SPOUSES BENITO TRINIDAD AND SOLEDAD TRINIDAD, PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES LUIS CABRERA AND DELIA CABRERA AND HON. JUDGE JOSE M. AGUILA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE RT…

In an ejectment case which the petitioners, spouses Benito and
Soledad Trinidad, filed against the respondents spouses Luis and Delia Cabrera,
docketed as Civil Case No. XXXII-0560 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro
Manila, Branch 32, Quezon City, a decision was rendered for the plaintiffs by
MeTC Judge Manuel F. Verzosa on January 25, 1989:

“x x x ordering the defendants: (1) and all persons claiming
rights under them to vacate the premises in question and surrender possession
thereof to plaintiffs; (2) to pay the rentals in arrears in the sum of
P5,000.00 for the period covering May 1988 to September 1988; (3) to pay the
sum of P1,000.00 as reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the
premises starting October 1988 and every month thereafter until the defendants
and all persons claiming rights under them shall have actually vacated the
premises in question and surrendered possession thereof to plaintiffs; (4) to
pay the sum of P3,000.00 as, and for, attorney’s fees; and, (5) to pay the
costs of suit.” (p. 22, Rollo.)

On appeal by the defendants to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City (Civil Case No. Q-89-1750),
the decision was affirmed in toto on April 25,1989 by RTC Judge
Lucas P. Bersamin.

A petition for review under Section 29 of the Judiciary Law, as
amended, was filed by defendants Cabreras in the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP
No. 17490) but it was dismissed on May 16, 1990.

The Cabreras elevated the case to the Supreme Court by a petition
for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (G.R. No. 95128). It was
denied by this Court on December 10, 1990 for “failure to
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error
in the questioned judgment” (p. 49, Rollo).

On January 30, 1991, Attorney Diosdado L. Dapucanta entered his
appearance in G.R. No. 95128 as new counsel for the Cabreras and simultaneously filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Court’s resolution dated December 10, 1990.

On February 11, 1991, the Court NOTED the appearance of Attorney
Dapucanta “the same being not filed in accordance with the Rules” and
“NOTED without action” (p. 15, Rollo) his motion for reconsideration of
the resolution denying the petition for review.

Entry of judgment
was made on January 31, 1991 by this Court.

The plaintiffs Trinidad spouses asked for the remand of the
records to the court of origin and filed a motion for execution therein on
April 16, 1991. A writ of execution was
issued on June 3, 1991 by MeTC Judge Verzosa.

On June 6, 1991, the defendants Cabreras filed a petition for
injunction with restraining order in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(Civil Case No. Q-­91-9005, “Sps. Luis Cabrera, et al. vs. Hon. Manuel F.
Verzosa, et al.”) wherein they asked the regional trial court to stop MeTC
Judge Verzosa from enforcing his decision in the ejectment case on the ground
that it was not yet final and executory. They alleged that their motion for reconsideration in the Supreme Court
was still pending “without action” as of February 11, 1991, hence,
the plaintiffs’ motion for execution was premature. The Trinidad spouses opposed the petition.

Nonetheless, RTC Judge Jose M. Aguila granted the petition for
injunction on June 25, 1991:

“x x x enjoining the
respondents to refrain and desist from enforcing the decision and writ of
execution in Civil Case No. XXXII-0560 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro
Manila, Branch 32, Quezon City, until the appeal in G.R. No. 95128 is finally
disposed of in their favor by the Supreme Court, and without pronouncement as
to costs.” (p. 17, Rollo.)

Judge Aguila reasoned out that as the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration in the Supreme Court was simply “noted without
action,” he “could not consider it denied or pro forma.”
Therefore, it is “still pending a resolution” or “not finally
disposed of.” The entry of judgment was premature. Said Judge Aguila:

“1. Although
the Second Division of the Supreme Court indeed issued a resolution dated 11
February 1991 stating that the motion of the petitioners for reconsideration of
the resolution of December 10, 1990 denying the petition for review on certiorari,
is ‘noted without action,’ there is nothing in said resolution
to show that the petitioners’ motion is denied or a pro forma motion because
the appearance of the counsel of the petitioners filed in court is not in
accordance with the Rules.

