SOCORRO ABELLA SORIANO, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND DEOGRACIAS REYES, RESPONDENTS.

The underlying mandate in the construction of our Rules of Court
is that they shall be liberally construed in order to promulgate their object
and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.^[1] The
jurisprudential caveat, however, is that the provisions on reglementary periods
are strictly applied as they are deemed indispensable to the prevention of
needless delays and necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business,^[2]
that strict compliance therewith is mandatory and imperative,^[3] and
that this stringency applies to the rules on the manner and periods for
perfecting appeals.^[4]

Nonetheless, such strictures have been relaxed on equitable
considerations,^[5]
and this Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, has given due
course even to appeals perfected out of time when to do so would serve the
demands of substantial justice.^[6] We,
therefore, bear in mind the aforestated decisional rules for a holistic
application thereof in the adjudication of the present appeal.

As disclosed by the records, this case originated from an
ejectment suit, Civil Case No. 8581 of the Municipal Court of Naga City, filed
by petitioner on November 11, 1988 to eject private respondent for non-payment
of rentals on two doors of a commercial building leased by the former to the
latter on a month-to-month basis.^[7]
Private respondent answered that he was not a tenant but a usufructuary, and
that the monthly payments he was making for his occupancy of the premises were
not paid “as rentals but in the concept of security for the enjoyment of
said usufruct.”^[8] Supposedly on the bases of the
stipulation of facts, the affidavits and the evidence adduced by the parties,
the municipal trial court sustained private respondent’s theory, dismissed the
complaint and ordered petitioner to pay P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees.^[9]

On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21 at Naga City,
docketed therein as Civil Case No. RTC 89-1791, the judgment of the trial court
was affirmed on October 24, 1989, with the modification that the award for attorney’s
fees was deleted.^[10]
Petitioner then proceeded to respondent Court of Appeals, and this is where a
procedural imbroglio was occasioned by the following resolution of said
respondent court in CA-G.R. SP No. 19294 promulgated on December 28, 1989:

“The petitioner first filed with Us on November 17, 1989 a
motion for extension of time within which to file a Petition for Review which
this Court granted per Our Resolution of November 23, 1989. On December 5, 1989 said petitioner again
filed a motion for extension of
time specifying a period of ten (10) days from December 5, 1989 within which to
file said petition for review and then again on December 15, 1989, petitioner
filed a third (motion for) extension of time specifying this time a period of
ten (10) days from December 15, 1989 within which to file said petition for
review and up to this date no such petition has been filed.

“In Lacsamana vs. IAC, 143 SCRA 643 at pp. 650-651, it was
held that “(B)eginning one month after the promulgation of this Decision,
an extension of only fifteen days for filing a petition for review may
be granted by the Court of Appeals, save in exceptionally meritorious
cases.” Under Rule 6, Section 3 of the Revised Internal Rules of this
Court, it is stressed very clearly that “(U)pon proper motion presented
before the expiration of the original reglementary period, the Court may grant
a non-extendible additional period of fifteen (15) days save in exceptionally
meritorious cases within which to file the petition for review.

“WHEREFORE, the third motion for extension of time dated
December 15, 1989 is DENIED and the proposed petition for review is DISMISSED
and/or DENIED due course”
(Emphasis in the original text; words in parentheses supplied.)^[11]

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration and
respondent court, this time through the same ponente but with two
different members composing its Eleventh Division, denied the same in a
resolution promulgated about one and a half years later on June 17, 1991
which felicitously reveals the reasons submitted by petitioner why she had to
resort to her three preceding motions for extension of time to file her
petition for review, and why respondent court dismissed and/or denied the
petition even before it was filed, thus:

“By Our Resolution of December 28, 1989, We had denied the
petitioner’s third Motion for Extension of Time to file her petition for review
following the holding in Lacsamana vs. IAC, x x x.

“But again on December 29, 1989, this Court was in receipt of
still a ‘Motion for Last Extension’ where petitioner’s lawyer had asked ‘for a
last extension of 3 days from today within which to file said petition’ and the
motion was dated December 26, 1990.

