JOSE D. LINA, JR., PETITIONER, VS. ISIDRO D. CARINO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, RESPONDENT.

This is a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus filed by
petitioner Senator Jose D. Lina, Jr., principally as taxpayer, against
respondent Isidro D. Carino, in the latter’s capacity as the then Secretary of
the Department of Education, Culture & Sports (“DECS”). Petitioner disputes the legal authority of
respondent Carino to issue DECS Order No. 30, series of 1991, dated 11 March
1991, entitled “Guidelines on Tuition and/or other School Fees in Private
Schools, Colleges and Universities for School Year 1991-1992.” DECS Order
No. 30 allows private schools to increase tuition and other school fees,
subject to the guidelines there set out. The complete text of DECS Order No. 30 is reproduced here for ready
reference:

“1. In response to the clamor from
the regions for guidelines responsive to the needs and conditions peculiar to
these areas, and in consideration of the regional wage orders, schools may
increase their tuition fees as approved by the State Assistance Council (SAC)
in accordance with the following guidelines:

a. Entering Freshmen. The tuition fee rates for entering freshmen
in all levels may be determined by the school itself, subject to
consultation. However, no consultation
is required when the amount of increase will raise the tuition fee level to not
more than P80.00 per unit for the tertiary schools and to not more than P1,500.00
per year for the elementary and secondary schools.

b. Upper Year Students. Schools may increase their tuition fees for
the upper year students in accordance with the following prescribed rates:

Tuition fee increases
within the prescribed rates above shall not require consultation and DECS
approval provided that a notice of increase is submitted to the DECS regional
office not later than April 30, 1991. Schools
may increase up to a maximum rate of 25% for programs below Level II
accreditation and up to a maximum of 30% for programs with Level II and Level
III accreditation based on approved tuition fee rates in school year 1990-1991,
subject to consultation.

c. Emergency Tuition Fee Assessment. To comply with the provisional emergency
cost of living allowances mandated by the Regional Tripartite Wages and
Productivity Boards of Regions VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII and the NCR,
schools in these regions may collect an emergency tuition fee assessment from
both the entering freshmen and the upper year students in all levels in
accordance with the following schedule:

(Schedule of Fees follows)

The above prescribed
emergency tuition fee assessments shall be collected only in school year
1991-1992 and shall not form part of the approved tuition fee rates. Consultation and DECS approval shall not be
required. However, a notice of collection
shall be submitted to the DECS regional office not later than April 30, 1991.

(Note 1: The prescribed emergency tuition fee
assessment for NCR will take effect only upon final resolution of a pending
petition for exemption.)

d.    Other Fees. Schools in all levels may increase the rates of other fees by not
more than 10%. Consultation and DECS
approval shall not be required provided that a notice of increase is submitted
to the DECS regional office not later than April 30, 1991.

e. For schools desiring to increase their
tuition and/or other fees beyond what are prescribed in sections a, b, and d
but whose programs are below Level II accreditation, the following must be
submitted to DECS regional offices for evaluation and approval/disapproval:

(1) A
certification by the school head, properly notarized, stating (a) that the 70%
share of tuition fee increases collected in June 1990 was distributed to the
teaching and non-teaching personnel in the form of salaries, wages; allowances,
and other benefits in compliance with Section 5.2 c of R.A. 6728, and (b) that
the P25.00 mandated wage order in 1989 and the applicable regional wage
orders in November 1990 were implemented.

(2) Schedule of
tuition and other fees of the previous year.

(3) Schedule of
proposed increase of tuition and fees for the current school year.

(4) Audited financial
statements for two (2) years immediately preceding the current year.

No school may collect any increase in
tuition and other fees prior to DECS approval. Deadline for filing of application is May 30, 1991.

f.    Consultation. As defined in this Order, consultation shall
mean a conference conducted by the school administration with duly organized
parents-teachers associations and faculty associations with respect to
elementary and secondary and with student governments or councils, alumni and
faculty associations with respect to tertiary schools as provided for in
Section 10 of R.A. 6728.

