SPOUSES ALFREDO AND MELINDA MUNAR, GLORIA PALISOC-RUGA, PACITA PALISOC, LYDIA PALISOC-ROSALES AND ILUMINADO PALISOC, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES RAMON AND REBE…

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 23177.

I

Petitioners Gloria, Pacita, Lydia and Iluminado, all surnamed
Palisoc (Palisocs), are the registered co-owners of a parcel of land with a
six-door apartment situated at No. 27 Yakal Street, Project 3, Quezon City and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 297768 (Records, p. 198).

On January 9, 1976, the Palisocs executed a notarized Conditional
Deed of Sale over the aforementioned property in favor of private respondents
Ramon and Rebecca Nieves (Nieveses) for and in consideration of P60,000.00
(Rollo, p. 62). Only the amount of P35,000.00
was paid by the Nieveses to the Palisocs upon the execution of the deed. The balance of P25,000.00 was to be paid on
May 16, 1977.

On the same date as the execution of the Conditional Deed of
Sale, the Palisocs also executed a special power of attorney in favor of the
Nieveses, authorizing them to collect the rentals on the apartments beginning
February 1976 (Rollo, p. 64).

Subsequently, petitioner Pacita Palisoc in a letter dated
February 3, 1976 (Exh. “E”), gave notice to all occupants of the
building that the Nieveses were the administrators of the said building with
whom they could make arrangements for their continued stay thereat (Records, p.
229).

In a letter dated September 27, 1977, petitioner Pacita Palisoc,
who was then in the United States of America and in need of money, asked the
Nieveses that the balance of the purchase price be converted into dollars and
be sent to her (Exh. “F”). The Nieveses dutifully accommodated the said request (Records, p. 229).

On March 25, 1983, the Nieveses filed a Complaint for Specific
Performance with Damages docketed as Civil Case No. Q-37735 against the
Palisocs with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 91, Quezon City, alleging that
the Palisocs refused to execute the Deed of Absolute Sale even after the
Nieveses had paid the balance of P25,000.00 to petitioner Pacita Palisoc
(Rollo, p. 67). The Regional Trial
Court rendered a decision in favor of the Nieveses, which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. On appeal by the
Palisocs, the Supreme Court dismissed their petition on July 8, 1992 (G.R. No.
104369).

On November 5, 1985, the Nieveses filed a Complaint for Ejectment
docketed as Civil Case No. 0048766 with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 33, against petitioners Alfredo and Melinda Munar (Munars) and
some of the tenants in the apartment for non-payment of rentals since June 10,
1985 (Rollo, p. 86).

In their answer with compulsory counterclaim, the Munars averred
that the Nieveses were no longer authorized to collect the rentals because the
power of attorney given them had been revoked by the Palisocs on June 30,
1985. They also contended that the
conditional deed of sale had been revoked by the Palisocs for failure of the
Nieveses to pay the balance of the purchase price, and that the ejectment case
was prematurely filed there being an on-going litigation between the Palisocs
and the Nieveses for specific performance (Rollo, pp. 84 and 92).

The Munars filed a Motion to Apply the Rule on Regular Procedure
alleging that a question of ownership was involved which made inapplicable the
Rule on Summary Procedure in ordinary ejectment cases. The motion was denied by the trial court in
its Order dated January 3, 1986 (Rollo, p. 97).

The Palisocs filed a Motion for Leave to Allow and Admit Answer
In Intervention, praying that they be allowed to intervene in the ejectment
case inasmuch as they had a legal interest in the matter in litigation as the
registered owners and the lessors of the premises (Rollo, p. 98).

In an Order dated January 21, 1986, the trial court denied the
motion to intervene, considering that in ejectment cases, such a motion is a
prohibited pleading not allowed by the Rule on Summary Procedure (Rollo, p.
105).

On February 18, 1986, the Munars filed a Motion to Include
Necessary Parties for the purpose of including the Palisocs (Rollo, p. 106).

In an Order dated February 28, 1986, the trial court granted the
aforementioned motion and ordered the Palisocs to appear before it for
preliminary conference (Rollo, p. 110).

On May 5, 1986, the Palisocs’ filed a manifestation informing the
trial court that the Munars have vacated the premises and that they are now the
ones occupying the premises in question as they are the rightful owners and
possessors of the same (Rollo, p. 111).