“Finally, the petition
for review was filed with Us on January 4, 1990.

“On January 10, 1990, the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration seeking the reconsideration of the Resolution of this court
dated December 28, 1989 which denied said petitioner’s third motion for
extension of time to file her petition for review.

x x x

“The petitioner in her motion for reconsi­deration argued that
the ruling in Lacsamana allows certain exceptions, i.e., “save in
exceptionally meritorious cases” and stressed that it is a matter of
public knowledge that a civil disturbance occurred from December 1 to 7 in the
attempted coup d’etat which prevented most offices in Metro Manila from
operating and functioning. Counsel said
that he resides in Dasmariñas Village which was within the combat zone and he
was not even able to leave his residence for the duration of said civil
disorder. When he was able to report
for work, his companions in the office were not available because they had
evacuated to the province and there was no available transportation to carry
them back to Manila. Other abnormal
situations took place in that month, one in the San Roque Parish Church where
two priests were taken hostage by two persons and another, an incident
involving a threat to strike by employees of the San Juan de Dios Hospital and
in the Espiritu Santo Parochial School in which incidents counsel had been
under professional engagements with the affected parties. That finally, after the Christmas holidays,
on December 29, there was a breakdown of the computers in the office of counsel
and thus by force majeure, the counsel could not
submit his petition for review but was again forced to ask for another five (5)
days extension. Only when the computers
were repaired was the petition for review put to print and was filed with this
Court.

“We recognize the exceptional circumstances narrated by
counsel which at least for the period from December 1 to December 15 could have
adversely affected counsel’s work and for that reason could have prevented him
from filing the petition for review. But beyond December 15 to the time the petition for review was actually
filed, there was no longer any exceptional circumstance which could have
prevented petitioner’s lawyer from coming up with his petition for review and
submitting it in Court.

x x x

“It is therefore most unfortunate that the motion for
reconsideration has to be denied and consequently also, the petition for review
filed with Us has to be dismissed.

“WHEREFORE, the petition for reconsideration is DENIED and the
petition for review which was filed beyond the allowable period is
DISMISSED.”^[12]

Petitioner sought relief from the aforequoted twin resolutions in
a petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court on August 9,
1991. Said petition was initially denied in our resolution of
October 14, 1991,^[13] but
on a favorable review of the arguments of petitioner in her motion for
reconsideration of November 14, 1991,^[14] we resolved on December 9, 1991 to grant
said motion and reinstate the petition for review, at the same time requiring
private respondent to comment thereon.^[15]

Private respondent sought and was granted two extensions of
thirty (30) and fifteen (15) days in our resolutions of February 17, 1992 and
March 25, 1992, respectively,^[16] but
despite his due receipt thereof, nothing was heard from him thereafter. We were consequently constrained, in our
resolution of July 1, 1992,^[17] to
require him and/or his counsel to show cause why they should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure, and to comply
with the aforesaid resolution of December 9, 1991, both within ten (10) days
from notice. It was only on August 10,
1992 that respondent’s counsel surfaced with a so-called “Compliance Cum
Motion.”

Finding his explanation unsatisfactory, since it merely alleged
that he suffered “pneumonia and heart attack” but without submitting
any supporting document therefor and for not filing even the corresponding
motion or manisfestation with the Court although he practices with associates
who are collectively counsel of record for private respondent, said counsel was
fined P500.00 but his motion for an extension of ten (10) days from notice
within which to file the required comment
was granted in our resolution of September 7, 1992.^[18] This
notwithstanding, and although the comment was due on October 10, 1992, the same
was actually filed on October 12, 1992 allegedly because of the death of said
counsel’s mother-in-law in San Narciso, Zambales, in consideration of all of
which we opted to admit his 5-page comment in our resolution of October 27,
1992.^[19]
Parenthetically, the petition for
review filed by petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 19294 of respondent court, and
which is the eye of the present judicial maelstrom, consists of 27 textual
pages.^[20]

