G.R. No. 100283. August 25, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. LEOPOLDO TAYCO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
PUNO, J.:
In an Information,[1] dated
November 27, 1986, accused LEOPOLDO TAYCO was charged with the crime of RAPE,
allegedly committed as follows:
“That on or about the 13th day of September, 1986, in the
evening, in Barangay Buswang Old, Municipality of Kalibo, Province of Aklan,
Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a knife, with lewd designs and
by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, have carnal knowledge of said JELLY INOCENCIO, against her
will and without her consent, thereby causing upon the latter physical
injuries, as follows:
‘Presence of 3 linear abrasions right,
thigh middle 3rd, medial side.
Presence of redness inner portion of the
left labia minora and region of the fourchet.
Hymenal tear 3:00; 7:00 & 9:00
o’clock positions but no bleeding noted.’
As per Medico-Legal Report on Physical
Injuries signed by Dr. Velvet C. Diangson, Senior Resident Physician of Dr.
Rafael S. Tumbokon Memorial Hospital, Kalibo, Aklan, hereto attached and forming
an integral part hereof.
“That as a result of the criminal acts of the herein accused,
the offended party suffered damages in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00) Pesos.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2393 before the
Regional Trial Court (Branch VII) of Kalibo, Aklan. After his arraignment on July 6, 1987, accused pleaded not guilty[2]
and was tried.
The essential facts, as stated in the assailed trial court
Decision, dated February 28, 1991, are as
follows:
“The offended party Jelly Inocencio was, at the time of the
incident, a 16 year old high school student. She was residing with her parents at Buswang
Old, Kalibo, Aklan. The uncontradicted
facts disclose that in the early evening of September 13, 1986, the accused
Leopoldo Tayco, with his friends Rey Ismael and Jimmy Inisa, arrived at the
girl’s house, bringing (with them) a native drink known as tuba. While they were drinking xxx, they were
entertained by Jelly and her parents Juanito and Sherlita Inocencio, sisters
Joela and Jelsen (sic), and Joela’s common-law husband, Joni Inisa, who was the
(sic) brother of Jimmy. The rest of the
people in the house were small children aged 12 to 3 (years old). xxx. The complainant and her mother testified that Juanito suffered an attack
of asthma, compelling Sherlita to go out to buy medicines. Sherlita said she left the house at 9:00
P.M. Ten minutes after her mother (had) left, Jelly went out of the kitchen
and urinated. She pulled up her pants
and was fastening its hook when she was accosted by the accused with a drawn
knife. He held her left arm and led her
to the coconut grove more than 50 meters away (from their house) and raped
her. The accused then left the scene,
while she proceeded to her grandparents’ house, afraid that Leopoldo and
his companions might still be around. Sherlita returned home at about 11:00 P.M., and saw that Leopoldo and
her daughter Jelly were not in the house. Leopoldo’s companions went home, while she retired for the night. At about 4 o’clock the following morning,
she went to her parents’ house and found Jelly with them. (emphasis ours)
“The accused Leopoldo Tayco testified, on the other hand, that
when he left at 9 PM (sic), Jelly and her mother were still in the sala, while the
father, Juanito, had gone upstairs to take medicines. Leopoldo asked permission to leave from Sherlita, went home
directly, and slept. Rey Ismael
testified that after Leopoldo departed, Jelly and her mother went upstairs,
leaving them in the sala with Joela’s husband Joni. They went home about 30 minutes later but before leaving, Joela
came to them murmuring that Jelly was not in the house. Jimmy Inisa was equivocal. He said that Jelly and her mother were in
the sala when they left, but (when) confronted by (sic) his affidavit, (he)
admitted that Jelly left the sala about 10 minutes after Leopoldo went out, and
(she) did not return. Leopoldo said
that at about midnight, he was awakened by the arrival of Joela and Joni who
were looking for Jelly. He told them that she was not with him.
“The physical examination to which the offended party was
subjected in the morning of September 14, 1986, disclosed incontrovertibly that
a man had a (sic) carnal knowledge of her the night before. Spermatozoa, or male sex cells, were found
in the vagina of the girl (Exh. A). The
doctor who made the examination affirmed that the life span of spermatozoa
inside the vagina can extend up to 36 hours. There is no question that a man had gained access to the offended party
in the night of September 13.”
In the afternoon of September 15, 1986, Sherlita, Juanito, Jelly
and her sister, Joselle, went to the house of Crestito Tayco, elder brother of
the accused. Later, accused and his
parents were summoned to go to Crestito’s house. According to Leopoldo, a confrontation ensued and the parents of
the victim wanted him to marry their daughter, saying: “If you will not marry her, something
will happen to you.”[3] He
refused and denied the accusation of rape. In the afternoon of September 15, 1986, another confrontation took place
in the house of policeman Jimmy Melgar. The victim and her family were there. They were allegedly forcing the accused to marry the victim. Accused, again, demurred.