(1) The
consultation process involves at least two weeks’ notice to all the parties
above-mentioned. A meeting of all
sectors is held during which views and positions on or reactions to the
proposed increase in tuition and other fees shall be discussed. Every sincere effort shall be exerted to
allow all sectors concerned to express themselves freely in order to arrive at
an acceptable compromise. However,
consultation does not necessarily mean agreement.

(2) In case of
disagreement, parties involved may choose the alumni association of the school
or any other impartial body of their choice as arbiter.

(3) Any of the
parties in disagreement with the decision of the arbiter may elevate the
decision to DECS Central Office which shall make the final decision.

g. Sanctions. Sanctions as
stipulated under DECS Order No. 50, s. 1990 still apply.

h. Government Tuition Fee Supplement. Financial assistance for tuition of students
in private schools, colleges and universities shall be provided by the
government as follows:

(1) For students
enrolled in high schools which charge less than one thousand five hundred pesos
(P1,500.00) per year in tuition and other fees during school year
1990-91, the government shall provide them with a voucher equal to two hundred
ninety pesos (P290.00) provided that the student pays in school year
1991-1992 tuition and other fees equal to the tuition and other fees paid during
the preceding academic year.

(2) For fourth and
fifth year students enrolled in priority courses, as determined by DECS, in
private schools, colleges and universities that charge an effective per unit
tuition rate of eighty pesos (P80.00) or less in SY. 1990-91, the
government shall provide each student with a voucher to cover the tuition
increase, up to twelve pesos (P12.00) per unit.

2. Guidelines on tuition and/or other school fees for the pre-elementary
program will be covered by a separate DECS Order.

3. This Order takes effect immediately and supersedes all other DECS
issuances inconsistent herewith.”

I

It is useful to summarize the positions taken respectively by the
parties and the intervenors.

1. Petitioner

Petitioner basically denies the legal authority of respondent
Secretary to issue DECS Order No. 30. It is the contention of petitioner that respondent Secretary at the time
of issuing DECS Order No. 30, no longer possessed legal authority to do so,
considering that authority to promulgate rules and regulations relating to the
imposition of school fees had been transferred to the State Assistance Council
(“SAC”) by Republic Act No. 6728.^[1]

Earlier, i.e. in 1987, the DECS Secretary issued an Order
authorizing private schools to increase their school fees by as much as 10% to
15% of the preceding year’s rates. The
Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. initiated an action questioning the legal
authority of the DECS Secretary to issue such Order on the ground that the
power of the DECS Secretary to regulate school fees did not include the power
to authorize an increase in school fees. In Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. v. Secretary of Education,
Culture & Sports,^[2]
the Court rejected the argument of Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc.
(“Phil. Consumers”) and held that since no other government agency
was vested with the authority to fix maximum school fees, that power should be
considered lodged with the DECS Secretary.

It is claimed by petitioner, however, that the ruling in Phil.
Consumers was superseded by R.A. No. 6728 which expressly conferred
authority to promulgate rules and regulations upon the SAC. Petitioner here relies on Section 14 of R.A.
No. 6728 to sustain his position —

“Sec. 14. Program
Administration-Rules and Regulations. — The State Assistance Council shall be responsible for policy
guidance and direction, monitoring and evaluation of new and existing programs,
and the promulgation of rules and regulations, while the Department of
Education, Culture & Sports shall be responsible for the day to day
administration and program implementation. Likewise, it may engage the services and support of any qualified
government or private entity for its implementation.

x x x                            x x x                                           x x
x”

(Underscoring
supplied)

Petitioner also contends that DECS Order No. 30 is inconsistent
with Section 10 of R.A. No. 6728. In DECS Order No. 30 (Section 1 [d] supra),
respondent Secretary exempted increases in school fees other than tuition fee
(or “other school fees” as distinguished from “tuition
fee”) from application of the consultation requirement. Upon the other hand, Section 10 of R.A. No.
6728 provides:

“Sec. 10. Consultation. — In any proposed increase in
the rate of tuition fee, there shall be appropriate consultations conducted
by the school administration with the duly organized parents and teachers
associations and faculty associations with respect to secondary schools, and
with student governments or councils, alumni and faculty associations with
respect to colleges. For this purpose,
audited financial statements shall be made available to authorized
representatives of these sectors. Every
effort shall be exerted to reconcile possible differences. In case of disagreement, the alumni
association of the school or any other impartial body of their choosing shall
act as arbitrator.” (Underscoring supplied)

