MAGDALENA O’DELL REPRESENTED BY HECTOR P. TEODOSIO AS HER ATTORNEY-IN FACT, PETITIONER, VS. MICHAEL FRENCH, RESPONDENT.

Before this Court is a Petition for Review^[1] filed by petitioner Magdalena O’ Dell assailing the Decision^[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 68 of Dumangas, Iloilo which set aside the Decision^[3] of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Passi City in Civil Case No. 437 in an action for Ejectment.

THE PARTIES

Petitioner Magdalena F. O’ Dell is of legal age, widow, American Citizen^[4] and presently residing in Houston, Texas, U.S.A. She is represented by her Attorney- in-Fact, Hector P. Teodosio, of legal age, married and a resident of Carles, Iloilo.^[5]

Respondent Rene Michael French, on the other hand is of legal age, and a resident of Passi City, Province of Iloilo.^[6]

THE ANTECEDENTS

On September 30, 2008, petitioner filed a Complaint^[7] for ejectment against respondent docketed as Civil Case No. 437.

O’dell avers that she is the owner of a parcel of land located at Passi City with an area of 487,871 square meters more or less covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19522.

Sometime in the 1980’s, the father of defendant, Henry French sought permission from the petitioner to cultivate a portion of the subject property, enjoy its produce, free from rentals. In return, he shall be responsible in paying some loans incurred by the former with the Philippine National Bank. Henry swore, if at any time petitioner shall need the property, he shall vacate the same. petitioner verbally consented thereto.

In 1991, Henry French passed away and respondent took possession of the property without permission from her. O’dell insists that respondent’s occupation of a portion of the subject property is by mere tolerance. Thus, petitioner sent thru her counsel a letter of demand dated January 10, 2008 ordering respondent to vacate the property within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.^[8] We quote the pertinent portions of the Complaint:

4. Sometime in the 1980’s the father of defendant Henry French, asked permission from the plaintiff to cultivate the portion of the above-described parcel of land, enjoy its produce without paying any rentals but will take charge in paying some loans with the Philippine National Bank. Henry French promised that if at anytime the plaintiff needs the property, he will vacate the same. Plaintiff verbally agreed. Xxx

5. In 1991, Henry French died, and defendant took possession of the property without permission from the plaintiff.

6. Defendant therefore by mere tolerance from plaintiff is presently occupying a portion of plaintiff’s property as above-described. As the possession of defendant is by mere tolerance, plaintiff has the legal right to eject the defendant: xxx

7. Plaintiff desirous of using her property, sent thru her counsel, a letter of demand dated January 10, 2008 demanding from defendant to vacate the property within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the said letter. xxx

8. Defendant was able to receive said letter, but despite receipt of the said letter of demand, defendant failed to vacate the premises;

Respondent filed his Answer with Affirmative and Special Defenses and Counterclaim^[9] to the complaint and alleged that it was his father Henry French and the close corporation French-Solinap Development Corporation who has been in possession of the property since 1985. Since then, they have acted as owners therein.

After his parents’ demise, respondent claims he succeeded as the administrator, owner and president of the close corporation.^[10] In response to the complaint, he puts up the defense of laches and extinctive prescription against petitioner and other persons acting on her behalf. French stresses, petitioner has remained in silence and in inaction over his claimed right for over twenty-three (23) years.^[11]

On January 27, 2008, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MCTC) rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. The fallo of which states:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against defendants (sic) as follows:

1) Ordering the defendant RENE MICHAEL FRENCH and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate Lot 6895 covered by TCT No. T-19522 and to turn over the possession thereof to the plaintiff;

2) Ordering said defendant to pay annually the sum of TWO HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P210,000.00) starting January 10, 2008, until defendant vacates and turn over the premises in question to the plaintiff as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of lot 6895;

3) Ordering the said defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as attorney’s fees;

4) Ordering said defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), as litigation expenses; and

5) The cost of the suit.

The counter-claim is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.^[12]

From the above decision, respondent filed an appeal^[13] before the Regional Trial Court. In response to the pleading filed, an Appeal Memorandum was also filed by petitioner.^[14]

On October 12, 2012, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 68 of Dumangas, Iloilo set aside the decision of the MTCC and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. It disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, for lack of jurisdiction, the questioned decision subject of the herein appeal is hereby set aside and the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED.^[15]

Ruling on the issues raised, the RTC held the inapplicability of the dead man’s statute considering that respondent is sued in his personal capacity.

It affirmed the finding of the MTCC in ruling that respondent or his predecessor-in-interest were not the owner of the property subject of the litigation. Likewise, it continued to affirm the declaration of the MTCC saying that indeed, respondent’s occupation was merely by tolerance.^[16]

However, it declared that the allegations in the complaint failed to confer jurisdiction with the MTCC.^[17] We quote:

xxx The court is now at a loss on how to treat the complaint of the plaintiff. If the same is to be treated as a case for unlawful detainer, the same cannot apply to the defendant as his entry was without the consent of the plaintiff. The one given permission by the plaintiff was the father of the defendant Henry French. Such permission was not accorded to defendant as the allegation itself is very clear and unequivocal: In 1991, Henry French died, and defendant took possession of the property without permission from the plaintiff.

