TEODORICO E. MENDIOLA, PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION BUREAU, RESPONDENTS.

Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
filed by Petitioner Teodorico
Mendiola against respondents Civil Service
Commission (Commission) and Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau
(Bureau). Petitioner seeks from this
Court the annulment of the resolutions passed by the Commission on February 1,
1989^[1]
and June 6, 1991,^[2]
respectively, and an order for his immediate reinstatement to the service.

The following facts are undisputed.

Petitioner has been an employee of the Bureau since May 21,
1973. He started as a Covert Agent of
the Bureau and was appointed Budget Examiner III in 1978. He held that position until April 30, 1988
although he concurrently performed the functions of Intelligence Agent and
Acting Chief, Administrative Branch of the CID.^[3]

In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 127
mandating the reorganization of the Department of Finance. In accordance with the said Executive Order,
the Commissioner of the Bureau issued a memorandum dated January 19, 1988^[4]
to streamline the Bureau. The said
memorandum provided the priority for the separation of personnel, to wit:

“CATEGORY
I – Personnel with administrative,
criminal and/or patently undesirable personnel.

CATEGORY II – Personnel above 60 yrs of age as of
January 1, 1988, and NOT occupying, sensitive or key supervisory/managerial
positions, as fols (sic):

a. Commissioner/Deputy Commis­sioner/or Assistant Commis­sioner;

b. Chiefs of Offices;

c. Division Chiefs (Operations Chiefs);

d. Chiefs of Special Units: Medical, Finance, and Special Operations Group;

e. Regional Directors; and

f. Plantilla Positions which may be exempted by EIIB Commissioner.

CATEGORY III – Personnel with family
relations within the Second Degree of consanguinity or affinity.

CATEGORY IV –
Personnel directly or indirectly in the management or control of any private
enterprise which may be affected by the functions
of EIIB, and

CATEGORY V – Personnel other than the above but willing
to be separated to take advantage of gratuity pursuant to Executive Order Nr.
(sic) 127.”

On March 30, 1988, petitioner received a notice of termination
from service effective at the close of office hours of April 30, 1988. Alleging that he was not informed of the
cause of his dismissal, petitioner appealed his case to the chairman of the
Appeals Board. His appeal was
denied. Subsequently, he appealed to
the Commission and averred that he was denied due process when he was dismissed
from the service. Furthermore, he
claimed that he could have been included in Category I of the January 19, 1988
memorandum. However, he contested such
inclusion because he had been commended and satisfactorily rated for his
performance. On September 21, 1988, the
Commission resolved the case in petitioner’s favor and held thus:

“The guidelines for separation of personnel established and
adopted by the EIIB are not in accordance with the guidelines prescribed under
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 5, s. 1988, where employees can be separated from
the service as a result of reorganization
only for the following reasons:

1. When there is a reduction in the number of
positions in the new staffing pattern and the employee separated is the least
competent and qualified; or

2. Where there has been a change in the agency functions or
orientation rendering the position of the separated employee redundant.

Ms. Leyesa and Mr. Mendiola were not informed of the particular
grounds for their separation. Hence,
they assumed that they might have been covered by Category No. 1 of the
unnumbered Memorandum of the EIIB which pertains to employees with
administrative or criminal charges. However, under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 5, s. 1988, even employees
with pending administrative charges should be included in the evaluation
process and should they meet the standards for retention or placement set forth under CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 10, s. 1986, they should be appointed. However, they should not be placed in positions higher than what
they previously held and their administrative cases shall be pursued until
decided.

On the basis of the above findings, it is apparent that appellants
were not accorded due process of law and were separated from the service not in
accordance with the prescribed rules on reorganization. The actions of the Bureau were violative of
the guidelines and procedures set forth under Presidential Memorandum dated
October 2, 1987, CSC Memorandum Circular No. 10, s. 1986, CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 5, s. 1988, and Republic Act No. 6656. The appellants’ separation from service is, therefore, considered
illegal.

In view therefore, it is hereby ordered that appellants be
reappointed to their previous positions or to positions of comparable or
equitable rank without loss of seniority and that they be paid back salaries
reckoned from the dates of their termination. However, reappointment to the service does not mean exoneration from any
accusations of wrongdoing or from any administrative
charges that may be filed against them.”^[5]

On December 13, 1988, petitioner filed a motion for execution of
the cited resolution.