According to petitioner, Section 10 above
notwithstanding its wording, covers increases in all types of school fees,
which increases must first comply with the requirement of consultation before
promulgation in order that prohibitive and burdensome fees (of any type) may be
avoided.^[3]

In fine, petitioner asks us to declare DECS Order No. 30 null and
void on two (2) grounds: (1) that
respondent Secretary does not have the legal authority to issue that Order, and
(2) that DECS Order No. 30 violates Section 10 of R.A. No. 6728 which
established a comprehensive requirement of consultation.

2. Respondent Secretary

The Solicitor General, representing respondent Secretary, maintains
that the power to prescribe maximum tuition and other school fees granted under
B.P. Blg. 232 was not withdrawn by R.A. No. 6728 and remains vested in the DECS
Secretary. The Solicitor General rests
his position here on the decision of this Court in the Phil. Consumers
case. The Solicitor General concedes
that R.A. No. 6728 granted unto the SAC the power to promulgate rules and
regulations, but argues that only rules and regulations relevant to the purpose
of that law, i.e. government assistance and subsidy to students and teachers in
private schools, may be promulgated by the SAC. In essence, the rules which may be promulgated by the SAC are
those involving a determination of the maximum rates of tuition fee in private
schools payment of which would not disqualify students thereof from availing
themselves of government assistance in the form of tuition fee supplements, and
from access to the high school textbook assistance fund and to tuition fee
waiver programs.

The Solicitor General further contends that DECS Order No. 30
conforms substantially with the consultation requirement of R.A. No. 6728, except
item 1 (a) of DECS Order No. 30 which unqualifiedly allows private colleges and
universities to raise the tuition fee in the tertiary level to not more than P80.00
per unit without prior consultation. He
therefore urges that DECS Order No. 30 be upheld, save only paragraph 1(a)
thereof which he considers to be inconsistent with the consultation
requirement.^[4]

3. Intervenor PACU.

Intervenor Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities
(PACU) is an association of one hundred eleven (111) privately-owned
educational institutions, both proprietary and non-proprietary in
character. PACU filed, with leave granted
by this Court on 13 August 1991, a Motion for Intervention and an accompanying
Comment in Intervention, claiming that it would be affected by the outcome of
the petition at bar.

Intervenor PACU does not deny the authority of the DECS Secretary
to promulgate rules and regulations with respect to the collection, application
and use of tuition fee increases as provided in B.P. Blg. 232. Like respondent Secretary, intervenor PACU
asks us to affirm the ruling of the Court in Phil. Consumers (supra). Intervenor PACU does not believe that R.A.
No. 6728 could have repealed B.P. Blg. 232 because these two (2) statutes deal
with separate and independent subjects and were enacted for different purposes.

Intervenor PACU questions DECS Order No. 30 only with respect to
paragraph 1 (a) which it perceives does not conform with the consultation
requirement. Upon the other hand,
intervenor PACU, traversing the position of petitioner, asserts that Section 10
of R.A. No. 6728 refers only to increases in tuition fees, and that
accordingly, consultation does not apply to increases in other school fees,
the latter kind of fees not being mentioned in Section 10.

4. Intervenor CEAP.

Intervenor Catholic Educational Association of the Philippines
(“CEAP”) is an organization of Catholic schools and universities with
a total membership of 1,191 institutions. With leave granted by this Court also on 13 August 1991, the CEAP filed
a Comment in Intervention.

Unlike intervenor PACU, intervenor CEAP relies on the ruling of
the Court in Cebu Institute of Technology v. Ople.^[5]
Relying principally on the following portion of the decision in the Cebu
Institute case —

“The Court after comparing section 42 of B.P. Blg. 232 and
Pres. Dec. No. 451, particularly section 3 (a) thereof, finds evident
irreconcilable differences.

