FRANCISCO O. YASA, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE LEONARDO L. LEONIDA, DOLORES M. PERALTA-BELAY AND MERCEDES R. POSADA-LACAP, IN THEIR CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONERS OF THE FIFTH DIVISION…
LAMPAS PERALTA, J.:
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing public respondent
National Labor Relations Commission’s (NLRC’s) (i) Decision dated
December 26, 2012[1] in NLRC
NCR CN. 05-07993-11 (NLRC LAC NO. 03-001053-12) which dismissed, for
lack of jurisdiction, petitioner’s complaint for illegal dismissal, and
(ii) Resolution dated April 29, 2013[2] which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated December 26, 2012.
THE ANTECEDENTS
Private respondent Vishay Philippines, Inc. (Vishay, for
brevity) is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of electronic and
semiconductor products.[3]
Private respondents Luzviminda P. Rosini and Norbert Lang are the Senior
Manager for Human Resources and the Country Manager, respectively, of
private respondent Vishay.[4]
Private respondent Vishay Philippines, Inc. Employees Union-Federation
of Free Workers (VPIEU-FFW) is a labor organization and the recognized
bargaining unit of the rank and file employees of private respondent
Vishay.[5]
In 1983, petitioner Francisco O. Yasa started working as
Machine Mechanic at private respondent Vishay where he also became a
member of private respondent VPIEU-FFW. He rose from the ranks and
eventually occupied the position of Senior Mechanic. From 2001 to 2010,
petitioner served as a member of the board of directors of private
respondent VPIEU-FFW.[6]
On April 26, 2011, petitioner received a letter[7]
from the executive board of private respondent VPIEU-FFW charging him
with violation of the union’s Constitution and By-Laws (CBL),
specifically, working against the purposes of the union and disloyalty
to the union, and directing him to explain why he should not be expelled
from the union. The charges against petitioner included (i) accusing
the union officers of negotiating a Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) for financial gain, by insinuating that there was “under the
table” transaction; (ii) accusing the union officers of buying the L300
van of the union for an overprice of five hundred (P500,000.00) thousand
pesos without any evidence; (iii) accusing the union officers of
fooling the members by reporting to different institutions the
additional budget for groceries; (iii) boasting among the members to
have filed a case before the fiscal against the union officers without
exhausting administrative remedies; (iv) charging the union officers as
corrupt before the eyes of union members without basis; and, (v) sowing
hatred and disunity among the members by destroying the credibility of
the union officers.
In a letter dated May 2, 2011,[8]
petitioner denied the charges and explained, among others, that he was
merely expressing his sentiments through Facebook and was just
“concerned with the affairs of the UNION and its members.” Private
respondent VPIEU-FFW found petitioner guilty of violating the CBL and
expelled him from membership, per Resolution No. 23 dated May 5, 2011.[9] In a letter dated May 10, 2011[10]
of Union President Jun Ramirez, petitioner was informed of his
expulsion from private respondent VPIEU-FFW. On the same date, private
respondent VPIEU-FFW informed private respondent Luzviminda P. Rosini of
petitioner’s expulsion from the union and requested that petitioner be
dismissed from employment pursuant to the union executive board decision
and the union security clause contained in the CBA.[11]
Private respondent Luzviminda P. Rosini immediately informed
petitioner of the request for his dismissal from employment and directed
him to submit a written explanation on why private respondent Vishay
should not implement the union security clause of the CBA.[12] Petitioner submitted his written explanation on May 11, 2011.[13]
On May 12, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[14] of Resolution No. 23, but the same was denied by private respondent VPIEU-FFW.[15] The denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was subsequently communicated to private respondent Luzviminda P. Rosini.[16]
In a letter dated May 13, 2011,[17]
private respondent Luzviminda P. Rosini informed petitioner of his
dismissal from employment at the close of working hours on May 13, 2011,
pursuant to the union security clause of the CBA.
On May 20, 2011, petitioner filed with the labor arbiter a complaint[18] against private respondents for “Illegal Dismissal – Actual, Non-payment – Salary/Wages, Moral and Exemplary Damages.”
