CITY OF MANILA REPRESENTED BY MAYOR GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR., PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE ARMY & NAVY CLUB, INC., RESPONDENTS.

Respondent Court of Appeals is faulted in this action for certiorari
for having set aside the order of execution dated June 10, 1991, and the writ
of execution issued by Judge Wilfredo Reyes of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila in Civil Case No. 91-56335.

This was a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the City of
Manila against private respondent Army and Navy Club for violation of the lease
agreement between them over a parcel of land on Roxas Boulevard in the said
city. A summary judgment in favor of
the petitioner was rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila^[1]
and seasonably elevated to the Regional Trial Court. To stay its execution, ANC filed a supersedeas bond in the amount
of P2,700,000.00, which was approved
by Judge Reyes.^[2]
He subsequently affirmed the appealed judgment on June 7, 1991.^[3]

On June 10, 1991, the petitioner filed an ex parte
motion for execution on the ground that the judgment had already become final
and executory under RA 6031. Judge
Reyes granted the motion the same day^[4]
and at 4:00 o’clock that afternoon the writ of execution was served on ANC.

ANC moved to quash the writ on June 11, 1991, but hours later,
sensing that the motion could not be acted upon, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Court of Appeals.

On July 3, 1991, that court issued the questioned decision,^[5]
prompting the filing of the present petition for certiorari.

The petitioner assails the action of the respondent court and
contends that decisions of the regional trial court in cases exclusively
cognizable by inferior courts are final and executory under RA 6031. Thus:

Sec. 1.                     x                   x                   x

In cases falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
municipal and city courts which are appealed to the courts of first instance,
the decision of the latter shall be final: Provided, That the findings of facts
contained in said decision are supported by substantial evidence as basis
thereof, and the conclusions are not clearly against the law and jurisprudence;
in cases falling under the concurrent jurisdictions of the municipal and city
courts with the courts of first instance, the appeal shall be made directly to
the Court of Appeals whose decision shall be final: Provided, however, that the Supreme Court in its
discretion may, in any case involving a question of law, upon petition of the
party aggrieved by the decision and under rules and conditions that it may
prescribe, require by certiorari that the case be certified to it for
review and determination, as if the case had been brought before it on
appeal. (Emphasis supplied.)

The respondents argue on the other hand that under BP 129
decisions of the regional trial court in cases originating from and within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts are not
final but subject to appeal in a petition for review to the Court of
Appeals. Such decisions cannot be
executed where the period of time for the defendant to perfect his appeal has
not yet expired. Thus:

Sec. 22. (BP 129) – Appellate jurisdiction. – Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial
jurisdiction. Such cases shall be
decided on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court
of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by
the parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The decision of the RTC in such cases shall be appealable by
petition for review to the Intermediate Appellate Court which may give it due
course only when the petition shows prima facie that the lower court has
committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modifications of the decision or judgment
sought to be reviewed. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is useful at this point to review the distinction between a
“final” judgment and one which has become “final and
executory.”

In PLDT Employees Union v. PLDT Free Telephone Workers Union,^[6]
the Court observed:

x x x (A)n order or judgment is
deemed final when it finally disposes of the pending action so that
nothing more can be done with it in the trial court. In other words, a final order is that which gives an end to the
litigation x x x when the order or judgment does not dispose of the case
completely but leaves something to be done upon the merits it is merely
interlocutory.

The case of Antonio v. Samonte^[7]
elaborated on this matter thus:

A final order of judgment finally disposes of, adjudicates, or
determines the rights, or some right or rights of the parties, either on the
entire controversy or on some definite
and separate branch thereof, and concludes them until it is reversed or set
aside x x x. Where no issue is left for future
consideration, except the fact of compliance or non-compliance with the terms
of the judgment or order, such judgment or order is final and appealable.

By contrast, in Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,^[8]
we declared:

Now, a “final judgment” in the sense just described
becomes final “upon expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no
appeal has been duly perfected” or an appeal therefrom having been taken,
the judgment of the appellate tribunal in turn becomes final and the records of
the case are returned to the Court of origin. The “final” judgment is then correctly categorized as a
“final and executory judgment” in respect to which as the law
explicitly provides, “execution shall issue as a matter of right.” It bears stressing that only a
final judgment or order i.e., “a judgment or order that
finally disposes of the action of proceeding” can become final and
executory.

A judgment becomes “final and executory” by operation
of law. Finality of judgment becomes a
fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected. In such a situation, the prevailing party is
entitled to a writ of execution and issuance thereof is a ministerial duty of
the court.

Both RA 6031 and BP 129 provide that decisions of the regional trial court in its
appellate capacity may be elevated to the Court of Appeals in a petition for
review. In effect, both laws recognize
that such judgments are “final” in the sense that they finally
dispose of adjudicate, or determine the rights of the parties in the case. But such judgments are not yet “final
and executory” pending the expiration of the reglementary period for
appeal. During that period, execution
of the judgment cannot yet be demanded by the winning party as a matter of
right.

