ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND MICHAEL AMOS, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the
reversal of the decision* dated
March 25, 1991 as well as the resolution dated March 28, 1991 of the respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17476 entitled “Marcelo Yadno, Filmore
Laoyan v. Director of Lands and Michael Amos which affirmed the decision** dated August 26, 1987 of the Regional Trial Court
of Baguio and Benguet in a joint trial of Land Registration Case No. 135
entitled “Marcelo Yadno v. Director of Lands, et al.” and Land
Registration Case No. 283 entitled “Filmore Laoyan v. Director of Lands,
et al.” dismissing, among others, the application for registration of
certain parcels of land of Yadno and Laoyan.

The facts of this case are as follows:

On the two separate dates of September 10, 1964 and September 17,
1968, applicants Marcelo Yadno (now deceased) and Filmore Laoyan, respectively,
sought to register certain parcels of land (Original Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-4;
Vol. III, pp. 1-4). In LRC No. N-135,
Marcelo Yadno seeks to register a parcel of land situated at Barrio Pico,
Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, which is embraced in survey
plan PSU-204731 approved by the Director of Lands on May 19, 1964. In Land Registration Case No. N-283, Filmore
Laoyan applied for the registration of a parcel of land situated at Sitio
Longlong, Barrio Pico, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, embraced
in survey plan PSU-225299 approved by the Director of Lands on July 27, 1966
(Rollo, p. 35).

The notice of initial hearing in LRC No. N-135 was published in
the Official Gazette in its issues on April 5 and 12, 1965 (Orig. Records, Vol.
1, p. 55) and posted by Deputy Sheriff Emilio Dacanay in the Municipality of La
Trinidad, Benguet, Mt. Province on 7th and 8th day of June, 1965 (Ibid., p.
63). In LRC Case No. 283, the notice of
initial hearing was also published in the Official Gazette in its issues on
November 25 and December 2, 1968 (Vol. III. p. 26) and posted by the same
Deputy Sheriff on December 12, 1968 in the Municipality of La Trinidad, Baguio
City (Ibid., p. 20).

To the aforesaid applications, the Director of Lands and Director
of Forestry seasonably filed an opposition on the ground that neither the
applicants nor their predecessor-in-interest possesses sufficient title to
acquire ownership in fee simple of the parcels of land applied for: that they have not been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question for
at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the present application;
that these parcels of land are portions of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines not subject to appropriation and that the parcels
of land applied for are within the unclassified public forest land (Orig.
Records, Vol. I, pp. 78-79; Vol. III, pp. 40; 46-47). Aside from the opposition filed by the government, private
persons also opposed said applications. In LRC No. N-135, the Heirs of Gaogao Tinuan, Michael Amos, Isabelo
Akiapat, Luiz Lorenzo and Corona Vda. de Jimenez and children registered their
opposition to Yadno’s application. In
LRC No. N-283, on the other hand, Corona Vda. de Jimenez and Marcelo Yadno also
opposed the application of Laoyan.

At the hearing on September 13, 1965 of LRC No. N?135, the
Court issued an order of general default with the exception of the Director of
Lands, Reforestation Administration, Michael Amos, Julian Amos and Tiotioen
(Orig. Records, Vol. I. p. 75). An
order of general default was also issued by the same court on March 13, 1969 in
LRC No. N-283 with the exception of the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry
and the Reforestation Administration: Michael Amos, Ezra Nabus and Corona Vda. de Jimenez (Ibid., Vol. III, p.
36).

On July 10, 1969, the lower court ordered that LRC No. N-283 and
LRC No. N-135 be tried together. (Ibid., p. 76) Consequently, joint trial then ensued.

In order to establish thirty (30) years of open and continuous
possession over the subject property, applicant Filmore Laoyan, among other
things, presented the testimonies of Arsenio Espiritu, Herminio Arenas and the
applicant himself Filmore Laoyan.

