G.R. No. 100878. December 02, 1992

ESTRELLITA AGUILAR, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) FIRST DIVISION, WACK WACK GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB AND COL. PERFECTO V. EUGENIO, RESPON…

Decisions / Signed Resolutions December 2, 1992 SECOND DIVISION CAMPOS, JR., J.:
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CAMPOS, JR., J.:


This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside
the decision* of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) dated December 11, 1990 in NLRC NCR CASE No. 00-08-03479-88
entitled “ESTRELLITA AGUILAR vs. WACK WACK GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB and COL.
PERFECTO N. EUGENIO” which reversed the decision** of the
Labor Arbiter declaring the dismissal of petitioner Estrellita Aguilar illegal
and ordering the reinstatement of complainant to her former position without
loss of seniority rights and with full backwages from the time she was illegally dismissed up to the time she
is actually reinstated.

The facts, as culled by the Solicitor General, are as follows:

Wack Wack Golf and
Country Club (CLUB, for brevity) operates
two (2) golf courses known as the
East Course and
the West Course,
runs a Clubhouse with a restaurant and
bar thereat, and
maintains other sports facilities for its one thousand three hundred ten
(1,310) members at Its compound along Shaw Boulevard,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, Col.
Perfecto Eugenio
is its General Manager.

In the course of its operation, the CLUB employed petitioner
Estrellita Aguilar (petitioner, for brevity) for twenty three (23) years prior to her alleged “illegal dismissal” on May 12, 1988. The last position she held was that of an
Accounting Clerk for which she received a monthly salary of Three Thousand Two Hundred Eighty Five Pesos (P3,285.00).[1]

Prior to August 1, 1986, the CLUB had been incurring continuous
losses in its restaurant and bar operations. To remedy the situation, the CLUB imposed a patronage fee of Two Hundred
Pesos (P200.00) per member starting August 1, 1986 pursuant to a Board
Resolution dated June 25, 1986. Under
said Board Resolution, CLUB members whose restaurant and bar bills/chits do not
exceed Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) a month are to be charged an additional
amount equivalent to the difference between their bills/chits and the patronage fee of P200.00. And CLUB members who do not avail of the restaurant and bar
services will be charged P200.00 a month.[2]

On several occasions, petitioner, without the knowledge and
consent of the CLUB management,
ordered and consumed food from the
CLUB restaurant/bar and charged them against the patronage fees of Jose Ma. Ozamis, Martin Cepeda, Roberto Reverente and Alex Yu
Gonzales, all CLUB members.[3]

On January 29, 1988 the CLUB, upon discovery of petitioner’s
misconduct, sent a written
notice of charges against her, but she refused to receive it. The CLUB then conducted an
investigation. Petitioner executed a written statement on January 31,
1988, explaining her side.[4]

During the investigation, petitioner was reminded that She was
not allowed under CLUB rules to sign restaurant
and bar bills/chits chargeable to the patronage fees of CLUB members. Nonetheless, petitioner continued to do so.[5]

On May 10, 1988
petitioner was dismissed for violation of House Rule (A), Section 15 (a); House
Rule (B), Section 7, as amended;
and for serious misconduct and breach of trust.[6]

On August 16, 1988 petitioner filed a Complaint for Illegal
Dismissal against the CLUB and Col. Eugenio before the NLRC-NCR, Manila.

On March 10, 1989, the Labor
Arbiter rendered his decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
complainant and against the respondents ordering the latter, as follows:

(a) To reinstate
complainant to her former position without loss of seniority rights and with
full backwages from the time she was illegally dismissed up to the time she is
actually reinstated:

(b) To pay the sum
of P30,000.00 for moral and exemplary damages; and

(c) To pay
attorney’s fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the award.

SO ORDERED.”[7]

Not contented with the decision, private respondent CLUB appealed
to the NLRC. On December 11, 1991, the
NLRC rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and
a new one entered ordering herein respondent Golf Club to pay complainant an
amount of P9,000.00 as financial assistance.

SO ORDERED.”[8]

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on June 25,
1991. Hence this petition.

The primordial issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner
violated any company rules and
regulations when she signed the chits for and in behalf of CLUB members.

Petitioner contends that
House Rule (A),
Section 15 (a)
and House Rule (B), Section 7, as
amended, are applicable only to
members of the CLUB and not to
petitioner who is merely its
employee. That petitioner was
able
to obtain food from the Bar Grill because of the authorization duly executed by the CLUB Members in her favor.