Pfc. Franklin Pastrana of Kalibo Integrated National Police
investigated the complaint. On
September 20, 1986, he conducted an ocular inspection and found that the sala and the kitchen (where the victim urinated) were separated by a
lawanit (Exhibit “C-3”), about one
and one-half meter wide and eight feet in height.[4] The
clothes worn by the victim the night she was molested, i.e., her soiled
pants and blouse; torn panty;[5] and
the knife[6]
left behind by accused, were submitted to him.
The defense presented witnesses[7] to
show that the victim is of loose moral character. Witness Conrado Tayco testified that the victim and her
boyfriend, a certain Boboy, had coitus in the evening of July 28, 1986.[8]
On October 10, 1986, he also saw Jelly and a certain “Toto” embracing
each other in a cassava farm.[9]
After trial, accused was found guilty of rape. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to pay the
offended party thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00), as civil indemnity, and to
pay the costs. Hence, the appeal.
These are the assigned errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO
THE TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINANT AND IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF
THE CRIME CHARGED.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE CASE WAS FILED TO FORCE THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO MARRY THE COMPLAINANT.
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
In rape cases, trial courts discharge the difficult task of
weighing the testimony of the victim vis-a-vis the testimony of the
accused. We accord great respect, if not
finality, to their findings since they observed the demeanor of witnesses at
the trial and, therefore, could discern better their credibility.[10]
In its assailed decision,[11] the
trial court analyzed the evidence as follows:
“In open Court, the girl pointed to the accused Leopoldo Tayco
as the person who threatened her into submitting to his advances. Again, there is no reason to doubt her
ability to make the identification. She
and the accused definitely knew each other prior to the incident. Contrary to his claim that it was only on
September 13 when he came to know her, his companion Rey Ismael admitted that
he had known her previously (tsn, May 17, 1988, at 20-21). Rizaldo Ismael, a neighbor of the
Inocencios, testified that he had seen Leopoldo several times in August 1986
going to Jelly’s house. The place
where the girl said the aggression was initiated, was outside the kitchen of
the house. There was a lamp in the
kitchen which cast its light to the area. Leopoldo’s companion Jimmy Inisa said that the light xxx was put off
only when he and Rey departed from the house. They were the last to leave. (tsn,
July 5, 1988, at 18-19). The girl
disclosed that the doorway of the kitchen was open, and she was about 4 1/2
meters away from the lamp. (tsn,
December 21, 1987, at 27-28). xxx there
was a toilet some distance away from the house xxx. The girl said that the toilet was about 15 or 20 meters away from
the kitchen (tsn, December 21, 1987, at 29). Considering the setting, and the circumstances of the aggression
which involved the most intimate physical proximity, the offended party would
have no difficulty knowing the identity of her aggressor.
“The Court has searched the records for anything to even
remotely suggest that the offended party had a motive to falsely accuse him of
the offense, and could not find none (sic). The girl was a student, young and unmarried. It is very difficult to believe that she
would have had the resolve and cunning to cry rape, and consequently, expose
herself to public embarrassment and humiliation.” (emphasis ours)
We have carefully examined the records of this case, and we agree
with the foregoing findings of the trial court. The aforequoted findings are fully supported by the evidence
adduced during trial. It is also meet
to note the observation of the trial court on the sincerity of the victim, viz:
“Indeed, the Court finds no reason to doubt the sincerity and
candor of the offended party in bringing this case against the accused. Having observed her deportment, and
manner of testifying and reaction to the often intense and embarrassing
questioning by counsels, we are morally convinced of the truthfulness of the
accusation.” (emphasis ours)
(Decision, February 28, 1991, p. 26)
Even then, accused-appellant points out that there were many
persons in the sala when the victim went to the kitchen to urinate. Hence, when accused-appellant accosted her,
she had the opportunity to call their attention, yet she did not. He also alleges that the knife poking incident
was but a product of the leading question propounded by the prosecution
counsel. He stresses that the victim
did not sustain injuries on her neck. The defense concludes that, since force and intimidation were not
substantiated, accused-appellant should be acquitted. We disagree.
The prosecution had sufficiently established the elements of
force and intimidation. Jelly
testified:
(FISCAL PERALTA)
“Q: Now,
after your mother left to buy medicine for your father, do you know of any
incident that took place in your house?
(JELLY INOCENCIO)
“A: Yes, sir.