After the parties had filed their position papers and
presented their evidence, the labor arbiter rendered a Decision dated
December 26, 2012,[19] finding
petitioner’s expulsion from private respondent VPIEU-FFW and subsequent
dismissal from employment as valid and legal, and dismissing
petitioner’s complaint for lack of merit. Thus:
“In sum, We are convinced that the expulsion of complainant Yasa
from the Union and his subsequent termination from employment by the
company pursuant to the CBA’s Union Security Clause was undoubtedly
valid and legal.WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the above-entitled case for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.”
Petitioner filed an appeal[20] before public respondent NLRC, which rendered a Decision dated December 26, 2012,[21]
dismissing petitioner’s complaint against private respondents Vishay,
Luzviminda P. Rosini and Norbert Lang for lack of merit, and dismissing
petitioner’s complaint against private respondent VPIEU-FFW for lack of
jurisdiction. Thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint against VISHAY, Luz Rosini and Norbert Lang is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The complaint against VISHAY-FFW is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.”
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision
dated December 26, 2012, but public respondent NLRC denied the same in a
Resolution dated April 29, 2013.[22]
Thus, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari which is premised on the following grounds:
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC ACTED IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION
AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN PROMULGATING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION
CONSIDERING THAT:
COMPLAINT AGAINST VPIEU-FFW FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION IS PATENTLY
ERRONEOUS AND CONTRARY TO STANDING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
VISHAY PHILIPPINES, INC., LUZ ROSINI AND NORBERT ANG, FOR LACK OF MERIT
IS ARBITRARY AND WHIMSICAL FOR AS WILL BE SHOWN HEREUNDER, SUCH IS
CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE PRESENTED, LAW AND STANDING JURISPRUDENCE.”[23]THE ISSUE
Whether public respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
in (i) dismissing petitioner’s complaint against private respondent
VPIEU-FFW for lack of jurisdiction, and (ii) dismissing petitioner’s
complaint against private respondents Vishay, Luzviminda P. Rosini and
Norbert Lang for lack of merit.
THE COURT’S RULING
In dismissing petitioner’s complaint against private
respondent VPIEU-FFW, public respondent NLRC ratiocinated that the same
involved an intra-union dispute; consequently, it is the Bureau Of Labor
Relations (BLR) that had jurisdiction over the complaint, not the labor
arbiter and public respondent NLRC.[24]
However, petitioner argues that it is the labor arbiter and public
respondent NLRC who have jurisdiction over the present case, not the
BLR, because the present case involves “illegal dismissal, unfair labor
practice, and a claim for reinstatement, payment of all monetary
claims.”[25] Allegedly,
petitioner’s “expulsion from the union was arbitrary and impetuous,
consequently constituting unfair labor practice,”[26]
as petitioner “was not maligning the union,” but “merely exercising the
rights of a member when he inquired about the proceedings of the
collective bargaining, when he inquired about the purchase by the union
of a vehicle, (and) when he questioned the use of the bulletin board.”[27]
The argument is unfounded.
Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides for the jurisdiction of labor arbiters as follows:
“Art. 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission. –
(a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor
Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the
case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence
of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers,
whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
- Unfair labor practice cases;
- Termination disputes;
- If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases
that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and
other terms and conditions of employment;- Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations;
- Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code,
including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and- Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security,
Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims arising from
employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or
household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for
reinstatement.
or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising
from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies
shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the
grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said
agreements.”
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor
Relations is provided in Article 226 of the Labor Code, as amended.
Thus:
“ART. 226. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS. — The Bureau of Labor
Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions in the regional offices of
the Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive authority to
act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties,
on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes,
grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management
relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or nonagricultural,
except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of
collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance
procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.
An intra-union dispute refers to any conflict between and among
union members, including grievances arising from any violation of the
rights and conditions of membership, violation of or disagreement over
any provision of the union’s constitution and by-laws, or disputes
arising from chartering or disaffiliation of the union.[28]
Sections 1 and 2, Rule XI of Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003
of the DOLE enumerate the following circumstances as inter/intra-union
disputes, to wit:
“RULE XI
INTER/INTRA-UNION DISPUTES AND
OTHER RELATED LABOR RELATIONS DISPUTES
SECTION 1. Coverage. — Inter/intra-union disputes shall include:
union and workers’ association officers/nullification of election of
union and workers’ association officers;SECTION 2. Coverage. — Other related labor
relations disputes shall include any conflict between a labor union and
the employer or any individual, entity or group that is not a labor
organization or workers’ association. This includes: (1) cancellation of
registration of unions and workers’ associations; and (2) a petition
for interpleader.” (Underlining supplied.)
