G.R. No. 10050. November 28, 1914
CIRILO B. SANTOS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. CECILIO RIVERA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
TRENT, J.:
not complied with the rules of this court in the preparation of his brief. Rules
19 and 20 read as follows:
“19. Prefixed to the brief of the appellant, but stated separately, shall be
an assignment of errors intended to be urged. Each specification of error shall
be separately, distinctly, and concisely stated without repetition, and they
shall be numbered consecutively. All briefs shall be printed and shall exhibit
an extract of the argument on the points of law or fact to be discussed, with
reference to the pages of the record and the authorities relied upon in support
of each point. The brief of the appellant shall also contain a concise statement
of the facts in the case.“20. No error not affecting the jurisdiction over the subject matter will be
considered unless stated in the assignment of errors and relied upon in the
brief.”
The appeal is from a judgment dismissing the complaint with costs after
sustaining a demurrer to the complaint on the ground that it does not state a
cause of action. Under the usual heading, the brief starts off with the
following paragraphs:
“This is an appeal in the above-entitled cause against an order handed down
on January 24, 1914, dismissing the complaint, and excepted to by the
appellant.“In the opinion of the appellant, the complaint sets forth facts of
sufficient weight to constitute a cause of action, and the demurrer interposed
against the same ought to be overruled, notwithstanding the opinion of the
Honorable (judge) Crossfield, who holding the personal action of the appellant
to be a real action, arrived at the conclusion that article 335 of the Code of
Civil Procedure must be applied in this case. This, in our opinion, is an error
which greatly prejudices the interest of the plaintiff, * * *.”
The brief then continues to discuss the facts alleged in the complaint and
their sufficiency in law to constitute a right of action. It is urged that this
is not a compliance with the above-quoted rules nor with our decision in Paterno
vs. City of Manila (17 Phil. Rep., 26), to which we also add Santiago
vs. Felix (24 Phil. Rep., 378).
In the first case, “counsel for appellant in his printed brief makes no
specific assignment of errors, but argues in a general way two questions.” In
the second case, the single error assigned was, “The Court of First Instance of
this city incurred error in rendering the judgment appealed from, for it is
contrary to law and the weight of the evidence.”
It is apparent that the case at bar is to be distinguished from the first
case, because there is in the opening statement of the appellant a reasonable
specific assignment of error, to wit, that the court erred in holding that the
complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. While
not being set off by itself and labeled as an assignment of error, this
statement makes the point as effectually if not as artistically. Such a
statement requires an inspection of the complaint and of the complaint alone for
its determination. To set off the error assigned with an appropriate title would
tend to clearness of style and hence be more acceptable to the court, but it
would not avoid the necessity of examining the contents of the complaint.
The present case may also be readily distinguished from the second case
cited. There are so many ways in which a judgment may be contrary to law and the
weight of the evidence that such a general statement leaves the court absolutely
in the dark as to what to look for. An alleged error should have definite bounds
and be limited as far as possible to a single point. Nothing could be more
irreducible than the statement that the complaint does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action, without limiting the extent of the
inquiry. For such a statement requires an inspection of the complaint as a
whole, and nothing less will suffice to dispose of it. It requires an
examination of only one particular portion of the record, to wit, the initial
pleading—the complaint.
On the other hand, in the two cases cited, the cases had gone to judgment on
the merits and a mere general discussion of what had transpired or the statement
that the judgment was contrary to law left the court to struggle through the
briefs and records in an effort to pick out something wrong.
Although the brief of the appellant is not a literal compliance with the
rules of the court, nor is it a work of art from a professional point of view,
still, we do not believe the departure from the prescribed practice has been so
radical as to call for a dismissal of the case. We do not desire, however, to be
understood as holding that it is not absolutely necessary to comply
substantially with the above-quoted rules.
The motion is therefore denied.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Carson, and Araullo, JJ.,
concur.
CONCURRING
MORELAND, J.
I agree to the decision. There are some expressions used therein, however,
which may be misleading in view of other decisions of this court, and it is to
that situation that I desire to call attention.
The court, in comparing an assignment of error providing that “the Court of
First Instance of this city erred in rendering the judgment appealed from, for
it is contrary to law and the weight of the evidence” with a demurrer to a
complaint upon the ground “that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action,” makes the observation that “nothing could be more
irreducible than a statement that the complaint does not state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action, without limiting the extent of, the inquiry.”
The purpose of the court in making this comparison is to demonstrate that the
allegation that a judgment is contrary to law and the weight of the evidence is
a reducible statement, that is, a statement so general that it means nothing and
points put no error of which the appellate court can take notice; whereas the
statement that a complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action is a statement so specific and direct and points out so clearly the
error in the complaint as to be entirely irreducible; that is, by no language
could, the error in the complaint be more specifically pointed out or attention
more directly and definitely called thereto.
I take exception to the statement with. regard to the irreducibility of the
allegation that a complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action and support my contention in the decision of this court in the
case of Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico (24 Phil. Rep., 504).
In that case one of the questions presented to and resolved by the court
arose upon the sufficiency of a demurrer which simply alleged that the complaint
did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; and, far from
holding that said statement was an irreducible statement and was so definite and
certain, and so direct in calling the attention of the court to the error
charged, that it could not be improved on in that regard, this court held
precisely the contrary, namely, that a demurrer containing such a statement was
so general and indefinite and failed so completely to comply with the express
provisions of section 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that it was a defective
demurrer for that reason and, if objected to upon that ground, could
not be held to have raised any question as to the sufficiency of the complaint.
The court laid down the doctrine in that case that, when a defendant demurred to
a complaint upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action, he must point out the precise objection to which he alluded
and state specifically wherein the complaint failed to state a cause of
action.
