THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JAIME SAMBANGAN Y VELASQUEZ, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
finding the accused Jaime Sam­bangan y Velasquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and
sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalty provided for by law, to indemnify
Maria Theresa Manguera in the amount of P12,000.00
and to pay the costs.

The accused Jaime Sambangan y
Velasquez was charged before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:

“That on or about the 27th day of April, 1975, in Kalookan City, Philippines, and within the juris­diction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with
and have sexual intercourse with Maria Theresa Manguera
y Esplena,
a minor of nine (9) years old, herein represented by her father Herminio Manguera y
Cruz.”

After trial, the Court of
First Instance of Rizal convicted Jaime Sambangan y Velasquez of the crime of rape and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with accessory penalty provided for by law and to indemnify Maria
Theresa Manguera the amount of P12,000.00 and to pay
the costs.  Hence, this appeal.

It appears from the
records that:

“The complainant, Maria Theresa Manguera,
was a young girl, nine years old, and a third grade pupil (p. 2, tsn., June 25, 1975). 
Her acquaintance with the accused Jaime Sambangan
y Velasquez deve­loped into intimacy when the Manguera
family and Sambangan lived in the same compound, at
779 Corner 7th Street and 9th
Avenue, Caloocan
City.

“In the evening of April
27, 1975, accused brought complainant to the bodega of Mendoza
& Sons (p. 3, Id.; Exh. “C”) which was located in the compound where
the complainant and her family reside. 
Once there, the accused ordered complainant to undress while he removed
his pants and brief.  Complainant,
however, did not strip herself as ordered,
but merely removed her shorts.  Accused
then lay on top of the complainant and tried to insert his private parts into
her organ (p. 3, tsn., June 25, 1975).  It was about this time that Bibiana Esplana Manguera, mother of the complainant noticed that her
daughter Maria Theresa was not yet home, so she looked for her inside the
compound.  While she was on her way to
the bodega, she saw Maria Theresa coming out with accused Jaime Sambangan.  She asked
her daughter to come home with her.  Upon
arrival at their house she inquired from Maria Theresa why she was with the
accused Jaime Sambangan in the bodega at that
time.  Bibiana
noticed that her daughter’s panty was wet with whitish substance.  She asked her daughter what happened and the
reply was that the accused inserted his private part into hers.  Bibiana confronted
the accused about what he did to her daughter. 
Accused promised not to do it again and begged for forgiveness (p. 3,
Decision).

On advice of a certain Mr. Mendoza, a co-owner of the compound
where the incident took place, Bibiana Esplana Manguera, with her said
daughter reported the incident to the
police authorities on April 28, 1975.  Ma.
Theresa was physically examined by Dr. David Cabrera to determine whether she
was sexually abused.  Dr. Cabrera found a
laceration of the hymen at 4 o’clock position but her private part would admit
only a small finger with resistance.  He
also found indications of sexual intercourse but there was only partial
penetration in that the insertion of the accused’s
private part into the complainant’s private part was not complete.^[1]

The accused-appellant on the other hand alleged that on April 27,
1975, he was working at 9th
Avenue, 7th Street, Caloocan City; that he did not
remember any un­usual event that took place in the date mentioned; that he did
not know anything about what Maria Theresa testified regarding his molesting
her by committing indecent act on her person; that he did not know anything
about her testimony that he inserted his penis into her vagina; and that on
April 27, 1975, he did not see or meet Maria Theresa Manguera in the morning and in the evening.

It has been established,
however, that Maria Theresa Manguera and appellant
knew each other before the act in question occurred; that on April 27, 1975, appellant brought her inside a bodega where
he ordered her to undress while appellant took off his pants and brief; and
that appellant placed himself on top of her. 
Appellant’s claim, therefore, that he did not remember any
unusual event on April 27, 1975, and that he did not “see and meet Maria Theresa Manguera
in the morning and in the evening“^[2] of that day is a downright lie.  No young Filipina, of decent repute would
publicly admit that she had been criminally assaulted unless that is the truth.^[3]
The contention of the appellant that he was accused of such serious offense
because complainant’s father, Herminio, and he
“were in estranged relationship”^[4]
because of an affair he had with a niece of Mr. Manguera,
is groundless.  For, as aptly found by
the lower court, “it is difficult to believe that Herminio
Manguera would go to the extent of falsely accusing
him of the crime of rape in which his very own daughter was involved, and the
fact that Manguera had trans­ferred his niece to
another place shows he had much less reason to manufacture a case of rape
against the accused x x x on the other hand, it
may not be far fetched to state that it was the accused who had a grudge
against Manguera for having transferred his
sweetheart and thereby deprived him of his alleged relationship with said
niece” x x x.^[5] Besides, a Barangay
member would not have apprehended appellant where no strong ground to believe
that he committed the act of which he is accused.  No police investigator would take a
confession (Exh. “C”) and make appellant
sign it if it were not true.^[6] Moreover,
no fiscal would have agreed to
an irregularity.

