BENJAMIN P. ABELLA, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, AND ADELINA Y. LARRAZABAL, RESPONDENTS.

Abella versus Commission on Elections

The Case

This is the fourth time that the controversy over who is the rightful governor of the province of Leyte, after the local elections of the first of February 1988, reached the Supreme Court. Two consolidated petitions are before the Court. Adelina Larrazabal, who obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed governor, asks the Court to set aside the decision and resolution of the Commission on Elections disqualifying her for lack of residence and registration qualifications. Benjamin Abella, who obtained the second highest number of votes, asks the Court to set aside the same resolution insofar as it disallowed his proclamation as governor. The case matters because it fixes the rule that the residence required of a candidate for local office means legal residence or domicile, not mere physical presence or property holdings, and because it settles who may be proclaimed when the winning candidate is disqualified.

Procedural History

Silvestre de la Cruz filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte a petition to disqualify Larrazabal for alleged false statements in her certificate of candidacy regarding her residence. The petition was transmitted to the Commission on Elections, which could not then function because all but one of its members had not yet been confirmed. De la Cruz came to the Supreme Court, which issued a temporary restraining order against Larrazabal's proclamation and later remanded the petition to the Commission for appropriate action. Abella, meanwhile, elevated his objections to the canvass in separate appeals, and he intervened in the disqualification case.

The Commission's Second Division dismissed the disqualification case and referred the matter to its Law Department for preliminary investigation. The Commission en banc denied reconsideration. On review, the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the dismissal and ordered the Commission to directly hear and decide the disqualification case under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Acting on that directive, the Commission conducted hearings. Its Second Division then rendered a decision disqualifying Larrazabal, and the Commission en banc denied her motion for reconsideration and affirmed the disqualification, at the same time disallowing Abella's proclamation. Hence these petitions, which the Court decided on their merits, after issuing a temporary restraining order and ordering the incumbent Vice Governor, Leopoldo Petilla, to maintain the status quo and desist from assuming the governorship.

Facts

Benjamin Abella was the official candidate of the Liberal Party for governor of Leyte in the election of the first of February 1988. Adelina Larrazabal is the wife of Emeterio Larrazabal, the original candidate of Lakas ng Bansa and PDP Laban, who had been disqualified by the Commission on Elections for lack of residence. On the thirty first of January 1988, the day before the election, she filed her own certificate of candidacy in substitution of her husband. The following day, Silvestre de la Cruz, a registered voter of Tacloban City, filed a petition to disqualify her for alleged false statements in her certificate of candidacy regarding her residence.

Larrazabal obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed the duly elected governor. The disqualification case, however, continued. Before the Commission, de la Cruz and Abella claimed that Larrazabal was neither a resident nor a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, as she claimed, but a resident and registered voter of Ormoc City, a component city of the province of Leyte but independent of the province under the Constitution, which would disqualify her for the position of governor of Leyte. They presented testimonial and documentary evidence. Larrazabal maintained that she was a resident and registered voter of Kananga and likewise presented evidence.

The Commission ruled against her. It found that she had established her residence at Ormoc City from 1975 to the present and not at Kananga, Leyte, and that her attempt to change her residence one year before the election by registering at Kananga showed that she considered herself already a resident of Ormoc City. It relied on the provisions of the Family Code, there being no evidence that she and her husband maintained separate residences. It disqualified her as governor and disallowed Abella's proclamation.

Issues

• Whether or not the Commission on Elections acted in conformity with the Supreme Court's directive when it heard and decided the disqualification case under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
• Whether or not the Commission erred in relying on the provisions of the Family Code in finding that Larrazabal lacked the required residence to qualify her to run for governor of Leyte.
• Whether or not the Commission erred in disallowing the proclamation of Abella as governor of Leyte after Larrazabal's disqualification.

Applicable Provisions

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

This is the provision under which the Court ordered the Commission to hear and decide the disqualification case directly, instead of shunting the matter to a roundabout criminal investigation.

Section 6 of Republic Act Number 6646 provides:

Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

This provision explains why the investigation of Larrazabal's disqualification could continue even after the election.

Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 337 provides:

Section 42. Qualification. (1) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on election day, a qualified voter registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he proposes to be elected, a resident therein for at least one year at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, and able to read and write English, Pilipino, or any other local language or dialect.

This is the qualification standard against which Larrazabal's residence and registration were measured.

Section 12 of Article X of the Constitution provides:

Section 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.

This is why residence in Ormoc City, an independent component city, could not serve as residence in the province of Leyte for purposes of the governorship.

Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code provide:

Article 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.

Article 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.

These provisions support the rule that husband and wife as a matter of principle live together in one legal residence, which is their usual place of abode.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the argument of Larrazabal is not meritorious. The questioned decision and resolution of the Commission conform with the Court's earlier decision. The Court had directed the Commission to determine her residence qualification in the disqualification case, and concomitant with that directive would be her disqualification if substantial evidence showed that she really lacked the residence required by law. The Commission merely conducted hearings in line with that directive.

On the second issue, the Court held that the reliance on the provisions of the Family Code was proper and in consonance with human experience. Larrazabal presented no evidence that she and her husband maintained separate residences. The Commission found, on the evidence, that she had established her residence at Ormoc City from 1975 to the present, and that her attempt to change her residence one year before the election by registering at Kananga showed that she considered herself already a resident of Ormoc City. The Court stressed that for the purpose of running for public office, the residence requirement should be read as legal residence or domicile, not any place where a party may have properties and may visit from time to time. On the principle of animus revertendi, the intention to return, the Court recalled its ruling that mere absence from one's residence or origin to pursue studies, engage in business, or practice one's avocation is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence, and that the party who claims abandonment must prove it preponderantly.

On the third issue, the Court disallowed Abella's proclamation. He obtained only the second highest number of votes, and the rule is that only the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes and who is qualified may be proclaimed.

Doctrine

For the purpose of running for public office, the residence requirement is read as legal residence or domicile, not any place where a party may have properties and may visit from time to time. Domicile depends largely upon intention, which may be inferred from a person's acts, activities, and utterances, and the party who claims that a person has abandoned or left his residence of origin must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss. Husband and wife as a matter of principle live together in one legal residence, which is their usual place of abode, so that in the absence of evidence of separate residences, the family domicile governs the residence qualification of each spouse. A candidate disqualified for lack of the required residence under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 337 cannot be proclaimed, and neither can the candidate who obtained only the second highest number of votes.

Disposition

The petitions were dismissed. Larrazabal remained disqualified as governor of Leyte, and Abella was not proclaimed in her place.

Remember This

Memorize the line that residence for election purposes means legal residence or domicile, not a place where one merely owns property and visits from time to time. Examiners use this case to test the residence qualification of local candidates, the application of the family domicile rule under the Family Code, and the rule that only the highest vote getter who is qualified may be proclaimed.