In the present case, the private respondent had up to June 25,
1991, to appeal the decision of the regional trial court. The motion for execution was filed by the
petitioner on June 10, 1991, before the expiration of the said reglementary
period. As the decision had not yet
become final and executory on that date, the motion was premature and should
therefore not have been granted. Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, what the trial court authorized
was an execution pending appeal.

While it is true that execution pending appeal is allowed under
Rule 39, Sec. 2, of the Rules of Court, this provision must be strictly
construed, being an exception to the general rule. The reason allowing this kind of execution must be of such
urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage of the losing party should it
secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal. Absent any such justification, the order of execution must be struck
down as flawed with grave abuse of discretion.^[9]

We see no such
justification in the case before us.

It is worth remarking that as the case was not tried under the
Rule on Summary Procedure, the writ of execution did not even fall under the
following Section 18 thereof:

Sec. 18. Appeal. –
The judgment or final order, including that rendered under Section 5 hereof,
shall be appealable to the appropriate regional trial court which shall decide
the same on the basis of the records, in accordance with Section 22 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. The decision of the
regional trial court in such civil
cases shall be immediately executory.

To stay the execution, a supersedeas bond is necessary except
where one has already been filed in the lower court. This bond continues to be effective if the judgment of the
regional trial court is appealed. But
during the pendency of the appeal, the defendant-appellant must continue
depositing with the appellate court the payments required in the appealed
judgment. The rentals accruing during
the pendency of the appeal must be deposited on or before the date stipulated,
if there is one, and in the absence thereof, on or before the dates provided
for in Sec. 8 of Rule 70. Failure to
make such deposits or payments is ground for execution of the judgment.^[10]

Since the private respondent in the case at bar has filed a
supersedeas bond and the stipulated rental is yearly,^[11]
execution may issue only when it fails to make the yearly deposit of the
rental, and after notice and hearing. Such default has not yet been established.

The Court notes with disapproval the arbitrary manner in which
Sheriff Dominador Cacpal and Deputy Sheriff Reynaldo Cordero acted in
delivering possession of the leased premises to the petitioner. The evidence shows that they enforced the
writ of execution on the same date they received it, forcibly taking out
movables from the said premises, including chandeliers, furniture and
furnishings, music organs, stereo components, lighting fixtures and
computers. They turned off the water,
cut off the electricity, and disconnected the telephones. They also unreasonably prevented ANC members
from entering the premises to get their personal belongings.

Cacpal and Cordero are hereby sternly reprimanded and warned that
a repetition of similar arbitrariness will be dealt with more severely. Their conduct was a clear violation of the
requirement that:

Under the Rules of Court the immediate enforcement of a writ of
ejectment execution is carried out by giving the defendant notice of such writ,
and making a demand that defendant comply therewith within a reasonable period,
normally from three (3) to five (5) days, and it is only after such period that
the sheriff enforces the writ by the bodily removal of the defendant and his
personal belongings.^[12]

On the issue of the
propriety of a special civil action for certiorari to assail an
order of execution pending appeal, this Court has held that –

x x x Although Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that
the special civil action of certiorari may only be invoked when
“there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
(ordinary) course of law” this rule is not without exception. The availability of the ordinary course of
appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use
of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where the appeal is not
an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy – not the mere absence of all other
legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ that usually determines the propriety of certiorari.^[13]

While appeal is normally employed to question an order or writ
which varies the terms of the decision being executed, it is nevertheless not
the sole and exclusive remedy. The
special civil action of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65
was available to the private respondent on-the-allegation that the regional
trial court, in issuing the writ of execution, committed grave abuse of
discretion and acted beyond its jurisdiction
and that the ordinary remedy of appeal was inadequate.

The last question to be resolved is, Assuming that the decision
of the regional trial court had already become “final and executory,”
could the said court order its execution?

The rule is that if the judgment of the metropolitan trial court
is appealed to the regional trial court and the decision of the latter is
itself elevated to the Court of Appeals, whose decision thereafter became
final, the case should be remanded through the regional trial court to the
metropolitan trial court for execution.^[14] The
only exception is the execution pending appeal, which can be issued by the
regional trial court under Sec. 8 of Rule 70 or the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court under Sec. 10 of the same Rule.

As previously observed, the petitioner has shown no weighty
justification for the application of the exception. Hence, the respondent court committed no error in reversing the
Regional Trial Court of Manila and annulling the writ of execution issued by it
on June 10, 1991, pending appeal of its decision.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED and the challenged
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano,
Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., on leave.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 25-32.

^[2]
Ibid., p. 51.

^[3]
Id., pp. 35-46.

^[4]
id., pp. 140-141.

^[5]
id., pp. 49-62. Kapunan, J., ponente; Chua & Victor, JJ.,
concurring.

^[6]
97 Phil. 424, per Mr. Justice Cesar
Bengzon.

^[7]
1 SCRA 1072, per Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes.

^[8]
147 SCRA 334, per Mr. Justice Andres R.
Narvasa.

^[9]
Valencia v. Court of Appeals,
184 SCRA 561.

^[10]
De Laureano v. Adil, 72 SCRA
148.

^[11]
Rollo, p. 26.

^[12]
Reformina v. Adriano, 189 SCRA
723.

^[13]
Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co., 113 SCRA 107.

^[14]
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol.
1, p. 276.