SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA AND NORTH LUZON MAGNOLIA SALES LABOR UNION-INDEPENDENT, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) prays that the Resolution
dated March 19, 1991 and the Order dated April 12, 1991 of public respondent
Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma declaring respondent union as the sole
and exclusive bargaining agent of all the Magnolia sales personnel in northern
Luzon be set aside for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and/or with
grave abuse of discretion.

On June 4, 1990, the North Luzon Magnolia Sales Labor Union
(respondent union for brevity) filed with the Department of Labor a petition
for certification election among all the regular sales personnel of Magnolia
Dairy Products in the North Luzon Sales Area.^[1]

Petitioner opposed the petition and questioned the
appropriateness of the bargaining unit sought to be represented by respondent
union. It claimed that its bargaining
history in its sales offices, plants and warehouses is to have a separate
bargaining unit for each
sales office.

The petition was heard on November 9, 1990 with petitioner being
represented by Atty. Alvin C. Batalla of the Siguion Reyna law office. Atty. Batalla withdrew petitioner’s
opposition to a certification election and agreed to consider all the
sales offices in northern Luzon as one bargaining unit. At the pre­-election conference, the
parties agreed, inter alia, on the date, time and place of the
consent election. Respondent union won
the election held on November 24, 1990. In an Order dated December 3, 1990,^[2] Mediator-Arbiter Benalfre J. Galang
certified respondent union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all
the regular sales personnel in all the sales offices of Magnolia Dairy Products
in the North Luzon Sales Area.

Petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor. It claimed that Atty. Batalla was only
authorized to agree to the holding of certification elections subject to the
following conditions: (1) there would
only be one general election; (2) in this general election, the
individual sales offices shall still comprise separate bargaining units.^[3]

In a Resolution dated March 19, 1991,^[4]
public respondent, by authority of the Secretary of Labor, denied SMC’s appeal
and affirmed the Order of the Med­-Arbiter.

Hence this petition for certiorari.

Petitioner claims that:

THE HONORABLE UNDERSECRETARY LAGUESMA ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE IGNORED AND TOTALLY DISREGARDED
PETITIONER’S VALID AND JUSTIFIABLE GROUNDS WHY THE ERROR MADE IN GOOD FAITH BY
PETITIONER’S COUNSEL BE CORRECTED, AND INSTEAD RULED:

A

THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS “THE SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING AGENT FOR
ALL THE REGULAR SALES OFFICES OF MAGNOLIA DAIRY PRODUCTS, NORTH LUZON SALES
AREA”, COMPLETELY IGNORING THE ESTABLISHED BARGAINING HISTORY OF
PETITIONER SMC.

B

THAT PETITIONER IS ESTOPPED FROM
QUESTIONING THE “AGREEMENT” ENTERED INTO AT THE HEARING ON 9 NOVEMBER
1990, IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE ESTABLISHED FACTS OF THE CASE AND THE APPLICABLE
LAW ON THE MATTER.

We find no merit in
the petition.

The issues for resolution are: (1) whether or not respondent union represents an appropriate bargaining
unit, and (2) whether or not petitioner is bound by its lawyer’s act of
agreeing to consider the sales personnel
in the north Luzon sales area as one bargaining unit.

Petitioner claims that in issuing the impugned Orders, public
respondent disregarded its collective bargaining history which is to have a separate
bargaining unit for each sales office. It
insists that its prior collective bargaining history is the most
persuasive criterion in determining the appropriateness of the
collective bargaining unit.

There is no merit in the contention.

A bargaining
unit is a “group of employees of a
given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best
suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the
law.”^[5]

The fundamental factors in determining the appropriate collective
bargaining unit are: (1) the will of
the employees (Globe Doctrine);^[6]
(2) affinity and unity of the employees’ interest, such as substantial
similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions
(Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history;
and (4) similarity of employment status.^[7]

Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this Court has categorically
ruled that the existence of a prior collective bargaining history is neither
decisive nor conclusive in the determination of what constitutes an
appropriate bargaining unit.^[8]

Indeed, the test of grouping is mutuality or commonality of
interests. The employees sought
to be represented by the collective bargaining agent must have substantial
mutual interests in terms of employment
and working conditions as evinced by the type of work they perform.

