ST. SCHOLASTICA’S COLLEGE, PETITIONER, VS. HON. RUBEN TORRES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, AND SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PANG-EDUKASYON SA STA. ESKOLASTIK…

The principal issue to be resolved in this recourse is whether striking
union members terminated for abandonment of work after failing to comply with
return-to-work orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SECRETARY, for
brevity) should by law be reinstated.

On 20 July 1990, petitioner St. Scholastica’s College (COLLEGE,
for brevity) and private respondent Samahan ng Manggagawang Pang-Edukasyon sa
Sta. Eskolastika – NAFTEU (UNION, for brevity) initiated negotiations for a
first-ever collective bargaining agreement. A deadlock in the negotiations prompted the UNION to file on 4 October
1990 a Notice of Strike with the Department of Labor and Employment
(DEPARTMENT, for brevity), docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-10-826-90.

On 5 November 1990, the UNION declared a strike which paralyzed
the operations of the COLLEGE. Affecting as it did the interest of the students, public respondent
SECRETARY immediately assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued on
the same day, 5 November 1990, a return-to-work order. The following day, 6 November 1990, the
UNION was served the Order. On 7
November 1990, instead of returning to work, the UNION filed a motion for
reconsideration of the return-to-work order questioning inter alia the assumption of
jurisdiction by the SECRETARY over the labor dispute.

On 9 November 1990, the COLLEGE sent individual letters to the
striking employees enjoining them to return to work not later than 8:00 o’clock
A.M. of 12 November 1990 and, at the same time, giving notice to some
twenty-three (23) workers that their return would be without prejudice to the
filing of appropriate charges against them. In response, the UNION presented a list of six (6) demands to the
COLLEGE in a dialogue conducted on 11 November 1990. The most important of these demands was the unconditional
acceptance back to work of the striking employees. But these were flatly rejected.

Likewise, on 9 November 1990, respondent SECRETARY denied
reconsideration of his return-to-work order and sternly warned the striking
employees to comply with its terms. On
12 November 1990, the UNION received the Order.

Thereafter, particularly on 14 and 15 November 1990, the parties
held conciliation meetings before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
where the UNION pruned down its demands to three (3), viz.: that striking employees be reinstated under
the same terms and conditions before the strike; that no retaliatory or
disciplinary action be taken against them; and, that CBA negotiations be
continued. However, these efforts
proved futile as the COLLEGE remained steadfast in its position that any
return-to-work offer should be unconditional.

On 16 November 1990, the COLLEGE manifested to respondent
SECRETARY that the UNION continued to defy his return-to-work order of 5
November 1990 so that “appropriate steps under the said
circumstances” may be undertaken by him.^[1]

On 23 November 1990, the COLLEGE mailed individual notices of
termination to the striking employees, which were received on 26 November 1990,
or later. The UNION officers and
members then tried to return to work but were no longer accepted by the
COLLEGE.

On 5 December 1990, a Complaint for Illegal Strike was filed
against the UNION, its officers and several of its members before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC Case No. 00-12-06256-90.

The UNION moved for the enforcement of the return-to?work
order before respondent SECRETARY, citing “selective acceptance of
returning strikers” by the COLLEGE. It also sought dismissal of the complaint. Since then, no further hearings were conducted.

Respondent SECRETARY required the parties to submit their
respective position papers. The COLLEGE
prayed that respondent SECRETARY uphold the dismissal of the employees who
defied his return-to-work order.

On 12 April 1991, respondent SECRETARY issued the assailed Order
which, inter alia, directed the reinstatement of
striking UNION members, premised on his finding that no violent or otherwise
illegal act accompanied the conduct of the strike and that a fledgling UNION
like private respondent was “naturally expected to exhibit unbridled if
inexperienced enthusiasm, in asserting its existence.”^[2] Nevertheless,
the aforesaid Order held UNION officers responsible for the violation of the
return-to-work orders of 5 and 9 November 1990 and, correspondingly, sustained
their termination.

Both parties moved for partial reconsideration of the Order, with
petitioner COLLEGE questioning the wisdom of the reinstatement of striking
UNION members, and private respondent UNION, the dismissal of its officers.

On 31 May 1991, in a Resolution, respondent SECRETARY denied both
motions. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari,
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.

On 26 June 1991, We restrained the SECRETARY from enforcing his
assailed Orders insofar as they directed the reinstatement of the striking
workers previously terminated.

Petitioner questions the assumption by respondent SECRETARY of
jurisdiction to decide on termination disputes, maintaining that such
jurisdiction is vested instead in the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Art. 217 of the
Labor Code, thus ?

“Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the
Commission. – (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor
Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide,
within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the
parties for decision without extension, the following cases involving all
workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: x x x x 2. Termination
disputes x x x x 5. Cases arising from
any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions on the legality
of strikes and lock-outs x x x x”

In support of its position, petitioner invokes Our ruling in PAL
v. Secretary of Labor and Employment^[3] where
We held:

“The Labor Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction when he
restrained PAL from taking disciplinary measures against its guilty employees,
for, under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, all that the Secretary may enjoin is the
holding of the strike but not the company’s right to take action against union
officers who participated in the illegal strike and committed illegal
acts.”

Petitioner further contends that following the doctrine laid down
in Sarmiento v. Tuico^[4] and
Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle’ Philippines, Inc.,^[5]
workers who refuse to obey a return-to-work order are not entitled to be
paid for work not done, or to reinstatement to the positions they have
abandoned by reason of their refusal to return thereto as ordered.

Taking a contrary stand, private respondent UNION pleads for
reinstatement of its dismissed officers considering that the act of the UNION
in continuing with its picket was never characterized as a “brazen
disregard of successive legal orders”, which was readily apparent in Union
Filipro Employees v. Nestle’ Philippines, Inc., supra, nor was it a wilful
refusal to return to work, which was the basis of the ruling in Sarmiento
v. Tuico, supra. The failure of
UNION officers and members to immediately comply with the return-to-work orders
was not because they wanted to defy said orders; rather, they held the view
that academic institutions were not industries indispensable to the national
interest. When respondent SECRETARY denied
their motion for reconsideration, however, the UNION intimated that efforts
were immediately initiated to fashion out a reasonable return-to-work agreement
with the COLLEGE, albeit, it failed.

The issue on whether respondent SECRETARY has the power to assume
jurisdiction over a labor dispute and its incidental controversies, causing or
likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the
national interest, was already settled in International Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment.^[6] Therein,
We ruled that:

“x x x [T]he Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263
(g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute
causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to
the national interest, and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily, this authority to assume
jurisdiction over the said labor dispute must include and extend to all
questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the
Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.”

And rightly so, for, as found in the aforesaid case, Article 217
of the Labor Code did contemplate of exceptions thereto where the SECRETARY is authorized
to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute otherwise belonging exclusively to
the Labor Arbiter. This is readily
evident from its opening proviso reading “(e)xcept as otherwise provided
under this Code x x x x”

Previously, We held that Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code was broad enough to give the Secretary of
Labor and Employment the power to take jurisdiction over an issue involving
unfair labor practice.^[7]

At first glance, the rulings above stated seem to run counter to
that of PAL v. Secretary or Labor
and Employment, supra, which
was cited by petitioner. But the
conflict is only apparent, not real.

To recall, We ruled in the latter case that the jurisdiction of
the Secretary of Labor and Employment in assumption and/or certification cases
is limited to the issues that are involved in the disputes or to those that are
submitted to him for resolution. The
seeming difference is, however, reconcilable. Since the matter on the legality or illegality of the strike was never
submitted to him for resolution, he was thus found to have exceeded his
jurisdiction when he restrained the employer from taking disciplinary action
against employees who staged an illegal strike.

Before the Secretary of Labor and Employment may take cognizance
of an issue which is merely incidental to the labor dispute, therefore, the
same must be involved in the labor dispute itself, or otherwise submitted to
him for resolution. If it was not, as
was the case in PAL v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, supra, and
he nevertheless acted on it, that assumption of jurisdiction is tantamount to a
grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise,
the ruling in International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor
and Employment, supra, will apply.

The submission of an incidental issue of a labor dispute, in
assumption and/or certification cases, to the Secretary of Labor and Employment
for his resolution is thus one of the instances referred to whereby the latter
may exercise concurrent jurisdiction together with the Labor Arbiters.

In the instant petition, the COLLEGE in its Manifestation, dated
16 November 1990, asked the “Secretary of Labor to take the appropriate
steps under the said circumstances.” It likewise prayed in its position
paper that respondent SECRETARY uphold its termination of the striking
employees. Upon the other hand, the
UNION questioned the termination of its officers and members before respondent
SECRETARY by moving for the enforcement of the return-to-work orders. There is no dispute then that the issue on
the legality of the termination of striking employees was properly submitted to
respondent SECRETARY for resolution.

Such an interpretation will be in consonance with the intention of our labor authorities to provide
workers immediate access to their rights and benefits without being
inconvenienced by the arbitration and litigation process that prove to be not
only nerve-wracking, but financially burdensome in the long run. Social justice legislation, to be truly
meaningful and rewarding to our workers, must not be hampered in its
application by long-winded arbitration and litigation. Rights must be asserted and benefits
received with the least inconvenience. For, labor laws are meant to promote, not defeat, social justice (Maternity
Children’s Hospital v. Hon. Secretary of Labor).^[8] After all, Art. 4 of the Labor Code
does state that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of its
provisions, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved
in favor of labor.