Filmore Laoyan claimed that the land applied for consisting of
Lots 1 and 3, containing an area of 4 hectares, was first in the possession of
his grandfather in 1918. The possession
was then taken over by his father, who paid the land taxes (Exhs. J, J-1 to
J-12) and used it for grazing and planted it with coffee. Then in 1949, he took over from his father
and cultivated it. He registered Lots 1
and 3 in his name for tax purposes (Exhs. G and G-1) and paid the land taxes
(Exhs. H and H-1). He fenced the
property and also planted it with coffee and camotes. Exhibit G is Tax Declaration 7113, describing “lot 1”
PSU 225299 as “uncult. agric. land”, containing an area of 2.7685
hectares. Exhibit G-1 is Tax
Declaration 7112, describing “lot 3” PSU 225299 as “uncult.
agric. land”, containing an area of 2.9719 hectares. Exhibits H and H-1 are official receipts No.
0919364-65 both dated September 30, 1968, evidencing the payment of the land
tax for lots 1 and 2 for the years “1965, 1966, 1967, 1968”. Also offered as documentary evidence are
Exhibits I and I-1, official receipts evidencing payment of real property tax
covered by Tax Declaration No. 222: Exhibits I-2 to I-8 are also official receipts evidencing payment of
real property tax covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 222 and 500: Exhibits I-9 to I-12 are likewise official
receipts evidencing payment of real property tax covered by Tax Declarations
222, 500 and 906; and Exhibit I-13, is an official receipt evidencing payment
of property tax without specification as to which property the tax was paid;
Exhibit J, is a Homestead Application, filed with the Bureau of Lands, on April
24, 1961, signed by a certain “Belen B. Espiritu” over a “five
(5) hectares” tract of land “x x x covered by my Tree Farm Lease
application dated April 10, 1987.” There is a certification in this
exhibit, tending to show that “I (Filmore Laoyan) granted permission to
herein applicant x x x, to occupy and improve the land x x x, which x x x is a
portion of the property I inherited from my ancestors.” And, finally,
there is Exhibit J-3, an official receipt evidencing payment of “HA
Fee.” (Rollo, pp. 16-17)

Arsenio G. Espiritu in his testimony also stated that he knows
the property being applied for registration because he used to occupy a portion
of the same; that on April 10, 1957, he applied for a tree farm lease with the
Bureau of Forestry and a license to cut pine trees which was granted; that on
May 4, 1961, applicant Laoyan informed him that he was encroaching upon his
property and likewise confirmed the testimony of the applicant that there were
coffee plants and camote patches in the area which were however destroyed
during a big forest fire in the area in 1967; that he did not pursue his
homestead application when he was informed by the applicant about his
application for registration, but nevertheless, was employed by the applicant
as the surveyor.

Herminio Arenas merely
corroborated the fact that the applicant was in open, adverse, public and in
continuous possession of the property being applied for (Rollo, pp. 12-13).

In the case of Marcelo
Yadno, he identified his signature in his application for registration (Exhs.
A, A-1, A-2) and in his affidavit dated January 21, 1958 (Exh. B), which
states, among other things, that he is the owner of “Pico, La Trinidad,
with an area of 0.0799 square meters” (TSN, March 7, 1985, pp.
16-22). He also offered a technical
description (Exh. B), surveyor’s certificate (Exh. C), Treasurer’s Certificate
dated September 8, 1964 (Exhs. D, D-1), Survey Plan, PSU 204731(Exh. B) and
Transmittal letter of October 20, 1964 (Exh. E) (Rollo, p. 16).

On the other hand, oppositor Michael Amos presented the
testimonies of Evaristo Tiotioen, Atty. Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., Engineer
Edilberto Quiaoit, Matias Camolo, Generoso Javier, Luis Dawayan and the
oppositor himself Michael Amos, to support his application for registration.

The testimonial and documentary evidence of Michael Amos showed
that Amos, since 1937, by himself and thru his predecessors-in-interest has
been in open, continuous and notorious possession of the land applied for up to
the present. The late Tulingan Pulot,
and his widow, Singao Pul-ot, possessed the land applied for, located at Bo.
Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet, Mountain Province, since 1932. They declared the land before the Second
World War for tax purposes under Tax Declaration No. 209. Then, Singao Pul-ot, because of old age,
relinquished her rights thereto in favor of Evaristo Tiotioen. Evaristo declared that the spouses occupied
the property as early as 1932. After
the Second World War, the property was occupied by Michael Amos, after
acquiring the same from him (Tiotioen) who received as consideration for the
transfer “cash”, “some seedlings”, and also “helped me
in my survey.”