If on the other hand the complaint is to be treated as one for forcible entry, the one year period within which to file the complaint has long ago lapsed and after the one year period expires, jurisdiction is already vested with the Regional Trial Court. Besides, it is doctrinal that a case for forcible party can never ripen into one for unlawful detainer. Xxx^[18]

From the above ruling, the RTC declared the complaint to possess a jurisdictional conflict in the allegations. Consequently, it held:

Verily, the sufficiency, of the allegations in the complaint is vital considering that the reckoning of the one year period from the date possession became illegal is indispensable. This time bar is sine qua non in determining which court has jurisdiction to try the issue of possession.^[19]

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration^[20]. The same was however met with an Order^[21] denying said motion. In doing so, it ratiocinated that it found no cogent reason to disturb its challenged decision.^[22]

The disposition of the RTC prompted petitioner to file the instant proceeding. In lodging the present petition, petitioner’s main contention is captured in her identified grounds for review:

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF PASSI CITY AND ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.^[23]

Specifically, it asserts:

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT PASSI CITY, IS NOT ONE OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER, NOTWITHSTANDING THE ALLEGATION IN PARAGRAPHS 4, AND 6 OF THE COMPLAINT xxx^[24]

Petitioner argues that the Regional Trial Court is mistaken. The complaint filed before the Municipal Trial Court of Passi City is not one of forcible entry for it lacked the two essential requisites. The Complaint dated September 30, 2008 never alleged that respondent took possession of the property by means of force, intimidation, stealth, strategy, or threat. Also, it never alleged that petitioner was in actual physical possession of the property at the time of taking. Hence, the complaint never constituted a case for forcible entry.

On the contrary, the Complaint clearly depicts a case of unlawful detainer. O’dell insists that the complaint clearly alleged respondent’s possession of the property as one by tolerance.^[25]

O’dell argues, the Regional Trial Court acknowledged that paragraphs 4 and 6 of the complaint sufficiently satisfy the requirement of tolerance.^[26] Granting argumenti gratia that paragraph 5 of the said complaint seemed to depict forcible entry, petitioner poses the question, will the allegation constitute sufficient reason to disregard paragraphs 4 and 6 of the complaint, set aside the decision of the MTCC, and dismiss the complaint in its entirety?^[27]

Petitioner submits, the allegations found in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the Complaint when collectively construed would clearly show tolerance. The possession of the respondent was merely a continuation of that of his father.

The confusion or jurisdictional conflict between paragraphs 4 and 6 of the Complaint on one hand and paragraph 5 of the same Complaint is not jurisdictional but a matter of interpretation of the paragraphs.^[28] Thus, the jurisdictional problem that the RTC has perceived should not be a basis in reversing the decision of the MTCC and dismissing the complaint.^[29]

Accordingly, petitioner prays for the Decision of the Regional Trial Court to be nullified and to reinstate the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Passi City. ^[30]

Acting on the petition filed, We directed respondent to file Comment.^[31] In compliance with this Court’s Order, respondent filed his Comment to the Petition for Review.^[32]

In response to petitioner’s arguments, French countered saying that petitioner’s tolerance existed since she herself said that respondent did not ask permission when he took possession of the subject land.^[33] respondent theorizes that there was neither any “allegation in the complaint nor any supporting evidence on record to show that he entered the property or who granted him permission to enter.” Without these allegations and evidence, the bare claim regarding “tolerance” cannot be upheld.^[34]

Respondent adds, paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the Complaint contradict an action for unlawful detainer resulting to a jurisdictional conflict in the allegations therein. While paragraphs 4 and 6 of the Complaint mentions tolerance, paragraph 5 thereof speaks of forcible entry because it depicts a situation where entry was without permission of the petitioner. ^[35]

Respondent likewise manifests the existence of a case for quieting of title involving the same parties and the same subject property docketed as Civil Case No. 08-156 pending before the same Regional Trial Court.^[36] French assays, considering that the main issue in the instant case and that in Civil Case No. 08-526 is ultimately for the purpose of determining the issue of ownership, it is only logical and pragmatic for the issue of ownership to be threshed out in Civil Case No. 08-516.^[37]

From the above submissions, respondent prays for this Court to deny the instant petition for review and to affirm the Decision of the RTC.^[38]

ISSUES

This Court shall rule on the following issues:

I
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court correctly
 dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction;

II
Whether or not there was tolerance in respondent’s
possession of the subject property;

THE COURT’S RULING

A reading of the assailed decision leads this Court to conclude that the “jurisdictional conflict” perceived by the Regional Trial Court stemmed from the allegations of the complaint vis a vis the elements of an unlawful detainer and forcible entry.

For a clear resolution of the first issue, a distinction of the characteristics of an unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases is in order.

