully scrutinized and not readily accepted.

Again, during the initial
investigation of Barangay Captain
Laput on July 23, 1987 before Sgt. Gataber, nothing was ever mentioned
regarding the supposed scratches and bite marks allegedly found on the chest of
appellant. The truth is that these
matters were mentioned in the trial court only after about two and a half years
from the arrest of appellant. It is
indeed strange that such vital evidence conspicuously found on the body of
appellant, if true, could be omitted in the sworn statement of Laput^[10] which was taken four days after the alleged
discovery. He and the investigator
could not have been unaware that the supposed scratches and bite marks were
obviously relevant in this kind of crime, more particularly to prove the
reported struggle of the victim against her unknown killer.

The aforesaid testimony
of Laput thus suffers from serious flaws attendant to its taking which
accordingly taint its credibility. The
long delay in his disclosure bolsters the suspicion that such testimony is
biased, if not fabricated. Laput’s claim
that he revealed the aforesaid facts to Sgt. Gataber^[11] is belied by his own sworn statement. It is true, and we have so held, that sworn
statements executed before police officers are usually incomplete and contain
data which are inconsistent with the facts narrated by the witnesses to said
officers. For this reason, courts have
generally brushed aside, as inconsequential, contradictions in the sworn
statement of a witness and his testimony as long as these dwell only on minor
and reconcilable matters.^[12]

However, the aforesaid allegations on the supposed scratches and bite
marks on the body of appellant can by no means be considered as minor or
trivial matters. The prosecution, in
fact, relies heavily thereon to support its theory of the case. Since every circumstance must be taken into
consideration in passing upon the guilt or innocence of the accused, it becomes
crucial for his eventual acquittal when such discrepancies touch on substantial
and irreconcilable facts, as when the omission in the sworn statement concerns
an important detail which the affiant would not have failed to mention, and
which omission could accordingly affect his credibility.^[13]

We are not persuaded by the theory that the accused waived their
right against the said unreasonable search and seizure, simply because they did
not object thereto. To constitute
waiver, it must appear, firstly, that the right exists; secondly, that the
person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such
right; and, lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.^[14] Courts understandably indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards and do not
deduce acquiescence in the loss of elementary rights.^[15]

Coming now to Sgt.
Gataber’s testimony, we find that the same seriously undermines the case for
the People. On the witness stand, he
recited the rights of an accused but apparently none of these were granted to
or applied in his investigation of appellant. This is partly explained by the fact that he had a wrong, if not a
weird, perception or understanding regarding a “person under custodial
interrogation,” his duty to apprise such person of his rights, and the
right of that person to counsel, as demonstrated below.

“Q   How
would you say that a person is under custodial interrogation?

A    When the accused is
assisted by a counsel of his own choice.

x x x

Q   In other words, if the
accused is not assisted by counsel in the investigation he is not under
custodial interrogation, is that what you mean?

A    Yes.

Q In
other words, (in) this particular case, you considered this investigation on
accused Salangga as not under custodial interrogation because he was not
assisted by counsel?

A    Yes, because that is not
the proper custodial interrogation.

Q   In other words, on that
day that you conducted the investigation, you did not apprise him of his rights
to have counsel?

A    I apprised him but there
was no available lawyer in our place but I considered his statement is true.

Q   Will you please go over
this statement if you can find a portion wherein you apprised the declarant of
his right to counsel?

A    I did not apprise
because of some circumstantial facts.

Q   What are these
circumstantial facts?

A    I did not bother to
write the rights of the accused.

Q   Did you not find it
important x x x because this case is quite serious?

A I
made that question and interrogation in my office but I was doubtful whether
that would be acceptable in Court because that question and answer was not
subscribed and sworn to before the municipal judge.

x x x

Q   In other words, you did
not tell him that the government can provide him counsel if he cannot afford
one?

A    Yes.

Q   You did not tell him
that?

A    I told him that if you
cannot afford to have a counsel, the government will give you one.

Q   Did you place that in
your question and interview?

A    No.

Q   Why did you not place
that in your question and interview?

A    Because my question and
interview which I made before him is not acceptable.

x x x

Q Because you thought that Salangga was under custodial interrogation of
the Police Station of Magsaysay at that time x x x why did you not require him
to have counsel of his own choice as you have attended a lot of seminars?

A That is the reason why
because there is no available lawyer in our place.