On June 5, 1986, the Nieveses filed a Motion to Declare Gloria
Palisoc-Ruga and Family In Contempt of Court for entering and occupying the
premises in question by means of stealth, strategy and force (Records, p. 326).

On August 1, 1986, the Palisocs filed their Answer/Comment to the
Motion for Contempt (Records, p. 329).

On May 15, 1990, the trial court rendered its decision in favor
of the Nieveses, disposing as follows:

“Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants as follows:

1.     
Declaring the ejectment of the defendants Munars on the
subject premises as moot and academic;

2.     
Ordering the defendants Alfredo and Melinda Munar to
pay the plaintiffs the amount of P4,400.00 representing their rental arrearages
from July 1985 up to October 1985 and every month thereafter at the rate of
P880.00 a month until the date they vacated (sic) the leased premises;

3.     
Ordering the Palisoc family, more particularly Gloria
Palisoc Ruga, who actually occupied the premises in question identified as No. 27
Yakal Street, Quezon City, to immediately vacate and surrender the peaceful
possession of the said premises to the plaintiff;

4.     
Ordering Gloria Palisoc Ruga to pay the plaintiffs a
monthly amount of P1,000.00 effective May 19, 1986, as the fair and reasonable
value of her use and enjoyment of the subject premises, until she finally
vacates and surrenders the peaceful possession of the same to the plaintiffs;

5.     
Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of
P5,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees;

6.     
Ordering the
defendants to pay the costs of suit.

Defendants’ counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit”
(Records, p. 232).

On June 1, 1990, the trial court amended its decision with the
following dispositive portion:

“Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants as follows:

1.   
Declaring the physical ejectment of the defendants
Munars on the subject premises as moot and academic, having vacated
the premises identified as No. 27 Yakal
Street, Quezon City, MM., but ordering
all persons presently occupying the same
without any authority from the plaintiffs,
including the necessary parties–defendants in
this case to vacate and to surrender
the peaceful possession of the subject
property to the plaintiffs;

2.   
Ordering the defendants Alfredo and Melinda Munar to pay the
plaintiffs the amount of P4,400.00 representing their rental arrearages from
July 1985 up to October 1985 and every month thereafter at the rate of P880.00
a month until the date they vacated (sic) the subject premises;

3.    Ordering
the Palisoc family, particularly Gloria Palisoc Ruga, who is joined
as necessary party to this case, to
pay the plaintiffs a monthly amount of
P1,000.00 effective May 19, 1986,
as the fair and reasonable value of
her use and enjoyment of the subject
premises, until she finally vacates and
surrenders the peaceful possession of the
same to the plaintiff;

4.    Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs the
sum of P5,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees; and

5.    Ordering the defendant to pay the costs of
suit.

Defendants’ counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit”
(Records, p. 251).

Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court, both the Munars and
the Palisocs appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The Palisocs filed a Notice of Appeal En
Abundante Cautela questioning the inferior court’s jurisdiction
over their persons (Records, p. 128; See also Records, p. 72). Subsequently, the Palisocs filed an Amended
Notice of Appeal En Abundante Cautela dated June 28, 1990,
also questioning the jurisdiction of the inferior court over their persons when
it rendered its Decision dated May 15, 1990 and its Order dated June 1, 1990
(Records, p. 257).

On August 22, 1990, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon
City, affirmed the inferior court’s decision except that it ordered all persons
presently occupying the premises without authority from the Nieveses to vacate
the same. It clarified that only those
who derived title from the Palisocs or were made parties to the case were bound
by the judgment (Records, p. 104).

On October 10, 1990, the motion for reconsideration filed by the
Palisocs was denied for lack of merit (Records, p. 105).

On November 20, 1990, the Palisocs filed a Petition with Prayer
for Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order questioning the court’s
jurisdiction over their persons (Records, p. 74).

On February 28, 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is ordered
DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
costs” (Rollo, p. 185).

In a resolution dated July 9, 1991, the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the Palisocs and Munars was denied for lack of merit
(Records, p. 360).

Hence this petition.

II

The issues to be resolved are the following:

(1)   
Whether or not the court a quo acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the Palisocs;

(2)   
Who has prior physical possession of the property in question;
and

(3)   
Whether or not the trial court erred in not consolidating the
specific performance case and the ejectment case.

The Palisocs contend that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons because the complaint was not amended to
include them as party defendants and no summons were issued and served on their
persons (Rollo, pp. 23-25).

We do not agree.