In Sumulong vs. Court of Appeals,^[39] the Supreme Court differentiated the distinct causes of action in forcible entry vis-à-vis unlawful detainer, to wit:

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of action defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the only issue is who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess and the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive, for in such action, the defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action is the termination of the defendant’s right to continue in possession.

It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint.^[40]

In Cabrera v. Getaruela,^[41] the Supreme Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

A reading of the allegations found in the pleading leads us to conclude that indeed the allegations found in the complaint comprise a cause of action in a case for unlawful detainer. The allegation of tolerance is embodied in paragraphs 4 and 5. In the narration of petitioner’s cause of action, she stated that respondent’s father entered the property by virtue of an agreement with the former. The complaint alleged, Henry French shall vacate the property when O’dell will be in need of it.

In 1991, respondent possessed the property. Petitioner asserted her right over the property through the letter dated January 10, 2008. In the said letter, petitioner demanded respondent to vacate the premises. Despite said notice, respondent refused to cede possession thereof.

Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Complaint on the other hand narrates the above-described incidents and depicts the illegal possession of respondent of the subject property as required by the second and third requisite for an unlawful detainer.

The date of filing of the Complaint then completes the fourth requisite. In the case at bar, the Complaint was filed on October 2008. Since the date of the last demand was made in January of the same year, the fourth requisite of filing the complaint within one year from the last demand is met.

We also add: Henry French’s occupation of the property was authorized by petitioner. It was in 1991 when respondent entered the property. It bears noting that it was only in 2008 when petitioner wanted to make use of the land that she demanded him to vacate the same. The fact that respondent was allowed to stay on the property without being ousted clearly speaks of tolerance. If at all, petitioner merely honored the original parties’ agreement that the possessor may be evicted once the need for the use of the land arises.

Further, We cannot allow respondent to change the course of his theory so conveniently to serve his purpose. It must be stressed that both the MTCC and the RTC agreed that respondent’s occupation of the subject property was by tolerance. The Regional Trial Court acknowledged there was tolerance by the petitioner of respondent’s possession of the subject property. Also, the act of insisting on the absence of tolerance would run counter to his prayer of affirming in toto the assailed decision. At the inception of the case, respondent did not contest the jurisdiction of the MTCC to try the case. It was only when the RTC declared that there was jurisdictional conflict that French chimed with the RTC’s declaration and claimed jurisdictional conflict.

The general rule is that factual findings of lower courts are accorded respect on review of their decisions x x x.^[42] Since both MTCC and RTC have settled the issue, We see no reason to disturb the same.

Having resolved the issue of tolerance, We find all the requisites of unlawful detainer present in the complaint.

It is settled that the allegations in the complaint determine whether a cause of action is stated therein and likewise the nature of the action which in turn forms the basis of determining jurisdiction over the subject matter.^[43]

Finally, We find the assertion of respondent that the issue of ownership must be threshed in the case for quieting of title to be unavailing.

It must be remembered that a ruling on the issue of ownership in an ejectment suit is only provisional to determine who between the parties has the better right of possession.   It is, therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of ownership.^[44] Hence, a ruling on the issue of ownership in a case for unlawful detainer is without prejudice to the eventual outcome of the quieting of title case.  As the law now stands, in an ejectment suit, the question of ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto.^[45]

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated October 12, 2012 in Civil Case No. 437 is SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Passi City is AFFIRMED and REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Maxino, P.A.A., and Francisco, R.C., JJ., concur.

---

^[1] Rollo, page 18.

^[2] Ibid. page 222.

^[3] Id. page 231.

^[4] Id., page 56.

^[5] Id., page 20.

^[6] Id., page 59.

^[7] Id.

^[8] Id., page 21.

^[9] Id., page 63.

^[10] Id., page 63.

^[11] Id., page 67.

^[12] Id., page 180.

^[13] Id., page 181.

^[14] Id., page 205.

^[15] Id., page 231.

^[16] Id., page 224.

^[17] Id., page 225.

^[18] Id., page 227.

^[19] Id., page 231.

^[20] Id., page 232.

^[21] Id.

^[22] Id., page 249.

^[23] Id., page 30.

^[24] Id.

^[25] Id., page 34.

^[26] Id., page 36.

^[27] Id., page 37.

^[28] Id., page 40.

^[29] Id., page 44.

^[30] Id., page 50.

^[31] Id., page 251.

^[32] Id., page 253.

^[33] Id., page 258.

^[34] Id., page 262.

^[35] Id., page 271.

^[36] Id., page 274.

^[37] Id., page 280.

^[38] Id., page 282.

^[39] G.R. No. 108817, May 10, 1994, 232 SCRA 372.

^[40] Morta, Sr. v. Occidental, G.R. No. 123417, June 10, 1999, 308 SCRA 167

^[41] G.R. No. 164213, April 21, 2009.

^[42] Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 616, 621 (February 3, 1994).

^[43] Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., 494 Phil. 603, 611 (2005).

^[44] Cresenciana Tubo  Rodriguez vs. Evangeline rodriguez, G.R. No. 175720, September 11, 2007.

^[45] Id.