ARTILE GARBO AND ALMABELLA GARDOSE, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 21, MAMBUSAO, CAPIZ AND ERLINDA ARTUZ, RESPOND…

The sisters Artile Garbo and Almabella Gardose are public school
teachers of San Nicolas Elementary School at Tapaz, Capiz. As the petitioners herein, they seek to avail themselves of the
benefits of probation, that have been denied to them by the Court of Appeals in
its various appealed resolutions.

The duo were charged with, and convicted for, direct assault and were
both sentenced by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 937 “to (undergo) an indeterminate
penalty of (imprisonment for) One (1) Year and One (1) Day, as minimum,
to Three (3) Years, Six (6)
Months and Twenty One (21) Days, as maximum,
and to pay a fine of P1,000 each xxx.”^[1]

On appeal by the petitioners, docketed as CA-G.R. CR 03109, the
Court of Appeals affirmed on 01 June 1988 the conviction but modified the
sentence by additionally imposing subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency,
for the P1,000 fine. (This decision^[2]
has since become final and executory).

On 05 July 1988, the petitioners applied for probation, which the
RTC granted in its order^[3] of 22
December 1988. The petitioners each
paid the P1,000 fine.

The private respondent, Erlinda Artuz, the complainant in the
criminal charge and a co-teacher of the petitioners, moved for the
reconsideration of the RTC’s order granting probation to the petitioners. Having been denied in an order, dated 19
April 1989, the private respondent petitioned the Court of Appeals, this time docketed as CA-G.R. 17647,
to annul the RTC’s above stated orders. On 31 January 1990, the Court of Appeals ruled:

“WHEREFORE, certiorari for annulment of the challenged
orders, dated December 22, 1988 and April 19, 1989, respectively, in so far as
they granted probation to private respondent Almabella Gardose, is DENIED;
however, the annulment of that part of the same orders granting probation to
private respondent Artile Garbo is GRANTED; although execution of her sentence
in Criminal Case No. 1558 is now moot since she has paid the fine. Costs against petitioner.”^[4]

Parenthetically, Criminal Case No. 1558,
referred to in the above quoted dispositive portion, was another criminal case
where petitioner Garbo was convicted of grave oral defamation (that arose out
of the same incident subject matter of RTC Criminal Case No. 937) and sentenced
to pay a fine of P200 which she paid.

In CA-G.R. No. CR 03109, the private respondent filed on 07
February 1991 a motion to clarify whether or not, under the decision (of the
Court of Appeals) of 01 June 1988, the petitioners would be subject to the
prison term aside from the subsidiary imprisonment. The appellate court, in its resolution^[5],
dated 11 March 1991, said that there was nothing to clarify since its decision
was clear, and it thereby ordered its execution; viz:

“WHEREFORE, the Honorable Julius L. Abela, presiding judge of
Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court of Capiz, is hereby directed to execute
within ten (10) days from notice hereof the decision in Criminal Case No. 937
as affirmed by this Court on June 1, 1988 and herein clarified.”

The events that followed have been summarized well by the
Solicitor General, which we here adopt; viz:

“On March 26, 1991, petitioners filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of the above
resolution claiming that they were already under probation in respect to the
penalty of imprisonment and that they had already paid the fine imposed.

“On April 22, 1991, however, without waiting for the
resolution on their urgent motion, petitioners filed with this x x x Court a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of
Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order wherein they prayed, among other
things, that the Resolution dated March 11, 1991 of the Court of Appeals
clarifying its decision be declared null and void.

“On April 29, 1991, this x x x Court dismissed the petition
for certiorari for failure, among other (things), to comply with
Memorandum Circular No. 1-88. Thereafter, petitioners on May 10, 1991 went through the motion of
“withdrawing” the already dismissed petition.

“On May 13, 1991, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution holding that since petitioners
had filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration is
deemed abandoned and withdrawn.

“On May 22, 1991, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Court of Appeals May 13, 1991 resolution holding that
the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration was considered abandoned and withdrawn.

“On May 24, 1991, petitioners filed an amended motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
dated June 14, 1991 on two grounds: first, when petitioners filed their motion to withdraw their petition
for certiorari and prohibition before this x x x Court, the Court had
already dismissed the petition, hence there was nothing to withdraw; and
second, the Amended Motion for Reconsideration dated May 24, 1991 was actually
a second motion for reconsideration prohibited by the Rules of Court.

“In the meantime, on June 6, 1991, the RTC denied petitioners’
motion to hold in abeyance the promulgation of decision, stating:

‘The motion to hold in abeyance the promulgation of decision, is
hereby DENIED.

‘The decision of this case is already final as per resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated March 11, 1991, directing the execution of the
decision within ten (10) days from notice hereof; and this Court has not
received any restraining order from the Supreme Court.’

“On June 21, 1991, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration alleging that the Resolution dated March 11, 1991 of the Court
of Appeals was not a final order but merely interlocutory hence, did not become
final.

“The motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
dated June 28, 1991 which states:

‘The motion for reconsideration filed by the accused praying for
the reconsideration of the resolution of this Court dated May 24, 1991, is
DENIED not only because it is a prohibited motion, it being a third motion for
reconsideration, but also because it is not meritorious.'”

The instant petition for certiorari now seeks to annul the
resolutions of 11 March 1991, 13 May 1991, 14 June 1991 and 28 June 1991 of the
Court of Appeals, and to rescind the warrant of arrest, dated 11 June 1991,
issued by the RTC. In our resolution of
15 July 1991, we issued the temporary restraining order prayed for.^[6]

From the foregoing factual and case settings, it is clear that the
grant of probation in favor of petitioner Almabella Gardose can no longer be
questioned. When applied for by the
herein petitioners, the RTC, in its order of 22 December 1988 has said:

“Considering finally, that the reasons manifested in the Post
Sentence Investigation submitted to this Court by reason of this case by
aforesaid Lourdes M. Bacalangco, PSI of the Probation Administration Office for
the Province of Capiz and the City of Roxas, duly approved by the Probation
Officer, Vicente V. Diaz, to be well grounded, the petition for Probation
subject hereof is hereby granted.

