PIO LABAYEN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. ROSENDO HERNAEZ, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
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Labayen versus Herna-ez
The Case
This is the case of Labayen versus Hernaez, decided by the Supreme Court in December 1902, at the very threshold of the new Code of Civil Procedure. Pio Labayen brought a declaratory action against Rosendo Hernaez, and Hernaez answered with a counterclaim. The trial court, acting on the report of two court-appointed referees, rendered judgment against the plaintiff for 13,498 pesos and 80 cents. The case matters because it fixes a rule every examinee must know: referees may report on facts, but they cannot decide questions of law, and a judgment that rests on their unauthorized legal conclusions is void. It is a case about the limits of a delegated trial.
Procedural History
The complaint was filed under the former law of civil procedure, and the answer with counterclaim was filed under that same law. From that stage onward, however, the trial was conducted under the new Code of Civil Procedure, and it was set for hearing on the sixteenth of April 1902. On that date the parties suggested the appointment of experts to examine the accounts, and the judge ordered their appointment. The parties later substituted one expert, and then another, by agreement accepted by the court. On the fourteenth of June the parties petitioned for the substitution of a resigned expert and defined the referees' duties: they were to report solely upon the facts appearing from the record, in accordance with article 134 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the documents presented to the court. The court issued the commission, and the clerk noted that it was issued under article 136 of the Code. The papers went to the referees on the fourteenth of June and came back on the thirtieth with an account-current and a report. The judge examined the account and the report and, without further proceedings, ordered judgment against the plaintiff for 13,498 pesos and 80 cents, concurring entirely in the report of the referees. The case reached the Supreme Court by appeal from that judgment.
Facts
Labayen sued Hernaez, who counterclaimed. The pleadings were filed under the old law, but the trial proceeded under the new Code of Civil Procedure. Because the dispute turned on accounts, the parties agreed to the appointment of experts, called referees, to examine the records.
The parties themselves defined the referees' task: to report solely upon the facts appearing from the record, in accordance with article 134 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the documents presented to the court. The court issued the commission, and the clerk's note invoked article 136 of the Code.
The referees returned an account-current and a report. In that report, however, they passed upon three questions of law and expressed their opinion on them. The trial judge, without any further proceedings, adopted the report in full and entered judgment against the plaintiff for 13,498 pesos and 80 cents.
Issues
- Whether or not the trial court could validly render judgment upon the report of referees who had been commissioned only to report upon the facts appearing from the record.
- Whether or not the referees' report, which passed upon three questions of law, could serve as the basis of a valid judgment.
- Whether or not the judgment entered in reliance on that report is null and void.
Applicable Provisions
Article 134 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as the parties invoked it, limited the referees to a report on the facts:
The said referees should report solely upon the facts appearing from the record, in accordance with the provisions of article 134 of the Code Civil Procedure, and the documents presented to the court.
This is the provision the parties themselves made the measure of the reference, and it confines the referees to facts, not law.
Article 136 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which the clerk's note invoked when issuing the commission, provides:
I have issued, under the seal of this court, the proper commission to the referees in favor of Messrs. William F. Nicholls and Felix Atienza, in accordance with the provisions of article 136 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
If the referees were acting under article 136, they were bound to comply with it and with the articles that follow it.
The Court also referred to articles 138, 139, and 140 of the Code of Civil Procedure as the provisions that govern a reference of this character:
In this case they should have complied with the provisions of the said article and those of the following articles, Nos. 138, 139, and 140.
These provisions supply the procedure that a referee's report must follow, and none of them, save the issuance of the commission and the collection of fees, was observed.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the trial judge had no authority, either by the consent of the parties or by the provisions of the law, to enter judgment as he did. The will of the parties was that the referees report solely upon the facts appearing from the record and the papers presented to the judge, in accordance with article 134 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
On the second issue, the Court found that the referees, in their report, passed upon three questions of law and expressed their opinion on them. The parties, under article 134, sought nothing more than an agreement as to the facts. If the referees understood that they were acting under article 136, as the clerk's note indicated, they should have complied with that article and with articles 138, 139, and 140. None of this was done, except the issuance of the commissions and the collection of fees. The result, the Court said, was a trial by referees in violation of the provisions of law.
On the third issue, the Court held that this was a substantial defect which vitiates the judgment itself. The judgment entered below was therefore declared null and void.
Doctrine
First, a reference to referees is limited to the terms of the commission and the agreement of the parties. Where the parties agree, under article 134 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that the referees shall report solely upon the facts appearing from the record, the referees cannot decide questions of law. Their legal conclusions are outside their authority.
Second, where referees act under article 136 of the Code of Civil Procedure, they must comply with that article and with articles 138, 139, and 140. A reference conducted without those safeguards is a trial by referees in violation of law.
Third, a judgment rendered upon a report that exceeds the referees' authority rests on a substantial defect and is null and void. Consent of the parties cannot cure the want of authority, for the judge had none either by consent or by law.
Disposition
The Supreme Court declared the judgment of the trial court null and void, without special condemnation as to costs, and directed that the record be returned to the court below.
Remember This
Referees report on facts, never on law; a judgment built on their legal conclusions is void for a substantial defect. Examiners use this case to test the limits of a delegated trial and the effect of a void judgment rendered upon a referee's report.