Based on the aforequoted provision, petitioner’s issue with
private respondent VPIEU-FFW involves an intra-union dispute because it
concerns the “validity/invalidity of impeachment/expulsion of union and
workers’ association officers and members.” Although petitioner’s
complaint[29] against private
respondent VPIEU-FFW was for illegal dismissal with prayer for
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, the same also put at
issue the legality of petitioner’s expulsion from private respondent
VPIEU-FFW. Accordingly, public respondent NLRC was correct when it held
that jurisdiction over such controversy insofar as private respondent
VPIEU-FFW is concerned, lies with the BLR. Thus:
“On appellant’s claim against the Union, it appears that the
matter is an intra-union conflict. Article 226 of the Labor Code as
amended by Republic Act No. 6715, provides:Art. 226. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS. – The Bureau of Labor
Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions in the regional offices of
the Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on
all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances
or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all
workplaces whether agricultural or nonagricultural, except
those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective
bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure
and/or voluntary arbitration.
The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) calendar days to act on labor
cases before it, subject to extension by agreement of the parties (Emphasis supplied)
An intra-union dispute is defined under Section (z), Rule I of the Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code, viz:
(z) ‘Intra-Union Dispute’ refers to any conflict between and
among union members, and includes all disputes or grievances arising
from any violation of or disagreement over any provision of the
constitution and by-laws of a union, including cases arising from
chartering or affiliation of labor organizations or from any violation
of the rights and conditions of union membership provided for in the
Code.
Anent the foregoing, this Office has no jurisdiction to hear the
complaint of appellant against the union. Thus, appellant’s case against
the Union should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.”[30]
With respect to the complaint for illegal dismissal against
private respondents Vishay, Luzviminda P. Rosini and Norbert Lang,
public respondent NLRC cannot be faulted in finding that the same was
without merit. It is clear from the records that petitioner’s dismissal
from employment stemmed from his expulsion from private respondent
VPIEU-FFW for violation of the latter’s Constitution and By-Laws,
specifically, gross misconduct and disloyalty for working against the
purposes of private respondent VPIEU-FFW, which prompted the latter to
ask private respondent Vishay for the implementation of the Union
Security Clause contained in its CBA with private respondent VPIEU-FFW.
The Union Security Clause of the parties’ CBA provides:
“Article II
Union Security
SECTION 1. Maintenance of Membership – All employees who are the
bargaining unit defined in Article I hereof and are members of the
UNION upon the signing of this Agreement shall remain members of the
UNION in good standing for the duration of this Agreement as a condition
precedent to continued employment with the COMPANY. It is understood
that employees within the bargaining unit who are not members of the
UNION as of the date of signing of this Agreement shall be free to join
or not to join the Union without pressure or compulsion from the COMPANY
or the UNION.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 3. Dismissals – Any such employee, mentioned in Section 2
hereof, who refuses to join the UNION after attaining regular status
and any UNION member who fails to maintain his membership in the UNION
for any of the following grounds:
(a) Commission of a crime against the Federation, UNION officers and members; (b) Non-payment of right amount of UNION dues and other special assessments to the UNION; (c) Voluntary resignation from the UNION during the effectivity of the Agreement; and (d) Violation of the UNION’s Constitution and By-Laws shall,
upon written notice by the UNION of such refusal to join or to maintain
membership in the UNION, be dismissed from employment by the COMPANY
provided, however, that the UNION shall hold the COMPANY free from
blameless from any and all liabilities that may arise should the
dismissed employee question, in any manner, his dismissal, and provided
further that no such written recommendation shall be made upon the
COMPANY nor shall the COMPANY be compelled to act upon any such
recommendation within the period of sixty (60) days prior to the expiry
date of this Agreement conformably with law.”
In dismissing an employee from employment pursuant to the Union
Security Clause, the employer must determine and prove that: (i) the
union security clause is applicable; (ii) the union is requesting for
the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA; and, (iii)
there is sufficient evidence to support the union’s decision to expel
the employee from the union or company.[31]
In the present case, the following considerations show that all the requisites were complied with by private respondent Vishay.