Now, if we have deigned to narrate the foregoing circumstances in
detail, it is but in obeisance to the doctrinal precepts set out in limine, one of which is that to warrant judicial
condonation of a litigant’s belated compliance with the periods provided by the
rules or ordered by the court there must be cogent reasons and equitable
considerations arguing in his favor. For that reason, we have prefatorily noted that the supervention of
delay in point of time cannot be imputed to petitioner alone. We consider as quite uncompromising the view
adopted by respondent court in its impugned resolution since petitioner
incurred in delay consisting of at most eighteen (18) days under comparatively
abnormal conditions. On the other hand,
without such contretemps, it took private respondent all of two hundred
fifty-four (254) days to file his abbreviated comment. And, as earlier noted, respondent court
resolved petitioner’s motion for the reconsideration of its original denial
resolution about one and a half (1 1/2) years later.

While, therefore, this observation regarding defaults likewise on
the part of private respondent and respondent court cannot be invoked as a
brief or a justification by petitioner for her own supposed delay, the
foregoing comparative scenarios cannot be entirely disregarded. At the very least, they lend substance to
the verity that certain circumstances beyond the expectation or control of a
party could cause his non-compliance with what is required of him, and that any
blame therefor should not unmitigatedly be visited on his head alone without at
all considering similar situations obtaining in the very same case.

According to the records, petitioner had up to November 19, 1989
to file her petition for review with respondent court, but since November 19,
1989 was a Sunday, the first 15-day extension seasonably sought from and
granted by respondent court expired on December 5, 1989. As already narrated, petitioner thereafter
sought two successive extensions of ten (10) days each and, ultimately, a last
extension of three (3) days after which she duly filed her petition. The reasons therefor have earlier been
recounted and we take cognizance of the events and consequences thereof, that
is, the coup d’etat, the fact that the Makati area was occupied
by rebel military factions, the need for subsequent clearing of the district of
barricades and possible land mines or explosives, the failure of the employees
of petitioner’s counsel to report to work thereafter, the breakdown of the
computers in the office of said counsel, and his necessary but unexpected
preoccupation with the emergencies posed by the hostageship of the priests and
the threatened strike of hospital and school employees involving his clients.

Respondent court does not consider the incidents after December
15, 1989 as sufficient justification for petitioner’s pleas for additional
extensions of time, but gives no reason therefor. On the other hand, private respondent expressed disbelief in the
truth of the facts reported by petitioner’s counsel explaining his predicament,
but neither does private respondent adduce any evidence to the contrary. It may be granted that such positions taken
by respondents are matters of perception but, to our mind, these appear to be more
of nitpicking and resort to technicalities which consequently lose sight of the
desirable judicial overview of an actual legal impasse.

On the contrary, we find significance in the fact that
petitioner’s counsel only asked, in piecemeal fashion as it were, for a few
days extension at a time, that is, after
the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period he twice sought the understanding
grant of extensions of ten (10) days and, lastly, five (5) days. We say this is significant since it induces
belief in said counsel’s good faith, the truth of his assertions, and the
absence of intent to delay the proceeding. For, undoubtedly, in anticipation of the lapse of the reglementary
period on December 5, 1989, petitioner’s counsel could very well have moved for
an extension of thirty (30) days in view of the civil disorder and the
uncertainty of its consequences, and he would be acting within the ambit of Lacsamana
on the matter of “exceptionally meritorious cases” and for which
additional extension no specific time limit is imposed.

The fact that he, instead, asked successively for those
extensions of only a few days each clearly shows that he anticipated, albeit
erroneously, that the situation would normalize within the periods contemplated
in each of his motions. Having been
proved wrong as the aberrant situation progressed, punctuated by other
subsequent and unexpected events, he had perforce to backtrack on his original
expectations and seek additional extensions. We do not find it in the interest of enlightened justice to punish a
litigant for incurring in delay due to a miscalculation on the ultimate
denouement of a parlous situation as shown only in the light of after-events.

