G.R. No. L-22985. January 24, 1968
BATANGAS TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. GREGORIO CAGUIMBAL, PANCRACIO CAGUIMBAL, MARIA MARANAN DE CAGUIMBAL, BIÑAN TRANSPORTATION COMPANY AND MARCIANO ILAGAN, RESPONDENTS.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The main facts are set forth in said decision from which we
quote:
“There is no dispute at all that the deceased Pedro Caguimbal, Barrio Lieutenant of Barrio Calansayan,
San Jose, Batangas, was a paying passenger of BTCO
bus, with plate TPU-507, going south on its regular route from Calamba, Laguna, to Batangas, Batangas, driven by Tomas Perez, its regular driver, at
about 5:30 o’clock on the early morning of April 25, 1954. The deceased’s destination was his residence
at Calansayan, San Jose, Batangas. The
bus of the Biñan Transportation Company, bearing
plate TPU-820, driven by Marciano Ilagan,
was coming from the opposite direction (north-bound). Along the national highway at Barrio Daraza, Tanauan, Batangas, on the date and hour above indicated, a
horse-driven rig (calesa) managed by Benito Makahiya, which was then ahead of the Biñan
bus, was also coming from the opposite direction, meaning proceeding towards
the north. As to what transpired
thereafter, the lower court chose to give more credence to defendant Batangas Transportation Company’s version which, in the
words of the Court a quo, is as follows: ‘As the BTCO bus was nearing a house, a
passenger requested the conductor to stop as he was going to alight, and when
he heard the signal of the conductor, the driver Tomas Perez slowed down his
bus swerving it farther to the right in order to stop; at this juncture, a calesa then driven by Benito Makahiya
was at a distance of several meters facing the BTCO bus coming from the
opposite direction; that at the same time, the Biñan
bus was about 100 meters away likewise going northward and following the
direction of the calesa; that upon seeing the Biñan bus, the driver of the BTCO bus dimmed his light as
established by Magno Ilaw,
the very conductor of the Biñan bus at the time of
the accident; that as the calesa and the BTCO bus
were passing each other from the opposite directions, the Biñan
bus following the calesa swerved to its left
in an attempt to pass between the BTCO bus and the calesa;
that without diminishing its speed of about seventy (70 ) kilometers an hour,
the Biñan bus passed through the space between the
BTCO bus and the calesa hitting first the left
side of the BTCO bus with the left front corner of its body and then bumped and
struck the calesa which was completely
wrecked; that the driver was seriously injured and the horse was killed; that
the second and all other posts supporting the top of the left side of the BTCO
bus were completely smashed and half of the back wall to the left was ripped
open (Exhibits 1 and 2). The BTCO bus
suffered damages for the repair of its damaged portion.”
As a consequence of this occurrence, two (2) passengers of BTCO
died, namely, Pedro Caguimbal and Guillermo Tolentino, apart from others who were injured. The widow and children of Caguimbal
instituted the present action, which was tried jointly with a similar action of
the Tolentinos, to recover damages from the Batangas Transportation Company, hereinafter referred to as
BTCO. The latter, in turn, filed a
third-party complaint against the Biñan
Transportation Company — hereinafter referred to as Biñan
— and its driver, Marciano Ilagan. Subsequently, the Caguimbals
amended their complaint, to include therein, as defendants, said Biñan and Ilagan.
After appropriate proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Batangas rendered a decision dismissing the complaint
insofar as the BTCO is concerned, without prejudice to plaintiffs’ right to sue
Biñan — which had stopped participating in the
proceedings herein, owing, apparently, to a case in the Court of First Instance
of Laguna for the insolvency of said enterprise — and Ilagan,
and without pronouncement as to costs.
On appeal taken by the Caguimbals, the
Court of Appeals reversed said decision and rendered judgment for them,
sentencing the BTCO, Biñan and Ilagan
to, jointly and severally, pay to the plaintiffs the aggregate sum of P10,
500.00[1]
and costs in both instances. Hence, this
appeal by BTCO, upon the ground that the Court of Appeals erred: 1) in finding said appellant liable for
damages; and 2) in awarding attorney’s fees.
In connection with the first assignment of error, we note that
the recklessness of defendant Ilagan was, manifestly,
a major factor in the occurrence of the accident which resulted, inter alia, in the death of Pedro Caguimbal. Indeed, as driver of the Biñan
bus, he overtook Benito Makahiya’s horse-driven rig
of calesa and passed between the same and the
BTCO bus despite the fact that the space available was not big enough therefor, in view of which the Biñan
bus hit the left side of the BTCO bus and then the calesa. This notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals
rendered judgment against the BTCO, upon the ground that its driver, Tomas
Perez, had failed to exercise the “extraordinary diligence,” required
in Article 1733 of the new Civil Code, “in the vigilance for the
safety” of his passengers.[2]
The record shows that, in order to permit one of them to
disembark, Perez drove his BTCO bus partly to the right shoulder of the road
and partly on the asphalted portion thereof.
