GOVERNOR BENJAMIN I. ESPIRITU, PETITIONER, VS. NELSON B. MELGAR AND HON. JUDGE MARCIANO T. VIROLA, RESPONDENTS.

The issue in this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition
is the jurisdiction of respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental
Mindoro to stop the provincial governor from placing a municipal mayor under
preventive suspension pending the investigation of administrative charges
against the latter.

On April 11, 1991, one Ramir Garing of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro,
filed a sworn letter-complaint with Secretary Luis Santos of the Department of
Interior and Local Government charging Mayor Nelson Melgar of Naujan, Oriental
Mindoro, with grave misconduct, oppression abuse of authority, culpable
violation of the Constitution and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the public service. The charge against
Mayor Melgar reads:

“On or about 4:30 in   the
afternoon of March 26, 1991, in the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro,
the aforementioned person, Nelson Melgar, being the Municipal Mayor of Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro, with abuse of official function, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the
person of Ramir Garing, by then and there boxing and kicking thereby inflicting
upon the latter physical injuries on different parts of his body and not being
contented ordered his arrest and detention in the municipal jail of Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro without filing any charges until he was released the following
day March 27, 1991 at about 8:30 in the morning.” (p. 30, Rollo.)

An identical letter-complaint was filed by Garing with the
Provincial Governor of Oriental Mindoro (herein petitioner Governor Benjamin I.
Espiritu) accusing Mayor Melgar of the same violations of law and requesting
that the mayor be placed under preventive suspension pending investigation of
the charges.

A third complaint filed by Garing with the Presidential Action
Center, Office of the President of the Philippines, was forwarded to Governor
Espiritu with a request for prompt action (Annex “C”, p. 36, Rollo).

On April 22, 1991, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental
Mindoro required Mayor Melgar to answer the complaint, which was docketed as
Adm. Case No. 91-01 (Annex “D”, p. 37. Rollo).

On May 22, 1991, Mayor Melgar submitted his answer in which he
recounted the events of March 26, 1991 that led to the filing of Garing’s
complaint against him:

“At around 6:30 in the evening of 26 March 1991, while I was
in the middle of my speech at the Naujan Public Gymnasium, this Municipality,
where the Jose L. Basa Memorial School graduation ceremonies were then being
held, a prolonged but nonetheless loud and intermittent clapping suddenly
erupted from one of the numerous people then in attendance. I paused. The handclapping stopped. I
resumed my speech. The fellow started
all over again.

“The audience was visibly disturbed and I found myself unable
to proceed not because I could not collect my thoughts but because I felt the
solemnity of the occasion had irreversibly been shattered by a rudeness so
totally unexpected.

“I ended my speech and instructed a policeman to investigate
the culprit who turned out to be Ramir Garing. He was drunk. I did not hurt him
as can be gathered from his medical certificate (Annex ‘B’ to the complaint)
which palpably contradicts his affidavit (Annex ‘A’ to the complaint).

“I was informed that said Ramir Garing was momentarily placed
in custody for his own protection because he was drunk. An open knife (balisong) was taken from
him. I was likewise informed that after
he had sobered up, he was told to go home, but he refused to go and only did so
the following morning.

“Certainly under the circumstances, charges could have been
filed against Ramir Garing under the provisions of Article 153 of the Revised
Penal Code and also for possession and concealment of a deadly weapon. Still, as a local Chief Executive, who to
most people represent (sic) a sovereign government, and who, at the cost of
foregoing personal vindication must avoid any appearance of
vindictiveness. I instructed my
policemen not to file charges against him.

“Attached hereto for your further reference are the joint
affidavit of teachers of the J. L. Basa Memorial School as Annex ‘A’, the joint
affidavit of the Municipal Jailer and the Police Investigator as Annex ‘B’, the
affidavit of Fireman 1st Class Roy Lomio as Annex ‘C’, and a xerox copy of the
pages in the Police Blotter where the incident in question was entered.”
(pp. 40-41, Rollo.)

After evaluating the complaint and its supporting documents, as
well as the Mayor’s answer and the affidavits of his witnesses, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro passed Resolution No. 55 on May 9, 1991,
recommending to the Provincial Governor that respondent Mayor be preventively
suspended for forty five (45) days pending the investigation of the
administrative complaint (Annex “H”, p. 49, Rollo).

On May 23, 1991, Mayor Melgar filed a motion to dismiss the
administrative complaint (Annex “I”, pp. 51-­55, Rollo). It was opposed by Garing.

On June 6, 1991, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan denied the motion
to dismiss (Res. No. 72, p. 62 Rollo; Annex “L” to the Petition).

Meanwhile, pursuant to the recommendation of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan in its Resolution No. 55. Governor Espiritu placed Mayor Melgar under preventive suspension on May
28, 1991 on the ground that:

“x x x there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent
Mayor Nelson B. Melgar of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, has committed the acts as
stated in the complaint and affidavit of Ramir Garing and corroborated by the
affidavits (Exhibits A, C & D) of his witnesses, namely: Lydia V. Garing, Nelson Tabor and Javier
Dagdagan, all of Poblacion II, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro.” (p. 63, Rollo.)

On June 3, 1991, Mayor Melgar received the Order of Suspension
(Annex “M”, p. 63, Rollo). He
forthwith filed a “Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary
Injunction with prayer for Restraining Order” in the Regional Trial Court
of Oriental Mindoro (Spl. Civil Action No. R-5003) alleging that “the
order of suspension was an arrogant, despotic and arbitrary abuse of
power” by the Governor (pp. 68-69, Rollo).