We now come to the more pivotal question of whether striking
union members, terminated for abandonment of work after failing to comply
strictly with a return-to-work order, should be reinstated.

We quote hereunder the
pertinent provisions of law which govern the effects of defying a
return-to-work order:

1.  Article 263 (g) of the
Labor Code –

“Art. 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts. – x x x x (g) When, in his opinion,
there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in
an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify
the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have
the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or
lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the
time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall
immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume
operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the
assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision
as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same x x x x”
(as amended by Sec. 27, R.A. 6715; underscoring supplied).

2.  Article 264, same Labor
Code –

“Art. 264. Prohibited
activities. – (a) No
labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first
having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this
Book or without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article
or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and
reported to the Ministry.

“No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of
jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification or
submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the
pendency of cases involving the
same grounds for the strike or lockout x x x x (underscoring supplied).

“Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a
consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full
back wages. Any union officer who
knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be
declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall
not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a
replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike x x x
x” (underscoring supplied).

3.  Section 6, Rule IX, of
the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (which took effect on 31 August 1990) –

“Section 6. Effects of Defiance. – Non?compliance with the
certification order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or a return to
work order of the Commission shall be considered an illegal act committed in
the course of the strike or lockout and shall authorize the Secretary of Labor
and Employment or the Commission, as the case may be, to enforce the same under pain or loss of employment status or
entitlement to full employment benefits from the locking-out employer or
backwages, damages and/or other positive and/or affirmative reliefs, even to
criminal prosecution against the liable parties x x x x” (underscoring
supplied).

Private respondent UNION maintains that the reason they failed to
immediately comply with the return-to-work order of 5 November 1990 was because
they questioned the assumption of jurisdiction of respondent SECRETARY. They were of the impression that being an
academic institution, the school could not be considered an industry
indispensable to national interest, and that pending resolution of the issue,
they were under no obligation to immediately return to work.

This position of the UNION is simply flawed. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code provides that if a strike has already
taken place at the time of assumption, “all striking x x x employees shall
immediately return to work.” This means that by its very terms, a
return-to-work order is immediately effective and executory notwithstanding the
filing of a motion for reconsideration (University
of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC).^[9] It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of any
petition questioning its validity (Union of Filipro Employees v.
Nestle’ Philippines, Inc., supra). After all, the assumption and/or certification Order is issued in the
exercise of respondent SECRETARY’s compulsive power of arbitration and, until
set aside, must therefore be immediately complied with.

The rationale for this
rule is explained in University of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC, supra, citing Philippine Air Lines
Employees Association v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,^[10]
thus –

“To say that its (return-to-work order) effectivity must wait affirmance
in a motion for reconsideration is not only to emasculate it but indeed to
defeat its import, for by then the deadline fixed for the return to work would,
in the ordinary course, have already passed and hence can no longer be affirmed
insofar as the time element is concerned.”

Moreover, the assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment over labor disputes involving academic institutions was
already upheld in Philippine School of Business Administration v. Noriel^[11]
where We ruled thus:

“There is no doubt that the on-going labor dispute at the
school adversely affects the national interest. The school is a duly registered educational institution of higher
learning with more or less 9,000 students. The on-going work stoppage at the school unduly prejudices the students
and will entail great loss in terms of time, effort and money to all
concerned. More important, it is not
amiss to mention that the school is engaged in the promotion of the physical,
intellectual and emotional well-being of the country’s youth.”

Respondent UNION’s failure to immediately comply with the
return-to-work order of 5 November 1990, therefore, cannot be condoned.

The respective liabilities of striking union officers and members
who failed to immediately comply with the return-to-work order is outlined in
Art. 264 of the Labor Code which provides that any declaration of a strike or
lockout after the Secretary of Labor and Employment has assumed jurisdiction
over the labor dispute is considered an illegal act. Any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in a
strike defying a return-to-work order may, consequently, “be declared to
have lost his employment status.”

Section 6, Rule IX, of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,
which provides the penalties for defying a certification order of the Secretary
of Labor or a return-­to-work order of the Commission, also reiterates the same
penalty. It specifically states that
non-compliance with the aforesaid orders, which is considered an illegal act, “shall
authorize the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission x x x to
enforce the same under pain of loss of employment status.” Under the Labor
Code, assumption and/or certification orders are similarly treated.