Yet, he could have and should have seen to it — had he exercised
“extraordinary diligence” — that his bus was completely outside the
asphalted portion of the road, and fully within the shoulder thereof, the width
of which being more than sufficient to accommodate the bus. He could have and should have done this,
because, when the aforementioned passenger expressed his wish to alight from
the bus, Ilagan had seen the aforementioned “calesa“, driven by Makahiya,
a few meters away, coming from the opposite direction, with the Biñan bus about 100 meters behind the rig, cruising at a
good speed.[3] When Perez slowed down his BTCO bus to permit
said passenger to disembark, he must have known, therefore, that the Biñan bus would overtake the “calesa“,
at about the time when the latter and BTCO bus would probably be on the same
line, on opposite of the asphalted portions of the road, and that the space
between the BTCO bus and the “calesa”
would not be enough to allow the Biñan bus to go
through. It is true that the driver of
the Biñan bus should have slowed down or stopped,
and, hence, was reek less in not doing so; but, he had no especial obligations
toward the passengers of the BTCO, unlike Perez whose duty was to exercise
“utmost” or “extraordinary” diligence for their safety.
Perez was thus under obligation to avoid a situation which would hazardous for
his passengers, and make their safety dependent upon the diligence of the Biñan driver. Such
obligation becomes more patent when we consider the fact — of which the Court
may take judicial cognizance — that our motor vehicle drivers, particularly
those of public utilities, have not distinguished themselves for their concern
over the safety, the comfort or the convenience a others. Besides, as correctly
stated in the syllabus to Brito Sy
vs. Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc.,[4]
“In an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need
not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier
in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought for by the passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier
assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination
safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the
circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right
away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier (Article 1756, new
Civil Code). This is an exception to the
general rule that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent
upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in Article 1733 and 1755 of the new Civil Code. “
In the case at bar, BTCO has not proven the exercise of
extraordinary diligence on its part. For
this reason, the case of Isaac vs. A. L. Ammen Trans.
Co., Inc.,[5]
relied upon by BTCO, is not in point, for, in said case, the public utility
driver had done “everything he could to avoid” the accident, and
could not have possibly avoided it, for he “swerved the bus to the very extreme
right of the road, which the driver, in the present case, had failed to do.
As regards the second assignment of error, appellant argues that
the award of attorney’s fees is not authorized by law, because, of the eleven
(11) cases specified in Article 1208 of the new Civil Code, only the fifth and
the last are relevant to the one under consideration; but the fifth case
requires bad faith, which does not exist in the case at bar. As regards the last case, which permits the
award, “where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees x
x x should be
recovered,” it is urged that the evidence on record does not show the
existence of such just and equitable grounds.
We, however, believe otherwise, for: (1) the accident in question took place on
April 25, 1954, and the Caguimbals have been
constrained to litigate for over thirteen (13) years to vindicate their rights;
and (2) it is high time to impress effectively upon public utility operators
the nature and extent of their responsibility in respect of the safety of their
passengers and their duty to exercise greater care in the selection of drivers
and conductors and in supervising the performance of their duties, in
accordance, not only with Article 1733 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
but, also, with Articles 1755 and 1756 thereof[6]
and the spirit of these provisions, as disclosed by the letter thereof, and,
elucidated by the Commission that drafted the same.[7]
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is
hereby, affirmed, with the costs of this instance against appellant Batangas Transportation Company.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Ruiz Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, J.P., J., did not take part.
[1]
For funeral expenses – P 1,000
For the death of Pedro Caguimbal – 6,000
For moral damages – 2,000
For attorney’s fees – 1,500
P10,500
[2]
“ART. 1733.
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them, according to all the circumstances of each case.”
[3] 70 km. p.h.
[4] 102 Phil., 482.
[5] 101 Phil., 1046.
[6]
“ART. 1755. A common carrier is
bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard
for all the circumstances.”
“ART. 1756. In
case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.”
[7]
“A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with due regard for all circumstances.
This extraordinary diligence required of common carriers is calculated
to protect the passengers from the tragic mishaps that frequently occur in
connection with rapid modern transportation.
This high standard of care is imperatively demanded by the preciousness
of human life and by the consideration that every person must in every way be
safeguarded against all injury.” (Report of the Code Commission, pp. 35-36.)