The controversy started when the motion for execution was left
unacted upon. This, according to petitioner prompted him to serve on
August 16, 1989 a letter prepared by his former counsel, Atty. Nestor Bamba, to
the Bureau Commissioner. That letter
requested the Bureau to reinstate him. On September 12, 1989, petitioner also filed with the Commission a
letter informing the latter of
the Bureau’s refusal to reinstate him and requesting for the taking of remedial
action by the Commission. These actions
on the part of petitioner allegedly remained unheeded. And on July 26, 1990, petitioner found out
that the Bureau filed on October 27, 1988 a motion for reconsideration of the
September 21, 1988 resolution. On
February 1, 1989, the Commission gave due course to the motion for
reconsideration thereby setting aside its September 21, 1988 resolution. On July 30, 1990, petitioner filed an
Omnibus Motion^[6]
with the Commission praying that the motion for reconsideration of the Bureau
be stricken off the records and that the February 1, 1989 resolution be set
aside. On June 6, 1991, the Commission
promulgated a resolution denying the omnibus motion. We quote the relevant portion of the resolution, thus:

“At the outset, the Commission is inclined to dismiss the instant motion for lack of merit. The grounds relied upon by the movant are
not any of those provided for under Section 39 of PD 807 as amended wherein a
motion for reconsideration may be entertained and/or prosper. Furthermore, the primary ground raised has
already been discussed in the resolution sought to be reconsidered. However, the legality of movant’s removal
deserves discussion in order to settle this particular issue once and for all.

Record shows that movant was holding a position of Intelligence Agent. As clearly stated in the pertinent provision
of LOI 71 dated September 4, 1978, all positions in the Bureau are considered
highly confidential in nature and incumbent thereof can be removed for loss of
confidence. The Supreme Court, in a
number of decisions has consistently ruled that employees holding confidential
positions do not necessarily enjoy security of tenure. As such they can be removed for loss of
confidence. The removal contemplated is
not in the nature of dismissal but merely expiration of term. Hence, such removal does not constitute
violation of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure (Ingles vs.
Mutuc, 26 SCRA 171; Corpus vs. Cuaderno, 13 SCRA 591). In view thereof, the removal of movant from
the office is legal and in accordance with existing civil service law and
jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant motion for
reconsideration is hereby denied. Accordingly, the Resolution dated February 1, 1989 is hereby
affirmed. x x x.”^[7]

This resolution and that of February 1, 1989, are now the
subjects of the present petition. Petitioner raises the following allegations before this Court:

“Respondent Civil Service Commission
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion,
in acting upon EIIB’s motion for reconsideration without notice to the
petitioner, thus depriving petitioner of his day in court.”^[8]

“Respondent Civil Service Commission
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion,
in altering and/or reconsidering its judgment which has already become final
and executory.”^[9]

“Respondent Civil Service Commission
refused to perform its ministerial duty of issuing a writ of execution to
enforce its already final and executory Resolution of September 21, 1988.”^[10]

Did the respondent Commission err in giving due course to the
motion for reconsideration of respondent Bureau? This is the crux of the instant petition.

Petitioner argues that respondent Commission acted without
jurisdiction when it acted upon the motion because the resolution had already
become final and executory. According
to him, respondent Bureau received the resolution of September 12, 1988 on
October 6, 1988 and from said date, the Bureau had fifteen (15) days within which
to move for a reconsideration. Petitioner cites Section 39, Presidential Decree 807 and Resolution No.
88-135 of the Commission.^[11]
Section 39(a), P.D. 807 states:

“Sec. 39 Appeals. – (a) Appeals, where allowable, shall be
made by the party adversely affected by the decision within fifteen days from
receipt of the decision unless a petition for reconsideration is reasonably
filed, which petition shall be filed within fifteen days. x x x.”

While Resolution No. 88-135^[12]
of the Commission contains the following provisions:

“Section 9. PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION. – Any party
adversely affected or not satisfied with the decision of the Commission may
file a petition for reconsideration within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the decision. Only one (1) petition for
reconsideration shall be allowed.

Section 10. FINALITY OF
DECISION. – The decision of the Commission shall be final and executory after
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the copy thereof by the parties, if no
petition for reconsideration thereof is seasonably filed. The Commission may, for exceptional and
valid grounds, stay its execution.

Sec. 11. EFFECTIVITY – This Resolution shall take effect
immediately.

Quezon City, April 8, 1988.”