Q And you are aware
about Atty. Mat(i)as Acquiatan?

A Yes, but sometimes he
is out of Magsaysay.

Q And despite that fact, you did not find ways and means to contact the
CLAO or Atty. Acquiatan in order to assist Salangga in the interview?

A There were several lawyers which I approached to assist the suspect but
they refused and at that time I also approached Atty. Acquiatan and he advised
me to see the lawyer of CLAO.

Q   But in this particular
case, you never tr(ied) to approach Atty. Acquiatan to assist accused Salangga?

A    No.

Q   Neither did you approach
the lawyer of CLAO in that particular interview?

A    No.”^[16]

It is consequently
evident that since appellant was not assisted by any counsel during his
custodial investigation, his supposed incriminatory statement is inadmissible
and cannot be considered in the adjudication of this case. Oddly enough, even Sgt. Gataber was
skeptical as to the validity of the statement he took from appellant.^[17] The rule, of course, is that no in-custody
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engaged by the person arrested, by any person in his behalf or appointed by the
court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by someone in his behalf.^[18]

While the right to
counsel may be waived, such waiver must be effected voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently. Further, waiver must be
with the assistance of counsel.^[19] The absence of counsel at that stage makes
the statement, in contemplation of law, involuntary, even if it was otherwise
voluntary in a non-technical sense.

With the Court now
unanimously upholding the exclusionary rule in toto, the
constitutional mandate is given full force and effect. This constitutional edict has been
proved by historical experience to be the practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures by
outlawing all evidence illegally seized and thereby removing the incentive part
of the military and police officers to disregard such basic rights. This is of special public importance and
serves as a shield in the remote provinces and rural areas to the people who
have no access to courts for prompt and immediate relief from violations of
their rights.^[20]

Section 5 of Rule 133 provides that when no direct evidence is
available, circumstantial evidence will suffice when the following requirements
are present: (a) there are more than
one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Furthermore, before conviction can be had upon circumstantial evidence,
the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the author of the crime.^[21]

A meticulous and closer inquiry into the records reveals that
there is really but one sole circumstance upon which the court relied in its
decision, that is, that Imelda was seen trailing behind appellant by a few
meters on the path towards her house. The prosecution presented two witnesses on this very same fact but the
testimony thereon of two witnesses cannot convert one circumstance into
two. All other
“circumstances” under the prosecution’s theory, such as the underwear
allegedly found in appellant’s pocket, the supposed scratches and bite marks on
his body, and his dubious confession to Sgt. Gataber are all products of an
illegal process, aside from their questionable veracity.

Assuming arguendo that appellant was seen walking in
front of Imelda about two hours before the discovery of the death of the
latter, such fact could not lead a prudent man to conclude that appellant was
the one responsible for the misfortune that befell the victim. Also, Sgt. Gataber believed that Lenie
Alingay and Ricky Monterde could shed light on the case and so he claimed to
have taken their statements, but, surprisingly, no sworn statements were
executed by them. Later, he retracted
what he said, announcing instead that he actually referred the taking of the
statements to Sgt. Saraum, but he could not remember if the statements, if
thereafter taken, were attached to the records.^[22]

We reject the People’s hypothesis on the alleged
“confession” of appellant to a certain Pastor Juan Tapic. The records reveal that there was a
statement of appellant merely saying that he and Lopez were suspects in the rape and death of Imelda but never did he say that they
were the ones responsible for such crime. Also, if the prosecution really believed that the appellant truly
admitted to Pastor Tapic his participation in the crime, it is puzzling that said pastor was not called by the
prosecution to take the witness stand. A party’s failure to produce evidence, which if favorable would
naturally have been produced, is open to the inference that the facts were
unfavorable to his case.^[23] Verily, that failure to present Pastor Tapic
can only mean that the prosecution itself doubted what appellant precisely
meant when he said that there are two of them, that is, himself and Lopez.

We also note that while
the prosecution presented a medical certificate^[24] to prove the alleged rape, it failed to
present the physician to affirm it. In
the absence of the doctor’s testimony, the contents thereof are hearsay.^[25] At any rate, even if the physician had been
presented there was in fact no need for him to make that affirmation since the
conviction of appellant is based merely on his supposed inculpatory statement
which has no probative value for having been taken in violation of explicit
constitutional mandates and proscriptions.