Under Pres. Dec. No. 451, the authority to regulate the imposition
of tuition and other school fees or charges by private schools is lodged with
the Secretary of Education and Culture (Sec. 1), whereas section 42 of B.P.
Blg. 232 liberalized the procedure by empowering each private school to
determine its rate of tuition and other school fees or charges,”^[6]

intervenor CEAP maintains that neither
the DECS Secretary nor the SAC may fix maximum tuition and other school fees
which private schools may lawfully charge. In the view of intervenor CEAP, the fixing of such fees is the exclusive
prerogative of the private schools themselves. It therefore urges the Court to strike down DECS Order No. 30 as null
and void in its entirety.

Intervenor CEAP, however, adheres to
the view of intervenor PACU on consultation, that is, that the imposition of other
school fees (non-tuition fees) is not subject to a consultation
requirement.

II

The principal issues raised by the parties may be restated in the
following manner:

(1) Whether DECS Order No. 30 is valid, that is,
whether respondent DECS Secretary has the legal authority to issue DECS Order
No. 30 prescribing guidelines concerning increases in tuition and other school
fees; and

(2) Whether the consultation requirement in R.A.
No. 6728 applies not only to increases in tuition fees but also to increases in
other school fees.

In respect of the first issue, it may be instructive to recall
the following brief historical note set out in the Court’s Decision on the Cebu
Institute case:

“x x x As early as March 10, 1917, the power to inspect
private schools, to regulate their activities, to give them official permits to
operate under certain conditions and to revoke such permits for cause was
granted to the then Secretary of Public Instruction by Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act
No. 180. Republic Act No. 6139, enacted
on August 31, 1970, provided for the regulation of tuition and other fees
charged by private schools in order to discourage the collection of exorbitant
and unreasonable fees. In an effort to
simplify the ‘cumbersome and time consuming’ procedure prescribed under Rep.
Act No. 6139 and ‘to alleviate the sad plight of private schools,’ Pres. Dec.
No. 451 was enacted on May 11, 1974. While this later statute was being implemented, the legislative body
envisioned a comprehensive legislation which would introduce changes and chart
directions in the educational system, hence, the enactment of B.P. Blg.
232. x x x.”^[7]

Petitioner Lina and intervenor CEAP contend that DECS Order No.
30 is null and void. Upon the other
hand, respondent Secretary and intervenor PACU insist that DECS Order No. 30 is
valid.

P.D. No. 451, entitled “Authorizing the Secretary of
Education and Culture to Regulate the Imposition of Tuition and Other School
Fees, Repealing R.A. No. 6139, and For Other Purposes” and promulgated on
11 May 1974, explicitly authorized the DECS Secretary not only “to
regulate” but also to fix the very tuition and other school fees to be
charged by any particular private school. Section 1 of this statute provides as follows:

“Sec. 1. Authority
of Secretary of Education and Culture. — Within the limits and under the
circumstances set forth in this Decree, the Secretary of Education and Culture
shall have the authority to regulate the imposition of tuition and other
school fees or charges by any and all private schools as defined under Act Numbered
Two thousand seven hundred and six, as amended. No changes in the rates of tuition or other school fees or
charges shall be effective without the prior approval of the Secretary of
Education and Culture. New school
fees or charges to be imposed by new or existing schools, whether for new
courses or other matters, shall be at such reasonable rates as may be
determined by the Secretary of Education and Culture based on the
standard of such school.” (Underscoring supplied)

B.P. Blg. 232, known as the “Education Act of 1982,”
was passed by the Batasan on 11 September 1982. The provisions of B.P. Blg. 232 pertinent
for present purposes are the following:

“Sec. 42. Tuition
and Other School Fees. — Each private school shall determine its rate
of tuition and other school fees or charges. The rates and charges adopted by schools pursuant to this provision shall
be collectible, and their application or use authorized, subject to
rules and regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Education Culture and Sports.

xxx                              xxx                                             xxx

Sec. 57. Functions and
Powers of the Ministry — The Ministry shall:

1. Formulate general education objectives and
policies, and adopt long-range educational plans;

2. Plan, develop and implement programs and
projects in education and culture;

3. Promulgate rules and regulations
necessary for the administration, supervision and regulation of the educational
system an accordance with declared policy;

4. Set up general objectives for the school
system:

5. Coordinate the activities and functions of
the school system and various cultural agencies under it;

6. Coordinate and work with agencies concerned
with the educational and cultural development of the national cultural
communities: and

