TEKNIKA SKILLS AND TRADE SERVICES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HONORABLE ADMI­NISTRATOR OF THE PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINIS­TRATION (POE…

This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court to set aside, for having been rendered with grave
abuse of discretion, the Decision^[1] dated
8 April 1991 and the Resolution, dated 5 June 1991, denying a motion to
reconsider the same, of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
Second Division, in NLRC-NCR-CA-No. 000279.^[2] The
decision affirmed, with modification, the 28 March 1990 ruling of the
respondent Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) in POEA Case
No. (L) 88-04-309^[3]
in favor of complainant (now private
respondent), the dispositive portion of which reads:

“PREMISES CONSIDERED, decision is hereby rendered ordering
respondents, jointly and severally, to pay complainant through this Office, in
Philippine currency at the rate prevailing at the time of payment:

US$600 less SR581 – representing earned salary for two months at
US$300;

US$6,600.00 – representing salary for unexpired portion of the contract per TEP.

SO ORDERED.”

The modification consists of the change of the time for reckoning
the rate of exchange from “time of payment” to “time the
complainant’s cause of action accrued or at the time she was allegedly
dismissed on April 5, 1988.”

The factual and procedural antecedents in this case are
summarized in the challenged decision of the NLRC, to wit:

“Complainant Rosanna de Leon applied as a nursing aide with
herein respondent Teknika Skills and Trade Services. On 10 February 1988, she was deployed to Saudi Arabia by
respondent as a janitress with a salary rate of US$300.00 a month. Upon reaching Riyadh in Saudi Arabia she was
met by an Indian National. She was
later conducted to her final destination in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia where she
worked as a baby sitter at a “social nursery” or a kind of
orphanage. After working for one (1)
month complainant was paid only Five Hundred Eighty-One (SR 581.00) Rials. After barely two (2) months of service,
complainant’s employment was terminated by respondent’s foreign principal. She left Jeddah and arrived in the
Philippines on 5 April 1988.

Aggrieved, she filed the instant complaint on 15 April 1988.

Complainant claims that after working for one (1) month she was
paid only SR581.00 far below her contracted salary rate of US$300.00 which
compelled her to demand from the Arab Officer of the orphanage that her salary
be raised to Three Hundred Dollars (US$300.00) pursuant to her contract of
employment. Shortly, thereafter,
complainant alleges that a certain Mr. Ali told her to pack-up her things and sign a resignation paper otherwise she
will be sent to jail. Fearing just
that, she was forced to do so and was thereby dismissed from the service
without any just and valid cause in violation of law and the provisions of her
contract of employment.

In defense, respondent counters that the dismissal was for cause;
that complainant, albeit single, as represented by her was found positive of
Morning Urine Pregnancy Test conducted in Riyadh (p. 30, Records), a violation of
Saudi Arabia’s strict code on chastity, considered a valid ground for the
termination of her contract; and that the SR 581.00 approximately US $155 was
not given to her as a salary, but merely served as her allowance to cover her
personal needs during her stay in Saudi Arabia. Respondent contends that complainant has no cause of action
against it and therefore prays for the dismissal of the instant case for lack
of merit.

The Administrator below found for complainant expounding that
respondent’s contentions were not duly substantiated and stating:

‘x x x The best evidence could have easily been a copy of the
subject medical certificate and the memorandum to complainant of the company’s
decision on her health condition. The
position paper or answer is empty of documents worth considering for
evidentiary purposes.'”

The POEA further concluded that:

“Besides, if it is true that complainant was found positive
for pregnancy in Riyadh, she would not have been directed to proceed to
Jeddah. She could have been sent back
right from Riyadh. Her stay in Jeddah
for nearly two months belies respondent’s allegation that she was told to stop
working. She ought not to have started
any work if it was really true that she was found pregnant in Riyadh.”

In ruling that complainant was illegally dismissed, the POEA
held:

“The 1-month notice requirement is true to (sic) all workers,
regular or probationary, as the law does not distinguish. Respondent failed to prove it notified
complainant of her would be (sic) termination.”