Nor is the foregoing the only consideration for the favorable
view that we take of this petition. We
are not unmindful of the line of decisions handed down by this Court, some of
which are invoked by petitioner,^[21]
wherein the hand of equity reached out to stay the dismissal of an appeal on
mere technicalities or by the inflexible application of the rules, especially
when the non-compliance with said rules was neither intended for delay nor
resulted in prejudice to the adverse party. In this case, as underscored by petitioner,^[22]
any delay in its disposition cannot prejudice private respondent as he was and
continues in the possession of petitioner’s property subject of this case and
for which occupancy he has long stopped paying rentals or any form of
compensation.

In Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, et al., we specifically
declared that “even assuming that a petition for review is filed a few
days late, where strong considerations of substantial justice are manifest in
the petition, this Court may relax the stringent application of technical rules
in the exercise of equity jurisdiction. In addition to the basic merits of the main cause, such a petition
usually embodies justifying circumstances which warrant our heeding the
petitioner’s cry for justice, in spite of earlier negligence of counsel.”^[23]

Now, on the merits of the main case, the evaluation of which also
enters into the determination of whether the situation here qualifies as an
“exceptionally meritorious case” contemplated in Lacsamana, we
have heretofore observed that private respondent resisted the ejectment suit on
the ground that he was not a lessee on a month-to-month basis but a lifetime
usufructuary, and that the amount he was paying petitioner was a “security
for the enjoyment of said usufruct,” a concept which bewilders us,
especially since we do not find in the record any written memorial of such
usufruct although the same is a real right which requires a writing when
constituted by the will of the parties.^[24] Curiously, private respondent also referred
to the payments as “rentals,” “compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises,” and “advances for real estate tax.”^[25]

However, in the Preliminary Conference Order^[26]
rendered in Civil Case No. 8581 by the trial court, private respondent made the
following admissions:

“1. that there is no written contract
between plaintiff and defendant regarding the use and occupation of the
premises subject of this case;

2. that the compensation for the use and occupa­tion of the premises being paid by the defendant through the
plaintiff was being paid monthly;

3. that whatever defendants paid in monthly amounts for the use and
occupation of the premises, every month they would do so by depositing such
amount to the account of the plaintiff in the Bank of (the) Philippine Islands,
Naga City Branch;

4. that in the year 1988 for the period March
to September 1988, the defendants
paid the amounts due to the
plaintiff for that period March to September 1988 only on September 19,
1988 by depositing the amount of P11,550.00 to the account of the plaintiff in
the Naga City Branch of the Bank of (the) Philippine Islands;

5. that plaintiff before September 19, 1988 made demands on the defendants
to pay the rentals in arrears and to vacate the premises;”
(Underscoring supplied.)

It is a source of puzzlement to us, therefore, that what
obviously and plausibly appears to be a simple ejectment suit for non-payment
of rentals has now assumed the proportions of a procedural cause celebre
generated by a coup d’etat and, as may be gleaned from the
records, fueled by acrimonious exchanges between petitioner’s counsel and the
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City to which the case was
appealed in the first instance. It
cannot be over-emphasized that a full-blown review of the proceedings in the
two courts below should accordingly be essayed, not only because of the cries
of injustice by petitioner, but to fathom how a verbal lease contract could
metamorphose into a supposed conventional usufruct, not only for a reasonable
period but for the lifetimes of the alleged usufructuaries.

Petitioner urges us to take the same course of action that we
have followed in some cases,^[27] that
is, that instead of remanding the case for further proceedings, we now resolve
the contentious issues between petitioner and private respondent since the same
are supposed to be purely legal, that petitioner is of advanced age and has
been deprived of income from her property subject of this case for more than
five (5) years, and that we putatively have before us all the data for deciding
the said controversy.

