PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SOLITO TENA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

The familiar maxim, “res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet” (“things done between strangers ought not to injure those who are not
parties to them”)^[1]
embodied in Section 25,^[2] Rule
130 of the Rules of Court furnishes basis for the appellant’s acquittal in the
case at bar.

On June 19, 1988, 82-year-old Alfredo Altamarino, Sr. was found
dead inside the bedroom of his house located at corner Gardner and Regidor
Streets, Barangay Sadsaran, Mauban, Quezon. His body, described as laid out in
an “orderly” manner on his bed, bore eight (8) stab wounds, two of them in the
neck and six in the chest. He also had
a depressed fracture on the right portion of his head and a lacerated wound on
his right eyebrow.1 Dr. Victorino Q. Arana, then
resident physician of the Mauban Dis­trict Hospital, conducted a post mortem
examination, and declared “cardiac tamponade” as the immediate cause of death.2

The deceased’s bedroom was in a topsy-turvy state; his cabinet’s
drawers had been opened and ransacked. Missing therefrom, according to the victim’s eldest child, Emma
Altamarino Ibana (who traveled from Manila to Mauban as soon as she heard the
news of her father’s death), were a diamond ring valued at P20,000.00, a Rolex
watch worth P8,000.00, a Seiko watch costing P3,000.00, a tie clip with 18
diamonds worth P50,000.00, two men’s rings costing P25,000.00, cash in the
amount of about P7,000 to P8,000 and an undetermined amount of dollars.3

Suspicion fell on the deceased’s caretakers, the spouses William
Verzo and Ofelia Ritual,1 but
investigation by the Mauban Police Force yielded no evidence to warrant the
filing of charges against them.2 Emma
Altamarino Ibana sought the help of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).3

On January 11, 1989, NBI Agents Reynaldo Manzanero and Celso
Ginga arrived at Mauban, Quezon to conduct their own investigation. Mauban Police Station Commander Lt. Geronimo
de Gala informed them that suspicion as to the authorship of the crime had
shifted to a syndicate oper­ating in Lucena City and nearby
municipalities. This syndicate was
reportedly involved in the robbery of a Petron Gas Station owned by a certain
Benjamin Lim and a member thereof, Adelberto Camota, was then in
detention. The NBI Agents interrogated
Camota.4

Sensing that Camota knew of the incident than he was letting on,
the NBI agents requested the services of an NBI polygraph examiner.5 The request was granted. On February 1, 1989,
Camota, allegedly with his consent,6 underwent
a polygraph examination conducted by Polygraph Examiner II Ernesto A. Lucena,
at the office of the Mauban Chief of Police.1

When confronted on the same day with the results of his polygraph
test, Adelberto Camota executed an extra-judicial confession2 in the presence of Atty. Albert Siquijor, admitting
participation in the robbery-killing of Alfredo Altamarino, Sr. and pointing to
Virgilio Conde, Jose de Jesus, Solito Tena and an unidentified person as his
companions in the crime.

An information3 for the
crime of Robbery with Homicide was subsequently filed by the Assistant
Provincial Fiscal against Virgilio Conde,
Jose de Jesus Jr., Adelberto Camota, Solito Tena and John Doe.

Virgilio Conde and Solito Tena
pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on November 12, 19894 as did Adelberto Camota when arraigned on January
17, 1990.5 Jose de Jesus and John Doe were
never apprehended and remain at large to date. Virgilio Conde later escaped from detention and was tried in absentia.

On February 26, 1991, the Trial Court rendered a decision,1 disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, after due consideration of the evidence herein
presented, accused Virgilio Conde, Adelberto Camota and Solito Tena are all
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide, and it appearing that there is no
mitigating circumstance present, and there is the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity and in band attending in the commission of the
crime, all the three accused are, therefore, sentenced to a prison term of
TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion perpetua and to pay joint­ly and
severally, the heirs of Alfredo Altamirano, Sr., the amount of P120,000.00 for
indemnity and damages and to pay the proportionate costs.

x x x                                      x x x                                         x x x

SO ORDERED.

Later, to correct what he described as a typographical error in
that decision, the trial judge issued an amended judgment on April 10, 1991 changing
the number of years of the penalty imposed, reclusion perpetua, from
twenty (20) to thirty (30) years.2

Only Solito Tena appealed. As earlier intimated, he will be granted the relief he seeks.