From the POEA’s decision, the dispositive portion of which was
quoted earlier, petitioner appealed to the NLRC.

It was only during the pendency of this appeal that petitioner
submitted to the NLRC a document purporting to be a copy of the alleged pregnancy
test result, a xerox copy of which is attached to the instant petition as Annex
“E”.^[4]

In its decision promulgated on 8 April 1991, respondent NLRC
dismissed the appeal but modified the decision of the POEA; it held that:

“Nevertheless, We find that not only was the pregnancy test
result submitted for the first time on appeal, which We can not consider
without transgressing upon complainant’s right to due process of law, but that
a cursory perusal thereof indicates that the same was conducted in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia contrary to respondent’s previous allegation that the same was conducted
in Riyadh leading us to safely
presume that the same was secured as an afterthought to support an otherwise
illegal dismissal. It must be pointed
out that respondent knew of the existence
of the case at bar, since the
initial conference hereon on 10 May 1988 and the document in question was
submitted in evidence only on 30 April 1990 or only after the lapse of more or
less two (2) years. Considering the
active business of respondent in Saudi Arabia and considering further the
communication facilities obtaining at present, it would not have been difficult
for respondent to secure the said document, had the same been actually existing
prior to complainant’s dismissal from the service on 5 April 1988.

Respondent’s assertion that complainant admitted below of having
been pregnant and of having subjected herself to abortion (sic) is not
supported by the minutes of the proceedings below.

Furthermore, suffice it for us to stress, that respondent must have
by requirements of existing rules subjected complainant to medical examination
before deploying her abroad. Were it
true that complainant was actually pregnant before her departure for Saudi
Arabia, then it follows that respondent did not in full conformity with
existing rules subject complainant to the required medical examination. If respondent had deployed her abroad under
such condition (sic) then it has only itself to blame.”

Hence, the instant petition
which was given due course by this Court after the public respondents, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, and the private respondent separately
filed their Comments thereto and the petitioner filed a Reply to each.

The parties thereafter
submitted their respective Memoranda.

The issue raised in this petition is whether or not grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction was committed
by: (a) the respondent NLRC in issuing
the challenged decision and resolution, and (b) the respondent POEA in issuing
its decision of 28 March 1990. The
petitioner holds the affirmative view and contends that the finding that
private respondent was illegally terminated is contrary to the documentary evidence — the pregnancy test
report — improperly rejected by the NLRC, and the private respondent’s own
admission. It is likewise averred that
the monetary award is unconscionable and unwarranted because it is not prayed
for; and, even granting for the sake of argument that private respondent was
illegally dismissed, she would only be entitled to separation pay equivalent to
one (1) month’s salary.

We decide against the petitioner.

The so-called photocopy of the pregnancy test result was properly
rejected by the NLRC. It was presented
for the first time during the pendency of the appeal before the NLRC. While the complaint was filed by private
respondent on 15 April 1988, petitioner submitted the said photocopy only on 30
April 1990, more than two (2) years later. On the assumption that indeed such a test was conducted, nothing, save
for inexcusable negligence, could justify such unreasonable delay in obtaining
the said photocopy. For, as observed by
the respondent NLRC, considering the petitioner’s active business in Saudi
Arabia and the communication facilities at its disposal, it would not have been
difficult to secure the document had the same actually existed prior to the
private respondent’s dismissal on 5 April 1988. The more compelling reason, however, for the exclusion of the
photocopy is the fact that contrary to petitioner’s representation in the
petition that it is in possession of the
medical report, a copy of which is appended to the
petition as Annex “E”,^[5] what
it really has is an alleged “true copy of the original” certified by someone
purporting to represent the Arabian Gulf Co. (the foreign employer); this
person is neither identified by name nor identifiable by the illegible
signature. An examination of Annex
“E” of the petition further reveals that the same is merely a true copy
of an alleged “Morning Urine For Pregnancy Test” of the Laboratory
Department of the Dr. Hassan A. Ghazzawi Polyclinic of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
purportedly signed by one Dr. Mohanty, M.D. and dated 8 March 1988. Clearly therefore, the petitioner is guilty
of misrepresentation by making it appear that it obtained the actual medical
report and annexed a copy of the same to the petition. Assuming, arguendo, that Annex
“E” is an accurate true copy, such is nevertheless inadmissible in
evidence because it is hearsay; the private respondent had no chance to
cross-examine the persons who procured it, certified that the document is a
true copy, prepared the true copy itself, and, more importantly, the person who
purportedly examined the morning urine. It is a mere scrap of paper.