Well-entrenched is the
rule that the findings of facts of trial courts carry great weight for these
courts enjoy the advantage of having observed the demeanor of the witnesses on
the witness stand and, therefore, can discern if these witnesses are telling
the truth or not. However, likewise
well-settled are the exceptions thereto, which are when (1) the conclusion is a
finding based entirely on speculations, (2) the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible, (3) there is a grave abuse of discretion, and (4)
the finding is based on a
misapprehension of the facts.^[26] The evidentiary bases for the conclusions of
the lower court having been demonstrated to be either incompetent in law or
incredible in fact, the exceptive circumstances have to be given full sway.

The prosecution’s
evidence regrettably leaves much to be desired, unfortunately as a consequence
of faulty investigative work in the first place. This Court must, however, be guided by a rule of long standing
and consistency that if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of
one or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not
fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction.^[27]

In our criminal justice
system, the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the
innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt. This determinant, with the
constitutional presumption of innocence which can be overthrown only by the
strength of the prosecution’s own evidence proving guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, irresistibly dictate an exoneration in this case. It is indeed a bitter truth for the victim’s
family to face, that human justice seems to have failed them due to the
foregoing confluent factors. We deeply
commiserate with them and sincerely hope that, somehow and in God’s own time,
divine retribution shall be visited upon the evil author of this human tragedy.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Loreto Salangga is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered to be
immediately released unless there are other grounds for his continued
detention, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Criminal Case No. XXI-92 (88) Regional
Trial Court, Branch 21, Bansalan, Davao del Sur; Original Record, 1; Judge
Rodolfo A. Escovilla, presiding.

^[2]
Rollo, 58-59.

^[3]
TSN, June 1, 1990, 4-5; March 21,
1990, 5-8, 11, 38-39.

^[4]
TSN, April 25, 1990, 4-12; June 1,
1990, 4-5.

^[5]
Exhibit A.

^[6]
TSN, June 1, 1990, 6-8, 11-18, 29-30;
January 9, 1990, 10-11, 16-17; April 27, 1990, 3-4.

^[7]
TSN, November 9, 1990, 21-22, 24-27,
35, 37-40.

^[8]
People vs. Burgos, etc., et al.,
G.R. No. 92739, August 2, 1991, 200 SCRA 67.

^[9]
TSN, January 9, 1990, 16.

^[10]
Original Record, 12.

^[11]
TSN, January 9, 1990, 25-26.

^[12]
People vs. Ponferada, et al.,
G.R. No. 101004, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 46.

^[13]
People vs. Hadji Basser Maongco, et al., G.R. Nos. 108963-65, March 1, 1994.

^[14]
Passion Vda. de Gracia vs.
Locsin, etc., et al., 65 Phil. 689 (1938).

^[15]
Johnson vs. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938).

^[16]
TSN, April 27, 1990, 12-14.

^[17]
TSN, January 9, 1990, 20-21; April 27, 1990, 13, 22; November
9, 1990, 50.

^[18]
People vs. Vasquez, et al., G.R. No. 92658, April 30, 1991, 196 SCRA 564.

^[19]
Sec. 12(1), Art. III,
Constitution.

^[20]
Nolasco, et al. vs. Paño, etc., et al., G.R. No. 69803, January 30,
1987, 147 SCRA 509.

^[21]
People vs. Ganohon, G.R. Nos. 74670-74, April 30, 1991, 196 SCRA 431;
People vs. Manliguez, et al., G.R. No. 91745, March 4, 1992, 206 SCRA
812.

^[22]
TSN, April 25, 1990, 17-19.

^[23]
Tulod, etc. vs. First City Line
Transportation Company, G.R. No. 92710, February 27, 1991, 194 SCRA 583.

^[24]
Exhibit I, List of Exhibits, 1.

^[25]
People vs. Marcedonio, et al.,
G.R. Nos. 78551-52, December 21, 1990, 192 SCRA 579.

^[26]
People vs. Yutuc, G.R.
No. 82590, July 26, 1990, 188
SCRA 1.

^[27]
People vs. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48 (1924); People vs. Parayno, et al.,
L-24804, July 5, 1968, 24 SCRA 3; People
vs. Taruc, G.R. No. 74655, January
20, 1988, 157 SCRA 178; People vs.
Yabut, G.R. No. 82263, June 26, 1992, 210 SCRA 394.