7. Recommend and study legislation proposed for
adoption.”

xxx                              xxx                                             xxx

Sec. 70. Rule-Making
Authority. — The Minister of
Education, Culture and Sports charged with the administration and enforcement
of this Act, shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and
regulations.” (Underscoring
supplied)

In the Phil. Consumers case,^[8]
as earlier noted, in sustaining Department Order No. 37, the Court citing
certain sections of B.P. Blg. 232 concluded that legal authority to issue that
Department Order was vested in the DECS Secretary:

“We are not convinced by the argument that the power to
regulate school fees ‘does not always include the power to increase’ such
fees. Such 57 (3) of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 232, otherwise known as The Education Act of 1982, vests the DECS with the
power to regulate the educational system in the country, to wit:

‘Sec. 57. Educations and
powers of the Ministry. — The Ministry
shall:

x x x

(3) Promulgate rules and regula­tions necessary for the
administration, supervision and regulation of the educational system in
accordance with declared policy.

x x x’

Section 70 of the same Act grants the DECS the power to issue rules
which are likewise necessary to discharge its functions and duties under the
law, to wit:

‘Sec. 70. Rule-making
Authority. — The Minister of
Education and Culture, charged with the administration and enforcement of this
Act, shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations.’

In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power
includes the power to prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been vested with the authority to fix
school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged with the DECS if
it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties under the
law.”^[9]
(Underscoring supplied)

In the Cebu Institute case,^[10]
the Court said that Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 232 had amended P.D. No. 451. As already noted, this ruling in Cebu
Institute had led intervenor CEAP to adopt the position — and to urge the
same upon us — that under Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 232, private schools are
authorized to fix and collect tuition and other school fees free from
intervention by the DECS Secretary.

After careful examination of the provisions of both P.D. No. 451
and B.P. Blg. 232, and the opinions of the Court in the Phil. Consumer
case and the Cebu Institute case, as well the lengthy pleadings filed by
the parties and the intervenors, the Court considers that the legal authority
of respondent DECS Secretary to set maximum permissible rates or levels of
tuition and other school fees, and to issue guidelines for the imposition and
collection thereof, like DECS Order No. 30, must be sustained.

Firstly, we are unable to agree with intervenor CEAP that Cebu
Institute had the effect of withdrawing from respondent DECS Secretary the
power to regulate, and to promulgate rules and regulations relating to the
imposition and collection of tuition and other school fees.

A close reading of the opinion of this Court in the Cebu
Institute case shows that the Court did not rule that the power
granted to the DECS Secretary to fix maximum permissible tuition and other
school fees by Section 1 of P.D. No. 451 had been eliminated by Section 42 of
B.P. Blg. 232. What the Court dealt
with in the Cebu Institute case was the matter of the detailed
allocation of the proceeds of increases in tuition and other school fees. In respect of this specific question,
there is no dispute that Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 232 did modify P.D. No.
451 by authorizing the DECS Secretary to issue rules and regulations relating
to the detailed allocation of funds raised by tuition and other fee increases
to various categories of uses and expenditures. What the Court, through Cortes, J., did say in the Cebu
Institute case was the following:

“x x x What then was the effect of B.P. Blg. 232 on Pres. Dec.
No. 451?

The Court after comparing section 42 of B.P. Blg. 232 and Pres.
Dec. No. 451, particularly section 3(a) thereof, finds evident irreconcilable
differences.

Under Pres. Dec. No. 451, the authority to regulate the imposition
of tuition and other school fees or charges by private schools is lodged with
the Secretary of Education and Culture (Sec. 1), where section 42 of B.P.
Blg. 232 liberalized private school to determine its rate of tuition and other school fees or charges.

Pres. Dec. No. 451 provides that 60%
of the incremental proceeds of tuition fee increases shall be applied or used
to augment the salaries and wages of members of the faculty and other
employees of the school, while B.P. Blg. 232 provides that the increment
shall be applied or used in accordance with the regulations promulgated by the
MECS.