In the case at bench, respondent union sought to represent the
sales personnel in the various Magnolia sales offices in northern Luzon. There is
similarity of employment status for only the regular sales personnel in
the north Luzon area are covered. They
have the same duties and responsibilities and substantially similar
compensation and working conditions. The commonality of interest among the sales personnel in the north Luzon
sales area cannot be gainsaid. In fact,
in the certification election held on November 24, 1990, the employees
concerned accepted respondent union as their exclusive bargaining agent. Clearly, they have expressed their desire to
be one.

Petitioner cannot insist that each of the sales office of
Magnolia should constitute only one bargaining unit. What greatly militates against this position is the meager
number of sales personnel in each of the Magnolia sales office in northern
Luzon. Even the bargaining unit
sought to be represented by respondent union in the entire north Luzon sales
area consists only of approximately fifty-five (55) employees.^[9]
Surely, it would not be for the best interest of these employees if they would
further be fractionalized. The adage
“there is strength in
number” is the very rationale underlying the formation of a labor union.

Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that Atty. Batalla was
merely a substitute lawyer for
Atty. Christine Ona, who got stranded in Legaspi City. Atty. Batalla was allegedly unfamiliar with the collective bargaining history
of its establishment. Petitioner claims
it should not be bound by the mistake committed by its substitute lawyer.

We are not persuaded. As
discussed earlier, the collective bargaining history of a company is not
decisive of what should comprise the collective bargaining unit. Insofar as the alleged “mistake” of the substitute lawyer is
concerned, we find that this mistake was the direct result of the negligence of
petitioner’s lawyers. It will be noted
that Atty. Ona was under the supervision of two (2) other lawyers, Attys.
Jacinto de la Rosa, Jr. and
George C. Nograles. There is nothing in the records to show that
these two (2) counsels were likewise unavailable at that time. Instead of deferring the hearing,
petitioner’s counsels chose to proceed therewith. Indeed, prudence dictates that, in such case, the lawyers allegedly
actively involved in SMC’s labor case should have adequately and sufficiently
briefed the substitute lawyer with respect to the matters involved in the case and the specific limits of his
authority. Unfortunately, this
was not done in this case. The
negligence of its lawyers binds petitioner. As held by this Court in the
case of Villa Rhecar Bus v. De la Cruz:^[10]

“x x x As a general rule, a client is bound by the mistakes of
his counsel. Only when the application
of the general rule would result in serious injustice should an
exception thereto be called for.”

In the case at bench, petitioner insists that each of the sales
offices in northern Luzon should be considered as a separate bargaining unit
for negotiations would be more expeditious. Petitioner obviously chooses to follow the path of least
resistance. It is not, however, the
convenience of the employer that constitutes the determinative factor in
forming an appropriate bargaining unit. Equally, if not more important, is the interest of the employees. In choosing and crafting an appropriate
bargaining unit, extreme care should be taken to prevent an employer from
having any undue advantage over the employees’ bargaining representative. Our workers are weak enough and it is not
our social policy to further debilitate their bargaining representative.

In sum, we find that no arbitrariness or grave abuse of
discretion can be attributed to public respondent’s certification of respondent
union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the regular Magnolia
sales personnel of the north Luzon sales area.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the challenged Resolution
and Order of public respondent are hereby AFFIRMED
in toto, there being no
showing of grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Regalado, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., no part.

^[1]
The Magnolia North Luzon Sales Area covers San Fernando, Pampanga, Cabanatuan
City, Olongapo City, Poro Point, La Union, Baguio City, Dagupan City, Laoag
City and Ilagan, Isabela.

^[2]
Annex “K”, Petition, Rollo, pp. 94-97.

^[3]
See Appeal, Annex “L”, Petition, Rollo, pp. 98-103, at p. 101.

^[4]
Annex “A”, Petition, Rollo, pp. 30-36.

^[5]
U.P. v. Ferrer-Calleja, G.R. No. 96189, July 14, 1992, 211 SCRA 451;
Belyca Corporation v. Ferrer-Calleja, G.R. No. L-77395, November 29,
1988, 168 SCRA 184; both cases citing Rothenberg
in Labor Relations, at p. 482.

^[6]
Mechanical Department Labor Union Sa Philippine National Railways v.
Court of Industrial Relations, No. L-28223, August 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 925.

^[7]
Rothenberg on Labor Relations, pp. 482-510.

^[8]
Free Trade Unions v. Mainit Lumber Development Company Workers Union,
G.R. No. 79526, December 21, 1990, 192 SCRA 598.

^[9]
See Petition for Certification Election, Annex “C”, Petition, Rollo,
at p. 39.

^[10]
No. L-78936, January 7, 1988, 157 SCRA 13.