PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SALVADOR ARMADA, JR., ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

An information for robbery with homicide was filed in the Regional
Trial Court, Iloilo City, against Jorge Espero, Angelino Lorca, Jr., Salvador
Armada, Jr., and Arnulfo Cabareño.^[1]
Cabareño alone could not be tried because he was then at large. After the prosecution had rested its case,
Jorge Espero changed his plea of not guilty to guilty and claimed that he alone
committed the crime. He was eventually
convicted.^[2]
Angelino Lorca, Jr. was discharged as a state witness. That left Salvador Armada, Jr., the herein
appellant.

After trial, he was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to pay the civil indemnity of
P30,000.00, and the costs.^[3]

The evidence of the prosecution showed that a week before June
23, 1987, Armada, together with Lorca, Espero and Cabareño, saw Jose Lozarita
selling his female carabao with two offspring for a sum of P5,000.00. Lorca later testified that his three
companions had even then already decided to rob Lozarita of the proceeds of the
sale.

On June 23, 1987;
at about three o’clock in the afternoon, the four men went to the farm of
Lozarita in Barangay Tampucao, Lambunao, Iloilo, to execute their plan. They pretended to ask for young coconuts
from him. He granted their request and
even lent them his bolo for splitting the coconuts. After eating the coconuts, Espero, without much ado, started hacking
Lozarita with the same bolo they had borrowed from him. Lozarita fell and died on the ground. Armada was then holding a knife and acting
as watcher while Cabareño and Lorca were also looking on. Afterwards, Espero got Lozarita’s money from
the latter’s left pocket. It was at
this point that Lorca fled, leaving the other three behind.^[4]

The foregoing narration was made by Lorca^[5] and
Bienvenido Librando,^[6]
another eyewitness. Librando testified
that he had gone that afternoon to Lozarita’s farm to buy some hardwood and he
saw the killing as he crouched about ten meters away in the coffee plants. He said that he ran when Espero espied him
and shouted after him, “Nong Bendoy, don’t try to be involved here! Something might happen to you also!”
Two days later, he went to the house of Lozarita’s sister, Epifania Ermeje, to
report the victim’s death.^[7]

The appellant denied the charge and said that at the time of the
incident he was at the Lambunao Institute of Science and Technology in
Poblacion Lambunao, Iloilo.^[8] He
was corroborated by his brother-in-law, Rolando Lozanes, who swore he
saw Armada leaving for school at 12:30 in the afternoon of June 23, 1987, and
returning at about 5:30 that same afternoon.^[9]

The appeal brief contends that the trial court erred in
discharging Angelino Lorca as state witness and in giving credence to the
witnesses for the prosecution.

We sustain the prosecution.

The discharge of an
accused so he may turn state witness is expressly left to the sound discretion
of the court, subject to the conditions prescribed in Rule 115, Section 9, of
the Rules of Court. It could be argued
that there was no absolute necessity for the testimony of Lorca, considering
the eyewitness testimony of Librando. Even so, Lorca’s testimony may still be considered under our ruling in
People v. Jamero,^[10] viz.:

This court has time and again declared that even if the discharged
witness should lack some of the qualifications enumerated by Sec. 9, Rule 119
of the Rules of Court, his testimony will not, for that reason alone, be
discarded or disregarded. In the
discharge of a co-defendant, the court may reasonably be expected to err; but
such error in discharging an accused has been held not to be a reversible one. This is upon the principle that such error
of the court does not affect the competency and the quality of the testimony of
the discharged defendant.

Lorca’s testimony was correctly taken into account by the trial court, there being no impediment
to its admission, and more so because he was extensively cross-examined by the
defense. At any rate, assuming for the
sake of argument that his testimony was inadmissible, there was still the
testimony of Librando, another eyewitness of the incident, who testified on the killing of
Lozarita and the participation of the appellant and his
companions.

The alibi of the appellant is not believable. The rule that alibi is unavailing against
the positive identification of the accused by credible witnesses is well
established. Moreover, it has not been
sufficiently shown that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene
of the crime at the time of its commission as there is a distance of only 3
kilometers between Lozarita’s farm and Lambunao Institute. No less significantly, the prosecution
established that regular classes started in the Lambunao Institute on June 28,
1987, five days after the killing. This
was affirmed by Mariano Lodigoon, head of the Vocational Department of the
school.^[11]

Armada’s denial is self-serving, negative evidence. It cannot outweigh the positive and
convincing testimony of eyewitnesses establishing his presence at the scene of
the crime and his active participation in its commission.