On June 24, 1991, RTC Judge Virola issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining Governor Espiritu from implementing the Order of
suspension against Mayor Melgar for:

“The Court is more inclined to believe the answer under oath
of the respondent and the sworn statements of his witnesses attached to the
Answer in the administrative case than the complaint under oath in the
administrative case which are the evidence to be considered in determining
whether or not the order of preventive suspension was issued in accordance with
law. There is no reason to doubt the
sworn statements of the numerous public school teachers and members of the
PNP. Besides, the medical certificate
issued in connection with the treatment of the complainant in the
administrative case tends to corroborate the theory of the respondent and
contradict that of the complainant in the administrative case. The abrasions on the right arm of the
complainant in the administrative case tend to show that said complainant was
held tightly by the hands by the members of the PNP because he was then drunk,
in possession of a balisong knife and causing serious disturbance and not
because he was boxed and kicked by herein petitioner.” (pp. 75-76, Rollo.)

Governor Espiritu filed a motion to dismiss and/or for
reconsideration which Judge Virola denied on July 16, 1991. Hence, this petition for certiorari
and prohibition.

Without giving due course to the petition, we required the
private respondent to comment and we issued a Temporary Restraining Order
commanding respondent Judge to cease and desist from further proceeding in
Special Civil Action No. R-5003 (pp. 106-107, Rollo). On August 22, 1991, Mayor Melgar filed an “Urgent Motion to
Lift Temporary Restraining Order” which the petitioner opposed and the
Court denied (p. 177, Rollo). In due time
he filed his Comment on the petition (pp. 127-155, Rollo).

Petitioner submits that respondent Judge Virola acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing: (1) the writ of preliminary injunction
restraining Governor Espiritu from implementing the order of preventive
suspension, and (2) in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss Special Civil
Action No. R-5003, for:

a) Petitioner, as
Provincial Governor, is empowered by Section 63 of the Local Government Code to
place an elective municipal official under preventive suspension pending
decision of an administrative case against the elective municipal official;

b) Petitioner did
not commit a grave abuse of discretion in placing respondent mayor under
preventive suspension; if at all, his error was an error of judgment which is
not correctible by certiorari;

c) By express
provision of Section 61 of the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan has jurisdiction over complaints against any elective municipal official;
on the other hand, Section 19(c) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
withdraws from regional trial courts jurisdiction over cases within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any person, tribunal or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. Thus, by
practically deciding the administrative case on the merits, the respondent
court acted without jurisdiction; and

d) Respondent Mayor
had a remedy of appeal under Section 66 of the Local Government Code.

Section 63, Chapter IV of the Local Government Code, provides:

SEC. 63. Preventive Suspension. – (1) Preventive suspension may
be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent
is a provincial or city official by the provincial governor
if the respondent is an elective municipal
official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an
elective barangay official.

“(2) Preventive
suspension may be imposed at anytime after the issues are joined, when there is
reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts
complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of
the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent
could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records and other evidence. In all
cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start
of said suspension.

“(3) At the
expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in
office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him
until its termination. However, if the
delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect or request,
the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of the
suspension.”

Clearly, the provincial governor of Oriental Mindoro is
authorized by law to preventively suspend the municipal mayor of Naujan at
anytime after the issues had been joined and any of the following grounds were
shown to exist:

1. when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent
has committed the act or acts complained of;

2. When the evidence of culpability is strong;

3. When the gravity of the offense so warrants; or

4. When the continuance in office of the respondent could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records and other evidence.

There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before the
charges against him are heard and before he is given an opportunity to prove
his innocence (Nera vs. Garcia and Elicaño, 106 Phil. 1031). Preventive suspension is allowed so that the
respondent may not hamper the normal course of the investigation through the
use of his influence and authority over possible witnesses (Lacson vs. Roque,
92 Phil. 456).

Since respondent mayor believed that his preventive suspension
was unjustified and politically motivated, he should have sought relief first
from the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, not from the courts. Mayor Melgar’s direct recourse to the courts
without exhausting administrative remedies was premature (Aboitiz & Co.,
Inc. vs. Collector of Customs, 83 SCRA 265; Garcia vs. Teehankee, 27 SCRA 937;
Manuel vs. Jimenez, 17 SCRA 55; Bongcawil vs. Provincial Board of Lanao del
Norte, 10 SCRA 327; The Phil. Veterans Affairs Office vs. Fariñas, et al.,
AC-G.R. SP No. 05937, July 5, 1985; Bonafe vs. Zurbano, 131 SCRA 9). The regional trial court had no jurisdiction
over Special Civil Action No. R-5003 and gravely abused its discretion in
refusing to dismiss the case.

There may exist honest differences of opinion with regard to the
seriousness of the charges, or as to whether they warrant disciplinary
action. However, as a general rule, the
office or body that is invested with the power of removal or suspension should be
the sole judge of the necessity and sufficiency of the cause (17 R.C.L. Sec.
233 cited in Attorney General vs. Doherty, 13 Am. Rep. 132). So, unless a flagrant abuse of the exercise
of that power is shown, public policy and a becoming regard for the principle
of separation of powers demand that the action of said officer or body should
be left undisturbed.

However, in this particular case, since the 60-day preventive
suspension of Mayor Melgar was maintained by the Temporary Restraining Order
which we issued on August 6, 1991, and therefore has already been served, he is
deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the
administrative investigation of the charges against him (Sec. 63, subpar. 3,
Local Government Code).

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition is granted. The writ of
preliminary injunction dated June 24, 1991 in Special Civil Action No. R-5003
is hereby annulled and set aside. Said
Special Civil Action No. R-5003 is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J.,
Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, and
Nocon, JJ., concur.