“Q: What happened?
“A: I urinated in the kitchen.
“Q: While you were urinating in your kitchen, what happened, if there is
(sic) any?
“A: Leopoldo Tayco went near
me.
“Q: After Leopoldo Tayco went near to (sic) you, what happened next
(sic)?
“A: The accused threatened me using a knife and told me not to shout, or
else he will (sic) kill me.
“Q: After the accused pointed a knife at your neck, did you shout or
not?
“A: No, because I was afraid he might kill me.
“Q: Now, after Leopoldo Tayco pointed a knife at your neck, what else happened?
“A: He dragged me to the
coconut groves.
“Q: Did you not resist when the accused dragged you to the coconut
groves?
“A: No, because he was a man,
and I cannot overpower him.
“x x x x
x x x x x.
“Q: Now, after the accused
dragged you to the coconut groves about more than fifty meters, what happened?
“A: He box(ed) me at the
stomach.
“Q: Now, after the accused box(ed)
you at the stomach, what happened to you?
“A: He pushed me.
“Q: After you were pushed, what
happened next?
“A: He had intercourse with me.”
(TSN, November 20, 1987, pp. 5-7)
In People vs.
Codllla,[12] we
held: “Intimidation must be viewed
in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule; it is, therefore,
enough that it produces fear–fear that if the victim does not yield to the
lecherous demands of the accused, something would happen to her at that moment
or even thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she reports the
incident.”
Consistent with this doctrine, Jelly’s failure to resist, shout or make an outcry does not
necessarily negate the use of force against her. So is it with the
absence of any wound on the victim’s neck. What matters is that accused-appellant threatened the victim with a
knife and, as a result thereof, the latter was petrified by fear. Jelly stifled any protest, fearful that
accused-appellant would kill her if she did. Moreover, it is a settled rule fashioned from the anvils of experience
that there is no standard form
of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling,
and frightful experience.[13] The
variety of human reaction to anecdotes of sexual crimes has yet to be fully
captured by the calculus.
Be that as it may, the victim’s conduct immediately after the
rape throws a light in many of the opaque aspects of the crime. In the case at bench, Jelly sought refuge at her
grandparents’ house after the dastardly act. She did not return home, afraid that her father, who was then ill, would
die if he should learn of her misfortune,[14] not
to mention that Leopoldo’s companions were still in their house when the
incident happened.[15] In
fine, her conduct is consistent with the horrible experience she had just gone
through.
The defense doubts why Jelly’s grandparents did not disclose the
rape to her aunt whose house was only a few meters away from her grandparents’. The defense further avers that it was
unnatural for Sherlita to wait until 4:00 in the morning before looking for her
missing daughter. These arguments
deserve scant consideration. These
incidents occurred after the rape and would not exculpate accused-appellant. Moreover, accused-appellant himself admitted
that at around 12:00 midnight of September 13, 1986, the victim’s sister,
Joela, together with her husband, Joni Inisa, came to his (accused-appellant’s)
house, looking for Jelly.
Accused-appellant also claims that Jelly committed
inconsistencies during the trial. We
have reviewed the transcript of stenographic notes of this case to verify
whether or not the alleged inconsistent testimonies would materially affect the
trial court’s conclusion on the guilt of accused-appellant. They will not.
On direct examination, Jelly
testified that she was urinating
when accused, then armed with a knife, accosted her. He held her right
hand and
dragged her towards the coconut grove some fifty meters away from their house
and, thereafter, boxed her in the stomach. He pushed her
to the ground, pulled her pants and panty, and mounted her. She felt pain as he inserted his penis into
her vagina. After two minutes, accused
dismounted and fled, leaving behind the knife beside her.[16]
She recognized the accused through his voice. When asked by her counsel whether there was light in the kitchen,
she claimed that the kitchen was lighted by a kerosene lamp.[17]
However, on cross-examination, Jelly claimed she had just
finished urinating and was about to put on her pants, or was about to fasten
its hook, when accused came near her.[18] Accused boxed her in the stomach
and pushed her hard to the ground. She was rendered unconscious upon hitting the
ground. Thus, she was not aware as to
when accused pulled down
her panty and pants. When she regained
her consciousness, he had already left. Nonetheless, the victim
knew she was raped because she felt pain.[19]
On re-direct examination, she alleged that after she hit the
soil, she was not rendered
totally unconscious. She was also aware that accused pulled down
her pants and inserted his organ into hers.[20]
Defense counsel then asked victim to explain her conflicting
testimonies as follows:
“ATTY. BRIONES:
“Q: Miss Witness, when I cross-examined
you, you said that you did not know from the time you fell to the ground up to
the time you recovered consciousness, you did not know what happened to
you. However, in the redirect
examination, you remember the accused putting his penis inside your organ. There is a difference in your testimony, is
it because your recollection of the incident is quite hazy now?