There was no eyewitness to the commission of the crime. The judgment of conviction was based chiefly
on the extrajudicial confession of accused Adelberto Camota. Notwithstanding Camota’s repudiation thereof
in open court, the Trial Court adjudged the same admissible in evidence upon
its own findings that: (a) Camota’s
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel were observed and fully
protected during its execution; (b) no force, maltreatment or coercion was
applied before, during and after its execution; and, (c) the details contained
in the confession attest to its voluntariness.1 According to said Court, that extrajudicial
confession, considered conjointly with the other established circumstances, to
wit: that the time, date and place of
the commission of the crime were exactly as confessed by Camota; that the
wounds sustained by the victim, numbering ten in all, could only have been been
inflicted by two or more persons; and that the flight of Virgilio Conde was
indicative of his guilt, demonstrates beyond reasonable doubt the complicity of
the accused in the crime charged.

Not unexpectedly, therefore, it is this extrajudicial confession
on which Solito Tena centers his attack in the present appellate proceedings,
assigning as errors on the part of the lower court the admission in evidence of
the extrajudicial confession of Adelberto Camota and his conviction on the sole
basis thereof.2

But as is made clear by the Solicitor General in his
“Manifestation in lieu of Appellee’s Brief,” the matter of that confession’s
competency need not be delved into as the issue of accused-appellant’s guilt or
innocence may be resolved by application of the doctrine, “res inter alios acta
alteri nocere non debet.”1 Actually,
the issue is not so much the admissibility in evidence of the extrajudicial
confession, but rather, even conceding its admissibility, its use against
persons other than the confessant, e.g., herein accused-appellant.

Use of Camota’s extrajudicial confession is precluded by Section
25 (now Section 28), of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz:

Section 28. Admission by third party. – The rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as
hereinafter provided.

The reason for the rule is that2:

On a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own
acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct
and declarations. Yet it would not only
be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound
by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be
bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as
evidence against him.

This rule admits of certain exceptions, to be sure, one of which
is found in Section 27, (now Section 30) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
which states:

Section 30. Admission by conspirator. – The
act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

This exception does not however apply. In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received
against his co-conspirator, it is necessary that (a) the conspir­acy be first
proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates
to the common object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged
in carrying out the conspiracy.1

Several factors bar the application of said Section 30 to the
case at bar. For one thing,
independently of Camota’s extrajudicial confession, Exh. K, there exists no
evidence of conspiracy between Camota and accused-appellant Tena. As stressed by the trial court, there was no
eyewitness to the commission of the crime and none of the circumstantial proofs
considered by the court a quo points to a conspiracy between
Camota and accused-appellant Tena. For
another, the extrajudicial confession was executed only on February 1, 1989,
long after the supposed conspiracy between Camota and accused-appellant had
come to an end.

More importantly, Camota, instead of confirming his extrajudicial
confession in court, repudiated the same, denied knowledge of the crime charged
and denied knowing accused-appellant Tena. Thus1:

Q:    In this document, which was marked as Exh.
“K” for the prosecution, you confessed having participated in this offense
charged of you and your co-accused. Now, what can you say about this?

A:    I do not know what was
contained in that document and I was just forced to sign it, sir.

Q:   How about this answer to
question No. 11 on page 1 of the same; Exh. “K”, wherein you mentioned, the
names of your co-accused to have participated in the same case. What can you say about this contents of this
affidavit?

May I request the
Interpreter to read that particular question No.11 and answer.

(NOTE: The Interpreter read question No. 11 of the affidavit, and also the
answer)

Q:   What can you say about
that portion of that alleged confession?

A:    I do not know that and
the persons mentioned therein, I do not know them, sir.

Q:    At the time you signed this particular
document marked Exh. “K” for the prosecution, have you come across or do you
have knowledge of this narration as portion of this document?

A:    They did not show me the
contents of the document, sir.

Q:   And when you say you do
not know the persons mentioned in the question No. 11, are you referring to
Virgilio Conde?

A:    Yes, sir.

Q:   Also to Solito
Tena?

A:    I do not
know him also, sir.

Q:   How about Jose de Jesus?

A:    I do not know him also,
sir.

Q:   Please tell the Hon.
Court, in its finality, do you really know or what can you say about this
charge against you and your co-accused about having robbed and killed the
victim, Alfredo Altamarino?

A:    That I do not know
anything about it, sir.

The extrajudicial confession of Camota thus being inadmissible
against his co-accused,1 and there
being no evidence independently of said confession, (Exh. K) linking
accused-appellant Solito Tena to the crime, this Court declares Tena not guilty
of the complex crime of robbery with homicide with which he is charged.2

Before ending this opinion, it is needful to devote a few words
to the amended judgment of the Trial Court which changed the penalty originally
imposed on the accused –- “TWENTY (20) YEARS
of reclusion perpetua” — ­to THIRTY (30) years of reclusion perpetua.”