III

Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is
acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its
authority or by service of summons. The
service of summons is intended to give notice to the defendant or respondent
that an action has been commenced against it (Quiason, Philippine Courts and
Their Jurisdictions 120-121, 134 [1992]). The defendant or respondent is thus put on guard as to the demands of
the plaintiff as stated in the complaint (Paramount Insurance Corporation v.
Japson, 211 SCRA 879 [1992]).

In the case at bench, the Palisocs cannot feign ignorance of the
complaint for ejectment filed by the Nieveses against the Munars. The Palisocs, whose counsel is the same as
that of the Munars, filed a Motion For Leave to Allow and Admit Answer in
Intervention alleging that they have an interest on the subject matter in
litigation (Rollo, p. 98). This was
denied because said motion was a prohibited pleading. Undaunted, the Munars filed a Motion to Include the Palisocs as
Necessary Parties (Rollo, p. 106) which was granted by the court a quo and made known in open court in the presence of the counsel of
both the Palisocs and Munars (Rollo, p. 110).

We also agree with the Court of Appeals that there was voluntary
appearance on the part of the Palisocs.

A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of formal
notice. Thus it has been held that when
the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of
the court over the person it must be for the sole and separate purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to
have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court
jurisdiction over the person (Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Mendoza, 156 SCRA 44
[1987]).

The Palisocs have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of
the trial court. It is too late in the
day for them to question the court’s jurisdiction over their person after
receiving an unfavorable judgment.

The Munars next contend that the Nieveses cannot anymore collect
the rentals because the special power of attorney executed in their favor was
revoked by the Palisocs (Rollo, p. 49).

Siding with the Munars, the Palisocs claim that since the
Nieveses failed to pay the balance of the purchase price, the contract of sale
was deemed rescinded; hence, ownership of the questioned property reverted to
them. Furthermore, they argue that the
right of the Nieveses to collect rentals emanated from the special power of
attorney, which was revoked by them (Rollo, p. 49).

The contention of the Munars is without merit. The trial court found that the contract of
lease was between the Munars and Nieveses. The Palisocs were not parties to the said lease contract; hence, the
Munars cannot raise the defense that the special power of attorney given to the
Nieveses to collect rentals was revoked by the Palisocs.

We have ruled that a tenant cannot, in an action involving the
possession of the leased premises, controvert the title of his landlord or
assert any rights adverse to that title. Neither can he set up any inconsistent right to change the relation
existing between himself and his landlord (Manuel v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 603 [1991]).

The issues raised by the Palisocs on the legal effects of the
failure of the Nieveses to pay the balance of the purchase price and the
revocation of the special power of attorney must be resolved in the case for
specific performance filed by the Nieveses against them.

Well-settled is the rule that the mere allegation of ownership of
the property in dispute by the defendant in an ejectment suit or the pendency
of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property does not divest
the inferior court of its
jurisdiction over the ejectment suit (Drilon v. Gaurana, 149 SCRA 342 [1987];
De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 520 [1984]; Alilaya v. Espanola, 107 SCRA 564
[1981]). The only exception to this
rule is where the question of de facto possession cannot be
determined properly without settling that of ownership because the latter is
inseparably linked with the former (Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 177 SCRA 604
[1989]).

The exception does not apply to the instant case. The Nieveses, by virtue of the notarized
Conditional Deed of Sale executed in their favor by the Palisocs, transferred
possession of the questioned property to the former. The execution of a sale, thru a public instrument, shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing, unless there is stipulation to the
contrary (Wong v. Carpio, 203 SCRA 118 [1991]).

An action for ejectment is merely a quieting process and actual
title to the property is never determined. A party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even
against the owner himself. Whatever may
be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority of
time, he has the right to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected
by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion
reinvindicatoria (Reynante v. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 794 [1992]).

Possession of the property in question was transferred to the Nieveses
when the Palisocs executed the Conditional Deed of Sale on January 9, 1976
(Rollo, p. 62). The possession of the
Palisocs began only when the Munars vacated the property in question as shown
by the Manifestation dated May 5, 1986 filed by the former. Hence, the Nieveses have prior physical
possession of the property in question.

Lastly, the issue on the consolidation of the specific
performance case and this ejectment case is rendered moot and academic by this
Court’s Resolution dated July 8, 1992 in G.R. No. 104369, which in effect
sustained the decision of the Regional Trial Court ordering the Palisocs to
perform specifically the Conditional Deed of Sale in favor of the Nieveses.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ.,
concur.