House Rule (A), Section 15 (a) and House Rule (B), Section 7 are
as follows:

“Rule A: General

x x x                x x x

Sec. 15. x x x (a) Non-members,
guests or visitors cannot sign chits for and in behalf of
members
.

“Rule B: Minors
and Children
.

x x x                x x x

Sec. 7. That the spouses
and dependents be allowed to sign chits for themselves and their guests for F to B and other facilities; provided
however, that in case of green fees, the legitimate spouse of a member can sign
chits for their guests but only when playing at the West Course and provided
further that the member should expressly authorize it in writing.”[9]
(Underscoring Ours).

The above-quoted rules
are applicable
to petitioner. There is no showing that petitioner was unaware of said rules and
regulations. All she invokes is that the same is not applicable to
her being merely an employee of the CLUB.

It is undeniable that petitioner is not a member of the
CLUB. Being a non-member, she is
prohibited from signing chits for and in behalf of club members notwithstanding
any authorization given by them. Furthermore, under Rule (B), Section 7, only the spouses and dependents
are allowed to sign chits for themselves and their guests for food and beverage
and other facilities. However, in case
of green fees, only the legitimate spouse of the member can sign chits for
his/her guests but the same must be expressly authorized in writing by the
member. Not being any of the persons
mentioned in said Rule, petitioner cannot sign chits even if authorized by CLUB
members.

Article 282 of the Labor Code provides in part:

“Art. 282. Termination
by Employer
. — An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following
causes:
a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience
by the employee of the lawful
orders
of
his employer or representative in
connection with his work.

x x x                x x
x.” (Italics supplied).

Willful disobedience of the employer’s lawful orders, as a just
cause for the dismissal of an employee, envisages the concurrence of at least
two (2) requisites: the employee’s
assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the willfulness being
characterized by a “wrongful and perverse attitude”. The order violated must have been
reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged
to discharge.”[10]

By petitioner’s own admission, she continued signing the
restaurant and Bar Grill bills or chits chargeable to the patronage fee of the
CLUB members Cepeda and Gonzales even after she had been investigated for such
misconduct on January 29, 1988[11] and
after she was already made aware that non-members like her cannot sign chits
for and In behalf of the CLUB members.

We agree with the NLRC that the acts of herein complainant in
defiantly disobeying the rules of the company even after investigation, shows
her cavalier attitude which leaves the management no other recourse but to
terminate her services. To condone such
conduct will certainly erode the discipline that an employer would uniformly
enforce so that it can expect compliance with said rules and regulations by its
other employees. Otherwise the rules
necessary and proper for the operation of its business would be rendered
ineffectual.[12]
An employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with the employment of a person
who admittedly was guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance towards his employer,
and whose continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to his
interests.[13]

With regards to the award of financial assistance to petitioner,
We find that the same is not justified. Petitioner’s willful disobedience of the orders of her employer
constitutes serious misconduct. As We
held in the case of Del Monte Phils., Inc. vs. NLRC.[14]
“henceforth
separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in
those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than
serious misconduct or those reflecting on
his moral character”. Hence, the
employer, CLUB, may not be
required to give the petitioner
separation pay, or financial
assistance, or whatever other name it
is called, on the ground of
social justice.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent National Labor
Relations Commission dated December 11, 1990 is hereby AFFIRMED with
modification that the award of financial assistance be deleted.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Feliciano, Regalado, and Nocon, JJ., concur.


*
Penned by Commissioner Romeo B. Putong and concurred in by Commissioner Vicente
S.E. Veloso III. Presiding Commissioner
Edna Bonto-Perez took no part.

**
Penned by Labor Arbiter Emerson C. Tumanon.

[1]
Petition, p. 2.

[2]
Petition, Annex B, p. 2.

[3]
Petition, Annex B, p. 3.

[4]
Petition, Annex B, p. 3.

[5]
Petition, Annex B, p. 3; Rec., p. 35.

[6]
Petition, Annex A, pp. 1-2.

[7]
Rollo, p. 29.

[8]
Rollo, pp. 44-45.

[9]
Rollo, p. 33.

[10]
Gold City Integrated Port Services vs. NLRC, 89 SCRA 811 (1990).

[11]
Reply, p. 3; Rollo, p. 80.

[12]
Soco vs. Mercantile Corporation of Davao, et al., 148 SCRA 526 (1987).

[13]
Colgate Palmolive Phils., Inc. vs. Ople, et al., 163 SCRA 323 (1988).

[14]
188 SCRA 370 (1990).