“In fact, the second division of the Supreme Court issued a
resolution dated March 6, 1991 in G.R. No. 95128 stating that ‘the withdrawal
of appearance of Atty. Pedro N. Belmi as counsel for the petitioners is noted.’
The Supreme Court has not yet resolved the motion for reconsideration of
petitioners because the withdrawal of the original counsel was only noted. The said motion for reconsideration remains
‘noted without action.’ The Court cannot consider the
motion for reconsideration of petitioners in
G.R. No. 95128 as denied or pro
forma. This view is in favor of
the petitioners unless it is clearly stated in the resolution of the Supreme
Court that it is otherwise. Said
resolution is clear, and interpretation is not necessary. Therefore, the motion for reconsideration of
the petitioners with the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 95128 is still pending
resolution, hence, it is not yet
finally disposed of.

“2. The entry of judgment relied on by
the respondents issued by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-­95128 appears to be premature. It stated that on January 31, 1991
the resolution of December 10, 1990 denying the petition for Review on Certiorari
of petitioners became final and executory. But within the reglementary period, on January 30, 1991, petitioners
filed their motion for reconsideration. The resolution of December 10, 1990 cannot be final and executory on
January 31, 1991 because the reglementary period stopped to run upon the filing
of the said motion for reconsideration on 30 January 1991. Hence, the denial of the petitioners’
petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. L-95128 is still pending reconsideration in the Supreme Court. It is not yet finally disposed of.

“3. There was no showing in the record
that petitioners was furnished copy of the entry of judgment in G.R.
L-95128 because it was not indicated on the face of said entry in order for
petitioners to contest it. Moreover,
there was no showing that petitioners was (sic) furnished copy of the
plaintiffs’ (private respondents of instant
petition) motion for execution dated October 4, 1990 in Civil Case No.
XXXII-0560 against defendants (petitioners of instant petition) in order for
petitioners to file their opposition, if any.

“The Court opines and
so hold that the writ of execution issued
by respondent Presiding Judge Manuel F.
Verzosa of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila, Quezon City,
Branch 32 is still premature for the enforcement of its
judgment dated 25 January 1989 because it is still on appeal that is pending resolution before the Supreme
Court.” (Emphasis supplied; pp. 15-16, Rollo.)

The Trinidads have come to this Court for relief from the above
decision by a petition for certiorari in this Court.

After deliberating on the petition for certiorari and its
annexes, as well as the private respondents’ comment thereon, the Court
resolved to grant the petition for respondent Judge Aguila gravely abused his
discretion in issuing the assailed decision. By holding that the Supreme Court’s entry of judgment in G.R. No. 95128
“Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals, et al.” was premature, Judge Aguila
overstepped the limits of his authority as a subordinate court. His is the duty to execute, enforce, and
implement the final decisions of this Court. Instead, he endeavored to impede and prevent its execution because of
his erroneous belief that this Court’s entry of judgment was premature. A becoming modesty should have advised him
to refrain from sitting in judgment upon the action of this Court (Ang Ping vs.
RTC of Manila, Branch 40, 154 SCRA 77, citing the opinion of Justice Laurel in
People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56; Shiaoji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil. 333; Kabigting vs.
Acting Director of Prison, 6 SCRA 281). Indeed, if Cabrera believed that this
Court’s entry of judgment was premature, he should have filed in this Court a
motion to set it aside, not to attack it in a lower court.

Judge Aguila’s opinion that because this Court simply “NOTED
without action” Attorney Dapucanta’s motion for reconsideration in G.R.
No. 95128, the motion remained “pending resolution” by this Court,
was erroneous for, as we noted
in the same resolution, the motion
for reconsideration was filed by a lawyer (Attorney Dapucanta) who had no
standing before us for his appearance was “not filed in accordance with
the Rules” (p. 15, Rollo). The
Motion for reconsideration which he filed was a sham pleading (Sec. 5, Rule 7,
Rules of Court). The Court did not have
to act upon it. It did not interrupt
the period for the finality of the Court’s resolution dismissing the petition
for review of the Court of Appeals’ decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The decision dated June 25, 1991 of
respondent Judge Jose M. Aguila in Civil Case No. Q-91-9005 entitled “Spouses Luis Cabrera, et al. vs. Hon. Manuel F. Verzosa, et
al.” is hereby annulled and set aside. The Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 32, is ordered to
execute without further delay its final and executory decision in Civil Case
No. XXXII-0560 entitled, “Spouses Benito Trinidad, et al., plaintiffs vs.
Spouses Luis Cabrera, et al., defendants.” This decision is immediately
executory.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Medialdea, and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.