First, the Union Security Clause is an existing provision in the
parties’ CBA, and its validity was not questioned by the parties. It is
applicable because membership in private respondent VPIEU-FFW is
necessary for continued employment in private respondent Vishay.
Second, private respondent VPIEU-FFW sent a letter dated May 10, 2011[32]
informing private respondent Vishay of its strong “request that
Francisco Yasa, be immediately dismissed from his work for the interest
of industrial peace in the plant,” pursuant to the “union executive
board decision and the union security clause” of the parties’ CBA.
Third, there is sufficient evidence to support the union’s
decision to expel the employee from the union or company. In a letter
dated April 26, 2011,[33]
private respondent VPIEU-FFW charged petitioner with violation of its
Constitution and By-Laws, specifically, “working against the purposes or
principles of the union such as but not limited to disloyalty, lack of
interest or gross misconduct,” and “disloyalty to the union or
discrediting the union in any manner” by committing the following acts:
“(1) accusing the union officers of negotiating a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) for financial gains, by insinuating that
there was under the table transaction;
(2) accusing the union officers of buying the L300 van of the
union for an overprice of five hundred (P500,000.00) thousand pesos
without any evidence;
(3) accusing the union officers of fooling the members by reporting
to different institutions the additional budget for groceries;
(4) boasting among the members to have filed a case before the
fiscal against the union officers without exhausting administrative
remedies such as discussing the matter with union officers or
appropriate committee;
(5) charging the union officers as corrupt before the eyes of union members without basis;
(6) sowing hatred and disunity among the members by destroying the credibility of the union officers;”
Records also bear that petitioner had made several posts in his
Facebook account indirectly accusing private respondent VPIEU-FFW’s
officers of corruption and bargaining to the prejudice of union members.
Copies of screenshots of the Facebook posts[34] were attached to the record. In a letter dated May 2, 2011[35]
addressed to the union’s executive board, petitioner denied the charges
and admitted that he made the Facebook posts, but that he was merely
expressing his sentiments. Petitioner also explained that he did not
name the union officers concerned in his Facebook posts. He was just
concerned with the affairs of the union and its members.
However, contrary to the claims of petitioner, although he did
not mention any names, his Facebook posts alluded corruption and
dishonesty to the “union pres at ibang officer” who were clearly known
to the members of private respondent VPIEU-FFW. The acts of petitioner
tended to discredit the union officers and promoted disunity among the
members. Thus, the decision of the executive board of private respondent
VPIEU-FFW to expel petitioner from membership for infractions which are
“inimical to the interest of the union and acts against the purposes
and principles of the union,”[36] was not unfounded. As correctly observed by public respondent NLRC:
“Appellant, in his explanation, while he denies the accusations
against him, did not refute the postings/messages he made in the
facebook which was the basis for the charges against him. However, he
claims that he was only concerned with the affairs of the union and its
members. He was merely expressing his sentiments and did not name names
in the Facebook postings and comments.We find the contention of appellant untenable. An examination of
the postings/messages made by the appellant would show that it directly
or indirectly attacks the credibility and integrity of the union and
its officers when he accused them of fraud and anomalous transactions
without any supporting evidence.Appellant’s allegation that it cannot be considered as gross
misconduct as it does not relate to the performance of his duties is
misplaced. He was terminated for the offense of misconduct not in
relation to his duties as senior mechanic but his behavior toward the
union wherein he is a member.”[37]
Petitioner further posits that he was denied due process because
his dismissal from employment was made in a “hasty and summary manner”[38]
and private respondent Vishay failed to establish “sufficient evidence
to support the decision of the union to expel the employee from the
union.”[39]
It bears stressing that termination of employment by virtue of
a union security clause embodied in a CBA is recognized and accepted in
our jurisdiction. This practice strengthens the union and prevents
disunity in the bargaining unit within the duration of the CBA.[40]
It is also well-settled that procedural due process in the
dismissal of employees requires notice and hearing. The employer must
furnish the employee two written notices before termination may be
effected. The first notice apprises the employee of the particular acts
or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, while the second notice
informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. The
requirement of a hearing, on the other hand, is complied with as long as
there was an opportunity to be heard, and not necessarily that an
actual hearing was conducted.[41]
The twin-notice rule was complied with in the present case.
