PERFECTO ECLARIN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. THE MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Eclarin versus Municipality of Tayabas

The Case

This is a civil action for damages brought by Perfecto Eclarin, a landowner of the barrio of Baguio in the municipality of Tayabas, against the Municipality of Tayabas itself. Eclarin complains that municipal councilors, without his consent and without paying him any indemnity, entered his coconut land in June 1905, opened a public road across it, and destroyed his coconut trees; and that the municipality later caused him to be prosecuted and arrested for refusing to reopen that road, a charge from which he was ultimately absolved. He asks for damages on both counts. The case matters because it fixes two enduring rules: when a cause of action for injury to real estate accrues for purposes of prescription, and when a civil action for damages may arise from a criminal prosecution that ends in acquittal.

Procedural History

Eclarin filed his complaint in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas in January 1912, amending it later that same year. The provincial fiscal answered for the municipality, raising prescription as a special defense to the first cause of action and arguing that the second cause of action stated no cause of action at all. After hearing and evidence from both sides, the trial court rendered judgment in April 1913 in favor of Eclarin, ordering the municipality to pay the value of the destroyed coconut trees, reimbursement of his expenses in defending the criminal charge, and exemplary damages, with costs. The municipality excepted and moved for a rehearing and a new trial. The motion was denied, the exception was noted, and the bill of exceptions was approved and elevated to the Supreme Court, which decided the appeal in December 1915.

Facts

On May 31, 1902, upon the petition of residents of the barrio of Baguio, the municipal council of Tayabas resolved to open a public road across Eclarin's property and appointed a committee of three councilors to carry it out. On June 9, 1905, those councilors, accompanied by several residents, went upon Eclarin's land without his consent and without further legal proceedings, cleared a strip about forty meters long and one or two meters wide, and destroyed coconut trees along the line. The estimates of the number of trees vary in the record, from thirty to one hundred seventy-seven.

Eclarin protested to the municipal council and attached his deeds of ownership. He sued the parties who opened the road in the justice of the peace court, but that suit was dismissed, and he closed and fenced the road. The municipal council then ordered him to reopen it within six hours under penalty of a fine, and the municipal president repeated the order, but he did not comply. The record shows nothing about the matter from 1906 until December 1911, when the municipal president again ordered him to reopen the road. Because he refused, a criminal charge was filed against him for violation of the Road Law. He was arrested, released on bail, convicted in the justice of the peace court, and sentenced to imprisonment and a fine. He appealed, was arrested again, was provisionally released, and was finally absolved by the Court of First Instance, which held that the municipality had not proved that the road on his land was a public road.

Eclarin then brought this action in January 1912, seeking damages for the loss of the use and enjoyment of his land and the destroyed trees from 1905 to 1911, and for the moral and material injury and expenses caused by the criminal prosecution.

Issues

• Whether or not the action for damages for the injury to and trespass upon Eclarin's real estate, committed in June 1905, had already prescribed when he filed suit in January 1912.
• Whether or not the period of prescription began to run only from the date the Court of First Instance absolved him and recognized him as owner of the land.
• Whether or not a civil action for damages lies against the municipality for the criminal prosecution it brought against him, which ended in his acquittal.

Applicable Provisions

Section 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as invoked by the Court, provides:

Actions for the recovery of title to or possession of real property, or for injury to or trespass upon real estate, must be brought within four years after the right of action accrues.

This fixes the four-year period that the Court applies to Eclarin's first cause of action and supplies the rule on when that period begins.

Article 326 of the Penal Code, as discussed by the Court, provides:

No penalty shall be imposed upon the person who shall have made a false accusation or complaint, unless the court, in dismissing the case, shall expressly order the prosecuting attorney to proceed against such person.

This governs the second cause of action, because the Court holds that the civil action for damages arising from the prosecution cannot proceed without such an express order in the judgment of acquittal.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the action had prescribed. The injury and trespass were committed on June 9, 1905, and no evidence showed any further act of trespass afterward; the municipality acted against the property only once. The complaint was filed on January 24, 1912, more than four years later, and so fell under the four-year period of Section 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

On the second issue, the Court rejected Eclarin's theory that prescription ran only from the date of his acquittal and the recognition of his ownership. The Court stated the governing rule:

It is a general rule that the right or cause of action accrues from the date on which an action or suit may be brought by reason of a certain act or event.

From the moment damages were caused to his property in June 1905, Eclarin could already have filed his complaint for indemnity. It was unnecessary that his title be first judicially determined, since his ownership was not denied or discussed, and a timely claim would have given him control over the land.

On the third issue, the Court held that the civil action for damages arising from the criminal prosecution was improper. Under Article 326 of the Penal Code, no action, civil or criminal, lies against a complainant unless the court, in acquitting the accused or in the order of final dismissal, expressly orders a prosecution against the complaining witness. No such order was made in Eclarin's favor, so his claim for damages on that ground could not prosper.

Doctrine

A cause of action for injury to or trespass upon real estate accrues on the date the wrongful act causing the damage is committed, and the four-year prescriptive period under Section 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure runs from that date. The pendency of a question of ownership does not suspend the running of the period, because the injured owner may sue at once to vindicate his rights. A civil action for damages based on a criminal prosecution that ends in acquittal does not lie unless the court, in its judgment of acquittal or order of dismissal, expressly directs that the complainant be proceeded against, as required by Article 326 of the Penal Code.

Disposition

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment appealed from and absolved the Municipality of Tayabas from the complaint, without special finding as to costs in both instances.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the right of action for trespass upon real estate accrues when the wrongful act is done, not when the owner's title is later confirmed. Examiners use this case to test the accrual of causes of action and prescription, and the rule that a civil claim for damages from a criminal prosecution requires an express order to prosecute the complainant under Article 326 of the Penal Code.