PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EDWIN NARDO AND WILLY YLARDE, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
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People versus Nardo
The Case
This is a criminal appeal in which the People of the Philippines prosecuted Edwin Nardo and Willy Ylarde for a mass shooting at a public market eatery in Umingan, Pangasinan, on the evening of July 21, 1985. Four persons died and two were wounded when the two accused, armed with a baby armalite and a short firearm, fired indiscriminately at the canteen of the Suitos spouses. The case matters for two reasons: it is a classic restatement of the rule of respect for the trial court's factual findings and credibility assessments, and it illustrates the correct way to characterize a single act that produces several distinct crimes, namely, as separate murders and attempted murders rather than as a complex crime.
Procedural History
Only Edwin Nardo was initially charged, because Willy Ylarde was then at large. Nardo pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. Ylarde was later included through an amended information charging both men with multiple murder with double frustrated murder, and he too pleaded not guilty. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 51, rendered its decision on May 8, 1991, convicting both accused as charged and sentencing each to reclusion perpetua, with civil indemnity and damages in favor of the heirs of the deceased and the injured victims. Both accused appealed directly to the Supreme Court, assigning a single error against the trial court's refusal to acquit them.
Facts
In the morning of July 21, 1985, Edwin Nardo and Willy Ylarde went to the eatery of the spouses Claro and Micaela Suitos at the public market of Umingan, Pangasinan. They carried a buri bag containing marijuana leaves and offered to sell the contents to Claro Suitos, who told them that the sale was prohibited. They left.
At about six thirty in the evening of the same day, the two men returned to the eatery. Nardo carried a baby armalite and Ylarde a short firearm, and both fired indiscriminately at the place. Clarence Suitos, Anicia Sales, Macario dela Peña and Luzviminda Pudol were killed. Claro Suitos was wounded on the left shoulder, Micaela Suitos on the left hip, and their daughter Marivic Suitos suffered a slight wound. The wounded spouses were treated at the Sacred Heart Hospital in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Pending trial, Claro Suitos died in an ambush.
The defense set up alibi and denial, claiming that after failing to sell cigarettes and matches in the morning, the two men went to Quezon City to return the goods to their owner and slept there that night, corroborated by the owner's caretaker. A police investigator testified that immediately after the incident he investigated the spouses at the hospital, that they then mentioned names other than the accused, and that he burned the unfinished and unsigned statements at their request. A tricycle driver testified that after the firing, four men threatened him with a long firearm and made him ferry them toward the boundary of Umingan and Lupao.
Issues
- Whether or not the prosecution evidence was sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding their defense of alibi and denial.
- Whether or not the testimony of Micaela Suitos, who failed to name the accused during the immediate police investigation, and the testimony of Rogelio Fernandez, who gave no statement until trial, are credible.
- Whether or not the accused conspired in the commission of the crimes.
- Whether or not the acts constituted the complex crime of multiple murder with double frustrated murder, or separate crimes of murder and attempted murder.
Applicable Provisions
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as invoked in the information, defines and penalizes murder:
Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity. 2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise. 3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin. 4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity. 5. With evident premeditation. 6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
This is the crime charged and the provision under which the trial court convicted the accused, and the Court uses it to fix the penalty for each killing.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code governs the complex crime, and the Court cites it to explain why it does not apply here:
Article 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
The trial court applied this provision in relation to Article 248, and the Supreme Court corrects that application because the killings were not the product of a single act.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court affirmed the finding of guilt. It reiterated the settled rule that when the question is whether to believe the prosecution or the defense, the trial court's choice is generally viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect, because the trial judge had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the witness stand. No fact of substance and value was overlooked. Alibi is unavailing against positive identification by witnesses who had no motive to falsely charge the accused with a grave offense, and Micaela Suitos was herself a victim and a close relative of other victims, a witness who would naturally strive to remember the faces of the assailants.
On the second issue, the Court held that the failure of Micaela Suitos to name the accused during the immediate police investigation did not destroy her credibility. She was in a state of shock, one daughter killed, another wounded, and she and her husband seriously injured, a condition confirmed by the defense's own investigator, who admitted the spouses seemed still under shock and who agreed to burn the unfinished and unsigned statements. Sworn statements taken ex parte are generally inferior to testimony given in open court. As for Rogelio Fernandez, the lapse of considerable time before a witness comes forward does not taint credibility, since the initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information out of fear of reprisal is a common occurrence, and no law requires that a witness's testimony be reduced to writing before it may be believed.
On the third issue, the Court sustained the finding of conspiracy, which need not be proved by direct evidence of prior agreement but may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, as shown here by the simultaneous discharge of their firearms.
On the fourth issue, the Court held that the crime was not the complex crime of multiple murder with double frustrated murder. The two accused fired their weapons at several victims, producing four deaths and two wounds. Each death and each wound was the result of a separate act directed at a particular victim, so the accused committed four separate crimes of murder and two separate crimes of attempted murder, not one complex crime. As to the two wounded spouses, the Court characterized the offense as attempted rather than frustrated murder.
Doctrine
First, findings of fact and assessments of credibility by the trial court are accorded the highest respect on appeal, and will not be disturbed absent a showing that the trial judge plainly overlooked facts of substance and value that might affect the result.
Second, alibi and denial cannot prevail over positive identification by witnesses who have no motive to testify falsely, especially where the witness is herself a victim or a close relative of a victim.
Third, the delay of a witness in coming forward, and the failure to reduce a witness's account to a written statement, do not by themselves impair credibility; sworn statements taken ex parte are inferior to testimony in open court.
Fourth, conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the crime, and the simultaneous discharge of firearms by the accused establishes it.
Fifth, Article 48 requires a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; where separate acts produce separate deaths and wounds, the accused is liable for as many crimes as there are victims, and each is punished under Article 248 as a distinct murder or attempted murder.
Disposition
The Court affirmed the guilt of both accused but modified the conviction, holding them liable for four separate crimes of murder and two separate crimes of attempted murder instead of the complex crime charged, with the penalties and civil liabilities adjusted accordingly.
Remember This
Remember the line that one act, many crimes makes a complex crime, but many acts, many victims make many separate crimes. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between a complex crime under Article 48 and separate crimes arising from successive acts, and to test the weight given to trial court credibility findings against alibi and denial.