Evaristo Tiotioen, a former clerk of the Municipal Treasurer’s Office
of La Trinidad, Benguet, testified that during the time the tax receipts were
issued to the Laoyan family, they were paying taxes but on another land and not
the one applied for by them (Exhibits “I” to “I-13”),
(t.s.n., Hearing of March 17, 1983, pp. 17 to 21).

Atty. Crisogono S. Bartolo, Jr. of the Bureau of Lands also
stated in his testimony that he had made an inspection of the land in question,
that the applications of Marcelo Yadno and Filmore Laoyan overlapped the area
surveyed by Michael Amos. He also found
out that Michael Amos has made permanent improvements on the land while
applicants Yadno and Laoyan did not introduce any (Exhibits “11” and
“12”); (t.s.n., Hearing of February 2, 1984, pp. 6-9).

Engineer Edilberto Quiaoit, a surveyor of the Bureau of Lands
testified about the possibility that Yadno and Laoyan only copied the survey
plan of Michael Amos (t.s.n., Hearing of August 18, 1983, pp. 4-7, 9­-11). Another witness in the person of Matias
Camolo also stated that he was with the surveyor of Marcelo Yadno when he
conducted the survey and they just relied on the existing corners contained in
the survey plan of Michael Amos and Isabelo Akiapat.

It was also noted by the Court during the ocular inspection
conducted on the land in question that the applicants Yadno and Laoyan were not
able to show any improvements made by them, whereas, Amos was able to show
houses, dirt roads, fences, plants and canals. The existence of these improvements was also corroborated by Generoso
Javier, a forester of the Bureau of Forestry (Exhibits “1”,
“2” to “2-C”). Another witness who confirmed the introduction of the improvements on
the land by Amos was Luis Dawayan (Rollo, pp. 13-14).

On August 26, 1987, the trial court rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court renders
judgment dismissing the applications of Marcelo Yadno and Filmore Laoyan, and
awarding the parcel of land under PSU-198528 to oppositor Michael Amos as the
true and lawful owner and ordering the registration of the same in his name,
without prejudice to the deed of quitclaim executed by Michael Amos in favor of
Damian L. Jimenez, and ordering the former to segregate the portion subject
matter of said quitclaim.

SO ORDERED.” (Orig. Records, Vol. III. pp. 501-504).

Appeal was interposed by Marcelo Yadno with the Court of Appeals
but during the pendency of the appeal Marcelo Yadno died (Rollo, p. 22). The Office of the Solicitor General, on the
other hand, was excused from filing the brief for the public oppositors (Ibid.,
p. 15).

On March 25, 1991, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the
disputed decision of the trial court (Ibid., pp. 10-19).

Subsequently, Atty. Jose Edward Navarro filed a pleading
denominated as a notice of substitution and motion for reconsideration. It prayed, among others, that Atty. Felipe
Navarro, the counsel of the late Marcelo Yadno, take the place of Marcelo Yadno
as a substitute (Ibid., pp. 20-21).

On May 28, 1991, the Court of Appeals denied said motion for
reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner assigns the following errors, to wit:

1. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding
that: “Applicant Marcelo Yadno did
not present any competent evidence either through his witnesses or documentary
to support his application for registration.”

2. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in
admitting the opposition of respondent Michael Amos filed on July 11, 1966.

3. Respondent Court
of Appeals erred in holding that: “Applicant Marcelo Yadno failed to establish that he was in actual
and physical possession of the land applied for by him for more than 30 years,
and have introduced permanent improvements thereon to be able to comply with
the provisions of Act 496 and R.A. 1942 amending Sec. 48(h) and (c) of C.A.
141.”

4. Respondent Court
of Appeals erred in denying the application of Marcelo Yadno and awarding title
to the land to oppositor Michael Amos who was never an applicant to any of the
lands in Baguio and Benguet and consequently erred in not confirming title to
applicant Marcelo Yadno, his kinsmen. And the tribe pursuant to law as embodied in the contract of legal
services in lieu for attorney’s fees of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro as admitted by
the respondent Court of Appeals in its November 2, 1989 resolution.

The immediate issue in this case is whether or not Atty. Felipe
C. Navarro, the petitioner, is the proper party to represent Marcelo Yadno, the
deceased.