In discussing that question we said: “A demurrer * * * should not leave the
court and the party against whose pleading it is aimed as ignorant of the defect
in the offending pleading as before the demurrer is filed. Many times the
objection that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action means very little. There are occasions, of course, when it is
sufficient. But it is certain that no injury can ever result from naming the
precise reason why the complaint does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action; and, in the great majority of cases, great good
will come of it.”
And further on in the decision the court also said:
“When a demurrer is made to a complaint, whether upon one ground or another,
it should set out distinctly the grounds upon which the objection is based. It
cannot be couched simply in the language of the code. It must set-forth
distinctly the grounds upon which that language is founded. The reason for. this
is plain. It is not fair to the plaintiff to interpose to a complaint the simple
objection that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action. Neither is it fair to the court. Neither the plaintiff nor the court
should be left to make, possibly, a long and tiresome examination and
investigation and then, perhaps, finally be compelled to guess. The grounds of
the objection should be pointed out so that all may see. A demurrer was not
invented to make useless work for a court, or to deceive or delude a plaintiff.
Its purpose was to clarify all ambiguities; to make certain all indefinite
assertions ; to bring the plaintiff to a clear and clean expression of the
precise grievance which he has against the defendant; to aid in arriving at a
real issue between the parties; to promote understanding and prevent surprise.
To that end, a demurrer should specify, for the benefit of the plaintiff and the
court as well, the very weakness which the demurrant believes he sees in the
complaint. It should be so presented and handled as to bring to a quick
determination the question whether the plaintiff has, at bottom, a legal claim
against the defendant. To attain this object, the demurrer should be clear,
specific, definite, and certain as to the precise weakness of the complaint.
Being an instrument to cure imperfections, it should not itself be
imperfect.“To the complaint before us a demurrer was interposed, stating merely that
the complaint did not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
No particular ground was specified. No specific failure was asserted or named.
No precise weakness was pointed out. The order overruling the demurrer does not
indicate that the court was informed as to the specific grounds upon which it
was based. Certainly, so far as the record goes, the plaintiffs never knew until
after the demurrer was decided precisely what the defendant was driving at when
he presented it.”
The court says that the statement that a complaint does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action is so definite, direct and clear that
it cannot be made more so “without limiting the extent of ‘the inquiry.” The
“extent of the inquiry” in such a case is to determine whether the complaint
states a cause of action or not; and it in no wise limits the extent of the
inquiry for the demurrant to point out where and in what particular the
complaint fails to state a cause of action. Precisely the same inquiry exists in
one case as in the other. The inquiry always is: Does the complaint state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action ? And that inquiry is not limited by
requiring the demurrant to point out the particular ground upon which he makes
the allegation.
The statement quoted is not necessary to a decision of the case at bar, and I
would not refer to it except that it might cause confusion in the mind of the
bench or the bar in such a way as to weaken the doctrine laid down in the case
above cited. With modification in this respect, I would not hesitate to concur
fully in the decision as written.
DISSENTING
JOHNSON, J.
From an examination of the record, I fail to find any sound reason for not
requiring the appellant to comply, with Rules 19 and 20 of this court, as we
have done in other cases. (Paterno vs. City of Manila, 17 Phil. Rep.,
26; Santiago vs. Felix, 24 Phil. Rep., 378.)
In the case of Paterno vs. City of Manila (supra), this
court said: “The rules of this court are few and simple. They have been
promulgated for several years, and every practicing attorney should be familiar
with them. They are the laws of the court and must be obeyed until
repealed, unless it can be shown that they are in conflict with the laws of the
United States or the Philippine Islands.”
In the case of Santiago vs. Felix (supra), this court said:
“It is an established rule of this court, uniformly applied in many
cases, that if the appellant fails to make an assignment of errors and
merely confines himself to a discussion of facts in general, this court can not
disturb the adverse finding of the trial court alleged to be contrary to law and
the weight of the evidence; it is necessary that the appellant point out
specifically the alleged error or errors in the judgment appealed
from.”
As was said in the case of Paterno vs. City of Manila:
“The rules of this court are few and simple. They have been promulgated for
several years and every practicing attorney should be familiar with them.” Said
Rule 19 requires an assignment of errors by the appellant; it requires that
there shall be prefixed to the brief of the appellant an assignment of errors
intended to be urged; that each assignment of error shall be separately,
distinctly and concisely stated, without repetition. Said rule or requirement
follows practically the rule of the Supreme Court of the United States. The
purpose of the rule, as has been repeatedly stated by the Supreme Court of the
United States, is to enable a busy court and the opposing counsel to see on what
points opposing counsel intend to ask a reversal of the judgment, and for the
further, and perhaps just as important a reason, to limit the discussion of the
parties on the appeal to particular points, either of fact or of law. (Philipps
vs. Seymour, 91 U. S., 646.) See also the following cases in which the
Supreme Court of the United States dismissed the appeals for the reason that the
appellants failed to make an assignment of error, in accordance with the rules;
Treat vs. Jemison (20 Wall., 652); Maxwell vs. Stewart (21
Wall., 71); Gumbel vs. Pitkin (113 U. S., 545); Dugger vs.
Tayloe (121 U. S., 286); Benites vs. Hampton (123 IL S., 519); Rowe
vs. Phelps (152 U. S., 87).
I suppose that in each argument by each appellant there might be found, upon
reading it, the particular error of which he complains. Courts, however, should
not be required to read the arguments of appellants for the purpose of sifting
out the particular error upon which they rely, especially when there have been
established a “few and simple” rules for the purpose of facilitating the work of
the courts, as well as of counsel.
I see no reason why the motion of the appellee in the present case should not
have been granted, at least to the extent of requiring the appellant to make a
special assignment or assignments of error upon which he expected to ask the
court to reverse the judgment appealed from.