UNIVERSITY PHYSICIANS SERVICES, INC., PAOLO C. CAMPOS AND CESAR L. BARZAGA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND JOCELYN PORMENTIRA, RESPONDENTS.

Submitted for resolution
before this Court is the question of which of the two cases, one for damages and
one for ejectment, filed in two different courts involving the same parties and
subject matter shall take precedence over the other. And if it be the ejectment proceedings, whether the action for
damages should be dismissed.

On March 2, 1990,
petitioner University Physicians’ Services Incorporated (UPSI) purchased two
(2) parcels of land, within the block of the Emilio Aguinaldo College in
Manila, from “VF” Development Corporation. Constructed on one of these lots is the Victoria Apartment,
consisting of four (4) floors, and one unit on the ground floor of said
apartment building is occupied by private respondent Jocelyn Pormentira.

On March 5, 1990, UPSI
sent demand letters to the tenants of said apartment to vacate the same within
60 days from receipt thereof or up to May 4, 1990.

All the tenants/occupants
vacated except private respondent who refused to vacate her apartment unit
despite the lapse of the 60-day period. On May 7, 1990, petitioner commenced the demolition of the apartment in
preparation for the construction of additional classrooms for the Emilio
Aguinaldo College being operated by petitioner corporation.

Claiming that the
demolition was unlawful, private respondent, on May 22, 1990, filed a complaint
for damages with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch IX, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53147.

On May 24, 1990,
petitioners were served with summons and copies of the complaint and the
temporary restraining order issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch IX. On the same day, petitioner corporation
filed a complaint for ejectment against private respondent before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch XX docketed as Civil Case No. 132418. Thereafter, petitioners moved to dismiss the
complaint of private respondent with claim for damages in Civil Case No.
90-53147 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and litis
pendentia.

On June 1, 1990,
respondent’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction was granted and
petitioners were ordered to desist from proceeding with the demolition of the
apartment unit occupied by private respondent.

On July 30, 1990, the
trial court denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and further ordered them to reinstall
the electrical and water connections pertaining to private respondent’s
apartment unit, to wit:

“WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is denied for lack of
merit. The defendants on the other hand
are ordered to re-install the water and electrical connections appertaining to
the premises of the plaintiff or otherwise allow the latter electrical and
water connections to give her (sic) same supply before the incident occurred.

“SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, pp. 101-102)

On appeal, respondent
court affirmed the order of the trial court stating that:

“x x x We believe the respondent court did not err when it
acquired jurisdiction over the nature of the action. Evidently, the private respondent did not file the action for
damages before the respondent court simply because she wanted to remain in the
premises she presently occupied. As can
be deduced from the whole context of her pleading, she precisely filed said
complaint with the end in view of seeking for indemnity as a result of the
irreparable damages she sustained when the petitioners, without court order or
proper permit demolished the Victoria Apartment which included Unit 1166 where
she was occupying.” (Rollo, p. 103)

Reconsideration sought by
petitioner was denied by respondent court, hence, this recourse.

Petitioners contend that
the action for damages filed by private respondent before the Regional Trial
Court should be dismissed, the issue being anchored on the question of
possession and must therefore give way to the ejectment suit duly filed before
the metropolitan trial court.

In ejectment cases, the
only issue to be resolved therein is the question as to who is entitled to the
physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto (De Luna vs. CA, 212 SCRA 276 [1992]). It has for its purpose the restoration to the aggrieved party the
possession of the premises from which he had been forcibly ejected or which had
been detained from him. This relief is
available to a landlord, vendor, or vendee or any party after the detainer’s
right to hold possession of the subject property, by virtue of a contract
express or implied, has expired or has been otherwise terminated (Lim Keh Tong,
Inc. vs. CA, 195 SCRA 398 [1991]).

Private respondent cannot
deny that the complaint for damages, taken in its full context, was meant to
prevent petitioners from ejecting her from Unit No. 1166 of the Victoria
Apartment. Indeed, a careful
examination of the complaint reveals that it demanded, as private respondent’s
main relief, that petitioners be permanently enjoined from doing any act to
force out and/or cause her ejectment from said apartment unit.

Private respondent’s
complaint for damages bears unmistakable earmarks that show off its true nature
and character touching as it does, on her alleged right to continued possession
of the premises. As may be observed from
the following averments in her
complaint:

“8. That the
demolition and/or breaking down of the units x x x they had both acted
unlawfully and with a scheme to prejudice herein plaintiff for not having
vacated the premises.

x x x

“11. That the
illegal and unjustifiable acts and maneuvers being done by defendants and even
at this time that the alleged acquisition of the Victoria Apartment (sic) has
not been clarified and has wrought (sic) most prejudicial consequences on the
part of herein plaintiff and family, considering that she is a professor and
with her children living and/or residing in said Apartment Unit No. 1166
and defendants despite having been temporarily stopped in their said illegal
acts are threatening to proceed again on the demolition of the said apartment
unit to force the herein plaintiff to vacate and leave the place x x x;

“WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and invoking the sound
discretion of this Hon. Court, it is most respectfully prayed that:

“a) Pending determination of this case, a
temporary restraining order be immediately issue (sic) against all defendants x
x x with any act as to force out and/or cause the ejectment of the herein plaintiff
from said unit x x x.” (Rollo, pp. 31-33; underscoring supplied)

Though not couched in
specific terms, private respondent is virtually asking for an indefinite
extension of the lease over the disputed premises. Admittedly, and while private respondent claims indemnity for
what she perceived were wrongful or illegal acts committed by petitioners, it
is nevertheless indisputable that the pivotal issue presented by the complaint
involves the determination of her right, or the lack of it, to possess the
subject property. It follows,
therefore, that the damages allegedly suffered by private respondent is merely
an incident to the question of possession which is the very issue disputed by
the parties.

Section 33 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended,
is explicit regarding jurisdiction over ejectment cases, thus:

“Sec. 33. Jurisdiction
of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Civil Cases?Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

x x x

“2) Exclusive
original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: x x x”

In Pardo vs.
Encarnacion (22 SCRA 632 [1968]), this
Court ruled:

“At any rate, while the said case before the Court of First
Instance of Cavite appears to be one for specific performance with damages, it
cannot be denied that the real issue between the parties is whether or not the
lessee should be allowed to continue occupying the land as lessee.

“The situation is not novel to Us.

“It has been settled in a number of cases that the right of a
lessee to occupy the land leased as against the demand of the lessor should be
decided under Rule 70 (formerly Rule 72) of the Rules of Court.

“There is no merit in the contention that the lessee’s
supposed right to renewal of the lease contract can not be decided in the
ejectment suit. In the case of Teodoro
vs. Mirasol, this Court held that ‘if the plaintiff has any right to the
extension of the lease at all, such right is a proper and legitimate issue that
could be raised in the unlawful detainer case because it may be used as a
defense to the action.’ In other words, the matter raised in the Court of First
Instance of Cavite may be threshed out in the ejectment suit, in consonance
with the principle prohibiting multiplicity of suits. And the mere fact that the unlawful detainer-ejectment case was
filed later, would not change the situation to depart from the application of
the foregoing ruling.

“It is to be noted that the Rules do not require as a ground
for dismissal of a complaint that there is a prior pending action. They provide that there is a pending action,
not a pending prior action.

“The fact that the unlawful detainer suit was of a later date
is no bar to the dismissal of the present action (Teodoro vs. Mirasol, 99 Phil.
150 [1956]).”

The issue of whether
private respondent had the right to occupy subject apartment unit should
therefore be properly threshed out in an ejectment suit and not in an action
for damages where the question of possession is likewise the primary issue to
be resolved.

We cannot simply ignore
the fact that private respondent, after her unjustified refusal to vacate the
premises, was aware that an ejectment case against her was forthcoming. It is therefore evident that the filing of
the complaint for damages and preliminary injunction was but a canny and
preemptive maneuver intended to block the action for ejectment which petitioner
was to take against private respondent.

The matter raised in the Regional Trial Court of Manila may be
properly determined in the ejectment suit before the Metropolitan Trial Court,
in consonance with the rule prohibiting multiplicity of suits. And the mere fact that the unlawful detainer
suit was filed later than the one for damages does not change the situation of
the parties (Rosales vs. CFI, 154 SCRA 153 [1987]).

Unknown to the Court and during the pendency of this case,
however, Metropolitan Trial Court, Br. XX, proceeded to hear the ejectment case
filed by petitioner and on April 3, 1992, rendered judgment against private
respondent.

Appeals subsequently taken by private respondent to the Regional
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals were to no avail.

On February 11, 1994, respondent Pormentira filed a petition
before this Court docketed as GR No. 113101, seeking a review of the decision
of the Court of Appeals in the said ejectment case.

On March 2, 1994, the Court Resolved to deny the petition there
being no reversible error committed by the lower courts (Rollo, p. 92; GR No.
113101). On April 27, 1994, the Court
likewise Resolved to deny Pormentira’s motion for extension of time to file
motion for reconsideration being a prohibited motion pursuant to the Court’s
Resolution of April 7, 1988 (Rollo, p. 96). Thus, Pormentira’s motion for reconsideration dated May 3, 1994 was
denied with finality per Resolution dated May 25, 1994.

The issue of precedence involving an action for damages and
another for ejectment having been rendered moot and academic in GR No. 113101,
it would appear that the case at bar should be dismissed accordingly. On the other hand, records do not disclose
whether the complaint for damages filed by private respondent has been
dismissed, in which case, the petition should be granted.

UPON THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the
instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Br. IX, where Civil Case No. 90-53147 is pending is hereby ordered to DISMISS said case. Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, (Chairman), Romero, Melo, and Vitug, JJ., concur.