Besides, it has not been shown by petitioner that a negative
result in a pregnancy test was a prerequisite for employment or that if
the private respondent would get pregnant, her employment would be
terminated. Neither was it proven that
the latter misrepresented that she was not pregnant at the time and that such
misrepresentation, if it existed, amounted to fraud which induced the
petitioner or its foreign principal to hire her, thereby giving them the right
to have the employment contract annulled pursuant to Article 1330, in relation
to Article 1338, of the Civil Code. No
fraud could have been committed by private respondent because firstly, she was
not warned that pregnancy is a ground for the rejection of her application or
annulment of her contract of employment; she was not even asked if she was
pregnant. Secondly, under the Rules of
the POEA existing at the time private respondent applied for employment and
departed for Saudi Arabia, a thorough medical examination, which could easily
belie any disclaimer of pregnancy, was required; it devolved upon the
petitioner to have the private respondent examined only by accredited medical
clinics or hospitals.^[6] The
pregnancy then could not have been a valid basis for unilaterally revoking the
contract before its expiry date.

Neither is there any
reversible error in the monetary awards. The principal cause of action in private respondent’s complaint is
breach of contract of employment for a definite period. Having established her case, which public
respondents correctly sustained, she is entitled to the salary corresponding to
the unexpired portion of her contract.^[7] This is not a simple case of illegal
dismissal of an employee whose employment is without a definite period. Hence, there is no merit in petitioner’s
claim that only separation pay equivalent to one (1) month’s salary for every
year of service should be awarded. Petitioner, as the recruiter and agent of the foreign employer, is solidarily
liable with the latter for such breach and for the corresponding award. Section 1, Rule II, Book II of the POEA
Rules and Regulations then in force provided:

“SECTION 1. Requirements for Issuance of License and
Authority. — Every applicant for license or authority to operate a private
employment agency, private recruitment entity or manning agency shall submit a
written application together with the following requirements:

x x x

d. A verified undertaking
stating that the applicant:

x x x

(3) shall assume
joint and solidary liability with the employer for all claims and liabilities
which may arise in connection with the implementation of the contract of
employment;

x x x

This Court takes this opportunity to stress the need for strict
enforcement of the law and the rules and regulations governing Filipino
contract workers abroad. Many hapless
citizens of this country who have sought foreign employment to earn a few
dollars to ensure for their families a life worthy of human dignity and provide
proper education and a decent future for their children have found themselves
enslaved by foreign masters, harassed or abused and deprived of their
employment for the slightest cause. No
one should be made to unjustly profit from their suffering. Hence, recruiting agencies must not only
faithfully comply with Government-prescribed responsibilities; they must impose
upon themselves the duty, borne out of a social conscience, to help citizens of
this country sent abroad to work for foreign principals. They must keep in mind that this country is
not exporting slaves but human beings, and, above all, fellow Filipinos seeking
merely to improve their lives.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is
DISMISSED with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Romero, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Annex “A” of Petition; Rollo, 20-28.

^[2]
Entitled Rosanna L. de Leon, Complainant-Appellee, vs. Teknika Skills
and Trade Services, Inc., Respondent?Appellant.

^[3]
Annex “C”, Petition, op. cit.; Rollo, op.
cit., 30-35.

^[4]
Rollo, 37.

^[5]
Rollo, 37.

^[6]
Sections 1, 3 and 10, Rule IV, Book VII, POEA Rules and Regulations.

^[7]
Wallem Phil. Shipping, Inc. vs. Minister of Labor, 102 SCRA 835
[1981]. See also Logan vs.
Philippine Acetylene Co., 33 Phil. 177 [1916]; Knust vs. Morse, 41 Phil.
184 [1920].