In refuting petitioner’s claim, respondent Bureau alleges that it
had thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of the resolution of the
Commission within which to file its Motion for Reconsideration. It cites as authorities Section 7, Article
IX of the Constitution and Section 12(11), Chapter III, Title I, Book V of the
Revised Administrative Code.^[13]

“Sec. 7. x x x Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution
or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
days from receipt of a copy thereof.”

The cited provision of the Revised
Administrative Code (1987) states:

“Sec. 12 x x x

x x x      x x x

(11)   Hear and decide administrative cases
instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested
appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the
agencies attached to it. Officials and
employees who fail to comply with such decisions, orders, or rulings shall be
liable for contempt of the Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings shall be final and executory. Such decisions, orders, or rulings may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof;

x x x      x
x x.”

Respondent Bureau also claims that it received a copy of the
resolution of September 21, 1988 on October 21, 1988, not on October 6, 1988 as
alleged by petitioner. And, according to
respondent Bureau, granting that it actually received the resolution on October
6, 1988, it still timely filed its Motion for Reconsideration on October 27,
1988 because the thirty (30)-day period allowed by law has not yet lapsed. Respondent Bureau then concludes that having
timely filed its Motion, the resolution of the Commission ordering
reinstatement did not become final and executory. Therefore, petitioner cannot compel the Commission by a petition
for mandamus to execute the decision and reinstate him to the service.

After a consideration of the legal provisions invoked by the
parties to buttress their respective claims, this Court agrees with petitioner
that an aggrieved party only has a period of fifteen (15), not thirty (30)
days, within which to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
resolution. Resolution No. 88-135 of
the Commission is clear in providing that a party “not satisfied with the
decision of the Commission may file a petition for reconsideration within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision.” The provisions of this
resolution are the applicable rules because they have been especially adopted
to govern appeals to the Commission of cases arising from reorganization. Thus, Section 1 of
Resolution 88-135 provides:

“Section 1. OBJECTIVES – These rules are promulgated to effect
a speedy, fair, and just resolution of appeals relative to the reorganization
of the different Departments or Agencies as authorized under their respective
Executive Orders.”

Furthermore, the whereas clauses of the
resolution state:

“WHEREAS, pursuant to Unnumbered Memorandum Circular dated
October 2, 1987, the President directed each Department or Agency which had
undergone reorganization to constitute a Reorganization. Appeals Board (RAB) at the Central Office on
or before October 21, 1987, to review or reconsider appeals or complaints
relative to reorganization;

WHEREAS, the foregoing Memorandum Circular dated October 2, 1987
provides for the remedy of appeal from decisions of the Reorganization Appeals
Board (RAB) of each Department or Agency to the Civil Service Commission;”

It has been established in this case that
petitioner was dismissed from service pursuant to the Executive Order No. 127 which ordered the reorganization of the
Department of Finance. He contested
such separation until his case reached the Commission which ruled favorably for
him on September 21, 1988. And the
Bureau, according to Resolution 88-135 should have filed its motion for reconsideration fifteen days after its
receipt of a copy of the September 21, 1988 resolution.

Respondent Bureau cannot rely on the constitutional nor the
Revised Administrative Code’s provisions because they refer to filing of
petitions for certiorari of decisions of the constitutional commission
concerned to the Supreme Court. The
provisions are clear and leave no room for interpretation. Nowhere in the cited provisions can it be
seen that the same can be applied to filing a Motion for Reconsideration before
an administrative office which rendered the assailed decision.

It is wrong, however, for petitioner to cite Section 39(a) of
Presidential Decree 807. This provision
falls under Article IX thereof entitled Discipline. Section 39 refers to appeals of disciplinary administrative cases
to the Commission. The present case did
not originate from a disciplinary administrative proceeding.

Since only fifteen (15) days are allowed an aggrieved party to
file a motion for reconsideration, respondent Bureau should have filed its
motion within fifteen (15) days from its receipt of the questioned resolution
or on or before October 21, 1988, if the prescriptive period is based on
October 6, 1988. And the filing by
respondent Bureau of the motion for reconsideration on October 27, 1988 is
indubitably too late. But there is an allegation that respondent Bureau
received its copy of the resolution on October 21, 1988. This claim, however, is unsupported by
evidence. On the other hand, petitioner
supported his allegation that respondent Bureau received its copy on October 6,
1988 by a transmittal document^[14] of
the Commission which was signed by a Bureau agent.^[15]
Between the two conflicting claims, we accept the latter since it has been adequately backed by
evidence. Consequently, We hold that
the fifteen-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration should be
reckoned from October 6, 1988. And the
failure of respondent Bureau to request for reconsideration of the September
21, 1988 resolution of the Commission within the allowed period made the
resolution final and executory
by operation of law. And this Court has
ruled that “(t)he Civil Service Commission has no power or authority to
reconsider its decision which has become final and executory”^[16]
even if the Commission later discovers that its decision is erroneous.
“The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice x x x.”^[17] Thus, We have ruled in Young vs. Court of Appeals^[18] that:

“x x x Once a decision becomes final and executory, it is
removed from the power and jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to
further alter or amend it, much less revoke it. This doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of
occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final at some
definite date fixed by law. To allow
courts to amend final judgments will result in endless litigation.”

This doctrine applies equally to quasi-judicial agencies. Thus, in Filcon Manufacturing Corp. vs.
NLRC,^[19]
We also said:

“A judgment which has become final and executory can no longer
be amended or corrected by the court except for clerical errors or
mistakes. Likewise, an executory and
final decision cannot be lawfully altered or modified even by the court which
rendered the same, especially where the alteration or modification is material
or substantial. In such a situation,
the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case except for execution of the
final judgment. Any amendment or
alteration made which substantially affects the final and executory judgment is
null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held
for that purpose.”

Since the September 21, 1988 resolution has already become final
and executory after October 21, 1988, the Commission could no longer alter the
resolution, much less entertain a motion for reconsideration of the said
resolution and reverse the same. The
only power left with the Commission as far as the resolution is concerned is to
execute it. The rule is well-settled
that the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of
execution and the issuance thereof is the court’s ministerial duty compellable
by mandamus.^[20]

With respect to petitioner’s contention that he was denied due
process when the Commission heard the Bureau’s motion for reconsideration
without notice to him, We agree with respondent Bureau’s argument that the
defect was cured by the filing by petitioner of his Omnibus Motion on July 30, 1990. Thus, in Medenilla v. Civil Service Commission,^[21] We said that the lack of notice to
petitioner regarding the pending appeal and the hearing of said appeal was
cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a
party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.^[22]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission dated February 1, 1989 and June 6, 1990 are hereby declared NULL and
VOID. This Court orders respondents
Civil Service Commission and Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau to reinstate
petitioner Teodorico E. Mendiola to his former position or to an equivalent
position if the former is no longer available without loss of seniority rights
and privileges granted by law.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, and Quiason, JJ., concur

^[1]
Annex “B” of Petition; Rollo,
pp. 19-21.

^[2]
Annex “C” of Petition; Rollo,
pp. 22-23.

^[3]
Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 4.

^[4]
Rollo, pp. 28-29.

^[5]
Annex “A” of Petition; Rollo,
pp. 17-18.

^[6]
Annex “K” of Petition; Rollo, pp. 45-54.

^[7]
Supra, note 2.

^[8]
Petition, p. 8; Rollo, p. 9.

^[9]
Petition, p. 10; Rollo, p. 11.

^[10]
Petition, p. 12; Rollo, p. 13.

^[11]
Reply, p. 9; Rollo, p. 103.

^[12]
Annex “C”, Reply; Rollo, p. 117.

^[13]
Rejoinder, p. 8; Rollo, p. 147.

^[14]
Annex “D”, Reply; Rollo, p. 120.

^[15]
Reply, p. 10; Rollo, p. 110.

^[16]
Marcayda vs. Civil Service Commission, 198 SCRA 447 (1991).

^[17]
Filcon Manufacturing Corp. vs. NLRC, 199 SCRA 814 (1991).

^[18]
204 SCRA 584, 599 (1991) citing Olympia International, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 180 SCRA 353, (1989); Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 94 (1989); Commercial Credit Corporation of Cagayan
de Oro vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 1 (1989); United CMC Textile
Workers Union vs. Labor Arbiter, 149 SCRA 424 (1987); Philippine Rabbit
Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Arciaga, 148 SCRA 433 (1987); Villanueva vs.
CFI of Oriental Mindoro, 119 SCRA 288 (1982).

^[19]
Supra, note, 17 at p. 822 citing Marcopper Mining Corp. vs.
Liwanag Paras Briones, et al., 165 SCRA 464 (1988).

^[20]
Maceda, Jr. vs. Moreman Builder Co., Inc., 203 SCRA 293 (1991).

^[21]
194 SCRA 278 (1991).

^[22]
T. H. Valderama and Sons, Inc. vs. Drilon, 181 SCRA 308 (1990).