“Petitioner-accused, Artile Garbo and Almabella Gardose, are
hereby granted probation. That by
reason of the granting of probation to the petitioners, the Motion for
Promulgation of Decision personally filed by private complainant Erlinda Artuz,
on December 20, 1988, is hereby denied.”

The above order, when appealed (CA-G.R. 17647), was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in its decision of 31 January 1990 insofar as petitioner
Gardose is concerned but the part which granted probation to petitioner Artile
Garbo was annulled in this wise:

“However, petitioner also faults respondent judge with having
granted probation to private respondent Artile Garbo despite the fact that she
was disqualified from the benefits of probation, because, convicted of grave
oral defamation in Criminal Case No. 1558 by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Dumalag-Tapaz, Capiz, she had been sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00, which
she paid on April 1, 1986.

Again, the non-applicability of PD 1990 is invoked in behalf of
said respondent Garbo in support of the proposition that she was not
disqualified from the benefits of probation, as claimed by petitioner, with the
argument that under PD 968 one was disqualified
only if the person was sentenced to a fine of “not more than P200.00”
while under PD 1990 it is “not less than P200.00.” In the case of
respondent Garbo, it is urged that
since the fine imposed on her was P200.00, this amount was certainly not
more than P200.00. Of course, such a
contention is absurd: for it can also
be said that her fine was “not less than P200.00.”

Be that as it may, but in this matter of disqualification, it is of
no moment whether the sentence of said respondent Garbo was handed down, and
service thereof by her was satisfied, before or after the effectivity of PD
1990; or whether the fine imposed on her was not more or not less
than P200.00. What is decisive is that
she had already served her sentence of fine by paying it at the time she
applied for probation which, as stated above, was granted by respondent Judge
in his said challenged order.

Respondent Garbo applied for probation on July 5, 1988, after PD
1990, amending PD 968, had taken effect. Section 4 of PD 968, as amended by PD 1990 provides that “Probation
may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine
only.” and Section 9 thereof provides that the benefits of probation shall
not be extended to those “who are already serving sentence at the time the
substantive provisions of this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33
thereof.” Section 33 simply provides that “That Decree shall take
effect upon its approval: Provided,
however, That the application of its substantive provisions concerning the
grant of probation shall only take effect on January 3, 1978.”

Clearly, respondent Garbo was one of those disqualified from the
benefits of probation at the time she filed her application therefor.”

This order of the appellate court became
final. The subsequent order, dated 11
March 1991, therefore, of the same court in CA-G.R. CR 03109, directing the
execution of the decision in Criminal Case No. 937 did not prejudice and did
not have the effect of nullifying the previous final order granting petitioner
Gardose’s application for probation. Evidently, a decision or an order that has become final and executory
can no longer be disturbed.^[7] The
confusion would not have likely occurred had the appellate court’s attention
been invited to its decision of 31 January 1990 in CA G.R. No. 17647.

Petitioner Artile Garbo is likewise concluded by the final and
executory decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 17647, nullifying the
grant of probation to her. We take note
of the fact that while the denial of her probation had been decided by the
Court of Appeals on 31 January 1990 in CA-G.R. 17647, the motion to clarify the
same court’s judgment in CA­-G.R. CR 03109 was only filed on 07 February 1991,
where the probation question, strangely enough, was again brought up. We do not see any cogent or compelling
reason to allow the same issue to be opened anew either before the appellate
court below or in the instant petition. As a settled rule, once a judgment or an order has become final, the
issues therein should be laid to rest.^[8] The
reason is grounded on the fundamental considerations of public policy and sound
practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgments or orders of
courts must become final at some definite date fixed by law.^[9]
So, too, the judgment of conviction in Regional Trial Court Criminal Case No.
937 and CA-G.R. CR 03109 has long become final and executory but which is yet to be implemented because of the
legal maneuvers extensively pursued by the parties, the private respondent not
excluded, that, wittingly or unwittingly, have stayed it to this day.

WHEREFORE, the appealed resolutions, dated 11 March 1991,
13 May 1991, 14 June 1991, and 28 June 1991 of the Court of Appeals are hereby
AFFIRMED as regards the petitioner Artile Garbo, and the same are SET ASIDE
insofar as petitioner Almabella Gardose is concerned. The warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court dated 11 June 1991
for the arrest of Almabella Gardose is hereby DISSOLVED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, Romero, and Melo,
JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., (Chairman),
on leave.

^[1]
Rollo, 22.

^[2]
Penned by Justice Ricardo Pronove, Jr., concurred in by Justices Florenciana Castro Bartolome and Bonifacio
Cacdac, Jr. (Sixth Division); Rollo, 20-­27.

^[3]
Rollo, 28-29.

^[4]
Penned by Justice Jesus Elbinias, concurred in by Antonio Martinez and Minerva
Reyes (Former Fifth Division); Rollo, 32-38.

^[5]
Rollo, 46-48.

^[6]
Rollo, 71-73.

^[7]
F. David Enterprises v. Insular Bank of Asia and America, G.R. No.
78714, 191 SCRA 516 /1990/.

^[8]
Enriquez v. CA, G.R. No.
83720, 202 SCRA 487/1991/.

^[9]
Turqueza v. Hernando, G.R. No. L-51626, 97 SCRA
483/1980/.