Petitioner, Atty. Felipe Navarro, is invoking the contract of
legal services he entered with his former client Marcelo Yadno and others as
his authority to take the place of Yadno in case of the latter’s death. Hence, when the supervening event of death
came during the pendency of Yadno’s appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner
Navarro simply filed a notice of substitution and a motion for reconsideration
rolled into one and upon receipt of an adverse decision, he is now before this
Court pursuing the case in lieu of the late Marcelo Yadno.

Private respondent counters that the “contract of legal
services” could not have transmitted any right to Atty. Navarro to succeed
the late Marcelo Yadno considering that the alleged document is neither a
substitution of heirs nor transmittal of rights on the land in litigation in
the case at bar. He avers that the
title of the contract itself states that it is a contract for legal services
and its contents which states “x x x our rights shall only be transmitted
to our heirs x x x” meaning the legal heirs could not have possibly made
Atty. Navarro as heir of Marcelo Yadno.

The contention of the
private respondent is well taken.

Section 17, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court sets the rule on substitution of parties in case of death of any
of the parties. Under the Rule, it is
the court that is called upon after notice of a party’s death and the claim is
not thereby extinguished to order upon proper notice the legal representative
of the deceased to appear within a period of thirty (30) days or such time as it
may grant.

Section 16 of Rule 3
provides:

“Whenever a party to a pending case dies x x x it shall be the
duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death x x x and to
give the name and residence of the executor, administrator, guardian or other
legal representative of the deceased.”

In the case at bar, petitioner Navarro did not give any
explanation why he failed to give the name and residence of the executor,
administrator or guardian of the deceased, if there was any, and in their
absence at least the name and residence of the heirs of Yadno who shall take
the place of the deceased (Evangelista v. Soriano, No. L-4625, 92 Phil. 190
[1952].

Clearly, priority is given to the legal representative of the
deceased, that is, the executor or administrator of his estate. It is only in cases of unreasonable delay in
the appointment of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the heirs
resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate, that the court may adopt
the alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the
deceased (Liwas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L 45809, December 12, 1986, 146
SCRA 173).

Petitioner Navarro took the short cut route of making himself the
legal representative of Yadno on the basis of the contract of legal
services. This mode resorted to by
Navarro is clearly without any legal basis. Even at this point in time, the record is bereft of any evidence that
would grant herein petitioner Navarro any authority to represent the late
Marcelo Yadno. In the same vein, there
is also no showing of any evidence granted to herein counsel Jose Edward
Navarro to file and prosecute the case and any other incidental cases for and
in behalf of Yadno’s heirs.

On the basis of the
foregoing alone the petition should be dismissed.

And even assuming that Atty. Navarro may represent Yadno, the
petition itself is bereft of merit.

It must be emphasized that it is the burden of the applicant to
prove its positive averments, not for the Government or the private oppositors
to establish a negative proposition insofar as the applicant’s specific lots
are concerned (Gutierrez Hermanos v. C.A., G.R. Nos. 54472-77, September 28,
1989, 178 SCRA 37). Applying this rule
to the instant case, the conclusions reached by the court a quo
and respondents Court of Appeals that the petitioner through his
predecessors-in-interest has not been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the subject land under a bona fide claim
of ownership are binding on this Court. Indeed, the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the
Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law imputed to
the latter, its findings of facts being conclusive generally. (Andres v. Manufacturer Hanover and Trust
Corp., G.R. No. 82670, September 15, 1989, 117 SCRA 618; Lauron v. CA. G.R. No.
62021, April 6, 1990, 184 SCRA 215).

Prescinding therefrom, this Court finds no reason to disturb the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals when it ruled that:

“The exhibits presented by the late Marcelo Yadno, to
wit: application for registration (Exh.
A), technical description (Exh. B), surveyor’s certificate (Exh. C),
Treasurer’s Certificate (Exh. D, Survey Plan, PSU 204731 (Exh. E) and
Transmittal Letter dated October 20, 1964 (Exh. F) and their submarkings are
part of the case records and of themselves do not prove that he had been in
open, continuous and notorious possession of the property for thirty (30)
years. He did not even offer a tracing cloth
plan, the primary purpose of which is to fix the exact location and definitive
identity of the land, as shown in the survey plan and technical
description. He has not offered
evidence that he has declared the land for tax purposes in his name, and/or
that he had paid the land taxes thereon.”