“ATTY. BRIONES:
I would like to make of
records (sic) that the witness could not answer the question.
“FISCAL PERALTA:
We would like to manifest
that the witness is nervous.
“ATTY. BRIONES:
We cannot agree to
that. In fact, she is smiling.
“COURT:
Both manifestations are
noted.
(TSN, February 17, 1988, p. 19)
It ought not to be overlooked that the victim was a minor and, as
observed by Assistant Prosecutor Peralta, not intelligent.[21]
Thus, despite some inconsistencies, the trial court gave credence to her
testimony. We, too, hold that her
inconsistent statements did not crack her credibility. We fully concur with the trial court’s
ruling, viz:
“xxx. We are not
disposed to treat this particular lapse in her testimony as an indication of a
tendency to prevaricate. It is probable
that the event may have placed her mind in a confused state. While she may have fainted at some point of
(sic) time, she was certain, however, that the man entered her. Defense counsel asked her:
‘So you did not know how
the accused committed or if the accused … committed sexual intercourse with
you?’
She answered:
‘I know because I felt pain’ (tsn, February 17, 1988, at 9).
There is nothing in her testimony to
indicate that she was totally unaware of the sex act itself. It is possible that, as she passed into
unconsciousness, she retained some experience or sensation of the
penetration. What is positive is that
the accused intimidated her, brought her to a secluded place, and threw her to
the ground. Even if we were to assume
that she lost all recollection of (the) succeeding events until the accused had
abandoned her in that secluded place, the basic facts shown, i.e., that it was
the accused who led her there by force, and semen was later found on her
private parts, (would) suffice to establish the existence of the rape, and the
responsibility of the accused therefor.”
(Decision, dated February 28, 1991, p. 26)
Indeed, a public denunciation by a Filipina, whose virtue has
heretofore been unblemished, that she has been raped carries a lot of credence.[22]
Absent any proof that she had ill-motive to falsely accuse a man of raping her,
she deserves full faith and credit.[23]
Accused-appellant alleges that the victim’s family filed the
instant case because he refused to marry her. Even if this fact is conceded, accused-appellant cannot escape
conviction. The prosecution had proved
beyond reasonable doubt that he forced his bestial desire on the victim. The later attempts of the victim’s family to
compel him to marry the victim constitute nothing more than a demand for him to
restore the shattered honor of Jelly. They should be viewed in light of Filipino customs and traditions still
strong, especially in the province, which put premium to family name, honor and
reputation and eschew public scandal.
We reject the defense of denial and alibi of
accused-appellant. Alibi is a weak
defense and, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, the same cannot
prevail over the positive declaration of the victim pointing to the
accused-appellant as the culprit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs
against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
[1]
Original Records, p. 23.
[2]
Order, dated July 6, 1987; Original Records, p. 81.
[3]
Ibid, pp. 14-15.
[4]
TSN, September 23, 1987, pp. 17, 23.
[5]
Marked as Exhibits “E to F.”
[6]
Marked as Exhibit “G.”
[7]
Luciano Reyes and Conrado Tayco.
[8]
TSN, March 21, 1990, pp. 4-7.
[9]
TSN, March 21, 1990, p. 12.
[10]
People vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 102409-10, December 21, 1992, 216 SCRA
754, 759-760.
[11]
See Decision, dated February 28, 1991, pp. 22-23.
[12]
G.R. Nos. 100720-23, June 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 104, 119.
[13]
People vs. Arnan, G.R. No. 72608, June 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 37, 43.
[14]
TSN, February 17, 1988, p. 11.
[15]
TSN, August 4, 1987, p. 23.
[16]
TSN, November 20, 1987, pp. 5-8, 14; TSN, February 17, 1988, p. 8.
[17]
TSN, November 20, 1987, p. 8.
[18]
TSN, December 21, 1987, pp. 21-22.
[19]
TSN, February 17, 1988, pp. 8-10.
[20]
Ibid, pp. 18-19.
[21]
TSN, December 21, 1987, p. 22.
[22]
People vs. Caballes, G.R. No. 93437-45, July 12, 1991, 199 SCRA 152;
People vs. Vinas, G.R. No. 91363-73, October 15, 1991, 202 SCRA 720; People vs. Pido, G.R. No. 92427,
August 2, 1991, 200 SCRA 45.
[23]
People vs. Villamayor, G.R. No. 97475-76, July 18, 1991, 199 SCRA 472.