Appellant’s charging the
different agencies of the government of falsely accusing him cannot stand.  His claim that he was maltreated by a
policeman while being investigated before his statement was taken (Exh. “C“) is also without merit.  At this point, appellant has not overcome the
presumption as to the voluntariness of his
confession.  In fact, his confession (Exh. “C“) narrates facts which could not have been dictated and supplied by
anybody but he.  Thus his narration:

“T:   Ano
ba ang hindi
magandang ginawa mo kay ‘Etes‘ na
iyong itinuro o si Maria Theresa Manguera?

 S:   Kagabi po sumama po sa
akin sa itaas ng bodega si ‘Estes’ tapos umupo kami
sa mga gagawing
kutsarang craft na may karton tapos po
naghubad siya ang kanyang shorts tapos po nagtangal
din ako ng pantalon at nagbati
or nagsalsal ako at ng labasan na
ako ay ipinahid ko ang tamod
sa puki ni
‘Etes‘.

“T:   Ano
pa ang ginawa mo pagkatapos nuon?

 S:   Pinasuot ko na siya ng
kanyang shorts at nag­pantalon
na rin ako
at kami ay bumaba na.

“T:   Kailan
at saan ba naganap ang bagay
na ito?

 S:   Oras humigit-kumulang
ika 8:00 ng gabi, kagabi Abril
28, 1975 doon po sa itaas ng
Bodega, Mendoza and Sons, 779 corner 7th st., 9th
Avenue, Caloocan City.”^[7]

would
not convey any other than that he had committed a wrong upon the complainant.  If appellant were allegedly maltreated, it is
rather surprising why he did not state the alleged maltreatment when he swore
to his confession before the fiscal.^[8] The absence of evidence, therefore, showing
how the investigating police officer maltreated and forced him to sign his
statement (Exh. “C“) and the lack of
explanation why the investigator would concoct a false confession^[9] only indicate the voluntary character of the execution thereof.
Appellant’s confession, there­fore, is admissible, as it was not shown to have
been involuntarily rendered.^[10]

The alibi of appellant
that he did not remember any unusual incident that took place in the evening of
April 27, 1975 and that he was sleeping in his place of work when he was
arrested by members of the Barangay at around
midnight is but an attempt to exculpate himself inasmuch as he resided in the
same compound as complainant.  His
presence, therefore, at the scene of the crime could not be
discounted.  It has been held by this
Honorable Court in several cases that:

“To establish alibi, a defendant must not only show that he was present at some other place about the
time of the alleged crime, but also that he was at such place for so long a time it was impossible
for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed, either before,
or after the time he was at such other place.”^[11]

In this case, appellant failed to prove
that it was physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime either before, during or after the time he
was at such other place.  Likewise,
appellant’s defense in this regard cannot prosper considering that he was
positively identified.  A defense of
alibi cannot prosper where the accused was positively identified as the
assailant.^[12] And above all, it is difficult to believe
that complainant and her parents would have gone to the extent that would
expose them to public trial if they were not actually motivated by a human desire to obtain redress of the wrong done to them.^[13]

And, lastly, the
contention of the accused that it was impossible for a nine year old who was
violated by a man of twenty-one not to have made an outcry, or, at least, cried
is untenable.  Under Art 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, carnal knowledge of a girl under twelve years is always
rape, even if no force or intimidation is used.  And
as was held in the case of People vs. de
la Cruz (56 SCRA 85):

“Appellant’s attempt to discredit complainant’s story by
observing that she had made no outcry during the commission of the crime or
immediately thereafter does not deserve serious consideration.  In the rape of a girl below twelve years of
age, force or intimi­dation need not be present.  The gravamen of the
offense is the carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years old.”

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED, with costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Makasiar, J.,(Chairman), joins J.
Aquino in his
concurrence.

Aquino, J., see cocurrence. 

^[1]
pp. 2-3, Appellee’s Brief.

^[2]
p. 3, tsn., Appellant’s Brief.

^[3]
People v. Gan, 46 SCRA 667.

^[4]
p. 2, Appellant’s Brief.

^[5]
pp. 9-10, Decision.

^[6]
p. 4, Appellant’s Brief.

^[7]
pp. 7-8, Decision.

^[8]
People v. Casillar, 30 SCRA 352; People v.
Pareja, 30 SCRA 693.

^[9]
People vs. Gomez, 28 SCRA 440.

^[10]
People vs. Dorado, 30 SCRA 52.

^[11]
People vs. Munoz, 107 SCRA 313; People vs. Capillas,
108 SCRA 173.

^[12]
People vs. Yutila,
102 SCRA 264; People vs. Bermoy, 105 SCRA 106.

^[13]
People vs. Selfacion,
1 SCRA 235.

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