This Court has ruled that although tax receipts are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the
holder had a claim of title over the property (Director of Lands v. Reyes, G.R.
No. L-27594, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177; Director of Lands v. Santiago,
G.R. No. L-41278, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 186).

In the case of Filmore Laoyan, the findings of the respondent
appellate court is also noteworthy:

“The   testimony of
Laoyan that he inherited Lots 1 and 3 from his father, who, in turn, also
inherited it from his father is not borne out in Exhibits I to I?12. The land described are covered by Tax
Declaration Nos. 222, 500 and 906, while Lots 1 and 3 are covered by Exhs. G
and G-1. “New” Tax
Declaration Nos. 7112 and 7113, which begun only in 1965, or after these cases
were filed in court. Tiotioen, a clerk
of the Municipal Treasurer’s Office of La Trinidad, Benguet, testified that
Exhibits I to I-13 were in payment of another land which is different from and
not Lots 1 and 3. Like Yadno, Laoyan
did not also present a tracing cloth plan of the property sought to be
registered, which would pinpoint the exact location and definitive identity of
the land as shown in the survey plan and technical description. Indeed, Felicitacion Roxas, of the
Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, Department of Justice, stationed
in Baguio City, and formerly Legal Officer IV of the Bureau of Lands, Baguio
City, testified that she, together with the applicants and the District Land Officer,
Bureau of Lands, conducted several ocular inspections of the lands applied for,
and found that both appellants have not introduced permanent improvements on
the lands in question.”

That applicant Laoyan has paid the corresponding taxes starting
in the year 1965 is of no moment because the important thing to consider is the
compliance of his predecessors-in-interest with the 30-year period which he
failed to substantiate.

Inevitably, the applicants (Yadno and Laoyan) have failed to
submit convincing proof of their predecessors-in-interest actual, peaceful and
adverse possession in the concept of owner of the lots in question during the
period required by law. This is
especially true in view of the basic presumption that lands of whatever classification
belong to the State and evidence of a land grant must be “well-nigh
incontrovertible” (Santiago v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. L-20241, November
22, 1974, 61 SCRA 146; Director of Lands v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-27594; supra).

On the other hand, this convincing proof of compliance with the
30-year period has been met by herein private respondent Michael Amos. The decision of the Court of Appeals on this
point is hereby quoted to wit:

“The evidence presented by oppositor?appellee Michael
Amos, consisting of his testimony and that of Evaristo Tiotioen, Atty.
Crisogono Bartolo, Jr. and Engr. Edilberto Quiaoit, as well as Exhibits 1 to 16
established that Michael Amos, since 1937, by himself and thru his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and notorious possession
of the land applied for up to the present.

The late Tulinga Pul-ot, and his widow, Signao Pul-ot, possessed
the land applied for, located at Bo. Pico, La Trinidad, Benquet, Mountain
Province, since 1932. They declared the
land before the Second World War for tax purposes under Tax Declaration No.
209. Then, Signao Pul-ot, because of
old age, relinquished her rights thereto in favor of Evaristo Tiotioen. Evaristo declared that the spouses occupied
the property as early as 1932. After
the Second World War, the property was occupied by Michael Amos, after
acquiring the same from him (Tiotioen) who received as consideration for the
transfer “cash”, “some seedlings”, and also “helped me
in my survey.” That Amos has made permanent improvements on the land, is
borne out by the testimony of Atty. Crisogono S. Bartolo, Jr., of the Bureau of
Lands, corroborated by Generoso Javier, a forester of the Bureau of Forestry
(Exhs. 1, 2, 2-A, 2-B and 2-C), and by Luis Dawayan.” (Rollo, p. 18).

The foregoing being conclusions of fact of the Court of Appeals,
this Court finds them to be final and binding (Lauron v. CA, supra). It is not the function of this Court to
re-examine all over again the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the
parties unless the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals is not supported
by the evidence on record or the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts
(Remalante v. Tibe, et al., G.R. No. L-59514, February 25, 1988, 158, SCRA 138)
which is not so in the case at bar.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Nocon, J., on leave.

* Penned by Associate Justice
Artemon D. Luna and concurred in by Associate Justices Serafin E. Camilon and
Celso L. Magsino.

** Penned by Judge Leonardo M.
Rivera.