Thus, we held in Sarmiento v. Tuico, supra, that by
insisting on staging the restrained strike and defiantly picketing the company
premises to prevent the resumption of operations, the strikers have forfeited
their right to be readmitted, having abandoned their positions, and so could be
validly replaced.

We recently reiterated this stance in Federation of Free
Workers v. Inciong,^[12] wherein
we cited Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle’ Philippines, Inc., supra,
thus –

“A strike undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor
of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus
illegal, pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code as
amended x x x x The union officers and members, as a result, are deemed to have
lost their employment status for having knowingly participated in an illegal
act.”

Despite knowledge of the ruling in Sarmiento v. Tuico, supra, records of the case reveal that private respondent UNION opted
to defy not only the return-to-work order of 5 November 1990 but also that of 9
November 1990.

While they claim that after receiving copy of the Order of 9
November 1990 initiatives were immediately undertaken to fashion out a
return-to-work agreement with management, still, the unrebutted evidence
remains that the striking union officers and members tried to return to work
only eleven (11) days after the conciliation
meetings ended in failure, or twenty (20) days after they received copy
of the first return-to-work order on 5 November 1990.

The sympathy of the Court which, as a rule, is on the side of the
laboring classes (Reliance Surety
& Insurance Co., Inc. v. NLRC),^[13] cannot be extended to the striking union officers and members in the
instant petition. There was willful
disobedience not only to one but two return-to-­work orders. Considering that the UNION consisted mainly
of teachers, who are supposed to be well-lettered and well-informed, the Court
cannot overlook the plain arrogance and pride displayed by the UNION in this labor
dispute. Despite containing threats of
disciplinary action against some union officers and members who actively
participated in the strike, the letter dated 9 November 1990 sent by the
COLLEGE enjoining the union officers and members to return to work on 12
November 1990 presented the workers an opportunity to return to work under the
same terms and conditions prior to the strike. Yet, the UNION decided to ignore the same. The COLLEGE, correspondingly, had every right to terminate the
services of those who chose to disregard the return-to­-work orders issued by
respondent SECRETARY in order to protect the interests of its students who form
part of the youth of the land.

Lastly, the UNION officers and members also argue that the
doctrine laid down in Sarmiento v. Tuico, supra,
and Union of
Filipro Employees v. Nestle’ Philippines, Inc., supra, cannot be made
applicable to them because in the latter two cases, workers defied the
return-to-work orders for more than five (5) months. Their defiance of the return-to-work order, it is said, did not
last more than a month.

Again, this line of
argument must be rejected. It is clear
from the provisions above quoted that from the moment a worker defies a
return-to-work order, he is deemed to have abandoned his job. It is already in itself knowingly
participating in an illegal act. Otherwise, the worker will just simply refuse to return to his work and
cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining the positions they
refuse to discharge or allow the management to fill (Sarmiento v. Tuico, supra). Suffice
it to say, in Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong, supra,
the workers were terminated from work
after defying the return-to-work order for only nine (9) days. It is indeed inconceivable that an employee,
despite a return-to-work order, will be allowed in the interim to stand akimbo
and wait until five (5) orders shall have been issued for their return before
they report back to work. This is
absurd.

In fine, respondent
SECRETARY gravely abused his discretion when he ordered the reinstatement of
striking union members who refused to report back to work after he issued two
(2) return-to-work orders, which in itself is knowingly participating in an
illegal act. The Order in question is,
certainly, contrary to existing law and jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby
GRANTED. The Order of 12 April 1991 and
the Resolution of 31 May 1991 both issued by respondent Secretary of Labor and
Employment are SET ASIDE insofar as they order the reinstatement of
striking union members terminated by petitioner, and the temporary restraining
order We issued on June 26, 1991, is made permanent.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Griño-Aquino, and
Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 44.

^[2]
Ibid., p. 34.

^[3]
G.R. No. 88210, 23 January 1991; 193 SCRA 223.

^[4]
Nos. L-75271-73, 27 June 1988; 162 SCRA 676.

^[5]
G.R. Nos. 88710-12, 19 December 1990; 192 SCRA 396.

^[6]
G.R. Nos. 92981-83, 9 January 1992.

^[7]
Meycuayan College v. Drilon, G.R. No. 81144, 7 May 1990; 185 SCRA 50.

^[8]
G.R. No. 78909, 30 June 1989; 174 SCRA 632.

^[9]
G.R. No. 89920, 18 October 1990; 190 SCRA 759.

^[10]
38 SCRA 372 (1971).

^[11]
G..R. No. 80648, 15 August 1988, 164 SCRA 402.

^[12]
No. L-49983, 20 April 1992.

^[13]
G.R. Nos. 86917-18, 25 January 1991; 193 SCRA 365.