A closer look at these differences leads the Court to resolve the
question in favor of repeal. As pointed
out by the Solicitor General, three aspects of the disputes provisions of law
support the above conclusion. First,
the legislative authority under Pres. Dec. No. 451 retained the power to
apportion the incremental proceeds of the tuition fee increases; such power is
delegated to the Ministry of Education and Culture under B.P. Blg. 232. Second, Pres. Dec. No. 451 limits the
application or use of the increment to salary or wage increase, institutional
development, student assistance and extension services and return on
investment, whereas B.P. Blg. 232 gives the MECS discretion to determine the
application or use of the increments. Third,
the extent of the application or use of the increment under Pres. Dec. 451 is
fixed at the pre-determined percentage allocations: 60% for wage and salary increases, 12% for return in investment
and the balance of 28% to institutional development, student assistance and
extension services while under B.P. Blg. 232, the extent of the allocation or
use of increment is likewise left to the discretion of the MECS.

The legislative intent to depart from the statutory limitations
under Pres. Dec. No. 451 is apparent in the second sentence of section 42 of
B.P. Blg. 232 Pres. Dec. No. 451 and
section 42 of B.P. Blg. 232 which cover the same subject matter are so
clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that there is no other
conclusion but that the latter repeals the former in accordance with
section 72 of B.P. Blg. 232 to wit:

x x x                                                     x x x                                                                     x
x x

Having concluded that under B.P. Blg. 232 the Collection and
application or use of tuition and other school fees are subject only to the
limitations under the rules and regulations issued by the Ministry, the
crucial point now shifts to the said implementing rules.”^[11]
(Underscoring supplied)

Secondly, an examination of the precise language or Section 42 of
B.P. Blg. 232 shows that there is really nothing in Section 42 which must be
read as eliminating the power of the DECS Secretary in respect of the fixing of
maximum tuition and other school fees vested in him by P.D. No. 451. Under
Section 42, a private school may determine for itself in the first instance
the rate of tuition and other school fees or charges that it deems
appropriate. Such determination by the
private school is not, however, binding and conclusive as against the Secretary
of Education, Culture and Sports. The
rates and charges adopted by such private school “shall be collectible,
and their application or use authorized” provided that such rates
and charges are in accord with rules and regulations promulgated by the DECS.

It is convenient to quote Section 42 again:

“Sec. 42. Tuition
and Other School Fees. -­-Each
private school shall determine its rate of tuition and other school fees or
charges. The rates and charges adopted
by schools pursuant to this provision shall be collectible, and their
application or use authorized, subject to rules and regulations promulgated
by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports.” (Underscoring
supplied)

We do not read the first sentence
of Section 42 as granting an unlimited power to private schools to
establish any rate of tuition and other school fees and charges that it may
desire and to enforce collection of such fees or charges from students. We think it entirely clear that the second
sentence of Section 42 is a limiting provision, that is, a provision
which, far from authorizing a private school to adopt any level of tuition and
other school fees or charges no matter how exorbitant, subjects the schedule
of rates and charges adopted by a particular school to the rules and
regulations promulgated by the DECS. Thus, the rates and charges adopted by any given private school shall be
“collectible”, i.e., enforceable against the students and their
parents to the extent that they are consistent with DECS rules and
regulations. Put a little differently,
the second sentence of Section 42 deals with two (2) distinguishable
subjects: (a) the enforceability of
rates of fees and charges adopted by private schools; and (b) the
enforceability of proposed applications or uses of the proceeds of such school
fees or charges — and both are declared subject to rules and
regulations promulgated by the DECS.

We turn to the argument of petitioner Lina that the DECS
Secretary was divested of his authority to promulgate rules and regulations
relating to the fixing of tuition and other school fees, by R.A. No. 6728, and
that such authority has been transferred instead to the SAC. The Court is unable to agree with this
contention. We do not see how R.A. No.
6728 could be regarded as vesting upon the SAC the legal authority to establish
maximum permissible tuition and other school fees for private schools. As earlier noted, R.A. No. 6728 deals with
government assistance to students and teachers in private schools; it does not,
in other words, purport to deal at with the question of authority to fix
maximum collectible tuition and other school fees. R.A. No. 6728 did authorize the SAC to issue rules and
regulations; but the rules and regulations which may be promulgated by the SAC
must relate to the authority granted by R.A. No. 6728 to the SAC. It is axiomatic that a rule or regulation
must bear upon, and be consistent with, the provisions of the enabling statute
if such rule or regulation is to be valid.^[12]
The SAC was authorized to define the classes of students who may be entitled to
claim government financial assistance. Under the statute, students of schools charging tuition and other school
fees in excess of certain identified rates or levels thereof shall not be entitled
to claim government assistance or subsidies. The specification of such levels of tuition and other school fees for
purposes of qualifying (or disqualifying) the students in such schools for
government financial assistance is one thing: this is the task SAC was authorized to carry out though the promulgation
of rules and regulations. The
determination of the levels of tuition and other school fees which may lawfully
be charged by any private school, is clearly another matter; this task is
vested in respondent Secretary.