Records bear that private respondent VPIEU-FFW’s executive board issued
Resolution No. 23[42]
expelling petitioner from membership on May 5, 2011. On May 10, 2011,
private respondent VPIEU-FFW sent a letter to private respondent
Luzviminda P. Rosini informing her of petitioner’s expulsion and
requesting petitioner’s dismissal from employment pursuant to the union
security clause contained in the parties’ CBA.[43]
On the same date, private respondent Luzviminda P. Rosini sent a letter
to petitioner requiring him to submit his “written explanation or
statement on the Union’s request and why the Company should not
implement the provisions of the CBA on Union Security clause x x x” in
order “to afford him (you) the opportunity to present his (your) side on
the matter.”[44] In a letter dated May 11, 2011,[45] petitioner acknowledged receipt of said letter and explained his side of the controversy.
On May 13, 2011, private respondent Luzviminda P. Rosini sent a letter[46] to petitioner dismissing him from employment pursuant to the union security clause of the CBA. Thus:
“x x x
Considering that the union’s request for your dismissal from
employment finds support in the above-quoted provision of the CBA and
the Company, after due verification and consideration of the documents
submitted by the union as well as your answer dated May 11, 2011, is
reasonably convinced that the decision to expel you from the union is
duly supported with sufficient evidence and that you have been duly
accorded your right to be heard in consonance with the procedural due
process requirement of law, the Company regrets to inform you that it
finds no valid reason to deny or refuse the request made by the union. x
x x”
Then again, there is grave abuse of discretion only when a court,
board, tribunal or official acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary
or despotic manner in the exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.[47] No
grave abuse of discretion has been shown to exist in the present case,
since the assailed Decision dated December 26, 2012 and Resolution dated
April 29, 2013 of public respondent NLRC are in accordance with law and
settled jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Sorongon[*] and Manahan[**], JJ., concur.
[*] Vice Associate Justice Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez, per Office Order No. 240-14-ABR dated May 23, 2014
[**] Vice Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta, per Office Order No. 241-14-ABR dated May 23, 2014
[1] pp. 47-63, Rollo
[2] pp. 64-68, Ibid.
[3] p. 369, Ibid.
[4] p. 370, Ibid.
[5] p. 498, Ibid.
[6] pp. 48-49, Ibid.
[7] pp. 71-72, Ibid.
[8] pp. 84-86, Ibid.
[9] pp. 87-89, Ibid.
[10] p. 174, Ibid.
[11] p. 171, Ibid.
[12] p. 94, Ibid.
[13] pp. 95-98, Ibid.
[14] pp. 90-91, Ibid.
[15] pp. 92-93, Ibid.
[16] p. 203, Ibid.
[17] pp. 69-70, Ibid.
[18] pp. 105-106, Ibid.
[19] pp. 233-248, Ibid.
[20] pp. 249-275, Ibid.
[21] pp. 47-63, Ibid.
[22] pp. 64-68, Ibid.
[23] p. 19, Ibid.
[24] pp. 59-60, Ibid.
[25] p. 21, Ibid.
[26] p. 25, Ibid.
[27] p. 30, Ibid.
[28] Employees Union of Bayer Phils., FFW, et al. vs. Bayer Phil., Inc., et al., 636 SCRA 473, December 6, 2010
[29] pp. 105-106, Rollo
[30] pp. 59-60, Ibid.
[31] Herminigildo Inguillo, et al. vs. First Philippine Scales, Inc., et al., 588 SCRA 471, June 5, 2009
[32] p. 171, Rollo
[33] pp. 71-72, Ibid.
[34] pp. 185-194, Ibid.
[35] pp. 84-86, Ibid.
[36] p. 88, Ibid.
[37] p. 57, Ibid.
[38] p. 36, Ibid.
[39] p. 40, Ibid.
[40] Alabang Country Club, Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., 545 SCRA 351, February 14, 2008
[41] Landtex Industries and William Go vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 529 SCRA 631, August 9, 2007
[42] pp. 87-89, Rollo
[43] p. 171, Ibid.
[44] p. 94, Ibid.
[45] pp. 95-98, Ibid.
[46] pp. 69-70, Ibid.
[47] Arsenio Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 328 SCRA 864, March 27, 2000