It is a settled rule that the conclusions of the trial judge
regarding their credibility command great respect and consideration, especially
when they are supported by the other evidence on record. As we said in one case:^[12]

The trial judge had the opportunity to observe the witnesses
personally and to determine by his
own first-hand impressions the credibility of their testimony as indicated by
their demeanor on the stand, the
forthrightness of their declarations, the shades of tone and word and pause
drawing the line between fact and fabrication. We sustain his findings on this matter, there being no showing that he
has abused his discretion or had no basis for his conclusions. And while it is true that, as pointed out by
the defense, there are a number of discrepancies and inconsistencies in the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses, we agree that these lapses are only on
minor details that do not detract from, but in fact, by their very
imperfection, strengthen its veracity.

Minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses are
natural and even enhance their credibility as they indicate that the responses
given were honest and unrehearsed. Such
discrepancies vitalize rather than weaken the testimony as a mere concoction
would have been more cleverly construed to correct any imperfection. This is especially true where, as in the
case at bar, the witnesses have no motive whatsoever to lie and enmesh the
accused in a fabricated charge. It has
not been shown that Librando, who corroborated Lorca, had any ill feeling
against the appellant.

Espero’s plea of guilt and his claim that he alone committed the
crime does not extinguish or mitigate the criminal liability of his co-accused,
particularly since the plea was made after the prosecution had rested. His purpose is suspect. It would appear that, after realizing that
his guilt had already been established, he sought to salvage the situation by
taking full responsibility for the crime and thus at least absolving his
companions.

Lorca admitted that he and his co-accused had a previous
agreement to rob the victim, and a week later all of them proceeded to Lozarita’s farm to carry out their
plan. On that fatal afternoon, the
appellant, together with Lorca and Cabareño, watched as Espero hacked Lozarita
to death and thereafter robbed him. It
is settled that a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.^[13]
The concerted acts of the group to attain a common criminal objective clearly
signify a conspiracy.

Conspiracy having been established, all the conspirators are
liable as co-principals regardless of their degree of participation in the
crime. In contemplation of the law, the
act of one is the act of all.^[14]
Armada cannot extricate himself from the killing of Lozarita which took place
by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. He cannot simply disclaim any knowledge that Espero would go to the
extent of hacking Lozarita to death. To
free himself from criminal liability, he should show that he performed some
overt act to stop or prevent the commission of the second or related felony.^[15]
There is no evidence of such action.

Besides, the phrases “on the occasion” and “by
reason of” robbery used by Article 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code,
refer to a homicide committed in the course of robbery without regard to the
robber’s alleged lack of intention to
kill another. It is the result that is
taken into account in characterizing the crime as robbery with homicide, not
the detailed circumstances or the specific causes or modes of intervention in
its commission.^[16]

The Court notes that the trial court did not order the return of
the sum of P4,000.00 stolen from the victim and the sum of P16,070.00
representing the funeral expenses as established by the receipts submitted by
the prosecution.

We are satisfied that Salvador Armada, Jr. was one of the
conspirators in the killing and robbery of Jose Lozarita on June 23, 1987. Proof beyond reasonable doubt has overcome
the constitutional presumption of innocence
in favor of the appellant and has clearly established his guilt.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED,
with the modification that the appellant is ordered to pay to the heirs of the
victim the sum of P4,000.00 stolen from the deceased, the sum of P16,070.00
representing the funeral expenses, and the civil indemnity, which is increased
from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, unless such amounts have already been paid by
Jorge Espero, with whom Salvador Armada, Jr. is solidarily liable.

SO ORDERED.  

Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Quiason, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 7.

^[2]
Decision
penned by Regional Trial Court Judge Edgar D. Gustilo, Branch XXVIII, Iloilo
City on April 22, 1991.

^[3]
Ibid., p. 18.

^[4]
TSN,
February 27, 1990, pp. 4-8.

^[5]
Ibid., pp. 3-13.

^[6]
Id., February 14, 1989, pp. 8-13.

^[7]
Id., pp. 10-16.

^[8]
Id., July 4, 1989, pp. 3-6.

^[9]
Id., November 6, 1989, pp. 5-8.

^[10]
24
SCRA 206.

^[11]
TSN, December 4,1989, pp. 4-6.

^[12]
People v. Delavin, 148 SCRA 257.

^[13]
People v. Villanueva, 211 SCRA 403; People v. Pajarit, 214 SCRA
678; People v. Martinado, 214 SCRA 712;
Siton v. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 473; People v. Ballinas, 202
SCRA 516.

^[14]
People v. Pugal, 214 SCRA 247.

^[15]
People v. Degoma,
209 SCRA 267.

^[16]
Ibid.