It is hardly necessary to add that the Court, in reaching the
above conclusion is not saying that every paragraph add sub-paragraph of DECS
Order No. 30 is necessarily valid and consistent with the provisions of the
enabling statute(s). We do not
understand the parties to be asking us to validate or strike down every such
paragraph and sub-paragraph.

In respect of the second principal issue, petitioner Lina
contends that section 1(d) of DECS Order No. 30 is inconsistent with Section 10
of R.A. No. 6728. We have earlier
pointed out that petitioner’s stand is inconsistent with the very language used
in Section 10 of R.A. No. 6728 which states in relevant part that: “in any
proposed increase in the rate of tuition fees, there shall be appropriate
consultations —.” Petitioner Lina’s argument here is, however,
essentially an invocation of “justice and equity.” Petitioner argues
that:

“x x x [T]here is no basis, legal or otherwise, for the
respondent Secretary to view ‘other fees’ as separate and distinct from
‘tuition fee rate’ for purposes of the consultation requirement of the
law. To exclude the imposition of
‘other fees’ from the consultation process would result in an anomalous
situation whereby so-called ‘other fees’ may become so burdensome that the
students and parents concerned may be deprived of the right of being heard or
consulted on matter directly affecting their interest. Justice and equity demand that any
increase in the tuition fee, tuition fee assessment or ‘other fees’ which in
its totality increases the cost of education, should and must be subjected to
consultation, as required in Section 10, R.A. No. 6728.”14
(Underscoring supplied)

The Court believes that petitioner’s argument — cogent though it
may be as a social and economic comment — is most appropriately addressed, not
to a court which must take the law as it is actually written, but rather to the
legislative authority which can, if it wishes, change the language and content
of the law. As Section 10 of R.A. No.
6728 now stands, we have no authority to strike down paragraph 1 (d) of DECS
Order No. 30 as inconsistent with the requirements of Section 10.

Summarizing, the first issue we must answer in the
affirmative. To the second issue, we
must give a negative answer.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for
Prohibition and Mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J.,
Cruz, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo,
Melo, and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., no part.

---

^[1]
R.A. No. 6728 is entitled “An Act Providing Government Assistance to
Students and Teachers in Private Education, and Appropriating Funds
Therefor.”

^[2]
153 SCRA 626 (1987).

^[3]
Petition, p. 5; Rollo, p. 5.

^[4]
The Secretary of Justice has rendered an opinion (Opinion No. 156, Series of
1989) dealing with the inter­relations of the various provisions of R.A. No.
6728 and suggesting that Section 10 of R.A. No. 6728 does not apply to
situations contemplated in Sections 5(1) (a) and 9 (a) of that law, but that
Section 10 should apply only to Sections 5(1) (b), 9 (b), and 9 (c). Paragraph 1 (a) of DECS Order No. 30
allegedly falls under Section 9 (c) of R.A. No. 6728.

^[5]
156 SCRA 629 (1987).

^[6]
156 SCRA at 661.

^[7]
156 SCRA at 660-661.

^[8]
153 SCRA 622 (1987).

^[9]
153 SCRA at 626-627.

^[10]
156 SCRA 632 (1987).

^[11]
156 SCRA at 661-662 and 663.

^[12]
Abila v. Civil Service Commission, 198 SCRA 102 (1991); Chartered Bank
Employees Association v. Ople, 138 SCRA 273 (1985).

14 Petition, p. 8; Rollo, p. 8.