We have long adopted that very procedure in other cases, in the
interest of speedy administration of justice, but we are not persuaded that on
the bases of the records before us we can arrive at a thorough and judicious
decision in the case at bar. It must be
recalled that this case was antecedently elevated to respondent court on a
petition for review but having been dismissed, the factual questions which are
necessarily present and involved in such a recourse were never passed upon nor
clarified. We need not belabor the fact
that respondent court is in a better position to unravel the disputed facts in
this case because of its trial jurisdiction, whereas this Court is not a trier
of facts and should be relieved of that burden. It may be mentioned that this is primarily the rationale for the
creation of such an intermediate appellate court.^[28]

Indeed, there are a number of factual matters in this case
requiring incision or excision by the evidentiary scalpel, such as the specific
provisions of the alleged agreement on lifetime usufruct, if true, and how it
came to be; the truth regarding the amounts and the real nature or purpose of
the payments made by private respondent to petitioner; the former dispositions
made of the same and the demandability of future obligations on that account;
and the evidentiary moorings of the judgment of the trial court and the
correctness of the factual findings or the procedural miscues of the regional
trial court in affirming said judgment on divergent grounds. There is, therefore, a compelling need of
proof to supplement for clarity the admissions and negations made by the
parties in their pleadings for a provident review of the actuations of the two
courts below.

ACCORDINGLY, the assailed resolutions of respondent Court
of Appeals, dated December 28, 1989 and June 17, 1991, are hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The petition for review in
CA-G.R. SP No. 19294 is REINSTATED and respondent court is directed to promptly
take the corresponding appropriate action thereon consistent with our
dispositions made herein.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), and
Nocon, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., no part, former
member of law office counsel for petitioner.

^[1]
Sec. 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court.

^[2]
Valdez vs. Ocumen, et al., 106 Phil. 929 (1960); Mangali, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., 99 SCRA 236 (1980).

^[3]
FJR Garments Industries vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 130 SCRA 216
(1984).

^[4]
Gutierrez vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 26 SCRA 32 (1968).

^[5]
Bagalanon, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 76 SCRA 233 (1977);
Pimentel, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 64 SCRA 475 (1975).

^[6]
Siguenza, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 137 SCRA 570 (1985).

^[7]
Annex E, Petition; Rollo, 61-63.

^[8]
Annex F, Id.,; ibid., 64-69.

^[9]
Annex J, id.,; ibid., 79-85.

^[10]
Annex N, id.,; Ibid.,
111-119.

^[11]
Penned by Justice Cezar D. Francisco, with the concur­rence of Justices Josue
M. Bellosillo and Alfredo A. Marigomen; Rollo, 25-26.

^[12]
Justice Cezar D. Francisco, ponente, with Justices Alicia Sempio-Diy and
Filemon H. Mendoza, concurring; Rollo, 31-33.

^[13]
Rollo, 133.

^[14]
Ibid., 134-148.

^[15]
Ibid., 149.

^[16]
Ibid., 151, 154.

^[17]
Ibid., 154-A.

^[18]
Ibid., 157.

^[19]
Ibid., 167.

^[20]
Annex D, Petition; Rollo, 34-60.

^[21]
Commercial Union Ins., et al. vs. Lepanto Consolidated, et al., 86 SCRA
79 (1978); A-One Feeds, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, Inc. et al., 100 SCRA
590 (1980); Yap vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 115 SCRA 104 (1982); Vda.
de Crisologo vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 137 SCRA 231 (1985); Orata vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 185 SCRA 148 (1990).

^[22]
Rollo, 12, 141.

^[23]
137 SCRA 231 (1985).

^[24]
Art. 563, Civil Code.

^[25]
Rollo, 36.

^[26]
Annex G, Petition; Rollo, 70.

^[27]
Limpan Investment Corp. vs. Sundiam, etc., et al., 157 SCRA 209 (1988);
Development Bank of the Phil. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,
190 SCRA 653 (1990); Dimayuga vs. Phil. Comm. & Industrial Bank, et al.,
200 SCRA 143 (1991).

^[28]
See Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 201 SCRA 51 (1991).