There is no need for a Trial Court to specify the duration in
years of reclusion perpetua whenever it is imposed as a penalty in any
proper case. Article 27 of the Revised
Penal Code sets forth generally the minimum and maximum ranges of all the
penalties in the Code except as regards the penalty of reclusion perpetua.1 The article simply declares that any person
“sentenced to any of the perpetual penalties shall be pardoned after under?going
the penalty for thirty years, unless such person by reason of his conduct or
some other serious cause shall be considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy
of pardon.” The provision’s intendment
is that a person condemned to undergo the penalty of reclusion perpetua
shall remain in prison perpetually, or for the rest of his natural life;
however, he becomes eligible for pardon by the Chief Executive after he shall
have been imprisoned for at least thirty years, unless he is deemed unworthy of
such a pardon.

This period of thirty (30) years
vis a vis reclusion perpetua is reiterated in Article 70 of the code. Said article pertinently provides that in
applying the so called “three-fold rule” — i.e., that “(w)hen the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, **
** the maximum duration of the convict’s sentence shall not be more than
three-fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties
imposed upon him” — “the duration of perpetual penalties (pena perpetua) shall be
computed at thirty years.” But as
should at once be perceived, the imputation of a thirty-year duration to reclusion perpetua in Articles 27 and 70 is, as this
Court has recently had occasion to point out, “only to serve as the basis for
determining the convict’s eligibility
for pardon or for the application of the three-­fold rule in the service of
multiple penalties.”1

It was thus incorrect for the Trial Court to specify the duration
of thirty (30) years in relation to the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed
by it on the accused in this case.

WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Solito Tena is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime of robbery with homicide in Criminal Case No. 1213 of
the Regional Trial Court of Mauban, Quezon. His immediate release from confinement, unless held for other lawful
cause, is directed. Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Regalado, Nocon, and
Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

^[1]
Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 1979, p. 1178.

^[2]
Now Section 28, as amended by Supreme Court Resolution dated March 14, 1989 in
Bar Matter No. 411

1 Exhs. “A” and “A-1”, pp. 1-2,
Folder of Exhibits; TSN, July 4, 1990, pp. 4-12.

2 Exh. “L-1”, p. 41, Folder of
Exhibits; TSN, July 4, 1990, p. 13. (N.B.: cardiac tamponade is defined as:
“mechanical compression of the heart by large amounts of fluid or blood within
the pericardial space that limits the normal range of motion and function of
the heart” [Webster’s Third New International Dictionary.])

3 TSN, September 18, 1990, pp.
105-108.

1 Exh. “J-11”, Folder of Exhibits

2 TSN, August 28, 1990, p. 81

3 Exh. “J-8”, Folder of
Exhibits, p. 30.

4 TSN, August 28, 1990, p. 66-68.

5 Exhs. “H”,
“H-1”, “H-2”, “H-2-A”, “H-3”,
“H-3-A” & “H­-4”, pp. 11-20, Folder of Exhibits; TSN, Ibid.

6 Exh. “D”, Folder
of Exhibits, p. 7.

1 TSN, July 4, 1990, p. 25.

2 Exh. “K” – “K-1”, Folder
of Exhibits, pp. 38-39.

3 Docketed as Criminal Case
No. 1213 in the Regional Trial Court of Mauban Quezon, Branch 64, presided over
by the Hon. Antonio O. Cabungcal, p. 8, Rollo.

4 p. 11, Rollo.

5 p. 13, Rollo.

1 pp. 25-45, Rollo.

2 p. 24, Rollo.

1 Judgment, pp. 41-43, Rollo.

2 p. 56, Rollo.

1 pp. 109-110, Rollo;
SEE footnote 1, p. 1, supra.

2 Stark on Evidence, (3d.
ed.) pp. 58-59; Best on Evidence, (12^th ed.) p. 430 cited in People vs.
Plaza, 140 SCRA 277, 290.

1 Montoya, et al. vs.
Baun, 44 O.G. 4382, cited in Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the
Philippines, Vol. VII, Part I, 1990 Edition, p. 349.

1 TSN, October 9, 1990, pp.
134-135, Underscoring supplied

1 People vs. Saldua,
87 SCRA 167; People vs. Sosing, 111 SCRA 368; People vs. Valerio,
Jr., 112 SCRA 208; People vs. Rojo, 114 SCRA 304; People vs.
Plaza, 140 SCRA 277.

2 People vs.
Guillermo, 93 SCRA 168

1 And, it may be added, bond
to keep the peace which shall be for such period of time as the court may
determine (footnote 2, infra)

1 Peo. vs. Cresencia
C. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 101127-31, Aug. 7, 1992 which points out the possibility
that “estafa through the use of so-called bouncing checks” (punished under B.P.
No. 22) may merit a penalty higher than
reclusion tempora but lower than the thirty-year period set for reclusion
perpetua in Articles 27 and 70 of the Revised Penal Code.